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In the 21st century, whenever a humanitarian crisis2 unfolds, the entire world watches 
closely. With today’s media and global communication methods, the crisis can 
unravel before our very eyes. As a result, we are confronted with humanitarian crises 
on an almost daily basis. As the images of persons in need of emergency aid appear 
in our newspapers, on our television screens and through social and online media 
sources, these crises cannot but become of global concern.  
In 2013, the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) 
reported a total of 330 disasters, affecting over 96 million people worldwide.3 These 
reported disasters do not include the humanitarian emergencies arising from conflict 
situations around the globe, but only refer to natural disasters such as droughts, 
earthquakes and floods, and technological disasters. Indeed, the past decade has 
                                                        
1 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Res 63/139 (5 March 2009) UN Doc A/RES/63/139 
‘Strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations’ §26. 
2 All legal concepts relevant to this research will be fully defined in Chapters 2 and 3. A full definition 
of a ‘humanitarian crisis’ will therefore be discussed in Section 3.3.3. Defining a Humanitarian Crisis. 
3 Debarati Guha-Sapir, Philippe Hoyois and Regina Below Annual Disaster Statistical Review 2013: The 
numbers and trends (CRED 2014) 21. 
‘Humanitarian assistance’ has increasingly been brought to the attention of the 
international community over the past years. The United Nations General 
Assembly declared in the Spring of 2009 that it: 
 
“Decides to designate 19 August as World Humanitarian Day in order 
to contribute to increasing public awareness about humanitarian 
assistance activities worldwide and the importance of international 
cooperation in this regard, as well as to honour all humanitarian and 
United Nations and associated personnel who have worked in the 
promotion of the humanitarian cause and those who have lost their lives 
in the cause of duty, and invites all Member States and the entities of the 
United Nations system, within existing resources, as well as other 
international organizations and non-governmental organizations, to 
observe it annually in an appropriate manner”. 
 
What are the rights and duties under international law involved in the provision 
of humanitarian assistance? Which actors are involved, and how can the 
provision of assistance be enforced? This thesis addresses the legal framework 






shown a wide array of circumstances that may warrant the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance. Several of these circumstances quickly spring to mind, such as the 
devastating tsunami in the South Pacific Ocean in 2004, the earthquake in Pakistan 
in 2005 in the conflict area of Kashmir, and the earthquakes in l’Aquila (Italy) and 
Haiti in 2009 and 2010, respectively. More recently the world has seen the disastrous 
effects of the earthquakes in Japan in March 2011 (including the ensuing tsunami) 
and Nepal in 2015, as well as the consequences of the on-going droughts in east 
Africa, particularly in Somalia. 
Adding to the millions of people affected by (natural) disasters, over 30 severe 
crises involving the use of massive force were counted by the Heidelberg Institute 
for International Conflict Research.4 Of these crises, the vast majority can be 
classified as intrastate conflicts, often resulting in a non-international armed conflict, 
as opposed to interstate conflicts, which may lead to an international armed conflict.5 
Indeed, over the past century, a change in the nature of conflicts has taken place, as 
the traditional interstate ‘war’ has increasingly come to be replaced by circumstances 
of non-international armed conflicts. Examples over the past few years include the 
recent ‘Arab Spring’, resulting in conflicts in Libya and Syria, but may also include 
the more complex situation in the Sudan. In fact, when considering the provision of 
humanitarian assistance, often an overlap is found between circumstances of conflict 
and natural disaster, resulting in more complex emergencies. Humanitarian 
assistance is not provided in a legal vacuum: conflicts, (natural) disasters, complex 
emergencies and other potential crises warrant legal regulation, as does the provision 
of assistance within these circumstances. Indeed, natural disasters and non-
international armed conflicts are two circumstances in which the provision of aid is 
increasingly needed, whilst regulation is lacking.  
Standing idly by in the face of devastation is challenging for many people. When 
images of hungry, thirsty and distraught people come into our homes through modern 
media, cries for the provision of humanitarian assistance to these persons in need 
become louder and with time, more organised. Indeed, the second half of the 20th 
century, in the aftermath of World War II and with a proliferation of natural disasters 
and non-international armed conflicts, has witnessed growing international concern 
for the protection of persons in crisis, increasingly resulting in international 
attention.6 Humanitarian assistance cannot make peace, nor can it prevent disasters. 
Yet, it can contribute to the survival of millions during a crisis or emergency, as well 
as in its immediate aftermath. The prompt delivery of emergency assistance can 
furthermore assist in the mitigation of displacement issues and the creation of 
refugees. Failing to provide humanitarian assistance to those in need can result in 
starvation and death.  
                                                        
4 Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, Conflict Barometer 2009: Crises - Wars - 
Coups d’État Negotiations - Mediations - Peace Settlements, (University of Heidelberg 2009) 1. 
5 Ibid. 4. For a definition of these concepts, see Section 3.2.1 Defining an Armed Conflict. 
6 Heike Spieker, ‘The Right to Give and Receive Humanitarian Assistance’,  in HJ Heintze & A Zwitter 





As such, the United Nations (UN) Charter calls upon states to cooperate in solving 
problems of amongst others a ‘humanitarian character’.7 This call has been translated 
into action over the years, especially following the end of the Cold War, upon which 
many international actors have become involved in the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance.8 When various actors in the international community wish to participate 
in the alleviation of human suffering resulting from a variety of emergencies such as 
conflicts or natural disasters and provide humanitarian assistance, international law 
becomes a factor of major importance. The roles of the affected state, on whose 
territory the crisis is occurring, and other potential third parties must be legally 
ascertained. Indeed, recent crises such as in Iraq and Syria demonstrate the need to 
determine the legal boundaries of the state sovereign in the legal framework 
pertaining to the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The concepts of state 
sovereignty and humanitarian assistance must be brought into balance.  
In light of the abovementioned changes in circumstances in which humanitarian 
assistance is needed, as well as the proliferation of actors involved in its provision, 
international law regulating humanitarian assistance is in need of clarity and 
potentially development. This need for clarity (and development) of the law follows 
from these factual changes: the protection granted by the law to persons in times of 
a crisis must be adapted to encompass these new movements in the world concerning 
humanitarian assistance. What rights do persons have to receive assistance? Which 
duties do states have to provide aid? What role do third parties have in the delivery 
of assistance, and how might access to a territory be obtained? Can humanitarian 
assistance be enforced? Such questions are raised through the increase and 
developments in crises over the past decades, whilst international law has also 
continued to develop. Determining which rights and obligations the current legal 
framework encompasses and whether improvements are necessary, is therefore 
particularly relevant. The current international law issues in the field of humanitarian 
assistance are in essence fourfold and cumulative.  
Firstly, the need for humanitarian assistance may exist in a variety of 
circumstances, such as international and non-international armed conflicts, 
occupation and (natural) disasters, resulting in fragmented legal regimes and a risk 
of fragmented protection.9 In each of these various circumstances, there are indeed 
different applicable legal regimes and as a result, also different legal regulations that 
exist for the provision of humanitarian assistance. For example, the legal regime 
applicable to an international armed conflict is not the same as the regime applicable 
in times of a natural disaster, resulting in disparate and divergent regulations for the 
                                                        
7 Article 1(3) UN Charter states: “To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems 
of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for 
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion”. 
8 Kate Mackintosh, ‘The Principles of Humanitarian Action in International Humanitarian Law: Study 4 
in: The Politics of Principle: the principles of humanitarian action in practice’, Humanitarian Policy 
Group Report 5 (March 2000) 1. 






provision of humanitarian assistance in both circumstances. Thus, to what extent an 
individual may be provided with humanitarian assistance is today commonly 
determined by the nature of the humanitarian crisis, which determines the applicable 
regime and the available law. The bulk of existing legal regulations concern 
international armed conflicts, given the developments following World War II.  As 
seen above however, in today’s world victims of natural disasters or of non-
international armed conflicts greatly outnumber the victims of international armed 
conflicts and are in need of legal protection.  
Secondly, the provision of humanitarian assistance is subject to a variety of 
actors, resulting in a variety of potential rights-holders and duty-bearers. Major roles 
in the provision of humanitarian assistance are played by the affected states, 
international organisations, other (coalitions of) states, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and individuals.10 All these actors have different 
responsibilities in international law with regard to the provision of humanitarian 
assistance. These responsibilities may vary according to the nature of the crisis. In 
the event of a natural disaster the assumption will often exist that the affected state 
will take charge in assisting those individuals affected by said disaster and may 
welcome foreign assistance, contrary to conflict situations where this may not 
regularly be the case. However, cyclone Nargis, hitting Myanmar in 2008, sadly 
demonstrated that governments may not always be willing to allow for the provision 
of humanitarian assistance from abroad, even in the event of natural disasters.11 Thus, 
the various actors are not only rights-holders or duty-bearers, in turn, they are also 
stakeholders in the (non-)provision of humanitarian assistance.  
Particularly poignant is therefore the third issue of state sovereignty in relation to 
the provision of humanitarian assistance. State sovereignty issues are related to both 
the first issue of ‘circumstances’ as these issues may arise in all three situations 
(occupation, conflict and (natural) disaster) that are addressed in this research 
concerning legal regulations affecting the provision of humanitarian assistance. The 
notion of sovereignty however is also related to the rights and duties third actors may 
potentially have within this legal framework. A study into the rights and obligations 
with regard to the provision of humanitarian assistance by all potential actors 
therefore always also includes the relationship with the state sovereignty of the 
affected state, more particularly with regard to the boundaries of this notion. Given 
the variety of actors and circumstances relevant to the provision of humanitarian 
assistance, the eventual problems with sovereignty will also vary according to the 
specific situation. It has been stressed by various states that humanitarian crises, non-
international armed conflicts and the influx of refugees may be more readily 
addressed if and when underlying political crises in a territory were also to be 
                                                        
10 For a definition of these concepts and a discussion of their role see Section 2.3 Actors Involved in 
Humanitarian Assistance. In referring to ‘international organisations’ throughout this research, inter-
governmental organisations are interchangeably meant.  
11 Rebecca Barber, ‘The Responsibility to Protect Survivors of Natural Disaster: Cyclone Nargis, a Case 





addressed.12 Sovereignty-related issues such as the offering and refusal of 
humanitarian assistance can indeed often be politically motivated, which will also be 
addressed, as part of the study into legal obligations concerning humanitarian 
assistance.  
Proliferation of regulations is a fourth and final problem that has arisen regarding 
the legal framework concerning the provision of humanitarian assistance, as a result 
of the three abovementioned problems. The fourth issue is not only related to both 
the variety of circumstances in which humanitarian assistance may be relevant and 
legal regulations pertaining to this such as humanitarian law and human rights. It is 
also related to the variety of actors involved in the provision of assistance that have 
mushroomed in recent years, resulting in the application of fields such as refugee law 
and provisions concerning internally displaced persons (IDPs). Many actors have, in 
attempting to regulate issues concerning state sovereignty and the circumstances in 
which they operate, established their own set of applicable (soft law) regulations.13 
Unfortunately, proliferation of regulations often leads to ambiguity rather than legal 
clarity. In the case of the scope of rights and obligations relevant to the provision of 
humanitarian assistance, this is no different.  
As this research will show, the variety of legal regimes, actors and applicable 
legal regulations has resulted in gaps and overlaps concerning the rights and 
obligations related to the provision of humanitarian assistance in various 
circumstances and particularly related to the notion of state sovereignty. With the 
lack of one common, comprehensive, overarching international legal framework 
regulating rights and obligations pertaining to humanitarian assistance in today’s 
world, combined with the growing number of emergencies and actors, it is apparent 
that a thorough study into the entire current legal framework on humanitarian 
assistance, encompassing armed conflict, occupation and (natural) disasters, is 
demanded. Comprehensive and coherent international regulation of the provision of 
humanitarian assistance is desperately needed, to ensure adequate and equal 
protection for all individuals suffering during or after a humanitarian crisis. Clarity 
regarding the body of law to serve all circumstances and actors would be a relevant 
contribution to the existing legal regulations currently in place concerning the 
provision of humanitarian assistance. In other words, in this particular area of law, 
further clarification of the lex lata is necessary.  
 
                                                        
12 Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council (1996-1999), Chapter VIII, ‘Consideration of 
questions under the responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and 
security’, Section 37 Protection for humanitarian assistance to refugees and others in conflict situations, 
Initial proceedings Deliberations of 21 May 1997 (3778th meeting) 1023-1024. 
13 Examples include the UN International Law Commission’s study on the protection of persons in the 
event of disaster, including Draft Articles on the protection of persons in the event of disaster currently 
in the making; the 1993 San Remo ‘Guiding Principles on the Right to Humanitarian Assistance’ of the 
International Institute of Humanitarian Law; and the Bruges 2003 Resolution on ‘Humanitarian 
Assistance’ of the Institut de Droit International. All will be discussed more in depth at a later stage 





1.2 Aim of the Research and Research Questions 
 
From the above, the topicality of the research can be easily discerned. There is no 
question that the notion of humanitarian assistance plays and will continue to play a 
role in international law given the various circumstances in which it may be relevant, 
and the various legal actors involved in its provision. The role of international law 
however remains somewhat undetermined, as there appears to be a lack of 
consistency and clarity with regard to the rights and obligations surrounding 
humanitarian assistance in all its relevant circumstances; namely armed conflict, 
occupation and natural disaster, as well as all actors in this particular international 
legal arena concerning humanitarian assistance. Due to the vast amount of actors and 
the proliferation of (soft law) regulations, a necessity arises to establish the core of 
the binding legal regulations applicable to the provision of humanitarian assistance, 
to enhance both legal certainty and practical applicability on the ground.  
 
1.2.1 Aim of the Research 
 
The aim of this research is to determine what the status and scope of the existing legal 
framework regarding humanitarian assistance is, and to discern whether clarification 
of and improvements to the current legal framework are necessary or desirable. 
Answering these questions will enhance the embedding and enforcement of 
humanitarian assistance in international law through the creation of a comprehensive 
legal framework. If such improvements are indeed necessary or desirable, the 
research in this thesis will have provided the background to make recommendations 
towards that end. In order to reach this aim, it will be relevant to firstly examine what 
the current existing legal framework is concerning the rights and obligations 
surrounding the provision of humanitarian assistance. Issues concerning sovereignty 
form a large part of the examination of this framework and they will be addressed in 
relation to the potential improvements. To this end, this thesis will examine what the 
prevailing law is, and what potential obstacles to the provision of assistance must be 
overcome in the current framework. The purpose is to analyse the existing 
international law with regard to the provision of humanitarian assistance in times of 
humanitarian emergencies and crises. Only upon establishment of the current legal 
regime, can the possible problems and need for improvement be discerned. 
Furthermore, only upon the establishment of such a possible need, can an endeavour 
be made towards finding improvements and proffering suggestions for new 
regulations. As part of this thesis, such improvements and suggestions are offered in 
Chapter 9. These potential improvements will contribute to the notion of a singular 
legal framework for the provision of humanitarian assistance. Meeting the aim of this 
research will contribute to the clarification of an aspect of international law – the law 
related to humanitarian assistance – and possibly help towards its development. 
Eventually this will then also aid persons in the midst of a humanitarian crisis to 






The approach of this research to such a framework will be comprehensive and 
will consider the provision of humanitarian assistance in all circumstances in which 
it may take place, namely in times of armed conflict, occupation and (natural) disaster 
if and when these circumstances amount to a humanitarian crisis. This inclusive 
approach of the research, taking into account the various circumstances, is a novel 
method and approach in itself – as opposed to existing legal research dealing usually 
with one of the respective fields – thereby providing added value. Given the fact that, 
as stated above, the (legal) circumstances of armed conflict, occupation and (natural) 
disaster are quite dissimilar, so are the legal regimes applicable to each situation. As 
a result, most research projects have focused on their separate legal frameworks, 
studying humanitarian assistance either in natural disasters, or occupation and 
conflicts.14 Yet, a need for food, water, shelter and medicine remains a need for food, 
water, shelter and medicine in any humanitarian crisis, regardless of the legal 
differentiation between a natural disaster, a conflict or a situation of occupation. A 
person in need is a person in need, regardless of whether a cyclone, tsunami or armed 
attack has taken place, and the loss of a human life due to a lack of humanitarian 
assistance should not be categorised.  
As relevant as a legal distinction therefore may be to determine whether or not 
the law of war is applicable in a certain situation, such a distinction should not be as 
pertinent to the rights and obligations amounting to the legal framework regarding 
humanitarian assistance. If the needs of a person in a humanitarian crisis or 
emergency are always similar; namely food, water, shelter and medicine, so then 
should the rights and obligations regarding the provision of humanitarian assistance 
be equal in all circumstances, rather than being dependent on the legal qualification 
of the circumstances.15 This research will therefore determine in an inclusive manner 
what the current rights and obligations in the international legal framework are upon 
which the provision of humanitarian assistance is built, looking into armed conflict, 
occupation and circumstances of disaster in a truly comprehensive manner to 
establish an overview in its entirety, rather than separately. It is important to find 
synchronisation between the legitimate needs of persons facing a crisis, and the 
realities on the ground, at the times of such a crisis. These practical issues will also 
                                                        
14 Examples include the International Federation of the Red Cross’ International Disaster Relief Law 
Programme; the International Law Commission’s study on the protection of persons in the event of 
disaster,  including draft articles currently in the making; the 1993 San Remo ‘Guiding Principles on the 
Right to Humanitarian Assistance’;  and the Bruges 2003 Resolution on ‘Humanitarian Assistance’.  
15 For a similar approach with regard to the qualification of a person as ‘protected person’ in the sphere 
of Article 4 of the Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
12 August 1949, see Prosecutor v. Tadić IT-94-1A (ICTY Appeals Chamber 15 July 1999) § 164-168. 
In this instance, the Appeals Chamber stated that a nationality-nexus could not be argued as a manner to 
avoid application of Article 4 of the Geneva Convention (IV), as its applicability should be seen in light 
of its object and purpose, rather than be made dependent on formalities and purely legal relations. The 
object and purpose of this Article is the establishment of the largest degree of protection possible for a 
civilian population. As such, according to the Appeals Chamber, the Article intends to look not to legal 
characterisations of relations, but rather their substance. In a similar manner, rights and obligations 
pertaining to humanitarian assistance should not be made dependent on legal qualifications, but rather on 





guide the solutions sought in the existing legal framework and contribute to the new 
insights offered.  
An inclusive approach will also create more clarity on the status of the law in any 
given situation, and provide a comparison of the rights and obligations in the various 
circumstances relevant to the provision of humanitarian assistance. From such a 
comparison, insights can be gained into possible gaps and overlaps in the existing 
framework. Regulations existing in one area may be absent in another domain, or 
vice versa. For example, circumstances such as ‘internal disturbances’ not meeting a 
threshold of armed conflict, often lack specifically tailored regulation whilst they 
may amount to a humanitarian crisis. This holds particularly true for the 
abovementioned increase of non-international armed conflicts where the state 
sovereign is often unwilling to recognise the conflict as such, in an attempt to avoid 
the application of humanitarian law. With a comprehensive approach to the provision 
of aid, these circumstances can also be incorporated and it can be determined what 
law is applicable in all potential circumstances warranting the provision of 
assistance. As a result of this comprehensive approach, a possible need for 
improvements can be established, and suggestions can be made for the development 
of such improvements to the entire legal regime concerning humanitarian assistance. 
Ultimately, legal rights and obligations relevant to the provision of humanitarian 
assistance may be seen as the body of ‘law of humanitarian assistance’ rather than 
several provisions dispersed over various legal fields. From this research, a core set 
of regulations will then be derived in Chapter 9, upon which actors involved can base 
themselves with regard to legal rights and legal responsibilities in the provision of 
humanitarian assistance.  
 
1.2.2 General Research Questions and Boundaries 
 
The general research question posed in this legal research is: what are the existing 
rights and obligations concerning the receipt, provision, denial and enforcement of 
humanitarian assistance, and is development or improvement of international law 
necessary for the creation of a comprehensive legal framework? This question can 
be broken down into several more narrow research questions, each to be addressed 
in various parts of this research to eventually reach the general aim of the research.16 
In a general sense, this question can be divided into three separate issues. Firstly, this 
research will address what the current rights and obligations regarding the receipt, 
provision and denial of humanitarian assistance are. In doing so, this research will 
discern what gaps and/or overlaps may emanate from this assessment. This will 
secondly enable the identification of areas of development and/or improvement, to 
enhance the embedding and enforcement of humanitarian assistance in international 
law should withholding or denial of assistance be wrongful. Lastly, and resulting 
from the former two, the creation of a comprehensive, synchronised core legal 
framework will be discussed that may function as a basis in all circumstances of 
humanitarian crisis. 
                                                        





As a result of the general research question, the various sub-questions discussed 
in the following chapters are addressed in a tiered manner. These questions will 
include amongst others what the various legally delimited circumstances are in which 
emergency aid is necessary, and how the matter of state sovereignty can be 
incorporated as part of the provision of humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, the 
question whether a possible human right to humanitarian assistance exists is 
addressed, to determine the applicability of human rights law. Research is needed to 
determine on which legal grounds a claim for assistance can be made by those 
enduring a humanitarian crisis. Subsequently, the matter whether an obligation to 
provide assistance exists, as well as alternatively a right to receive assistance, is 
considered in the various specific circumstances. Following on from this, addressing 
the possible right to access for its provision and a possible obligation to allow such 
access is relevant. Lastly, the research questions warrant a closer look at enforcement 
options, consequential to the possible withholding or denial of the provision of 
assistance.  
 Having discussed the questions that are addressed within this research, it remains 
relevant to establish what will not be addressed in order to clearly establish 
boundaries. This research into the legal framework regarding the provision of 
humanitarian assistance is international by nature. As a result, the domestic legal 
frameworks of various states will not be specifically addressed. Such frameworks 
vary, and this research seeks to establish a core, overarching baseline and framework 
from which may not be deviated and upon which may be relied in all circumstances. 
An aspect of such domestic variations pertain to practical issues relating to the 
delivery of aid, such as placing search and rescue dogs into quarantine, visa issues 
for persons from a variety of nationalities, etc. It is not possible as part of this research 
into the international legal rights and responsibilities relating to the provision of 
assistance to address these matters in depth. As such, a focus will be placed upon 
sources of international law like treaties and customary norms that have a broader 
scope.17 This approach also aligns with the practical circumstances that both conflicts 
and disasters often have cross-border effects, warranting binding international 
regulation.  
This research is furthermore built on two distinct premises. As a point of 
departure, it is presumed in this research that in the discussion of sovereign duties or 
third party rights and responsibilities to provide assistance, the affected persons 
indeed wish to receive such aid. Whereas in certain instances persons affected by 
emergencies are indeed not willing to engage with authorities or third parties, this is 
not the common denominator in circumstances of crisis. Thus, this research assumes 
the position that the delivery of assistance is not in fact only necessary for the 
immediate survival of persons in crisis, but also desired by those in need. Secondly, 
this research accepts that the provision of humanitarian assistance may in reality at 
times also have a negative impact on the ground, due to conflicting interests of 
sovereign authorities, third parties, international organisations and persons in need. 
Indeed, there is no singular solution in times of crisis, and this research cannot 
                                                        





provide all the answers needed to resolve humanitarian emergencies. This research 
attempts to provide legal clarity regarding the existing framework, and to assist those 
affected by humanitarian crises through such legal means. Thus, from the outset, it is 
assumed in this research that the positive effects of the provision of humanitarian 
assistance to persons in need outweigh the potential occasional negative effects.  
 
1.3 Research Structure 
 
In order to determine the existing legal framework in the provision of assistance, this 
research is separated into three distinct parts. Part I addresses the delimitations and 
boundaries of the framework, and establishes the relevant legal definitions. Part II 
then discusses the current rights and duties of involved actors in the provision of 
assistance, and Part III lastly examines the rights and duties of third parties in the 
delivery of aid when such initial provision is absent. These three parts are explained 
in more detail below to portray the structure of this research.  
Given the aim of this research, namely to establish in a comprehensive manner 
which rights and obligations regarding humanitarian assistance and international law 
are currently in place, a structure divided according to the various rights and 
obligations is necessary. Only in this manner will it be possible to adequately 
establish what differences and similarities exist in the three circumstances relevant 
to the law regarding humanitarian assistance: armed conflict, occupation and 
(natural) disaster and possibly synchronise them. A distinct choice has been made 
with this structure, so as to approach the legal framework of humanitarian assistance 
per legal question, in order to contribute to the aim of the research, as a situational 
structure (according to the law in each circumstance, rather than according to the 
rights and duties per actor cumulatively) would have provided a more fractioned 
overview of the framework that is currently in place. Reduction of fragmentation and 
enhancement of unification of protection is a distinct aim of this legal research.  
To realise the first aim of this research; namely examining and establishing the 
scope of the current legal framework concerning humanitarian assistance, 
delimitation of the framework is necessary, which is the subject of Part I. This 
research therefore commences in Chapter 2 with a historical overview of the 
framework and of definitions of the concepts relevant to this framework. These 
include the definition of humanitarian assistance itself, as well as a discussion of the 
principles by which it is provided. Furthermore, the various actors involved in its 
provision are addressed. Subsequently, Chapter 3 provides the scope of application 
of the legal framework; namely the circumstances in which humanitarian aid is 
generally provided. These circumstances include armed conflict, occupation and 
(natural) disaster. As a result, whilst proffering the notion of a ‘humanitarian crisis’ 
in this Chapter, the research will subsequently address the rights and obligations 
under international law according to these three distinct circumstances. In this regard, 
Chapter 3 concludes with a discussion of the applicable law in times of crisis, and 
the relationship between these corpora juris to provide a basis for more in depth 





Chapters. Chapter 4, the final Chapter of Part I, discusses the notion of state 
sovereignty as a contextual concept in relation to the legal framework on the delivery 
of humanitarian assistance. The concept of sovereignty plays a distinct role 
throughout the discussion of the legal framework on humanitarian assistance, and is 
therefore critically examined at the outset. Chapter 4 provides a historical overview 
of the developments of the concept, its reconceptualisation following the 
development of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine, and its current status in 
international law.  
Having established the (legal) definitions to be used within this research, as well 
its scope of application, Part II addresses the legal rights and duties in the provision 
of assistance. Part II commences with Chapter 5 concerning the possible (human) 
right to receive humanitarian assistance, as well as corresponding obligations of the 
affected state under human rights law. This Chapter considers whether a possible 
(human) right to receive humanitarian assistance exists independently in human 
rights law or results from existing human rights. Human rights law, as discussed in 
Chapter 5, maintains applicability in times of crisis, warranting a discussion of the 
protection it offers to those in need of assistance. With the approach taken by this 
research; namely a structure according to rights and obligations that are applicable in 
this framework, Chapter 6 subsequently addresses the existing duties of the sovereign 
authorities to provide assistance and the rights of persons to receive it in the three 
circumstances of armed conflict, occupation and (natural) disaster, whilst 
differentiating between international armed conflicts and non-international armed 
conflicts. This Chapter provides an overview of the current rights and duties of the 
primary actors involved, as well as revealing gaps in protection that may exist.  
Having established what rights and duties initially exist for the persons in need 
and their sovereign authorities under the current legal framework, Part III examines 
the role of third parties in the provision of assistance, as well as enforcement 
mechanisms. Thus, Part III addresses the aspects of the legal framework that become 
relevant when the initial provision of aid remains absent. Chapter 7 in this regard 
addresses the provision of humanitarian assistance from the perspective of third 
parties wishing to deliver aid. This Chapter considers the rights and obligations of 
external actors, such as states and international organisations, to offer and provide 
humanitarian assistance. Related to this is the possible right to access of those 
providing assistance in the aforementioned three circumstances of armed conflict, 
occupation and (natural) disaster as well as the potential duty of the affected state to 
allow such access. With an assessment of whether access to a territory can be 
obtained through existing rights and obligations under international law, a 
completion of the comprehensive framework regarding the provision of humanitarian 
assistance will have been put in place, laying bare the potential problems in the 
provision of aid. Having established what rights and obligations exist, Chapter 8 
examines the possibility of enforcement of these rights and obligations, should 
assistance remain lacking. Enforcement options exist at various levels, varying from 
the use of force to legal enforcement before international courts or other bodies, both 





to the existing legal framework in the assessment of manners in which humanitarian 
assistance may be enforced, when aid is not delivered.  
With the described structure and method of research, the current legal framework 
will be established in a truly comprehensive manner. These Chapters, in establishing 
the existing framework, will simultaneously have led this research towards its second 
aim. It will thus also have become clear what gaps, problems and/or overlaps exist in 
the law between the various circumstances, and therefore also if potential 
developments are necessary for the clarification and possible improvement of the 
law, in order to enhance the embedding and enforcement of humanitarian assistance 
in international law. These conclusions regarding the overarching, comprehensive 
legal framework in times of humanitarian crises are offered in Chapter 9. This 
Chapter addresses the foundations available in international law at all times, 
explicating the existing rights and duties upon which can be relied in times of armed 
conflict, occupation and (natural) disaster amounting to a humanitarian crisis. The 
Chapter furthermore addresses potential synchronising developments and 
improvements applicable to the legal framework that may be necessary and 




This legal research makes use of a variety of sources of international law. The broad 
topic of humanitarian assistance, which can be needed in a variety of legally 
delimited circumstances, warrants the applicability of multiple bodies of law. 
Furthermore, the developments as described above in Section 1.1 concerning the 
proliferation of regulations warrant a discussion of both primary sources of law and 
secondary sources of law, both discussed in more detail below. The generally 
accepted primary sources of public international law are stated in Article 38(1) of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and include treaties, customary 
international law and general principles of law.18 The subsidiary sources of 
international law, mentioned in Article 38 (1)(d) the ICJ Statute, namely case law 
and legal scholarship, remain relevant to this research related to humanitarian 
assistance, in particular in consideration of the potential gaps in protection. Other 
suggested subsidiary sources of international law include unilateral acts and 
resolutions of UN bodies such as those of the Security Council and General 
Assembly, as well as soft law.19 In the subsequent Sections, a more in-depth 
                                                        
18 Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute states: “The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with 
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: a. international conventions, whether 
general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; b. international 
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c. the general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations; d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules 
of law”. 
19 Hugh Thirlway, ‘The Sources of International Law’ in Malcolm Evans (ed) International Law (Oxford 





perspective is provided regarding the specific sources that are of particular relevance 
to the legal framework concerning the delivery of humanitarian assistance.  
First however, the manner in which the abovementioned sources are studied must 
also be briefly clarified. Different methods of interpretation may lead to different 
outcomes in research. Articles 31 and 32 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties set out the general methods of interpretation. The primary method 
according to the Vienna Convention is to interpret according to a treaty term’s 
ordinary meaning, in light of its object and purpose.20 This approach, which can be 
considered to reflect customary international law, encompasses aspects of the three 
main interpretation techniques accepted in international law.21 A first technique is the 
grammatical or objective method, where the factual text and analysis of the words is 
emphasised. A second technique is the subjective approach in which the intention of 
parties to an agreement is underlined. Finally, the teleological interpretation stresses 
the object and purpose in its determination of the meaning of an agreement.22 All 
abovementioned manners of interpretation play a role in this research in order to 
ensure the proper interpretation of the sources at hand. In the discussion of the various 
sources relevant to the legal framework relating to the provision of assistance, the 
factual text primarily provides means for analysis, yet upon a need for clarity the 
subsequent methods are utilised. The travaux préparatoires of various international 
treaties provide a source for the subjective approach, whilst available public 
statements or treaty reservations by states as well as official Commentaries allow for 
a teleological interpretation.  
Furthermore, Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
states that as a basic interpretative rule, together with the object, purpose and context 
of a treaty, also ‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties’ must be considered. This provision is considered a general rule 
of interpretation, with a view to the continuous development and evolution of the law 
and remains equally relevant to the legal framework concerning the provision of 
                                                        
20 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states: “1. A treaty shall be interpreted in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context 
and in the light of its object and purpose. 2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty 
shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: (a) any agreement relating to 
the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; (b) any 
instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and 
accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 3. There shall be taken into account, 
together with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation 
of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the 
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 4. A special meaning shall be given to a 
term if it is established that the parties so intended”. Article 32 of the same Convention states: “Recourse 
may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and 
the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of 
article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: (a) leaves the 
meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable”.  






humanitarian assistance.23 Indeed, with developments over the past century in types 
of crises and the proliferation of actors and regulations as discussed above, each 
source of international law, as well as each distinct body of law, must be interpreted 
in consideration of other relevant applicable rules of international law. As discussed 
in Chapter 3, this method of interpretation is particularly relevant to the consideration 
of human rights law and humanitarian law that according to Article 31(3)(c) Vienna 
Convention should also be interpreted with the other body of law in mind. Chapter 3 
furthermore addresses at a more in depth level the concept of the lex specialis 
principle as a method of interpretation, and its applicability to the various bodies of 
law relevant in the provision of humanitarian assistance.  
 Lastly, before addressing the various primary and secondary sources applied 
in this research, a differentiation must be made between types of obligations in 
international law, as relevant to the provision of humanitarian assistance. In 
discussing the existing legal framework, the relevant responsibilities are addressed. 
Under international law, a distinction is made between ‘obligations of result’ and 
‘obligations of conduct’ (also called obligations of ‘effort’). Chapter 5, exploring 
human rights law in relation to the provision of humanitarian assistance, and 
subsequent Chapters address the effects of these two types of obligations in relation 
to the provision of assistance. At the more theoretical level, it is relevant to note that 
an obligation of ‘result’ requires a duty-bearer to ensure a specific outcome, whereas 
an obligation of ‘conduct’ requires a duty-bearer to act in a specific way.  
 
1.4.1 Primary Sources 
 
The primary sources of international law applied in this research include international 
treaties and customary law, as well as general principles of international law.24 
Within treaty law, at a general level the UN Charter is relevant, but given the fact 
that humanitarian assistance is addressed in a variety of circumstances, including in 
times of armed conflict, occupation and (natural) disaster, various treaties within the 
fields of international law are relevant. Particularly, the focus in Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 
8 will lie on international humanitarian law and human rights law. Analysis regarding 
the field of international humanitarian law centres around the four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols. With regard to human rights 
law, specific human rights treaties, such as the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) will play a role. Specific rights relevant to humanitarian 
assistance, such as the right to life, the right to food and the right to health, are 
studied.25 Next to these major treaties, regional treaties are furthermore considered. 
                                                        
23 Commentary to the Vienna Convention, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. II (1966) 
222 (Draft Article 27).  
24 Article 38(1) ICJ Statute.  
25 The right to adequate housing is distinctly left outside the realm of this research, as the concept of 
humanitarian assistance is considered to encompass those aspects of emergency aid needed for the 





Also relevant are the Refugee Convention and the framework concerning internally 
displaced persons (IDPs). When considering treaty law, the travaux préparatoires of 
the relevant treaties are of importance, as an additional method of interpretation, to 
assess the intentions of states parties in relation to the provision of assistance. Given 
the aim of this research, comparative analysis of treaty law and of corpora juris takes 
place throughout the Chapters, in order to establish the overarching applicable legal 
framework in times of crisis.  
With the abovementioned proliferation of regulations and actors in the area of 
humanitarian assistance, ascertaining the existence of particular rules of customary 
international law may be invaluable to the determination of existing rights and 
obligations within the framework of the provision of humanitarian assistance. Due to 
its characteristics regarding legal developments, customary international law can thus 
be of specific relevance. As a source of law, Article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute has 
declared it to entail a ‘general practice accepted as law’.26 Traditional doctrine 
considers customary rules of international law to result from two particular elements, 
namely widespread and consistent state practice, and a more normative component 
‘opinio juris sive necessitatis’; the conviction that this practice indeed flows from a 
rule of law.27 Furthermore, established customary international law is binding upon 
all states and is therefore particularly relevant to the study of rights and obligations 
concerning the all-encompassing legal framework pertaining to humanitarian 
assistance.28 Throughout the following Chapters, these requirements: state practice 
and opinio juris, are used in the context of various norms under consideration, in 
order to determine whether a particular norm can be considered to have binding 
customary international legal status. In this regard, aspects of the abovementioned 
human rights treaties but also the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and 
humanitarian law provisions that have near universal accession, are considered in 
particular.  
Of the general principles of international law, one in particular is of the utmost 
importance to this particular field of research regarding the provision of humanitarian 
assistance. Circumstances in which humans are involved, should be guided by the 
principle of humanity.29 As a general principle, the principle of humanity functions 
as a baseline throughout this research, given that the provision of humanitarian 
assistance aims at ensuring basic human dignity for those persons affected by 
humanitarian crises. The essence of the delivery of humanitarian aid is, after all, the 
insurance that those affected by crises do not starve and perish.  
These three primary sources of law are, as primary sources, of equal standing in 
international law. Outside of the realm of the ICJ Statute, binding decisions of the 
                                                        
26 See Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute (n 18). 
27 Thirlway, ‘The Sources of International Law’ (n19) 102; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment 27 June 1986 I.C.J. Reports 
1986, p. 14 § 175-177 and 186; as well as more generally the North Sea Continental Shelf cases (Federal 
Republic Of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands) Judgment Of 20 February 
1969, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 3.  
28 Shaw, International Law (n 21) 91. 





Security Council, as discussed in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 are furthermore a source of 
international law. Such binding decisions, unlike other decisions of a non-binding 
nature adopted by international organisations and their organs, are not considered 
secondary sources. As stated in Article 38 ICJ Statute, subsidiary sources of law are 
relevant in consideration to aid the interpretation of the abovementioned primary 
sources.  
 
1.4.2 Secondary Sources 
  
Secondary sources including case law and legal scholarship, as well as soft law, form 
a large part of the current available (semi) legal resources regarding humanitarian 
assistance and are therefore of relevance to this research. Of particular relevance is 
the jurisprudence of the ICJ, as well as of specific judiciary bodies such as the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and regional 
bodies like the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). ICJ judgements such as 
in the 1986 case concerning Military and Paramilitary in and against Nicaragua, the 
2007 case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and 
Montenegro) and the 2011 case concerning the Application of the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. 
Russian Federation) are particularly relevant throughout this research. Numerous 
ICTY and ECtHR decisions are also considered in the interpretation of various 
primary sources of international law.  
Soft law can then be considered in two distinct categories, both of which are 
relevant to this research. A first category is that of non-binding actions by states, such 
as resolutions or declarations in international settings, amongst which the UN. 
Indeed, UN resolutions of a non-binding character and other documents adopted 
within the UN framework form another major aspect of available secondary legal 
resources, especially with regard to humanitarian assistance in the event of natural 
disasters. Such resolutions are often indicative of developments in the perspectives 
of states on the law, and can add to the existence of opinio juris on a matter, or even 
state practice in the case of for example General Assembly Resolutions through 
consistent voting patterns. An example specifically concerning the provision of 
humanitarian assistance includes the widely known United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution 46/182 ‘Strengthening the coordination of humanitarian 
emergency assistance of the United Nations’.30  
A second category of soft law instruments is that of international bodies, not 
compiled of states, attempting to add to the existing hard law and state action by 
means of standard-setting. With a view to the provision of humanitarian assistance, 
these include various non-binding decisions and comments of treaty body 
mechanisms existing in human rights law, as well as the work of the International 
                                                        
30 UNGA Res 46/182 (19 December 1991) UN Doc A/RES/46/182 ‘Strengthening the coordination of 





Law Commission’s (ILC).31 In particular the ILC’s current work (in progress) on the 
‘Protection of persons in the event of disasters’ is relevant, and throughout this 
research, the ILC’s Draft Articles of May 2014 are utilised. Furthermore, the ILC’s 
adopted Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
(ARSIWA) form a major source of law in the discussion of the law on state 
responsibility, as they are largely an attempt at codification of existing customary 
international law, as discussed in Chapter 8. Both the Draft Articles on the ‘Protection 
of persons in the event of disasters’ and the ARSIWA have not yet been adopted by 
the UN General Assembly, although their various stages of development are clearly 
distinct, given that the drafting of the ‘protection of persons in the event of disasters’ 
is still ongoing. Furthermore, outside the UN realm, many organisations have created 
their own semi-legal frameworks with regard to certain aspects of humanitarian 
assistance, as well as functioning as practical benchmarks for practitioners in the 
field. Whether they be named guidelines, principles, or rules of procedure, it is clear 
that they do not form part of the primary sources that shape the hard body of law 
concerning humanitarian assistance. The various documents of these organisations 
discussed within this research furthermore differentiate in their goal, which is of 
relevance to their potential consideration as a secondary source. Within this context 
of particular importance are the ‘International Disaster Response Law Guidelines’ 
(IDRL Guidelines) of 2007, reviewed at length in Chapters 6 and 7. Whilst these 
Guidelines are of great relevance, they are not a codification attempt, and merely 
attempt to be of practical use; therefore within this legal research, they must be 
treated as such. Various other organisations, such as the UN and the European Union 
(EU) concerning their member states, do attempt to create legislation, or at least 
binding regulations. As discussed in the above, the work of NGOs, given their 
contested status in international law and the fact that they do not create legal norms 
themselves, falls largely outside the scope of this research into the international legal 
framework pertaining to the delivery of humanitarian assistance.  
These relevant secondary sources – namely case law, UN documents and 
frameworks from other organisations – form the bulk of materials available for 
additional legal analysis for the purpose of this thesis, next to the primary sources of 
international law. Whereas the existing hard law may be sufficient for the 
establishment of an overarching framework concerning humanitarian assistance, 
secondary sources and soft law contribute to the further development of this 
framework. Indeed, soft law contributes to the body of international law in its entirety 
and can be considered supplementary evidence of existing law, or reflecting one of 
the formative components of customary international law.32 As such, these additional 
                                                        
31 The work of the ILC will be discussed at length in later Chapters, but it is relevant to note that the 
purpose of the Commission is “the promotion of the progressive development of international law and 
its codification”; Article 1 of the 1947 Statute of the International Law Commission (Adopted by the 
General Assembly in resolution 174 (II) of 21 November 1947, as amended by resolutions 485 (V) of 12 
December 1950, 984 (X) of 3 December 1955, 985 (X) of 3 December 1955 and 36/39 of 18 November 
1981).  
32 Alan Boyle, ‘Soft Law in International Law-Making’ in Malcolm Evans (ed) International Law 





sources can be of aid in the determination of potential solutions to the problems 
within the existing legal framework on the delivery of humanitarian assistance that 
this research may uncover. However, this research does not consider soft law 
instruments in any way to be a source containing binding rights and duties in the 
international legal sphere.33  
Soft law however can also aid in the explanation and interpretation of existing 
law.34 A distinction must furthermore be made between existing soft law and lex 
ferenda. Whilst both are not lex lata, a differentiation is possible between soft law 
and the scope of lege ferenda. At which point in creation soft law potentially becomes 
binding is arguable, and moreover largely dependent on which form of hard law it 
could eventually take; such as a formal treaty, or development into customary 
international law.35 Many soft law instruments however never develop into hard law 
and as such do not form part of the body of existing law. Yet resolutions, guidelines 
and principles are often the result of careful drafting and negotiations. The intent with 
which many such documents are created can be seen as evidence towards a 
commitment to law-making.36 This holds true in particular when states are party to 
such negotiations. Indeed, it is these efforts that can be seen as de lege ferenda; as 
what the law ought to be. With greater and widespread commitment towards law-
making, opposing positions may be more difficult to legally uphold. As such, these 
various resources may be invaluable in particular with respect to the analysis of 
current rights and obligations, as well as the development of a comprehensive legal 
framework regarding humanitarian assistance. Thus, although not hard law in itself, 
these sources will play a role throughout this thesis, as their application will be 
relevant to all aspects of the research questions.  
 
1.4.3 Character of the Research 
  
Lastly, prior to commencing the discussion of the legal framework concerning the 
provision of humanitarian assistance, the character of this research needs to be 
addressed. This character is dual in its nature. The duality of the research holds true 
at various levels. As such, the main research question holds elements pertaining to 
the lex lata, as well as de lege ferenda and furthermore is dual in its addressing of 
                                                        
33 For a discussion on soft law more in general, see amongst others Alan Boyle & C M Chinkin, The 
Making of International Law (Oxford University Press 2007); Gregory C Shaffer and Mark A Pollack, 
‘Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance’ (2010) 
94 Minnesota Law Review, 706-799 and with a more objecting perspective Jan Klabbers, ‘The 
Redundancy of Soft Law’ (1996) 65 Nordic Journal of International Law, 167-182. Whilst being aware 
of the discussion that exists regarding the inherent value of soft law, this discussion remains outside the 
scope of this research, as these non-binding documents are merely used in a supplementary manner to 
form part of a discussion of existing law.  
34 Ulrich Fastenrath, ‘Relative Normativity in International Law’ (1993) 4 European Journal of 
International Law, 313-314.  
35 C M Chinkin, ‘The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law’, (1989) 38 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 856-857. 





multiple potential rights and duties and their respective rights-holders and duty-
bearers.  
In this research, a focus is firstly placed on the determination of the existing law, 
making it descriptive and comparative in nature. With this critical legal analysis, the 
current legal framework regarding humanitarian assistance will be brought into place. 
At the same time, a supervisory element will also be present, as part of this research 
is to uncover whether or not compatibility exists between the law concerning 
humanitarian assistance in times of armed conflict, occupation and (natural) disaster. 
This duality furthermore applies to the various right-holders and duty-bearers 
concerned with the provision of assistance, varying from the affected persons and 
states, to third parties.  
Having established whether or not gaps, overlaps or other potential problems 
stand in the way of such compatibility, this research then proceeds towards different 
questions. Fundamental questions, such as how the law may be adapted to better 
match underlying legal principles concerning humanitarian assistance (such as the 
principle of humanity) are discussed, as well as how the existing law could be further 
synchronised in the three circumstances in which humanitarian assistance is 
potentially relevant, when amounting to a humanitarian crisis. Lastly, the drafting 
and formulating of recommendations for potential future development is relevant to 
the research. Therefore, instrumental questions, trying to develop suggestions for the 
issues encountered in the current framework on the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance will be raised. 
The character of this research is however distinctly geared towards an in-depth 
discussion of existing lex lata. When referring to the determination of ‘one singular, 
comprehensive and overarching framework’ this does not imply lege ferenda or soft 
law. The purpose remains the demonstration and evincing of the existing legal 
framework as a shared common legal basis in all circumstances in which the need for 
the provision of humanitarian assistance arises. There is no intention of merging 
existing legal regimes, or creating an entirely new regime. The character of this 
research, with a focus on lex lata, attempts to demonstrate that within existing 
international law, a foundation can be found to apply to all circumstances warranting 
the provision of assistance. As such, this framework is distilled from existing hard 
law. By doing so, an assessment can be made of the existing law governing the 
provision of humanitarian assistance at all times. Furthermore, with an analysis of 
lex lata, the necessity for and desirability of new developments can be assessed, 
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To start an analysis of the legal framework regarding humanitarian assistance, 
including all relevant rights and obligations, it is necessary to establish and define the 
legal concepts that form part of this research. To that extent, this Chapter explores 
and establishes the legal definitions and parameters of relevant concepts related to 
humanitarian assistance. Firstly, the notion of humanitarian assistance itself is 
examined, as well as the manner in which it may be provided. Relevant actors are 
discussed, considering both those who provide assistance and those that may receive 
it. This examination commences with a brief historical overview of the development 
of humanitarian assistance, first within the context of armed conflict, where the notion 
was born, but later in the 20th century also with a discussion of its incorporation in 
times of (natural) disaster. By assessing the origins of humanitarian assistance, it will 
be possible to address the notion as a contemporary concept, and make it possible to 
proffer a working definition of the concept of humanitarian assistance as it is 
understood today.  
 
                                                        
1 <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/08/12/uk-ukraine-crisis-russia-aid-idUKKBN0GC08O20140812> 
accessed 9 September 2014.  
In the summer of 2014, Russia attempted to bring goods to the Ukraine whilst 
clashes were ongoing. As was reported:  
 
“A Russian convoy of trucks carrying tonnes of humanitarian aid left on 
Tuesday for eastern Ukraine, where government forces are closing in on 
pro-Russian rebels, but Kiev said it would not allow the vehicles to cross 
onto its territory […] ‘No political or any other objectives must be 
pursued,’ EU humanitarian aid commissioner Kristalina Georgieva told 
a news conference. ‘The content of humanitarian aid must be exactly 
that, humanitarian aid, and obviously cannot be taken on face value’”.  
 
What makes certain goods humanitarian assistance? What makes their providers 








2.2 The Concept of Humanitarian Assistance 
 
Understanding humanitarian assistance as it exists today, also entails understanding 
its origins and history. Tracing the origins of humanitarian assistance acknowledges 
its foundation and explains the manner in which it has developed in international law.  
 
2.2.1 Historical Development  
  
The precursors of the modern provision of humanitarian assistance can be found in 
the efforts throughout history to constrain the use of force in conflict as well as 
occasional early efforts to spare the lives of prisoners of war.2 The growth of religions 
throughout the world furthermore spurred limits to warfare, as well as enhancing 
humanitarian initiatives.3 The development of the notion of humanitarian assistance 
was however not solely confined to religious spheres, as secular humanitarianism 
developed through natural law notions and the enlightenment of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.4 In 1758, Emer de Vattel argued: 
 
“[…] si un people est désolé par la famine, tous ceux qui ont des vivres de reste doivent 
l’assister dans son besoin, sans toutefois s’exposer eux-mêmes à la disette […] 
L’assistance, dans cette dure extrémité, est si essentiellement conforme à l’humanité, 
qu’on ne voit guères de Nation un peu civilisée y manquer absolument […] De quelque 
Calamité qu’un peuple soit affligé, la même assistance lui est dûe”.5  
 
De Vattel refers to English actions of humanity with regard to calamities in Portugal 
in the eighteenth century where tens of thousands died, as well as Swiss initiatives at 
that time towards neighbouring countries.6 With these initiatives, a period ensued in 
which further steps were taken in the development of the more contemporary notion 
of humanitarian assistance. The notion of humanitarian assistance as we understand 
it today was particularly developed by the Swiss businessman Henri Dunant, upon 
witnessing the battle of Solferino on June 24, 1859.7 Dunant shared his experiences 
                                                        
2 Frits Kalshoven & Liesbeth Zegveld, Constraints on the Waging of War: An Introduction to 
International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge University Press 2011) 3. 
3 Peter Macalister-Smith, International Humanitarian Assistance: Disaster Relief Actions in 
International Law and Organization (Martinus Nijhoff 1985) 8. 
4 Ibid. 9.  
5 Emerik de Vattel, Le Droit de Gens: ou Principes de la Loi Naturelle, Vol. II Chapitre I (1758) 260-
261. English translation: “If a people is visited with famine, all those who have provisions enough and to 
spare should come to its assistance, though not to the extent of exposing themselves to scarcity…Help in 
such an extremity is so much in accordance with humanity that no civilized nation could altogether fail 
to respond…Whatever the nature of the disaster that afflicts a nation, the same help is due to it”.  
6 Ibid 261.  
7 The battle of Solferino was part of the Italian unification process. It was fought in northern Italy between 
Austrian and Franco-Italian soldiers, leaving ten thousands dead, injured or missing. For more 
information on this battle, see Spencer C. Tucker, Battles That Changed History: An Encyclopedia of 
World Conflict (Greenwood Publishing Group 2011) 331-334. 
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of that battle in Un Souvenir de Solférino, first published in 1862.8 In this book, 
Dunant related the horrors of the battlefield, in particular the incapacity of the present 
medical services to deal with the number of victims. Having shared his experience in 
this publication, Dunant expressed his desire to develop organisations of a neutral 
and impartial character, to aid those wounded by war: 
 
“Mais pourquoi avoir raconté tant de scènes de douleur et de désolation, et avoir peut-être 
fait éprouver des émotions pénibles? Pourquoi s’être étendu comme avec complaisance 
sur des tableaux lamentables, et les avoir retracés d’une manière qui peut paraitre 
minutieuse et désespérante? A cette question toute naturelle, qu’il nous soit permit de 
répondre par cette autre question: N’y aurait-il pas moyen de fonder de Sociétés 
volontaires  de secours qui auraient pour le but de donner ou de faire donner, en temps de 
guerre, des soins aux blessés”.9 
  
Raising this simple question eventually led to the establishment of the International 
Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), while his subsequent question led to the 
development of the original Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field of 22 August 1864:10  
 
“Dans des occasions extraordinaires, comme celle qui réunissent, par exemple à Cologne 
ou à Chalons, des princes de l’art militaire, de nationalités différentes, ne serait-il pas à 
souhaiter qu’ils profitent de cette espèce de congres pour formuler quelque principe 
international, conventionnel et sacré, lequel, une fois agréé et ratifié, servirait de base à des 
Sociétés de secours pour les blessés, dans les divers pays de l’Europe. Il est d’autant plus 
important de se mettre d’accord et d’adopter d’avance des mesures, que, lors d’un 
commencement d’hostilités, les belligérants sont déjà mal disposés les uns envers les 
autres, et ne traitent plus les questions qu’au point de vue unique de leurs ressortissants”.11 
 
Here, Dunant raised the idea of creating international standards that parties to a 
conflict should abide by. With his publication, Dunant wished to raise awareness 
amongst leaders of his time to create the abovementioned Convention and the ICRC 
and to that end, he distributed his book free of charge.12 Thus, the notion of 
humanitarian assistance as we know it today, was first developed to relieve the 
                                                        
8 Henri Dunant, Un Souvenir de Solférino (self-published 1862);  
<http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0361_memory_of_solferino.pdf>  accessed 23 
June 2011.  
9 Henri Dunant, Un Souvenir de Solférino (1863, 3rd ed. Imprimerie de J.G. Flick) 150. English 
translation: “But why have I told of all these scenes of pain and distress, and perhaps aroused painful 
emotions in my readers? Why have I lingered with seeming complacency over lamentable pictures, 
tracing their details with what may appear desperate fidelity? It is a natural question. Perhaps I might 
answer it by another: Would it not be possible, in time of peace and quiet, to form relief societies for the 
purpose of having care given to the wounded in wartime by zealous, devoted and thoroughly qualified 
volunteers?”. 
10 François Bugnion, ‘From Solferino to the Birth of Contemporary International Humanitarian Law’, 
online publication with the ICRC (April 22nd 2009), 5 
<http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/solferino-bugnion-icrc.pdf> accessed 24 June 2011.  
11 Dunant, Un Souvenir de Solférino (n 8) 165. 







wounded and other victims of wars. For his extraordinary achievement, Henri Dunant 
was the first recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1901.13 Following the 
establishment of the Convention and ICRC, National Societies of the Red Cross were 
created. Returning in greater detail to the ICRC and its specific role as a major actor 
in this area of international law in Sections 2.2.2.2 and 2.3.2, other developments that 
have led to the current state of legal rights and obligations concerning humanitarian 
assistance will first be briefly addressed. 
At first, notwithstanding De Vattel’s influence, relief assistance remained within 
the sphere of armed conflict as developed through Dunant’s ideas. From the late 
nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century, the ICRC provided 
humanitarian assistance during instances such as the Franco-Prussian War, the Boer 
War and the Russian-Japanese War, reaching a larger scale with its assistance during 
World War I.14 With the increase of international awareness, the first civilian oriented 
assistance action was undertaken during that same war, aimed at the Belgian 
population that was threatened by famine due to the German occupation. The 
Commission for Relief in Belgium (CRB) was created in 1914 by Herbert Hoover, 
later president of the United States of America, and operated with a strictly 
humanitarian mandate to provide relief to civilians during World War I.15 Having 
convinced all parties to the conflict that providing relief to Belgian civilians was 
desirable, the CRB received support from both sides to the conflict, to operate while 
maintaining its neutrality.16 This particular scheme created a valuable precedent for 
ensuing attempts of humanitarian assistance, as neutrality, independence and 
communication towards all parties have continued to remain invaluable to relief 
organisations today, while subsequent organisations have benefitted from this first 
experience.17  
During the interbellum, several developments occurred. In 1921, the President of 
the Italian Red Cross proposed the creation of an organisation focused specifically 
on assistance to victims of natural disasters, which was taken up by the League of 
Nations and resulted in the establishment of the International Relief Union (IRU) in 
1927.18 The IRU’s goals were the delivery of first aid, the procurement of means to 
do so and the coordination of other organisations providing relief, and as an 
organisation it was governed by the principles of non-discrimination and respect for 
                                                        
13 Dunant shared the first Nobel Peace Prize in 1901 with Frédéric Passy. For more information, see 
<http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/> accessed 23 June 2011.  
14 Macalister-Smith, International Humanitarian Assistance: Disaster Relief Actions in International 
Law and Organization (n 3) 10.  
15 Yves Beigbeder, The Role and Status of International Humanitarian Volunteers and Organizations: 
the Right and Duty to Humanitarian Assistance (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1991) 22. 
16 Macalister-Smith, International Humanitarian Assistance: Disaster Relief Actions in International 
Law and Organization (n 3) 11.  
17 Ibid 12; see also Beigbeder The Role and Status of International Humanitarian Volunteers and 
Organizations: the Right and Duty to Humanitarian Assistance (n 15) 23. On these principles, see Section 
2.2.3 The Principles for the Delivery of Assistance.  
18 Macalister-Smith, International Humanitarian Assistance: Disaster Relief Actions in International 
Law and Organization (n 3) 18-19.  
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state sovereignty.19 Yet, as the first meeting of the IRU’s General Council was held 
in 1933, ensuing developments leading up to World War II in Europe prevented it 
from actually providing the relief it was established for.20 During this same period, 
the League of Nations involved itself with the numerous refugees following various 
revolutions and the aftermath of World War I, and installed a High Commissioner 
for Russian Refugees.21 In following years, a High Commissioner for Refugees from 
Germany was established, but both offices were dissolved in 1938 for the 
establishment of a general ‘Office of the High Commissioner for all Refugees’ under 
the protection of the League of Nations.22 The outbreak of World War II however cut 
short the further work of this Office. In 1943, still in the midst of the war, the United 
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was created for 
international cooperation and the provision of humanitarian relief.23 Interestingly, 
this organisation was thus created prior to the United Nations itself. UNRRA’s main 
tasks consisted of the provision of relief to, rehabilitation and resettlement of specific 
groups of victims and displaced persons due to World War II.24 Although UNRRA 
based many of its principles on its ‘predecessor’ the CRB, unlike the CRB it was not 
an NGO but an intergovernmental organisation, receiving funding from states on a 
voluntary basis.25 While the organisation only lasted until 1948 when it was 
dismantled into several separate organisations, it managed to achieve quite massive 
relief operations throughout war stricken Europe.26 Yet, as time went on, states 
became hesitant to continue with such a large-scale cooperative approach to 
humanitarian assistance.27 Thus, although UNRRA was closed down as an 
organisation, its general goals of cooperation and provision of humanitarian relief 
were incorporated in the United Nations’ fundamental purposes and as such continue 
to exist today.28 Upon the closing of UNRRA, the International Refugee Organization 
(IRO) similarly existed for a few years, functioning as a specialised agency for the 
relief of refugees following from World War II.29  
                                                        
19 Beigbeder, The Role and Status of International Humanitarian Volunteers and Organizations: the 
Right and Duty to Humanitarian Assistance  (n 15) 24.  
20 Ibid 24-25; see also Law and legal issues in international disaster response: a desk study (International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 2007) 27.  
21 Beigbeder, The Role and Status of International Humanitarian Volunteers and Organizations: the 
Right and Duty to Humanitarian Assistance  (n 15) 23.  
22 Paul Weis, ‘Human Rights and Refugees’, (1971) 1 Israel Yearbook for Human Rights 36.  
23 Macalister-Smith, International Humanitarian Assistance: Disaster Relief Actions in International 
Law and Organization (n 3) 12-13. 
24 Article 1 Agreement for United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, November 9 1943; 
see also Beigbeder, The Role and Status of International Humanitarian Volunteers and Organizations: 
the Right and Duty to Humanitarian Assistance  (n 15) 25.  
25 Beigbeder, The Role and Status of International Humanitarian Volunteers and Organizations: the 
Right and Duty to Humanitarian Assistance  (n 15) 25.  
26 Macalister-Smith, International Humanitarian Assistance: Disaster Relief Actions in International 
Law and Organization (n 3) 13 -14.  
27 Ibid 14.  
28 Ibid. See also Article 1(3) UN Charter.  
29 Emily Haslam, ‘United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration’, (2006) Max Planck 







2.2.1.1 The Role of the UN in the Development of Humanitarian Assistance 
 
Major organisations currently involved in the provision of humanitarian assistance 
are the ICRC and the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC)30 and the UN, 
including its specialised organisations. Both have had a parallel but separate 
development and warrant discussion. The United Nations as a major actor in the 
provision of humanitarian assistance will be discussed in Section 2.3.2, yet the 
development to its current status will be briefly addressed at this stage. Upon 
cessation of UNRRA, the United Nations did not partake in humanitarian assistance 
for several years. Rather, it focused in the 1950s and 1960s on promoting 
development aid.31  
The Cold War and events surrounding decolonisation further enabled this attitude, 
but one specific and problematic instance invoked the UN’s subsequent active 
participation in humanitarian assistance.32 In 1967, the eastern state of the Nigerian 
Federation, Biafra, declared itself independent, which resulted in a civil war within 
the Nigerian Federation.33 As the UN viewed the conflict was an internal strife, it 
remained silent throughout the evolving humanitarian crisis, and efforts for the 
provision of humanitarian assistance were initiated through various organisations 
only at a regional level.34 The UN had continuously struggled with the decision to 
involve itself situations of armed conflict. Rather, it laid the focus on situations of 
providing assistance in cases of natural disaster, doing so for the first time in a 
General Assembly resolution in 1965.35 Yet in 1971, a few years after the UN’s 
failure to act in the situation in Biafra, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution 
establishing the UN Disaster Relief Organisation (UNDRO).36 In doing so, the 
General Assembly set aside the UN Secretariat’s position that the United Nations 
system should lay emphasis on ‘good offices’  rather than becoming actively involved 
in humanitarian relief operations. Unfortunately, UNDRO was unable to live up to 
expectations, and with each new crisis or disaster various specialised agencies 
mushroomed, making the UN’s role in humanitarian assistance during the following 
two decades scattered and dispersed, rather than coherent.37 In 1984, UNDRO 
attempted to address problems regarding the provision of disaster relief in times of 
natural or man-made disaster, excluding ongoing armed conflict, through the 
                                                        
30 See (n 52) regarding the IFRC. 
31 Ed Tsui & Thant Myint-U, ‘The Institutional response: creating a framework in response to new 
challenges’ (2004) II The Humanitarian Decade: challenges for Humanitarian Assistance in the last 
decade and into the future (OCHA) 2. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Henning Lahmann, ‘Biafra Conflict’, (2009) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law § 
1. 
34 Ibid § 20-23.  
35 UNGA Res 2034 (XX) ‘Assistance in cases of natural disaster’ (7 December 1965).  
36 UNGA Res 2816 (XXVI) (14 December 1971). In the same resolution at § 1, the appointment of a 
Disaster Relief Coordinator for the UN was also envisaged.  
37 Tsui and Myint-U, ‘The Institutional response: creating a framework in response to new challenges’ 
(n 31) 3; see also UNGA Res 36/225 (17 December 1981) UN Doc A/RES/36/225.  
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development of the Draft Convention on Expediting the Delivery of Emergency 
Relief (1984 Draft Convention).38 Although this initiative had not been requested of 
UNDRO, the Organisation based itself on a 1977 resolution that instigated UN bodies 
to look more closely into the expedition of disaster relief.39 Yet, the Draft 
Convention, having been presented to the UN Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC), never came beyond discussion by the UN’s Second Committee, where 
no further official action was taken.40 Although the reasons as to why this Draft 
Convention never came into existence are somewhat unclear, it has been speculated 
that the efforts may have been premature.41 Furthermore, various NGOs in the field, 
as well as the ICRC, were disappointed to not have been involved in the drafting 
process and expressed their concern for this new Draft Convention.42 These 
organisations argued that such a new convention, placing emphasis on the concept of 
state sovereignty, would not be beneficial to the provision of humanitarian assistance, 
and that the emphasis should lie on the further implementation of existing resolutions 
and instruments.43 The emphasis on sovereignty however was a reflection of the Cold 
War time period in which the drafting had taken place. By the end of the Cold War 
era and with the changing times, the UN General Assembly called for an 
‘International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction’ in response to the vast increase 
of disasters occurring throughout the world: 
  
“Decides to designate the 1990’s as a decade in which the international community, under 
the auspices of the United Nations, will pay special attention to fostering international co-
operation in the field of natural disaster reduction […]”.44 
 
In subsequent years, the General Assembly followed up on this initiative and 
emphasised its interest in natural disaster reduction.45 The culmination of these 
efforts can be found in the landmark Resolution 46/182 ‘Strengthening the 
coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations’, in which 
the General Assembly laid out a framework of ‘Guiding Principles’ for humanitarian 
assistance.46 This resolution and theme followed the combined efforts of providing 
                                                        
38 UNGA Res 39/367 (18 June 1984) UN Doc. A/39/367/Add.2 and E/1984/96/Add.2 ‘Draft Convention 
on Expediting the Delivery of Emergency Relief’. 
39 ECOSOC Resolution 2102 (LXIII) (3 August 1977) UN Doc E/2102 (LXIII) § 2.  
40 IFRC’s ‘Law and legal issues in international disaster response: a desk study’ (n20) 28. The UN’s 
Second Committee is also known as the Economic and Financial Committee, and deals with economic 
issues at its meetings. For further information on the Second Committee, 
<http://www.un.org/en/ga/second/index.shtml> accessed 4 January 4 2012.  
41 IFRC’s ‘Law and legal issues in international disaster response: a desk study’ (n20) 28.  
42 Beigbeder, The Role and Status of International Humanitarian Volunteers and Organizations: the 
Right and Duty to Humanitarian Assistance  (n 15) 378.  
43 Ibid. 
44 UNGA Res 42/169 (11 December 1987) UN Doc. A/42/169 § 3.  
45 UNGA Res 43/202 (20 December 1988) UN Doc A/43/202 and also UNGA Res 44/236 (22 December 
1989) UN Doc A/44/236 where the General Assembly in § 1 “Proclaims the International Decade for 
Natural Disaster Reduction, beginning on 1 January 1990”. 
46 UNGA Res 46/182 (19 December 1991) UN Doc. A/RES/46/182, General Assembly Resolution 







relief to southern Sudan by UN agencies and NGOs, which started in 1989 and is 
known as ‘Operation Lifeline Sudan’.47 Following this resolution a first Emergency 
Relief Coordinator, Jan Eliasson, was appointed and UNDRO was enveloped into the 
newly instated UN Department for Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA).48 Another 
drastic change occurred in 1998 when UN reform, under the auspices of then 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan led to the dissolution of DHA into the newly 
established Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which still 
exists today.49 The UN furthermore established its ‘International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction’ followed by the well-known Hyogo Framework for Action, both focused 
on disaster risk reduction and prevention.50 With these structural changes also came 
the UN’s realisation that coordination between its various agencies was necessary, as 
well as cooperation with its partners in the field.51  
 
2.2.1.2 The Role of the ICRC and IFRC in the Development of Humanitarian 
Assistance 
 
One of the UN’s major counterparts is the abovementioned ICRC, which similar to 
the UN has also broadened its focus over the last century. Whereas the UN now also 
embraces the provision of assistance in times of conflict as part of its work, the ICRC 
strives to encompass more than its original focus on assistance in times of armed 
conflict, resulting in often overlapping areas of interest of the two organisations. The 
development of the ICRC and its founding in 1863 has already been touched upon, 
but the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement also comprises the IFRC as the 
umbrella organisation of the national Red Cross Societies,52 which since 1919, then 
                                                        
47 For more detailed information on Operation Lifeline Sudan, see amongst others Larry Minear 
Humanitarianism under siege: A Critical Review of Operation Lifeline Sudan (The Red Sea Press 1991). 
48 Tsui and Myint-U, ‘The Institutional response: creating a framework in response to new challenges’ 
(n 31) 10.  
49 Ibid 11. See also <http://www.unocha.org/about-us/who-we-are/history> accessed 3 January 2012.  
50 UNGA Res 56/195 (21 January 2002) UN Doc A/RES/56/195, ‘International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction’. Disaster risk reduction as a topic falls outside the scope of this research. Through risk 
reduction however, the need for the provision of humanitarian aid can often be greatly reduced.  
51 Tsui and Myint-U, ‘The Institutional response: creating a framework in response to new challenges’ 
(n 31) 11-13.  
52 The International Federation of the Red Cross, forming a federation of the various Red Cross National 
Societies, will be discussed more in depth in Sections 2.2.3 The Principles for the Delivery of Assistance 
and 2.3.2 Providers of Humanitarian Assistance. At this stage it is relevant to briefly mention the 
distinction between the ICRC and the IFRC, as well as the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
through their separate mandates. This distinction of the three prongs can be found in the Article 1 of the 
2006 Statute of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement: “The International Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Movement (hereinafter called “the Movement”) is composed of the National Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies recognized in accordance with Article 42 (hereinafter called “National 
Societies”), of the International Committee of the Red Cross (hereinafter called “the International 
Committee”) and of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (hereinafter 
called “the Federation”)”. With regard to the ICRC, the Statutes of the Movement declare in Article 5: 
“The International Committee, founded in Geneva in 1863 and formally recognized in the Geneva 
Conventions and by International Conferences of the Red Cross, is an independent humanitarian 
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known as the ‘League of Red Cross Societies’, has been involved in the provision of 
assistance and cooperation between the national Red Cross entities.53 In the aftermath 
of World War I, the formation of a federation was proposed, to continue the close 
cooperation amongst the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies that had 
proven fruitful during that war.54 In the Statute of the Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement, the combined effort between the ICRC, the IFRC and the National 
Societies can be found:  
 
“the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the International Committee of the 
Red Cross and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
together constitute a worldwide humanitarian movement, whose mission is to prevent and 
alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found, to protect life and health and ensure 
respect for the human being, in particular in times of armed conflict and other 
emergencies”.55 
 
Since 2001 the IFRC has developed its interest in legal issues pertaining to disaster 
relief. Although the original idea of the International Conference of the Red Cross 
and Red Crescent had been to develop a comprehensive treaty regarding international 
disaster response law, the organisation was unable to decide on the matter and 
initiated the ‘International Disaster Relief Laws, Rules and Principles Programme’ 
(IDRL programme).56 Subsequently in 2003, the goal was set forth at the 28th 
International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent57 to: 
 
“Enhance international disaster response through support for the compilation and 
application of the laws, rules and principles applicable to international disaster 
response”.58 
                                                        
organization having a status of its own. It co-opts its members from among Swiss citizens”. Article 5(2) 
and 5(3) of the Statute proceed to formulate the specific tasks and mandate of the ICRC, particularly 
relevant for this research is the fact that it is the ICRC that is given tasks under international humanitarian 
law, as mentioned in the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols. With regard to the IFRC, the Statutes 
proclaim in Article 6: “The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies comprises 
the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. It acts under its own Constitution with all rights and 
obligations of a corporate body with a legal personality”. Article 6(4) of the Statutes envisage the task of 
the IFRC to lie mainly within the area of disaster relief, outside the scope of international humanitarian 
law. For the purpose of this research, the ICRC and IFRC will be addressed independently. Use of the 
formulation ‘Red Cross’ will be done in referral to the umbrella organization of the ‘Red Cross 
Movement’.  
53 See <http://www.ifrc.org/en/who-we-are/history/> accessed 23 February 2012.  
54 Ibid.  
55 Preamble of the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, (adopted by the 
25th International Conference of the Red Cross at Geneva in 1986, amended in 1995 and 2006).  
56 Red Cross/Red Crescent Council of Delegates Resolution 5 ‘International Disaster Response Law’ (14 
November 2001). See also Heike Spieker, ‘The Right to Give and Receive Humanitarian Assistance’, in 
HJ Heintze & A Zwitter (eds), Humanitarian Assistance and International Law (Springer 2011) 23.  
57 For a discussion on the Red Crescent as part of the Red Cross movement see the Statutes of the 
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. 
58 XXVIIIth International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, ‘Agenda for Humanitarian 







Thus, the possibilities of the law as part of disaster response were to be explored, 
including the identification of gaps, for which the IFRC was designated as 
coordinator.59 Accordingly, the IFRC developed ‘Guidelines for the domestic 
facilitation and regulation of international disaster relief and initial recovery 
assistance’, which were adopted by the Red Cross and states parties to the Geneva 
Conventions in 2007.60 The UN General Assembly quickly supported this 
development by encouraging their use in the following year.61 The IDRL Guidelines 
function as a non-legal initiative, striving to assist governments in practical ways to 
ensure the enhanced dissemination of humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of a 
disaster.62 
 
2.2.2 Defining Humanitarian Assistance 
 
The above discussion of the historical development of humanitarian assistance serves 
as a means to a more thorough understanding of what precisely the notion of 
humanitarian assistance entails today. With a (legal) definition in place, a more in 
depth discussion of the current status of various actors in the field of humanitarian 
assistance and their particular work can be provided, as well as an analysis of the 
existing international legal framework. The legal framework does not exist in a 
vacuum and the realities on the ground in various circumstances must be taken into 
consideration. The concept of humanitarian assistance63 was developed largely by 
Dunant as part of the envisaged relief of victims of war, and thus the definition of 
this concept will firstly be sought in the law of war. Yet over time, the provision of 
humanitarian assistance has also developed outside the realm of conflict, in situations 
of natural disaster; therefore a wide range of sources will be addressed and 
incorporated in the determination of the content of humanitarian assistance. 
Naturally, assistance is time- and case specific, and not defining it too strictly can be 
relevant to its adaptation to various different situations. 
Within international humanitarian law,64 the actual content of humanitarian 
assistance is not defined as such. The ‘Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of 
                                                        
59 Ibid § 3.2.6. 
60 ICRC Resolution 30IC/07/R4 ‘Guidelines for the domestic facilitation and regulation of international 
disaster relief and initial recovery assistance’, 30th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent (30 November 2007). 
61 UNGA Res 63/137 (11 December 2008) UN Doc A/RES/63/137 § 6; UNGA Res 63/139 (11 December 
2008) UN Doc A/RES/63/139 § 8; UNGA Res 63/141 (11 December 2008) UN Doc. A/RES/63/141 § 
5.  
62 See in this regard <http://www.ifrc.org/what-we-do/disaster-law/about-disaster-law/international-
disaster-response-laws-rules-and-principles/idrl-guidelines/> accessed 1 September 2014.  
63 This research will use the term humanitarian assistance, while acknowledging the use of terms such as 
humanitarian and disaster relief assistance, emergency (international) assistance, aid, relief actions, etc. 
For the purposes of this research however, one phrase has been chosen.  
64 The law of war, or ius in bello, is often divided into ‘The Hague law’, relating to the regulation of 
hostilities or combat and the ‘law of Geneva’, also known as international humanitarian law. An in depth 
discussion of the distinction between ‘The Hague law’ and ‘Geneva law’ will remain outside the scope 
of this research. For further reading on these notions see amongst others Frits Kalshoven & Liesbeth 
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Civilian Persons in Time of War’ (Fourth Geneva Convention or GC IV) of 1949 
makes reference to ‘relief schemes’ that should consist:  
 
“in particular, [of] the provision of consignments of foodstuffs, medical supplies and 
clothing”.65 
 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (Additional Protocol I or AP I) adds 
to this by stating that such relief schemes are to be ‘implemented without delay’,66 
emphasising the character of urgency that is attached to humanitarian assistance.67 
No further specificities are mentioned, nor is the (non-exhaustive) list of Article 59 
of the Fourth Convention further developed. Importantly however in light of the 
application of Article 59 GC IV, humanitarian assistance can amongst other things 
be distinguished by its urgent character.  
Similarly, the ICRC has not provided much insight into what it includes as 
humanitarian assistance; referring in a resolution to it as ‘providing food, shelter, 
clothing, health care, first aid, psycho-social support, etc’.68 This non-limitative 
approach is reflective of the manner in which the ICRC follows humanitarian law, as 
well as its desire not to restrict its work.  
Within the UN system, in relation to the deliverance of humanitarian assistance, 
the General Assembly referred in 1970 to:  
 
“emergency supplies, including medicines, non-perishable food-stuffs, blankets, tents and 
clothing, and … other facilities such as logistical equipment and helicopters”.69 
 
Quite narrowly, this preliminary list thereby solely includes those supplies necessary 
for the immediate survival of people, as well as the equipment to ensure the arrival 
of such supplies. ECOSOC elaborated on this definition, stating in 1971 that aid in 
emergency situations may include not only food supplies and medicines, but also 
personnel, transportations and communications”.70 The failed UN 1984 Draft 
Convention on Expediting the Delivery of Emergency Relief proposed emergency 
assistance to entail relief consignments such as the abovementioned foodstuffs, 
medical supplies, blankets and shelter materials, but also vehicles, seeds and 
                                                        
Zegveld, Constraints on the Waging of War: An Introduction to International Humanitarian Law 
(Cambridge University Press 2011); Yoram Dinstein, The conduct of hostilities under the law of 
international armed conflict (Cambridge University Press 2010).  
65 Article 59, Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 
August 1949.  
66 Article 69 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977.     
67 Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann (eds), Commentary on the Additional 
Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949  (International Committee of the 
Red Cross 1987) Protocol I Article 69, 814. 
68 ICRC Resolution 1 ‘Together for Humanity’, 30th International Conference (Geneva, 26-30 November 
2007) 75.  
69 UNGA Res 2717 (XXV) (15 December 1970) UN Doc A/2717 §5(c).  







agricultural equipment, as well as other goods of prime necessity.71 The Draft 
Convention however also considered services such as personnel, equipment, means 
of transport and necessary action to meet the needs as part of emergency assistance.72 
A few years after this Draft Convention, the UN General Assembly stated in its 
Resolution ‘Strengthening the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of 
the United Nations’ that particular focus should lie on the supply of food, medicines, 
shelter and health care.73 Although the UN Security Council has referred to the 
concept of humanitarian assistance frequently in resolutions, it has never defined or 
elaborated upon the concept as such. Hence, a definition provided by this UN organ 
is absent. According to the criteria formulated by other UN organs therefore, 
humanitarian assistance at least encompasses the supply of food, medicines or health 
care, as well as clothing and shelter. Arguably, certain aspects of transportation 
necessary for the provision of these items, also form part of this definition. In recent 
years, the ILC has concerned itself with the study of the ‘Protection of persons in the 
event of disaster’, and as such performed in-depth research into humanitarian 
assistance.74 Although the ILC study discusses many of the definitions of 
humanitarian or emergency relief and assistance provided by other organisations, it 
does not itself provide for a definition of the concept of humanitarian assistance.75 It 
also remains uncertain whether the efforts of the ILC pertaining to the protection of 
persons in the event of disasters will in time evolve into a binding document. In a 
rather broad manner, the ILC puts forward: 
  
“assistance can be described as the availability and distribution of the goods, materials and 
services essential to the survival of the population. The elements of the concept of 
protection depend largely on the context or area of law in which the concept is 
employed”.76 
 
Thus, in the current phase of its study, the ILC has unfortunately decided not to 
formulate a Draft Article on the concept of humanitarian assistance, rather leaving 
its definition open to interpretation, without explaining its choice to do so.  
                                                        
71 UNGA Res 39/367 ‘Draft Convention on Expediting the Delivery of Emergency Relief’ (n 38) Article 
1(c). 
72 Ibid Article 1(d).  
73 UNGA Res 46/182 (19 December 1991) UN Doc A/RES/46/182 §6. 
74 The work of the ILC is not in itself binding by nature, both prior and after the adoption of its work by 
the General Assembly. However, its draft work is frequently cited, amongst others the ICJ relied on the 
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts numerous times prior to 
their adoption by the General Assembly in 2001. See in this regard Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project 
(Hungary/Slovakia), Merits Judgment 25 September 1997, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p.7, § 47, 50, 52-53, 79 
and 83. As a result, it is submitted that the work of the ILC is highly esteemed and authoritative; in 
particular upon its adoption by the General Assembly and when referenced by international courts. 
75 ‘Protection of persons in the event of disasters’ (26 February 2008) Memorandum by the Secretariat 
(ILC), Addendum, UN Doc A/CN.4/590/Add.1.  
76 ‘Preliminary report on the protection of persons in the event of disasters’ (5 May 2008) International 
Law Commission UN Doc. A/CN.4/598 § 51.  
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Yet not only the UN bodies have concerned themselves with finding a clear 
definition of what constitutes humanitarian assistance; such attempts can also be 
found in legal scholarship. In 1991, Peter Macalister-Smith77 formulated the 
‘International Guidelines for Humanitarian Assistance Operations’78 at the Max 
Planck Institute in Heidelberg, defining humanitarian assistance as including urgent 
material consignments, which in turn aligns with those goods also listed by the UN.79 
The International Institute of Humanitarian Law in San Remo (San Remo Institute) 
declared in its 1993 ‘Guiding Principles on the Right to Humanitarian Assistance’ 
(San Remo Principles) that:  
 
“Humanitarian assistance may consist of any material indispensable to the survival of 
victims, such as foodstuffs, water, medication, medical supplies and equipment, minimum 
shelter, clothing; of services such as medical services, tracing services, religious and 
spiritual assistance, as well as civil defence, in conformity with the tasks defined in 
international humanitarian law”.80 
 
Clearly, this definition is broader than the one formulated by the Geneva Conventions 
and the UN, as it includes religious and spiritual assistance, ‘civil defence’ and other 
services that are more extensive than the preceding definitions have provided for. 
Subsequently in 2003 the Institute of International Law81 adopted the ‘Bruges 
Resolution’ pertaining to humanitarian assistance, in which it declared the following:  
 
“1. “Humanitarian assistance” means all acts, activities and the human and material 
resources for the provision of goods and services of an exclusively humanitarian 
character, indispensable for the survival and the fulfillment of the essential needs of the 
victims of disasters. 
a) “Goods” includes foodstuffs, drinking water, medical supplies and equipment, means 
of shelter, clothing, bedding, vehicles, and all other goods indispensable for the survival 
and the fulfillment of the essential needs of the victims of disasters; this term never 
includes weapons, ammunition or any other military material. 
                                                        
77 Peter Macalister Smith is affiliated with the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Law and 
International Law at Heidelberg, Germany.  
78 The Guidelines were formulated at the request of the Federal Republic of Germany and the study was 
completed in 1988.   
79 P. Macalister-Smith, ‘International Guidelines for Humanitarian Assistance Operations’, (Max Planck 
Institute for Comparative Law and International Law, Heidelberg,1991) Article 2 (a) and (d). 
80 ‘Guiding Principles on the Right to Humanitarian Assistance’ (April 1993) The International Institute 
of Humanitarian Law in San Remo, Principle 9. These Principles were adopted by the Council of the 
Institute after the Institute’s 17th Round Table on ‘Current Problems of International  Humanitarian Law 
to “The Evolution of the Right to Assistance”’ in September of 1992. The International Institute of 
Humanitarian Law is a non-profit organisation established in 1970 with as main purpose the promotion 
of humanitarian law, human rights and refugee law. 
81 Founded in 1873, the Institute of International Law aims to contribute to the development of 
international law, as an independent scientific institution. According to the Institute, the adopted 
Resolutions seek to highlight current international law and may sometimes be determinations de lege 
ferenda, so as to contribute to the development of the law and give assistance to progressive codification 







b) “Services” means the means of transport, tracing services, medical services, religious, 
spiritual and psychological assistance, reconstruction, de-mining decontamination, 
voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons, and all other services 
indispensable for the survival and the fulfillment of the essential needs of the victims of 
disasters”.82 
 
From the above, it is apparent that this definition also elaborates on the formulations 
of the UN and the San Remo Principles, including not only the basic elements of 
food, medicine, shelter and logistics, but also such aspects as religious and 
psychological assistance and the return of displaced persons and refugees. Whilst 
indeed religious and cultural particularities may be considered, it remains relevant to 
be aware of the extreme urgency in which humanitarian aid provision operates. In 
such circumstances of armed conflict or of (natural) disasters, the factual provision 
of assistance in itself is challenging and recourse must be had to the most urgently 
needed supplies such as water and food. Interestingly, the ‘Bruges’ definition 
explicitly excludes weapons, ammunition or any other form of military material.  
Similarly the International Court of Justice determined in the 1986 Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua Case, in referral to United States’ 
legislation defining humanitarian assistance as including the provision of food, 
clothes, medicine and ‘other assistance’, that humanitarian assistance distinctly 
excludes weapons, ammunition or other material which can be used to inflict bodily 
harm.83 The Court argued that in order to be considered humanitarian assistance 
rather than a breach of the principle of non-intervention, the assistance must be 
strictly limited to such humanitarian purposes.84 Indeed, in a more recent example, 
the carrying of weapons was also put forward by Israel as an argument that the 2010 
‘Flotilla’ towards Gaza was in fact not providing humanitarian assistance, but rather 
also supplying materials for other purposes.85 Such an argument may also be applied 
to the intentions of those providing the assistance, as will be seen in the subsequent 
Section 2.2.3. 
Ascertaining the particularities of humanitarian assistance is relevant to 
establishing a definition of humanitarian assistance. From the above, it is clear that a 
single legal definition of the notion of humanitarian assistance is lacking. Although 
various institutions and resolutions, provided as soft law or secondary sources of 
international law, hold a rather broad definition of humanitarian assistance, the 
abovementioned views portray that common ground can at least be found in a more 
narrow definition of humanitarian assistance. Such a more narrow definition also 
                                                        
82 Resolution ‘Humanitarian Assistance’ (2 September 2003) Institute of International Law, Sixteenth 
Commission, Bruges Session § 1.  
83 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 
Merits, Judgment 27 June 1986 I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14 § 242-243. 
84 Ibid § 243. 
85 See amongst others: 
<http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2010/Israel_Navy_warns_flotilla_31-May-
2010.htm> accessed 3 December 2012 and <http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Article.aspx?id=177342> 
accessed 3 December 2012.  
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takes into consideration the attempts at definitions made through the UN, ICRC and 
case law. The definition of humanitarian assistance that is put forward by the author 
is that it is:  
 
Assistance consisting of food, medicine, shelter and logistics for its provision; 
for urgent purposes and which is indispensable to the survival of the people 
at whom it is aimed. 
 
According to the definition suggested here, the provision of humanitarian assistance 
is restricted to urgent purposes and the qualification that it is to be indispensable to 
the survival of people during and in the aftermath of a humanitarian crisis, suggests 
particular boundaries to the timeframe in which humanitarian assistance may be 
delivered. Arguably, as assistance could and should be provided as long as it is 
indispensable to the survival of victims of emergencies, such assistance should take 
place not only in the immediate aftermath of an emergency situation, but rather as 
long as it may remain necessary.86 Evidently a crisis-like situation can last for a 
prolonged period of time and those persons finding themselves in such circumstances 
may not differentiate between searching for food and searching for a school for 
children. From a legal perspective however, a clear distinction must be made between 
humanitarian assistance as defined here and development assistance, although a 
possible transition from the former to the latter does often occur.87 Whilst in factual 
circumstances both notions are often intertwined and recipients may not 
acknowledge the differentiation between both types of aid, such conceptual 
                                                        
86 Budislav Vukas, ‘Humanitarian Assistance in Cases of Emergency’, (2007) Max Planck Encyclopedia 
of Public International Law § 7. 
87 Development assistance is (financial) assistance provided by international organisations or states to aid 
the development of other states, either economically, socially or politically. It can be distinguished from 
humanitarian assistance through its long-term perspectives. Development aid is furthermore not 
necessarily neutral or impartial, as it can be subject to conditions. For the purpose of this research, 
development assistance will however not be discussed, as it is not part of the scope of the research. See 
for the distinction between the two concepts amongst others Spieker ‘The Right to Give and Receive 
Humanitarian Assistance’ (n 56) 7. With regard to the UN’s stance in general, see UNGA Res 46/182 
‘Strengthening the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations’ Guiding 
Principle 9: “There is a clear relationship between emergency, rehabilitation and development. In order 
to ensure a smooth transition from emergency to rehabilitation and development, emergency assistance 
should be provided in ways that will be supportive of recovery and long-term development. Thus, 
emergency measures should be seen as a step towards long-term development”. For an alternative 
perspective, see the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)’s stance with 
regard to humanitarian assistance in relation to development assistance  in ‘Contributing to Conflict 
Prevention and Post-Conflict Peace-Building’, Medium-Term Strategy for 1996-2001 (1995) adopted by 
the General Conference at its 28th session § 190: 
<http://www.unesco.org/webworld/fed/temp/communication_democracy/conflict_resolution.htm> 
accessed 2 November 2011. For further information on development assistance, see also the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) at 
<http://www.beta.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/overview.html> accessed  4 January 2012 
and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and development at: 








boundaries remain relevant to the research into the legal framework on the provision 
of humanitarian assistance, addressing the relevant rights and duties within this 
particular framework.  
Furthermore, the provision of humanitarian assistance must not be seen as a 
substitute for otherwise engaging in international efforts that may advance peace or 
stability in a country or region.88 Indeed, humanitarian assistance is often provided 
in conflict areas, where civilians are in dire need of protection from violence. The 
provision of food, water, medicine and shelter aimed at the survival of persons in 
these circumstances must therefore be distinctly acknowledged in this light. The 
provision of assistance is aimed at the survival of persons in circumstances of 
emergency and crisis, through the provision of supplies that are key to that survival. 
While various institutions and their resolutions apply a broad definition of 
humanitarian assistance, the abovementioned perspectives show that common 
ground can be found in the aforesaid more narrow definition of humanitarian 
assistance. Importantly, humanitarian assistance can amongst other things be 
distinguished by its urgent character and indispensible nature.89 
 
2.2.3 The Principles for the Delivery of Assistance 
 
Ascertaining the particularities of humanitarian assistance, generically consisting of 
food, shelter, basic health care, and personnel and equipment to provide such items, 
is one part of defining humanitarian assistance. Yet, whether or not an act is 
humanitarian assistance is not only determined by what is provided, but also relates 
to the manner in which such assistance is provided: only when its delivery abides by 
certain principles of delivery can aid be considered ‘humanitarian assistance’.90 
Looking to international humanitarian law first, the Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocols of 1977 refer to the deliverance of relief schemes by an 
impartial humanitarian organisation, or to relief actions that are of an ‘exclusively 
humanitarian and impartial nature’.91 Such an organisation envisaged by the 
Conventions may be the ICRC, or any other organisation that acts according to the 
principles of the ICRC.92 In order to establish more in depth what humanitarian 
                                                        
88 UNCHR ‘Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, submitted 
pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1995/57: Internally displaced persons’ (22 
February 1996) UN Doc E/CN.4/1996/52 § 78. 
89 Rohan J Hardcastle & Adrian T L Chua, ‘Humanitarian Assistance, Towards a Right of access to 
victims of natural disaster’, (1998) 38 International Review of the Red Cross 325, 590.    
90 For the various actors involved in the provision of humanitarian assistance, see Section 2.3.2 Providers 
of Humanitarian Assistance. The role of the affected state in particular will be dealt with in greater detail 
in that Section.  
91 Common Article 3, Articles 10, 59 and 61 Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War; Article 70 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977; Article 
18(2) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection 
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977. 
92 Article 63 GC IV states: “Subject to temporary and exceptional measures imposed for urgent reasons 
of security by the Occupying Power: (a) recognized National Red Cross (Red Crescent, Red Lion and 
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assistance encompasses, it is relevant to look into these notions of ‘humanity’ and 
‘impartiality’, as well as specific principles of the ICRC referred to, for the 
organisation’s own characterisation of the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The 
Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement declare the 
Movement itself to be guided by its ‘Fundamental Principles’:  
 
“1) Humanity: The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, born of a desire 
to bring assistance without discrimination to the wounded on the battlefield, endeavours, 
in its international and national capacity, to prevent and alleviate human suffering 
wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for 
the human being. It promotes mutual understanding, friendship, cooperation and lasting 
peace amongst all peoples. 
2) Impartiality: It makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class 
or political opinions. It endeavours to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided 
solely by their needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress. 
3) Neutrality: In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the Movement may not 
take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious 
or ideological nature. 
4) Independence: The Movement is independent. The National Societies, while auxiliaries 
in the humanitarian services of their governments and subject to the laws of their respective 
countries, must always maintain their autonomy so that they may be able at all times to act 
in accordance with the principles of the Movement. 
5) Voluntary Service: It is a voluntary relief movement not prompted in any manner by 
desire for gain. 
6) Unity: There can be only one Red Cross or one Red Crescent Society in any one country. 
It must be open to all. It must carry on its humanitarian work throughout its territory. 
7) Universality: The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, in which all 
Societies have equal status and share equal responsibilities and duties in helping each 
other, is worldwide”.93 
 
Thus, for assistance to be considered ‘humanitarian’ according to the Geneva 
Conventions and thereby also customary international humanitarian law,94 it must 
                                                        
Sun) Societies shall be able to pursue their activities in accordance with Red Cross principles, as defined 
by the International Red Cross Conferences. Other relief societies shall be permitted to continue their 
humanitarian activities under similar conditions; (b) the Occupying Power may not require any changes 
in the personnel or structure of these societies, which would prejudice the aforesaid activities. The same 
principles shall apply to the activities and personnel of special organizations of a non-military character, 
which already exist or which may be established, for the purpose of ensuring the living conditions of the 
civilian population by the maintenance of the essential public utility services, by the distribution of relief 
and by the organization of rescues”. 
93 Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, (adopted by the 25th International 
Conference of the Red Cross at Geneva in 1986, amended in 1995 and 2006), Preamble. The Fundamental 
Principles of the Movement were proclaimed in Vienna in 1965. See also Article 2(a) of the Statute which 
states: “The role of the International Committee, in accordance with its Statutes, is in particular: a) to 
maintain and disseminate the Fundamental Principles of the Movement, namely humanity, impartiality, 
neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity and universality”. 
94 To date, 194 states are party to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, also granting their content the 
status of customary international humanitarian law. The 1977 Additional Protocols do not have this 







fulfill the criteria of humanity and impartiality, whereas the ICRC furthermore refers 
to the aspect of neutrality.95 The latter two criteria of ‘unity’ and ‘universality’ refer 
to the Red Cross itself, and therefore fall outside the scope of the principles to be 
discussed.   
 
2.2.3.1 The Principle of Humanity  
 
Separate to the provision of humanitarian assistance, the principle of humanity has 
existed in international law for a long period of time. Humanity as a concept can be 
defined in various ways, but a common denominator can be found in ‘the state of 
being human’ or ‘humane’, as well as treating others with ‘benevolence’ or 
kindness.96 As codified in the well-known ‘Martens-clause’ in 1899, the minimum 
requirements for belligerent parties would be those rules of international law as 
resulting from the practice between states, as well as ‘from the laws of humanity, and 
the requirements of the public conscience’.97 Today, its equivalent can be found in 
Article 1(2) of AP I declaring:  
  
“in cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and 
combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law 
derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of 
public conscience”. 
 
The principle of humanity thereby serves as an underlying notion by which parties to 
a conflict must always abide, to ensure the protection of civilians. As such it also 
stands in close relation to the principle of distinction. Although codified within the 
context of international humanitarian law, the principle and concept of humanity can 
be found throughout history in major world faiths, and has origins also in natural law, 
with the notion of ‘human dignity’. According to Meron, and supported by the above 
definition of ‘humanity’, the principle of humanity is equal to the notion of 
‘elementary considerations of humanity’.98 These have been recognised by the ICJ 
as obligations resting upon states both in times of war and in times of peace.99 The 
                                                        
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, see amongst others Theodor Meron, ‘The Geneva Conventions as 
Customary Law’ (1987) 81 American Journal of International Law 2. For further information on 
ratification of the Geneva Conventions, see 
<http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/(SPF)/party_main_treaties/$File/IHL_and_other_related_Treaties.pdf> 
accessed 7 November 2011. 
95 Sections 2.2.3.4 An Alternative: The UN Principles Regarding Humanitarian Assistance and 2.2.3.5. 
Other Perspectives on the Principles for Providing Humanitarian Assistance explore the adoption of the 
ICRC Principles by other organisations, such as the UN and EU, as well as several resolutions pertaining 
to humanitarian assistance.  
96 See in this regard the definitions provided by the Oxford Dictionaries and Merriam-Webster.  
97 Hague Convention II with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1899.  
98 Theodor Meron, ‘The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of the Public Conscience’ 
(2000) 94 American Journal of International Law 1, 82. 
99 Corfu Channel Case (UK v Albania) (Merits) 9 April 1949 I.C.J. Reports 4, §67: “The obligations 
incumbent upon the Albanian authorities consisted in notifying, for the benefit of shipping in general, the 
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ICJ has furthermore recognised such obligations, amongst which the Martens-clause 
and thereby also the principle of humanity, as ‘fundamental to the respect of the 
human person’ and ‘intransgressible principles of international customary law’.100 In 
doing so, the Court also relates these principles to the obligation under humanitarian 
law to prohibit causing unnecessary suffering (to combatants).101 Indeed, the 
provision of humanitarian assistance aims to accomplish precisely that goal in 
relation to the civilian population also.  
According to the ICRC, the principle of humanity is its supreme principle and the 
driving force behind its work.102 Aside from the Geneva Conventions, and the ICRC, 
the ICJ has also referred to the principles of humanity (and impartiality), declaring in 
the Nicaragua case that in order for the provision of aid to be considered 
humanitarian, it must be given without any form of discrimination to all those in need 
of aid and not merely to one party to a conflict.103 Additionally, the assistance must 
be limited to those purposes echoed by the practice of the ICRC, namely the 
alleviation of human suffering and the protection of life, health and the human being: 
 
“An essential feature of truly humanitarian aid is that it is given “without discrimination” 
of any kind. In the view of the Court, if the provision of “humanitarian assistance” is to 
escape condemnation as an intervention in the internal affairs of Nicaragua, not only must 
it be limited to the purposes hallowed in the practice of the Red Cross, namely “to prevent 
and alleviate human suffering” and “to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the 
human being”; it must also, and above all be given without discrimination to al1 in need 
in Nicaragua, not merely to the contras and their dependents.104  
 
This stance of the Court also aligns with the above formulated definition of 
humanitarian assistance which focuses on emergency aid. In this ruling, the ICJ 
declares these principles applicable to all providers of humanitarian assistance (such 
as the United Nations), not merely the ICRC itself.105 This latter take on the principles 
by the Court echoes Article 63 of the Fourth Geneva Convention that in the same 
way declared (other) providers of aid to be able to operate under similar conditions 
                                                        
existence of a minefield in Albanian territorial waters and in warning the approaching British warships 
of the imminent danger to which the minefield exposed them. Such obligations are based, not on the 
Hague Convention of 1907, No. VIII, which is applicable in time of war, but on certain general and well-
recognized principles, namely: elementary considerations of humanity, even more exacting in peace than 
in war; the principle of the freedom of maritime communication; and every State's obligation not to allow 
knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States”.  
100 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226, § 
78-79. 
101 Ibid. 
102 ‘The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC): Its mission and work’, Adopted by the 
Assembly of the ICRC on 19 June 2008, (2009) 91 International Review of the Red Cross 874, 404.  
103 ICJ Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against (n 83) § 243. For support in legal scholarship, 
see also Vincent Chetail, ‘The contribution of the International Court of Justice to international 
humanitarian law’, (2003) 85 International Review of the Red Cross 850, 265.  
104 Ibid § 243. 








as the ICRC.106 Yet the ICJ’s stance that assistance must be given to all parties to a 
conflict is challenged by some. Firstly, it must be noted that the Nicaragua case did 
not concern an international armed conflict,107 and as such there is no proscription to 
be found in the Geneva Conventions regarding the provision of assistance to only 
one side of a conflict by organisations providing humanitarian assistance. 
Conversely, in an international armed conflict, international organisations providing 
assistance are permitted to provide relief to civilians in need that are under the control 
of only one party to the conflict.108 Frits Kalshoven argued that states often provide 
assistance to only one side of a conflict, especially in liberation wars, which is still 
considered by the larger community to be humanitarian in nature.109 Furthermore, 
international organisations providing assistance also usually operate in the territory 
of just one side of the conflict, rather than being able to operate on both or multiple 
sides.110 Particularly significant is the fact that the assistance may not contribute to 
one side of a conflict, but pursues the goal of alleviation of human suffering.111 As 
long as the purpose of the aid is not to support any party to a conflict rather than to 
alleviate the suffering of a civilian population in need, it can be considered 
humanitarian.112 Given the abovementioned definition of humanity, as well as the 
ICRC’s declaration that the principle of humanity entails but three main aspects, 
namely respect for the human being, the prevention and alleviation of human 
suffering, and the protection of life and health as well as legal debate, providing 
assistance to both sides of the conflict in order to be deemed humanitarian, as argued 
by the ICJ, does not appear to be a general consensus under international law.113 
 
2.2.3.2 The Principle of Impartiality  
 
Impartiality, the second criterion mentioned not only in the Geneva Conventions but 
also by the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross for its own purposes, essentially 
                                                        
106 See (n92) for the text of Article 63 GC IV.  
107 For the definition of an international armed conflict, see Section 3.2.1 Defining an Armed Conflict. 
108 Ruth Abril Stoffels, ‘Legal Regulation of Humanitarian Assistance in Armed Conflict: Achievements 
and Gaps’, (2004) 86 International Review of the Red Cross 855, 541. See for example Article 25 GC II; 
Article 27 GC IV; and Article 8 of Additional Protocol I.  
109 Frits Kalshoven, ‘Impartialité et neutralité dans le droit et la pratique humanitaires’, (1989) 71 
International Review of the Red Cross 780, 543-544.   
110 Kate Mackintosh, ‘The Principles of Humanitarian Action in International Humanitarian Law: Study 
4 in: The Politics of Principle: the principles of humanitarian action in practice’, Humanitarian Policy 
Group Report 5 (March 2000) 7. 
111 Joakim Dungel, ‘A Right to Humanitarian Assistance in Internal Armed Conflicts Respecting 
Sovereignty, Neutrality and Legitimacy: Practical Proposals to Practical Problems’, (2004) Journal of 
Humanitarian Assistance § 2.2 <http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/838> accessed 24 November 2014. 
112 Abril Stoffels, ‘Legal Regulation of Humanitarian Assistance in Armed Conflict: Achievements and 
Gaps’ (n108) 540. 
113 Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, (adopted by the 25th 
International Conference of the Red Cross at Geneva in 1986, amended in 1995 and 2006). See also Jean 
Pictet, ‘1979 Commentary to the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross’ (Principle of Humanity 
Commentary (a) (b) and (c)) <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/fundamental-
principles-commentary-010179.htm> accessed 24 November 2014. 
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considers that assistance must be given in a non-discriminatory manner, with a focus 
on those who most urgently need to be aided.114 As seen above, the ICJ has echoed 
this principle in its judgement in the Nicaragua case.115 In his 1979 Commentary to 
the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross, Jean Pictet divides this principle into 
three separate elements, namely non-discrimination, proportionality and impartiality 
itself as distinguished principle.116 Firstly, regarding non-discrimination, Pictet 
argues it is the primordial of the Red Cross Principles, and closely related to the 
principle of humanity.117 As seen above, the ICJ has echoed the importance of these 
two concepts within the provision of humanitarian assistance in the Nicaragua-
case.118 The Geneva Conventions themselves in Common Article 3 prohibit ‘any 
adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or 
any other similar criteria’.119 Clearly, this list is non-limitative in its nature. Yet, 
considering the fact that assistance is to be provided based on the urgency of the need, 
non-discrimination does not mean that certain considerations such as age or sex may 
not be relevant to the determination of whom is to receive the most immediate relief 
of suffering.120 As such, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention mentioned 
that no adverse distinction was to be allowed. The ICRC itself declares:  
 
                                                        
114 Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, (adopted by the 25th 
International Conference of the Red Cross at Geneva in 1986, amended in 1995 and 2006) and ibid Pictet, 
‘1979 Commentary to the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross’ (Principle of Impartiality). 
115 ICJ Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against (n 83) §242.  
116 Pictet, ‘1979 Commentary to the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross’ (n 113) (Principle of 
Impartiality, I. Non-Discrimination). 
117 Ibid. 
118 ICJ Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against (n 83) § 243. 
119 The full text of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 states: “In the case of 
armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting 
Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: (1) 
Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down 
their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in 
all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion 
or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end the following acts are and shall 
remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment; (d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment 
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized 
as indispensable by civilized peoples. (2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An 
impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services 
to the Parties to the conflict. The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by 
means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention. The application 
of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict”.  
120 Dungel ‘A Right to Humanitarian Assistance in Internal Armed Conflicts Respecting Sovereignty, 







“Impartiality, a principle that rejects any form of discrimination, calls for equal treatment 
for people in distress, according to their needs. It enables the ICRC to prioritize its 
activities on the basis of the degree of urgency and the types of needs of those affected”.121 
 
Evidently, the Red Cross envisages the possibility to distinguish based on need, 
whilst simultaneously adhering to the principle of non-discrimination. This reasoning 
also falls in line with Pictet’s second element within the principle of impartiality: the 
notion of proportionality, which entails that the relief is to be accorded in proportion 
to the degree of suffering and the degree of urgency.122 Thirdly, Pictet discerns the 
element of impartiality as a separate notion within the larger scope of the principle.123 
He argues that, once non-discrimination has been accepted as a norm, impartiality 
becomes secondary, due to the fact that it relates to the ‘lesser’ action without 
prejudice, namely not to be partial in one’s individual (organisation’s) actions.124 
Whereas non-discrimination and proportionality apply to the deliverance of 
humanitarian assistance, the distinct element of impartiality as noted by Pictet 
concerns the decision-making process of an organisation such as the ICRC in its 
entirety.125 Particularly in situations of non-international conflicts, the notion of 
partiality can be an issue, as those providing aid, such as National Red Cross 
Societies, are often very familiar with all parties to the conflict.126 This also adheres 
to the above discussion on whether or not aid may be provided to the civilian 
population of only one party to a conflict as addressed by the ICJ. Furthermore, there 
is also a different concept of impartiality to consider, where cooperation amongst 
relief providers may be in order, to ensure that distribution of aid is truly only 
determined based on need, and that impartiality can be discerned through the equal 
results of the assistance.127 However, at this point in time, there is no legal 
requirement within international humanitarian law for this last concept of 
impartiality, as it would also impose obligations of cooperation on various relief 
providers.128 
 
                                                        
121 ‘The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC): Its mission and work’, Adopted by the 
Assembly of the ICRC (n 102). 
122 Pictet, ‘1979 Commentary to the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross’ (n 113) (Principle of 
Impartiality, II. Proportionality). 
123 Pictet is not alone in distinguishing separate elements in the larger principle of impartiality, see also 
Abril Stoffels, ‘Legal Regulation of Humanitarian Assistance in Armed Conflict: Achievements and 
Gaps’ (n108) 540-541. 
124 Pictet, ‘1979 Commentary to the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross’ (n 113) (Principle of 
Impartiality, III Impartiality).  
125 Denise Plattner, ‘ICRC neutrality and neutrality in humanitarian assistance’, (1996) 36 International 
Review of the Red Cross 311, 171.  
126 Ibid. 
127 Dungel, ‘A Right to Humanitarian Assistance in Internal Armed Conflicts Respecting Sovereignty, 
Neutrality and Legitimacy: Practical Proposals to Practical Problems’ (n 111) § 2.2; and Abril Stoffels, 
‘Legal Regulation of Humanitarian Assistance in Armed Conflict: Achievements and Gaps’ (n108) 540. 
128 Abril Stoffels, ‘Legal Regulation of Humanitarian Assistance in Armed Conflict: Achievements and 
Gaps’ (n108) 541.  
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2.2.3.3 The Principle of Neutrality  
  
Lastly, the principle of neutrality needs to be addressed. Often confused with, and 
closely related to, impartiality, this principle relates to the ICRC’s position that to be 
able to provide relief, the organisation needs to enjoy the trust of all sides to a 
particular conflict and to that extent may itself not take sides in any kind of armed 
conflict.129 Importantly, both neutrality and non-participation of non-belligerent 
states with regard to a conflict are not intended by this principle of neutrality.130 
Neutrality as a principle in humanitarian assistance is furthermore absent from the 
Geneva Conventions, perhaps also due to this military connotation with regard to the 
abovementioned non-belligerent states.131 Yet as a legal concept it does appear in 
various provisions related to the field of humanitarian assistance,132 and has been 
widely described in guidelines relating to the manner in which humanitarian 
organisations or other actors provide relief. It can be considered an autonomous 
concept, independent of the entity that is actually providing the assistance: the body 
providing the assistance may not be neutral, but the assistance itself may still meet 
the requirements of the principle of neutrality of assistance.133 Thus, third states and 
various international organisations can certainly meet these requirements. However, 
referring back to Article 63 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, any entity wishing to 
provide humanitarian assistance in accordance with international humanitarian law, 
must act according to principles similar to those of the ICRC, which has incorporated 
the notion of neutrality.134 In their actions, humanitarian organisations or other actors 
such as third states must convey their neutrality to all sides of a conflict through 
refraining from any action that may be harmful or helpful to the parties in conflict, 
and in return, so should the neutrality of these organisations be respected by the 
                                                        
129 Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, (adopted by the 25th 
International Conference of the Red Cross at Geneva in 1986, amended in 1995 and 2006) and ‘The 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC): Its mission and work’, Adopted by the Assembly of 
the ICRC (n 102). 
130 Pictet, ‘1979 Commentary to the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross’ (n 113) (Principle of 
Neutrality, (b) military neutrality). For a more in depth discussion of the distinction between neutrality 
and non-participation in conflicts when applicable to states, as opposed to the neutrality of a relief 
organisation such as the ICRC, see Plattner, ‘ICRC neutrality and neutrality in humanitarian assistance’ 
(n 125) 164-165. 
131 Mackintosh, ‘The Principles of Humanitarian Action in International Humanitarian Law’ (n 110) 8.  
132 See Chapters 6 and 7. Also, see Plattner, ‘ICRC neutrality and neutrality in humanitarian assistance’ 
(n 125) 175.  
133 Plattner, ‘ICRC neutrality and neutrality in humanitarian assistance’ (n 125) 178. An example 
provided by Plattner includes the possibility of a non-neutral state providing humanitarian assistance that 
in itself is neutral.  







parties.135 Thus, the principle of neutrality obliges duties of abstention.136 Neutrality 
as a principle of humanitarian assistance is not merely military, but also political, 
racial, religious and ideological.137 Pictet refers to this aspect of neutrality as 
‘ideological neutrality’ but notes that although it is distinct from military neutrality, 
in today’s world politicisation is a grave concern for the Red Cross, considering the 
change in warfare since the World War II.138 Publicly voicing an opinion on a certain 
conflict or supporting one of the parties could be, and has in the past sometimes been, 
considered a violation of this principle; note in this regard the discussion on the 
delivery of aid by Russia to the Ukraine in the summer of 2014.139 Yet there is no 
legal obligation to abstain from drawing attention to large-scale violations of human 
rights or humanitarian law, regardless of whether or not this may form part of an 
organisation’s own code of conduct.140 In relation to this, the Red Cross’ perspective 
on neutrality has thus always been a means to provide humanitarian assistance rather 
than an end in and of itself.141 For an organisation providing humanitarian assistance, 
like the ICRC, there must be a choice between striving for justice or politics and 
striving for the provision of assistance to all those in need. To uphold the principle 
of neutrality, often only the latter can be chosen.142 Denise Plattner143 observes that 
neutrality as a principle of humanitarian assistance may function as an umbrella under 
which the principle of impartiality, together with non-discrimination, may also fall.144 
Problematic for the principle of neutrality and in connection to Pictet’s views, is that 
it runs the risk of being compromised in the event where humanitarian assistance is 
to be delivered in a territory contrary to the will of the party that controls this territory. 
                                                        
135 Pictet, ‘1979 Commentary to the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross’ (n 113) (Principle of 
Neutrality, (b) military neutrality). An example given by Pictet is the neutrality of a hospital: parties to a 
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136 Plattner, ‘ICRC neutrality and neutrality in humanitarian assistance’ (n 125) 170.  
137 Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, (adopted by the 25th 
International Conference of the Red Cross at Geneva in 1986, amended in 1995 and 2006) and ‘The 
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138 Pictet, ‘1979 Commentary to the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross’ (n 113) (Principle of 
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accessed 9 September 2014; Abril Stoffels, ‘Legal Regulation of Humanitarian Assistance in Armed 
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140 Abril Stoffels, ‘Legal Regulation of Humanitarian Assistance in Armed Conflict: Achievements and 
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142 Pictet, ‘1979 Commentary to the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross’ (n 113) (Principle of 
Neutrality, ‘other aspects of neutrality’). See also Plattner, ‘ICRC neutrality and neutrality in 
humanitarian assistance’ (n 125) 162.  
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several missions for that organisation.  
144 Plattner, ‘ICRC neutrality and neutrality in humanitarian assistance’ (n 125) 177-178.  
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This particular issue will be dealt with extensively at a later stage, as issues relating 
to state sovereignty are a continuous thread in the discussion of the legal framework 
on the provision of humanitarian assistance.145  
Remaining within the scope of international humanitarian law, the San Remo 
Institute has also adopted the abovementioned three principles in its 1993 ‘Guiding 
Principles on the Right to Humanitarian Assistance’, stressing:  
 
“that humanitarian assistance, both as regards those granting and those receiving it, should 
always be provided in conformity with the principles inherent in all humanitarian 
activities, namely the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality, so that political 
considerations should not prevail over these principles”.146 
 
The Institute furthermore declares that neutrality and impartiality vis-à-vis parties to 
a conflict must always be upheld in the provision of assistance during an armed 
conflict.147 Legal scholarship thereby – through such soft law documents – supports 
this view of the principle of impartiality.  
 
2.2.3.4 An Alternative: The UN Principles Regarding Humanitarian Assistance  
 
The above Sections have addressed the development of the principles for the 
provision of assistance in times of conflict. The abovementioned principles have also 
been widely incorporated in humanitarian assistance outside the scope of armed 
conflict, for example in relation to the regulation of the provision of humanitarian 
assistance in the aftermath of natural or other disasters, in particular through the work 
of the UN warranting some further discussion. Both the principle of humanity and 
impartiality have been extensively referred to, as well as interestingly the principle 
of neutrality, which clearly finds its origins in conflict.148 A first mention of such 
principles within the context of the UN can be found in some 1970 UN General 
Assembly Resolutions that declare to be ‘mindful’ of principles adopted by the Red 
Cross with regard to humanitarian relief the prior year as well as referring to their 
applicability.149 The principles referred to by the General Assembly relate to the 
provision of relief without discrimination, by an impartial organisation, which is to 
be considered a humanitarian matter.150 In fact, the General Assembly asserts that the 
                                                        
145 For an in depth discussion of the problems relating to the delivery of assistance when a sovereign or 
other party in control of a territory is reluctant or unwilling to allow entry and access of humanitarian 
assistance, see Chapters 7 and 8. 
146 ‘Guiding Principles on the Right to Humanitarian Assistance’ (n 80) preambular § 5.  
147 Ibid Foreword § 3.  
148 Plattner, ‘ICRC neutrality and neutrality in humanitarian assistance’ (n 125) 175. 
149 UNGA Res 2675 (XXV) (9 December 1970) ‘Basic principles for the protection of civilian 
populations in armed conflict’ § 8 and UNGA Res 2717 (XXV) (15 December 1970) ‘Assistance in cases 
of natural disaster’, Preambular § 4.  
150 ‘Declaration of principles for international humanitarian relief to the civilian population in disaster 
situations’ XXIst International Conference of the Red Cross, Resolution XXVI (Istanbul September 







principles shall apply equally to circumstances of natural disaster and conflict.151 The 
(failed) UN 1984 Draft Convention on Expediting the Delivery of Emergency Relief 
proposed that relief consignments and services be of an ‘exclusively humanitarian 
and non-political character provided to meet the needs of those affected by 
disasters’.152 As can be derived from the above, the scope of this Draft Convention 
lay outside international humanitarian law, focusing on disasters of a natural or other 
kind.153 Furthermore, the Draft Convention declared that the provision of assistance 
should occur without discrimination.154 In 1988 a clear reference to the principles of 
humanity, impartiality and neutrality occured for the first time, as the UN General 
Assembly stated in its Resolution ‘Humanitarian Assistance to victims of natural 
disasters and similar emergency situations’:  
 
 “recalling that, in the event of natural disasters and similar emergency situations, the 
principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality must be given utmost consideration by 
all those involved in providing humanitarian assistance”.155 
 
Following this Resolution, the General Assembly posed in 1990 that efficiency and 
speed of assistance often depend on organisations working ‘in an impartial manner 
and with strictly humanitarian motives’, as well as recognising the important 
contributions made by this manner of work.156 Only one year later, the General 
Assembly fortified its earlier statements and declared:  
 
“humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, 
neutrality and impartiality”.157  
 
During the 1990s several ensuing resolutions affirmed the importance the UN 
attaches to the principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality.158  
                                                        
151 UNGA Res 2675 (XXV) (9 December 1970) § 8.  
152 UNGA Res 39/367 ‘Draft Convention on Expediting the Delivery of Emergency Relief’ (n 38) Article 
1 (a). 
153 Article 1(b) of the Draft Convention on Expediting the Delivery of Emergency Relief states: 
“’Disaster’  means any natural, accidental or deliberate event (not being an ongoing situation or armed 
conflict) as a result of which assistance is needed from outside the State upon whose territory the event 
occurred or which has been affected by the consequences of the event”.  A more in depth discussion of 
the concept of a natural disaster can be found in Section 3.2.5  Defining a (Natural) Disaster .  
154 UNGA Res 39/367 ‘Draft Convention on Expediting the Delivery of Emergency Relief’ (n 38) Article 
5 (c).  
155 UNGA Res 43/131 (8 December 1988) UN Doc A/RES/43/131 ‘Humanitarian Assistance to victims 
of natural disasters and similar emergency situations’ Preambular § 12. 
156 UNGA Res 45/100 (14 December 1990) UN Doc A/RES/45/100 ‘Humanitarian Assistance to victims 
of natural disasters and similar emergency situations’, Preambular § 11 and operational § 3. 
157 UNGA Res 46/182 (19 December 1991) UN Doc. A/RES/46/182 (n 46) § 2. [Emphasis added EEK] 
158 UNGA Res 48/57 (14 December 1993) UN Doc A/RES/48/57, ‘Strengthening the coordination of 
humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations’ § 18; and UNGA Res 49/139 (20 December 
1994) UN Doc A/RES/49/139 ‘Strengthening the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of 
the United Nations’ § 3. 
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Interestingly, in 2004 the General Assembly not only reaffirmed the 
abovementioned principles, but also addressed a new principle relevant to the 
provision of humanitarian assistance, namely the principle of ‘independence’:  
 
“Reaffirming the principles of neutrality, humanity and impartiality for the provision of 
humanitarian assistance, Recognizing that independence, meaning the autonomy of 
humanitarian objectives from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any 
actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented, is 
also an important guiding principle for the provision of humanitarian assistance”.159  
 
In a following resolution, all four principles, including the newly phrased principle 
of independence, are subsequently reaffirmed by the General Assembly as relevant 
to the provision of humanitarian assistance.160 Thus, independence as a principle is 
related to the provision of humanitarian assistance by the UN General Assembly, 
whilst the actor providing the actual assistance in question might also be concerned 
with certain other objectives.  
In this sense, the definition is somewhat similar to Plattner’s perspective in 
international humanitarian law that an actor does not necessarily have to be neutral, 
as long as the humanitarian assistance itself is neutral.161 This principle of 
independence as coined by the UN also finds some overlap with the Red Cross’ 
principle of neutrality, whilst the Red Cross’ notion of independence is somewhat 
different.162 Whereas from the UN’s perspective the objectives must be independent; 
the Statutes of the Red Cross Movement state that the National Societies of the Red 
Cross themselves must maintain their autonomy.163 This refers to political, economic 
and religious autonomy, which as an essential derivative principle, at the same time 
guarantees the neutrality of the ICRC.164 Thus, where neutrality for the Red Cross 
entails to refrain from any political or otherwise explicit acts or statements, 
independence means that the authorities of the territories in which the National 
Societies are established must abstain from any interference with the work and 
functioning of these Societies, to enable them to act impartially without 
interference.165 The differences in perspectives of both principles of independence 
can be derived from the difference in addressees. The UN addresses states in its 
resolutions, whilst the ICRC addresses its own National Societies. Both perspectives 
are not necessarily contradictory, given the difference in addressees, as well as the 
                                                        
159 UNGA Res 58/114 (5 February 2004) UN Doc A/RES/58/114 ‘Strengthening the coordination of 
humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations’ Preambular § 4 and 5. [Emphasis added EEK] 
160 UNGA Res 60/124 (8 March 2006) UN Doc A/RES/60/124 ‘Strengthening the coordination of 
humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations’ Preambular § 4. 
161 Plattner, ‘ICRC neutrality and neutrality in humanitarian assistance’ (n 125) 178.  
162 See the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, (adopted by the 25th 
International Conference of the Red Cross at Geneva in 1986, amended in 1995 and 2006) concerning 
the definition of the principle of Independence.  
163 Ibid. 









fact that the UN’s notion of ‘independence’ is to a certain extent also expressed in 
the Red Cross principle of neutrality, a principle also adhered to by the UN in its 
resolutions.166 However, given the discrepancy between the two definitions of the 
principle of independence, it is therefore not possible to derive one single definition 
of the principle of independence, applicable to the provision of humanitarian 
assistance, as the two major actors, the UN and the Red Cross, both hold different 
views of what this principle entails. Thus, although the UN commenced by 
incorporating the principles as defined by the Red Cross, it has continued to develop 
its own definition of the principle of independence. This development has then lead 
to proliferation of principles, and more uncertainty as to their content.  
Within the UN framework the concept of ‘human security’ has also been coined, 
in the United Nations Development Programme's 1994 ‘Human Development 
Report’, stating that – although related to development – human security is a more 
narrow, centred and universal concept with an interdependent approach.167 In 2005, 
in the World Summit Outcome Document, the UN accepted the concept, with a view 
to further clarifying it: 
 
“We stress the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. 
We recognize that all individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom 
from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and 
fully develop their human potential. To this end, we commit ourselves to discussing and 
defining the notion of human security in the General Assembly”.168 
 
Given this explanation, the notion of human security exists of course in close 
relationship with the principle of humanity discussed above. It is precisely this 
common denominator of humankind that forms the foundation and supports the legal 
framework on the provision of humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, the principles 
for the provision of assistance, as recognised not only by the ICRC but also the UN 
and the ICJ exclude the concept of so-called ‘conditional’ humanitarian assistance, 
in which the receipt of aid is based on the fulfillment of certain conditions or 
obligations. This has also been asserted by the Security Council on recent occasions, 
where the Council has stressed the need to uphold ‘humanitarian principles’, whilst 
condemning the ‘politicization’, ‘misuse’ and ‘misappropriation’ thereof.169 
 
 
                                                        
166 UNGA Res 43/131 (8 December 1988) UN Doc A/RES/43/131 (n 155) Preambular § 12; UNGA Res 
46/182 (19 December 1991) UN Doc. A/RES/46/182 (n 46) § 2; UNGA Res 48/57 (14 December 1993) 
UN Doc A/RES/48/57 (n 158) § 18; UNGA Res 49/139 (20 December 1994) UN Doc A/RES/49/139 (n 
158) § 3. 
167 ‘Human Development Report’ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (Oxford University 
Press 1994) 22-33.  
168 UNGA Res 60/1 (24 October 2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1 ‘World Summit Outcome Document’ § 143.  
169 See amongst others UNSC Res 2100 (25 April 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2100 preamble § 8; and UNSC 
Res 2060 (25 July 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2060 § 5.  
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2.2.3.5 Other Perspectives on the Principles for Providing Humanitarian Assistance  
 
In his research into the ‘Protection of persons in the event of disasters’, the Special 
Rapporteur of the UN International Law Commission has suggested that Draft Article 
7 states: 
  
“Response to disasters shall take place in accordance with the principles of humanity, 
neutrality and impartiality, and on the basis of non-discrimination, while taking into 
account the needs of the particularly vulnerable”.170 
 
With regard to these principles, the ILC’s discussion of the Draft Article had noted 
several different viewpoints on their relationship and their possible applicability to 
situations of natural disaster, but the Article has remained unchanged to date.171 Not 
only has the ILC incorporated these humanitarian principles and included the non-
discriminatory basis upon which the provision of humanitarian assistance must take 
place, the Draft Articles also consider the concept of human dignity, stating in Draft 
Article 5:  
 
“In responding to disasters, States, competent intergovernmental organizations and 
relevant non-governmental organizations shall respect and protect the inherent dignity of 
the human person”.172 
 
The ILC Draft Articles are thereby taking an inclusive approach; also incorporating 
concepts originally from humanitarian law although the Draft Articles themselves are 
restricted to circumstances other than conflict.  
Although the UN is one of the major actors next to the ICRC in the provision of 
humanitarian assistance, other actors have also incorporated the various 
abovementioned principles relevant to the provision of humanitarian assistance, as 
well as many of the available soft law mechanisms and resolutions concerning 
humanitarian assistance.173 Such soft law examples include Macalister-Smith’s 1991 
Guidelines that argue that assistance provided should be of an exclusively 
humanitarian character, and that its provision should be ‘on an impartial basis without 
any adverse distinction to all persons in urgent need’.174 Also, the ‘Mohonk Criteria 
for Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies’ (Mohonk Criteria) 
formulated in 1994 by the ‘Task force on Ethical and Legal issues in Humanitarian 
                                                        
170 ILC ‘Protection of persons in the event of disasters: Texts and titles of the draft articles adopted by 
the Drafting Committee on first reading’ Draft Article 7 ‘Humanitarian principles’ UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.831 (15 May 2014). 
171 ILC ‘Report of the International Law Commission’ UN Doc A/65/10  (3 May – 4 June, 5 July – 6 
August 2010) § 309-313. 
172 ILC ‘Protection of persons in the event of disasters’ Draft Articles UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.831 (15 May 
2014). 
173 For a detailed discussion of the various actors relevant to the provision of humanitarian assistance, 
see Section 2.3.2 Providers of Humanitarian Assistance. 
174 Macalister-Smith’ ‘International Guidelines for Humanitarian Assistance Operations (n 79) Article 







Assistance’,175 adopt the principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality as 
developed by the ICRC, as well as a principle similar to its notion of independence.176 
However, the Mohonk Criteria furthermore add the principle of ‘empowerment’ to 
the aforementioned principles, declaring this to entail an effort for local institutions 
to build on the steps taken with humanitarian assistance to continue with 
reconstruction and development.177 Thereby the Mohonk Criteria pursue a wider 
concept of humanitarian assistance than other organisations or resolutions have 
envisaged. Interestingly, the 2003 Bruges Resolution of the Institut de Droit 
International / Institute of International Law is not outspoken in this regard, declaring 
only that the provision humanitarian assistance must occur with an ‘exclusively 
humanitarian character’, as well as stating in general that the resolution is without 
prejudice to principles of international humanitarian law, yet not naming any specific 
principles.178  
Furthermore, the European Community (EC)179 as an actor also adhered to the 
principle of impartiality, as well as the provision of aid without discrimination in its 
1996 regulation concerning humanitarian assistance.180 This approach was followed 
by the European Union (EU) in its 2008 ‘European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid’ 
declaring the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality to be fundamental 
principles of humanitarian assistance and also adhering to the UN’s abovementioned 
notion of independence as a principle.181 However, with the new Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, Article 214 now stipulates that assistance 
provided by the EU shall comply with international law and the principles of 
‘impartiality, neutrality and non-discrimination’.182 Thus, whilst incorporating ‘non-
                                                        
175 The Mohonk Criteria were developed in February 1994 by the ‘Task force on Ethical and Legal issues 
in Humanitarian Assistance’, established at the World Conference on Religion and Peace, during the 
‘Program on Humanitarian Assistance’, under the lead of then UN affiliate J.M. Ebersole. 
176 ‘The Mohonk Criteria for Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies’, (1995) reprinted in 17 
Human Rights Quarterly 1, 196-197.  
177 Ibid 197.  
178 Bruges Resolution ‘Humanitarian Assistance’ (2 September 2003) (n 82) § I.1 and § X.a.  
179 For a more in depth discussion of the role of the European Community and Union as an actor within 
the provision of humanitarian assistance, see Section 2.3.2.2. International Organisations. 
180 European Council Regulation concerning humanitarian aid (EC) No. 1257/96 (20 June 1996) 
preambular § 10 and § 11. 
181 ‘Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States 
meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission’ (European 
Consensus on Humanitarian Aid)  (30 January 2008) EU Doc 2008/C/25/01 § 10-14.   
182 The full text of Article 214 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union states: “1. The 
Union's operations in the field of humanitarian aid shall be conducted within the framework of the 
principles and objectives of the external action of the Union. Such operations shall be intended to provide 
ad hoc assistance and relief and protection for people in third countries who are victims of natural or 
man-made disasters, in order to meet the humanitarian needs resulting from these different situations. 
The Union's measures and those of the Member States shall complement and reinforce each other. 2. 
Humanitarian aid operations shall be conducted in compliance with the principles of international law 
and with the principles of impartiality, neutrality and non-discrimination. 3. The European Parliament 
and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish the measures 
defining the framework within which the Union's humanitarian aid operations shall be implemented. 4. 
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discrimination’ similarly to the ILC, the principle of humanity has been left out of 
this provision, although the final paragraph dictates that the aid provision of the EU 
shall have to be in conformity with that of the UN, thereby incorporating the principle 
in a backhand manner.  
Most recently, the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of 
Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention) declared an obligation 
for state parties to uphold and ensure respect for the principles of humanity, 
impartiality and neutrality, as well as independence of the humanitarian actors.183 In 
a reciprocal manner, those organisations and actors providing assistance are 
themselves bound by the abovementioned principles.184 This Convention, dating 
from 2009, recently entered into force in 2012.185 Following from the above, it has 
become apparent that also outside the sphere of international humanitarian law the 
principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality have been embraced on a large 
scale, with more recent developments including the notion of non-discrimination.  
From the above analysis, a concise and narrow definition of humanitarian 
assistance can be discerned. Establishing such a definition is not only relevant to the 
purposes of this research, but can also clarify ambiguities between various actors in 
this field. Furthermore, clearly establishing the objectives and purpose of 
humanitarian assistance protects it from ‘abuse’ by certain actors for other goals.186 
Concluding, for the purpose of this research, humanitarian assistance can be defined 
as assistance consisting of food, medicine, shelter and logistics for its provision; for 
urgent purposes and which is indispensable to the survival of the people at whom it 
is aimed.187 The main objective of humanitarian assistance can also be established, 
namely the alleviation of human suffering, and the purpose of saving lives.  
Furthermore, the manner in which this assistance is provided must at least be in 
conformity with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality. The ICRC’s 
                                                        
The Union may conclude with third countries and competent international organisations any agreement 
helping to achieve the objectives referred to in paragraph 1 and in Article 21 of the Treaty on European 
Union. The first subparagraph shall be without prejudice to Member States' competence to negotiate in 
international bodies and to conclude agreements. 5. In order to establish a framework for joint 
contributions from young Europeans to the humanitarian aid operations of the Union, a European 
Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps shall be set up. The European Parliament and the Council, acting by 
means of regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall determine the rules and 
procedures for the operation of the Corps. 6. The Commission may take any useful initiative to promote 
coordination between actions of the Union and those of the Member States, in order to enhance the 
efficiency and complementarity of Union and national humanitarian aid measures. 7. The Union shall 
ensure that its humanitarian aid operations are coordinated and consistent with those of international 
organisations and bodies, in particular those forming part of the United Nations system”.  
183 African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa 
(Kampala 22 October 2009) Article 5(8).  
184 Ibid Article 6(3).  
185 In 2014, although all African Union members have signed the Kampala Convention, 22 member states 
had ratified the Convention. 
<http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Convention%20on%20IDPs%20-%20displaced..._0.pdf> 
accessed 9 September 2014. The Convention entered into force 6 December 2012. 
186 Frances Stevenson & Joanna Macrae, ‘Legislating for humanitarian aid’, (2002) 21 Humanitarian 
Exchange Magazine, 34-35.  







definition of the principle of independence is somewhat different from the UN’s view 
of the same principle, preventing the further incorporation of this principle into the 
above definition of humanitarian assistance that is based purely on common ground 
amongst all actors. However, the principle of independence remains an equally 
relevant principle as a whole to most actors in the field. The concept of non-
discrimination has been brought to the forefront more recently through the EU and 
ILC initiatives. As ever, the law does not operate in a vacuum. Whilst these principles 
are the legal basis upon which assistance may be provided, this unfortunately does 
not preclude an affected state from sometimes arguing that certain providers of 
assistance might not satisfy their view of the content of these provisions.  
 
2.3 Actors Involved in Humanitarian Assistance 
 
From the above Section on the manner in which assistance is provided, it becomes 
clear that the ICRC and other organisations distinguish several principles, amongst 
which the principle of humanity in their provision of assistance to those in need. 
When discussing humanitarian assistance, it is relevant to establish clearly to whom 
this assistance is provided. Although many may automatically assume that assistance 
is provided to certain victims, or a civilian population, it is necessary to briefly 
establish on what basis such an assumption is made.  
 
2.3.1 Recipients of Humanitarian Assistance 
 
With regard to humanitarian assistance in times of armed conflict or occupation, the 
Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols stipulate that the provision of 
humanitarian assistance must occur to a ‘civilian population’.188 This excludes 
prisoners of war from the receipt of humanitarian assistance, as many tailored 
provisions exist within humanitarian law for their specific protection.189 The civilian 
population must furthermore be distinguished from civilians as ‘protected persons’ 
as mentioned in the Geneva Conventions, for which the Conventions also provide 
specifically.190 A distinction must also be made between the civilian population and 
                                                        
188 See amongst others Articles 10 and 55 GC IV; Article 69 AP I; Article 18 AP II.  
189 Note in particular GC III: Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 75 
U.N.T.S. 135, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950. 
190 Article 4 GC IV states in regard to protected persons: “Persons protected by the Convention are those 
who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or 
occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals. 
Nationals of a State which is not bound by the Convention are not protected by it. Nationals of a neutral 
State who find themselves in the territory of a belligerent State, and nationals of a co-belligerent State, 
shall not be regarded as protected persons while the State of which they are nationals has normal 
diplomatic representation in the State in whose hands they are. The provisions of Part II are, however, 
wider in application, as defined in Article 13. Persons protected by the Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 
1949, or by the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949, or by the Geneva Convention relative 
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949, shall not be considered as protected persons 
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‘internees’, although such internees may be civilians.191 According to Article 50 AP 
I: 
 
“1. A civilian is any person who does not belong to one of the categories of persons referred 
to in Article 4 A (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Convention and in Article 43 of this 
Protocol. In case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to 
be a civilian. 2. The civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians. 3. The 
presence within the civilian population of individuals who do not come within the 
definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian character”.192 
 
Thus, within the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols, a presumption exists to 
consider a population as a ‘civilian population’ unless it can be otherwise defined. 
Furthermore, if individuals within that population cannot be considered civilians, 
humanitarian assistance can still be provided as the population in general is not 
deprived of its civilian character. As the abovementioned Section 2.2.3 has discussed, 
humanitarian assistance may only be provided in accordance with the principles of 
humanity, neutrality and impartiality. The distinction between civilians and 
combatants therefore remains relevant to date in relation to the principle of neutrality, 
as well as to specifically defining a civilian population.193  
Clearly, this distinction between civilians and combatants is only relevant to the 
situation of an international armed conflict or occupation, whereas the provision of 
humanitarian assistance is broader; also encompassing circumstances outside of 
conflict, such as man-made or natural disasters. Arguably, today the distinction made 
by the Geneva Conventions regarding ‘categories’ of civilians is not as relevant, due 
to the changing nature of conflict increasingly towards non-international armed 
conflicts, which results in less distinct groups of civilians.194 Yet, Article 50 AP I 
regarding international armed conflicts also acknowledges this changing nature, as 
its final paragraph refers to the possible presence of combatants among the civilian 
population, something occurring more and more frequently in modern warfare. The 
provision of humanitarian assistance to the civilian population thereby remains 
protected under international law and the provider of assistance must do everything 
in its power to respect the principle of neutrality.195  
                                                        
within the meaning of the present Convention”. For a discussion on the categories of ‘protected persons’ 
mentioned in Article 4 of GC IV, see Jean Pictet, Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949 Volumes I-IV (International Committee of the Red Cross 1952-1959), Volume IV Commentary GC 
IV Article 4, 46-51.  
191 The Geneva Conventions provide specifically for internees, amongst others in Articles 108-111 GC 
IV.  
192 Article 43 AP I refers to those persons who are members of the armed forces, and the persons in 
Article 4 A (1), (2), (3) and (6) refer to several categories of prisoners of war.  
193 Abril Stoffels, ‘Legal Regulation of Humanitarian Assistance in Armed Conflict: Achievements and 
Gaps’ (n108) 542. 
194 Mackintosh, ‘The Principles of Humanitarian Action in International Humanitarian Law’ (n 110) 5 
195 Abril Stoffels, ‘Legal Regulation of Humanitarian Assistance in Armed Conflict: Achievements and 







The United Nations refers to a variety of subjects of humanitarian assistance, 
although all can be considered part of a civilian population. As such, UN resolutions 
refer to ‘victims’ or ‘affected populations’ of natural disasters or of other 
emergencies,196 as well as ‘civilians’ or ‘civilian populations’ which should include 
‘refugees and internally displaced persons’.197 This line of reasoning by the UN 
follows the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement that, although non-binding, 
are implemented by key actors in the field and provide that IDPs are subjects of the 
provision of humanitarian assistance when affected by a natural or man-made 
disaster.198 Refugees and IDPs can be considered a distinct category of persons in 
international law, but are included in the recipients of humanitarian assistance.199 The 
                                                        
196 UNGA Res 46/182 (19 December 1991) UN Doc. A/RES/46/182 (n 46) § 1 and 4. 
197 UNSC Res 1265 (17 September 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1265 § 7; UNGA Res 52/167 (18 February 
1998) UN Doc A/RES/52/167 ‘Safety and security of humanitarian personnel’ § 3; UNGA Res 53/87 
(27 January 1999) UN Doc A/RES/53/87 ‘ Safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection 
of United Nations personnel’ § 11; UNGA Res 60/124 (8 March 2006) UN Doc A/RES/60/124 (n 160) 
§ 2; UNGA res 61/133 (1 March 2007) UN Doc A/RES/61/133 ‘Safety and security of humanitarian 
personnel and protection of United Nations personnel’ § 4; UNGA Res 62/94 (25 January 2008) UN Doc 
A/RES/62/94 ‘Strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United 
Nations’ § 24; UNGA Res 63/139 (5 March 2009) UN Doc A/RES/63/139 ‘Strengthening of the 
coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief assistance of the United Nations, including special 
economic assistance: strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the 
United Nations’ § 25.  
198 ‘Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, submitted pursuant to 
Commission resolution 1997/39’, Addendum ‘Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement’ (Guiding 
Principles on IDPs) (11 February 1998) UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, Principle 3. The Guiding 
Principles are supported by the United Nations offices UNHCR and OHCHR, and furthermore the UN 
General Assembly declared in § 7 of UNGA Res 58/177 (12 March 2004) UN Doc A/RES/58/177 
‘Protection of and assistance to internally displaced persons’ that it ‘Expresses its appreciation of the 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement as an important tool for dealing with situations of internal 
displacement’. The former UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons 
Walter Kälin has furthermore declared in his final ‘Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General 
on the human rights of internally displaced persons’, UN Doc A/HRC/13/21 (5 January 2010) § 10 that: 
“The Guiding Principles reflect and are consistent with international human rights and humanitarian law, 
restating existing norms and tailoring them to the needs of the displaced”. Furthermore the General 
Assembly has continued to embrace the Guiding Principles, amongst others in UNGA Res 60/1 (24 
October 2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1 ‘World Summit Outcome Document’ § 132 where the General 
Assembly recognises the Principles as an “important international framework for the protection of 
internally displaced persons”, a phrasing that is echoed by UNGA Res 60/124 (8 March 2006) UN Doc. 
A/RES/60/124 (n 160) § 6; UNGA Res 60/168 (7 March 2006) A/RES/60/168 ‘Protection of and 
assistance to internally displaced persons’ § 8; and UNGA Res 62/153 (6 March 2008) UN Doc. 
A/RES/62/153, ‘Protection of and assistance to internally displaced persons’ § 10; as well as UN HRC 
Res 6/32 (14 December 2007) A/HRC/6/32 § 5. 
199 Article 1 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) declares 
anyone to be a refugee who: “(1) Has been considered a refugee under the Arrangements of 12 May 1926 
and 30 June 1928 or under the Conventions of 28 October 1933 and 10 February 1938, the Protocol of 
14 September 1939 or the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization; Decisions of non-
eligibility taken by the International Refugee Organization during the period of its activities shall not 
prevent the status of refugee being accorded to persons who fulfil the conditions of paragraph 2 of this 
section; (2) As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to wellfounded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 
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inclusion of IDPs as the recipients of humanitarian assistance flows from the increase 
of many internal disturbances and non-international armed conflicts during the 
1990s, in which affected persons, although in need of aid, could not be granted the 
status of refugees as there was no crossing of borders involved.200 Furthermore, their 
situation often arises both from an ongoing situation, and in the aftermath of an event 
such as a natural disaster. To avoid gaps in the protection of such affected persons 
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), followed by the Security 
Council, commenced incorporating the protection of IDPs in their mandate and 
actions.201 The Guiding Principles on IDPs interestingly refer specifically to women, 
children and other vulnerable groups, stating that their special needs entitle them to 
protection that takes this status into account.202  
Like the UN, the International Law Association (ILA) adopted a position with 
regard to IDPs.203 The ILA asserted in 2000 that all IDPs have the right to seek and 
receive humanitarian assistance.204 For the purpose of this research, refugees and 
IDPs will like other civilians be considered the subjects of humanitarian assistance, 
unless a separate discussion is warranted and relevant to the legal rights and 
obligations specific to their status. It remains to be noted however that the provision 
                                                        
himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country 
of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to return to it. In the case of a person who has more than one nationality, the term “the country of his 
nationality” shall mean each of the countries of which he is a national, and a person shall not be deemed 
to be lacking the protection of the country of his nationality if, without any valid reason based on well-
founded fear, he has not availed himself of the protection of one of the countries of which he is a 
national”. A thorough discussion of the notion of a refugee falls outside the scope of this research. For 
further reading, see Guy S Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (Oxford 
University Press 2007) and Erika Feller, Volker Türk, Frances Nicholson (eds), Refugee Protection in 
International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection (Cambridge University 
Press, 2003). Currently, no legal binding definition of IDPs exists, nor any legal binding document 
governing their status. The ‘Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement’ (11 February 1998) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (n 198) declare in Preambular § 2 that: “For the purposes of these Principles, 
internally displaced persons are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or 
to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the 
effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or 
human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border”. 
Furthermore, the African Union Kampala Convention on IDPs echoes this definition by the ‘Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement’ in its Article 1(k). For further reading, see Catherine Phuong, The 
International Protection of Internally Displaced Persons (Cambridge University Press 2004).  
200 Roberta Cohen, ‘Humanitarian Imperatives are Transforming Sovereignty’, (2008) 9 Northwestern 
Journal of International Affairs 1, 3-4. 
201 Ibid 4-5, and Roberta Cohen & Francis Mading Deng, Masses in Flight: The Global Crisis of Internal 
Displacement (Brookings Institution Press 1998) 120. 
202 ‘Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement’ (11 February 1998) UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 
(n 198) Principle 18(3) and 19(2).  
203 The International Law Association, founded in 1873 in Brussels is an NGO founded with the purpose 
to further the understanding and respect of (public and private) international law, as well as its study, 
clarification and development. For more information, see <http://www.ila-hq.org/index.cfm> accessed 5 
January 2012. 
204 ILA Declaration of International Law Principles on Internally Displaced Persons (29 July 2000) 
Article 3 (2). The possible right to receive humanitarian assistance will be discussed more in depth in 







of humanitarian assistance is aimed at such a stage in a crisis so as to prevent large-
scale displacement and refugees, thereby not warranting an in depth discussion of 
many particular provisions of refugee law and other bodies of law specific to IDPs 
and refugees.  
The ILC, in its study into the protection of persons in the event of disasters also 
studied the recipients of humanitarian assistance in order to assess which category of 
persons should fall within its scope of application. The ILC noted that being affected 
by natural disasters is not considered a criterion for the attribution of the status of 
refugee, although it is precisely such disasters that result in the generation of large 
numbers of refugees and IDPs.205 As the ILC notes, being affected by a disaster at 
this point in time does not represent a separate legal category in international law.206 
With this consideration, the ILC concludes that the current study and the draft articles 
it is developing shall ‘apply to the protection of persons in the event of disasters’.207 
Thereby the ILC chooses not to distinctly define which categories of persons fall 
within these ‘persons’ who may be protected through humanitarian assistance. 
Certainly, this broad approach will enable the widest array of persons to be eligible 
to fall under the ILC’s scope of protection.  
Likewise, the European Community also makes reference to victims and 
vulnerable groups, declaring that assistance shall be provided to:  
 
“people in third countries, particularly the most vulnerable among them, and as a priority 
those in developing countries, victims of natural disasters, man-made crises, such as wars 
and outbreaks of fighting, or exceptional situations or circumstances comparable to natural 
or man-made disasters”.208 
 
Similar to the European Community before it, the EU stated in 2008 that civilians are 
the main victims of humanitarian crises, in particular the ‘most vulnerable among 
them’ as well as generating large numbers of refugees and IDPs.209  
Furthermore with a view to soft law initiatives, like the early UN resolutions, the 
Institute of International Law, in its 2003 Bruges Resolution also refers to the notion 
of victims, as a group of persons ‘whose fundamental human rights or whose essential 
needs are endangered’.210 
                                                        
205 ILC ‘Preliminary report on the protection of persons in the event of disasters’ UN Doc. A/CN.4/598 
(n 76) § 27-28.  
206 Ibid § 50.  
207 ILC ‘Protection of persons in the event of disasters’ Draft Articles UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.831 (15 May 
2014) Draft Article 1: “The present draft articles apply to the protection of persons in the event of 
disasters”.  
208 European Council Regulation concerning humanitarian aid (EC) No. 1257/96 (20 June 1996) Article 
1. 
209 ‘Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States 
meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission’ (European 
Consensus on Humanitarian Aid)  (30 January 2008) EU Doc 2008/C/25/01, § 2.  
210 Bruges Resolution ‘Humanitarian Assistance’ (2 September 2003) (n 82) §3.  
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It can be concluded that the subjects and recipients of humanitarian assistance, 
regardless of the specific circumstances they may find themselves in (such as conflict 
or natural disaster) are civilians, including particularly vulnerable groups such as 
refugees and IDPs. Although the Guiding Principles on IDPs make a separate 
reference to groups with special needs, such as women and children, this is not 
common to the discussion of the subjects of humanitarian assistance.  
 
2.3.2 Providers of Humanitarian Assistance 
 
In previous Sections, various organisations involved in the provision of humanitarian 
assistance have already been touched upon, as well as the manner in which 
humanitarian assistance must be provided. At this stage, it is important to look into 
these organisations in more depth, including the particular roles they fulfill in the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance. In this Section a basic overview of the various 
relevant actors in the provision of humanitarian assistance will be provided in a more 
comprehensive manner, namely the ‘affected state’, international organisations and 
NGOs, and third states. As such, this Section shall commence by addressing the actor 
that is often considered the primary responsible provider of assistance: the ‘affected 
state’. The affected state holds a particularly special and delicate position and 
therefore a greater focus will be placed on its specific responsibilities and duties in 
the following Chapters as an in depth analysis of an affected states’ duties and rights 
will not be pursued at this stage.  
 
2.3.2.1 The Affected State 
 
Whether humanitarian assistance is provided or not, is often directly related to the 
possibilities and willingness of the affected state to do so itself. As the sovereign 
authority in the particular area where the assistance is needed, its role cannot be 
overlooked or surpassed. In fact, the affected state can be both a vehicle and an 
obstacle in the provision of assistance.211 The Geneva Conventions do not make use 
of the particular phrasing ‘affected state’, as it is mostly derived from situations of 
(natural) disaster, but by analogy it can be applicable to circumstances of conflict too, 
as the sovereign over a territory in which a conflict takes place shall be the primary 
‘affected’ actor, for a variety of reasons amongst which simply the matter of vicinity 
and sovereign responsibility.212 Although no specific mention is made of the 
‘affected state’, the Geneva Conventions did foresee a role for authorities in 
territories dealing with a situation of potential crisis, where assistance may be needed. 
Article 59 GC IV mentions for example that an ‘Occupying Power’ is to allow for 
assistance in the occupied territories, as well as facilitate such assistance.213 Staying 
                                                        
211 See Chapter 4 State Sovereignty as a Contextual Concept regarding Humanitarian Assistance, for a 
discussion of sovereignty as such an obstacle or vehicle. 
212 For considerations into primary responsibility, see Chapter 6.  
213 Article 59 GC IV states: “If the whole or part of the population of an occupied territory is inadequately 







within the realm of occupation, the Geneva Conventions furthermore provide a role 
for the delivery of humanitarian assistance for many other actors: 
 
“The distribution of the relief consignments referred to in the foregoing Articles shall be 
carried out with the cooperation and under the supervision of the Protecting Power. This 
duty may also be delegated, by agreement between the Occupying Power and the 
Protecting Power, to a neutral Power, to the International Committee of the Red Cross or 
to any other impartial humanitarian body […]”.214 
 
As such, the Conventions acknowledge the possibility of the provision of assistance 
by third states, the ICRC or another neutral organisation.  
Returning to the ‘affected state’, the Geneva Conventions’ Common Article 3 lays 
an obligation on all ‘parties to the conflict’ to take certain minimum requirements.215 
For the purpose of this Section, it is relevant to note that these parties include not 
only states, but also armed groups and other forces involved in a non-international 
armed conflict.216 Additional Protocol I, relating to international armed conflicts, 
similarly mentions a role for ‘the Parties to the conflict’ as well as ‘each High 
Contracting Party’, wording also used by the Additional Protocol II in relation to 
non-international armed conflicts.217 Although not hard law, but voicing international 
legal scholarship, the San Remo Principles formulated: 
 
“The primary responsibility to protect and assist the victims of emergencies is that of the 
authorities of the territory in which the emergency causing urgent humanitarian needs 
occurs”.218 
 
Thus, like the Geneva Conventions, in particular their 1977 Protocols, the San Remo 
Principles envisaged that not only a state sovereign may function as the highest 
authority within a certain territory, but in certain territories this role may be taken by 
some other form of authority.  
Outside the realm of international humanitarian law and focusing more on 
situations of (natural) disaster, the UN General Assembly has also reaffirmed the 
                                                        
facilitate them by all the means at its disposal. Such schemes, which may be undertaken either by States 
or by impartial humanitarian organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, shall 
consist, in particular, of the provision of consignments of foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing. All 
Contracting Parties shall permit the free passage of these consignments and shall guarantee their 
protection. A Power granting free passage to consignments on their way to territory occupied by an 
adverse Party to the conflict shall, however, have the right to search the consignments, to regulate their 
passage according to prescribed times and routes, and to be reasonably satisfied through the Protecting 
Power that these consignments are to be used for the relief of the needy population and are not to be used 
for the benefit of the Occupying Power”. See also Section 6.5.3 Duties of the Affected State (Occupying 
Power) in Times of Occupation for the particular duties of an occupier.  
214 Article 61 GC IV. 
215 For the full text of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions see (n 119).  
216 See Section 3.2.1 Defining an Armed Conflict on the definition of a non-international armed conflict 
and actors involved therein. 
217 Article 70 AP I and Article 18 AP II.  
218 ‘Guiding Principles on the Right to Humanitarian Assistance’ (n 80) Principle 4. 
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primary role of the affected state in many of its resolutions, with a view to its tasks 
as a sovereign.219 In more recent years, the ILC has also considered the ‘affected 
state’ as holding a primary position in the provision of humanitarian assistance in the 
event of disasters and as such has drafted: 
 
“1. The affected State, by virtue of its sovereignty, has the duty to ensure the protection of 
persons and provision of disaster relief and assistance on its territory. 2. The affected State 
has the primary role in the direction, control, coordination and supervision of such relief 
and assistance”.220  
 
Thereby the ILC, in line with the UN General Assembly, maintains this primary role 
for the affected state, as well as granting it a coordinating role, thus acknowledging 
the possibility of assistance from the exterior.221 This viewpoint had already been 
adopted by the ILC at an earlier stage of its research, as it argued that ‘outside actors’ 
could play a considerable role in the provision of assistance.222  
The IFRC has, unlike the UN General Assembly and the ILC, opted to provide a 
definition of such an affected state, and has declared it to be: 
 
“The State upon whose territory persons or property are affected by a disaster”.223 
 
As discussed, it may be assumed that the affected state undertakes its allotted role 
and task in the event of a (natural) disaster more willingly, as opposed perhaps to an 
unwilling attitude in a situation of armed conflict or occupation in which assistance 
may be necessary, but further Sections will show that such an assumption must not 
be made lightly.224 A well-known recent example is that of cyclone Nargis, where 
the authorities in Myanmar were unwilling to allow the provision of humanitarian 
assistance for a prolonged period of time.225 
                                                        
219 Amongst others in UNGA Res 36/225 (17 December 1981) UN Doc A/RES/36/225 ‘Strengthening 
the Capacity of the United Nations system to respond to natural disasters and other disaster situations’ § 
2; UNGA Res 45/100 (14 December 1990) UN Doc A/RES/45/100 (n 156) Preambular §  2 and Operative 
§ 2; and UNGA Res 46/182 (19 December 1991) UN Doc. A/RES/46/182 (n 46) Guiding Principle 4. 
See for more specific duties Section 6.3.3 Duties of the Affected State under General Assembly 
Resolutions. 
220 ILC ‘Protection of persons in the event of disasters’ Draft Articles UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.831 (15 May 
2014) Draft Article 12.  
221 See for more specific duties Section 6.3.3 Duties of the Affected State under General Assembly 
Resolutions. In further Sections, an in depth discussion of the relationship between sovereignty and the 
provision of humanitarian assistance will take place, as well as a more in depth view of the responsibilities 
of the affected state. 
222 ILC ‘Protection of persons in the event of disasters, Memorandum by the Secretariat’ UN Doc 
A/CN.4/590 (11 December 2007) § 250.  
223 IFRC ‘Guidelines for the domestic facilitation and regulation of international disaster relief and initial 
recovery assistance’ (IDRL Guidelines) (30 November 2007), adopted at the 30th International 
Conference of the Movement, Section 2, § 8 . 
224 See in particular Chapter 4 State Sovereignty as a Contextual Concept regarding Humanitarian 
Assistance. 








Most other institutions and actors have attempted to abstract the concept of the 
affected state from a particular situation such as conflict or natural disaster and rather 
apply the role of primary responsible actor to a range of situations. In doing so, these 
institutions attempt to provide more regulation for the practical circumstances on the 
ground, that have proven that humanitarian assistance is certainly not always 
provided when it is in fact needed. As such, the Institute for International Law 
declared in its 2003 Bruges Resolution that an affected state is ‘the State or the 
territorial entity where humanitarian assistance is needed’, without specifying the 
particular circumstance.226 The Bruges Resolution emphatically places a primary 
responsibility on the affected state in the provision of humanitarian assistance, or on 
another authority that may be exercising jurisdiction in a certain area.227 Similarly, 
the Mohonk Criteria envisage the task for the provision of humanitarian assistance to 
lie firstly with the authorities in the affected state, declaring also that ‘insurgent 
groups and militias’ should be held to equal standards.228 Furthermore, Macalister-
Smith also noted the primary role as lying with the affected state, keeping in mind 
that the state may however be limited in its possibilities: 
 
“Primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance within the limits of the 
resources available rests with the national authorities of the State where persons are in 
need”.229 
 
In relation to the assistance of the specific category of IDPs, the recently effective 
2009 Kampala Convention and the ILA Declaration on IDPs of 2000 both see a 
primary role for the national authorities of the affected territories, but also include a 
role for international organisations providing relief.230 This position can also be seen 
with the abovementioned Geneva Conventions and the Institute for Humanitarian 
                                                        
0>; <http://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-cyclone-nargis-ocha-situation-report-no-6> 
accessed 2 October 2013. 
226 Bruges Resolution ‘Humanitarian Assistance’ (2 September 2003) (n 82) Section I.4.  
227 Bruges Resolution ‘Humanitarian Assistance’ (2 September 2003) (n 82) Section III on the primary 
responsibility of the affected State declares “1. The affected State has the duty to take care of the victims 
of disaster in its territory and has therefore the primary responsibility in the organization, provision and 
distribution of humanitarian assistance. As a result, it has the duty to take the necessary measures to 
prevent the misappropriation of humanitarian assistance and other abuses. 2. Any other authority 
exercising jurisdiction or de facto control over the victims of a disaster (for example in case of 
disintegration of the governmental authority) has the duty to provide them with the necessary 
humanitarian assistance, and also has all the other duties and rights of the affected State provided for in 
this Resolution”.  
228 ‘The Mohonk Criteria for Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies’, (1995) (n 176) Section 
II ‘Responsibility to provide assistance during complex emergencies’: “1. Primary responsibility for the 
protection and wellbeing of civilian populations rests with the government of the state or the authorities 
in control of the territory in which the endangered persons are located. 2. Insurgent groups and militias 
should be held to the same standards of responsibility as governments”. 
229 Macalister-Smith’ ‘International Guidelines for Humanitarian Assistance Operations (n 79) Principle 
6(b).  
230 African Union Kampala Convention Article 5(1) and 5(7); ILA Declaration of International Law 
Principles on Internally Displaced Persons (29 July 2000) Article 10.  
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Law. The latter envisaged with its San Remo Principles that national and 
international organisations mandated with the provision of humanitarian assistance 
should in fact be able to provide it.231 Furthermore the Institute for International Law 
also envisages multiple actors involved in the provision of assistance, other than the 
affected state or another authority in that territory:  
 
“Assistance may be sought on behalf of the victims, by the members of the group, by local 
and regional authorities, the government of the affected State, and national or international 
organizations”.232 
 
Thus, most institutions realise that designating a primary role for the affected state in 
itself is not enough to ensure the provision of humanitarian assistance, thereby 
acknowledging important roles for other actors, such as international organisations 
and NGOs. This approach in itself hints at a need for international assistance in the 
provision of assistance as is addressed in Chapter 7. Indeed, whilst a primary role for 
the affected state remains crucial, the changing notion of state sovereignty in the 21st 
century addresses the difficulties faced in circumstances where an affected state does 
not provide assistance or provide for its citizens in a broader sense.233 The specific 
legal framework pertaining to the legal rights and duties of the affected state in the 
provision of humanitarian assistance will be discussed further in Chapter 6. Given 
the struggles and difficulties states face in times of conflict, as well as the fact that 
authorities in times of natural disaster are often either overwhelmed or occasionally 
unwilling to provide assistance, it is indeed logical to turn to providers of 
humanitarian assistance from either outside the territory that is affected, or national 
organisations without ties to the affected state.234 These institutions provide 
alternative manners for the provision of humanitarian assistance to those in need.  
 
2.3.2.2 International Organisations 
  
The previous Sections have already touched upon various organisations involved in 
the provision of humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, from the above it has become 
apparent that, although a primary role is envisaged for the affected states or other 
authorities acting as such, the ICRC, the UN and other organisations and institutions 
also play a large role in the provision of such assistance.235 A distinction must be 
made between international organisations such as the UN and EU, with both inter-
governmental and supranational characteristics, as subjects of international law, and 
                                                        
231 Guiding Principles on the Right to Humanitarian Assistance’ (n 80) Principle 5. 
232 Bruges Resolution ‘Humanitarian Assistance’ (2 September 2003) (n 82) Section II.2. 
233 The following Chapters will provide an in depth discussion of the relationship between humanitarian 
assistance and sovereignty.  
234 See UNGA Res 59/141 (25 February 2005) UN Doc A/RES/59/141 ‘Strengthening of the coordination 
of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations’ § 11-12 referencing the central role played 
by civilian organisations.  
235 This research will not provide an overview of all organisations involved in the provision of 
humanitarian assistance. It will merely portray that organisations are involved in humanitarian assistance, 







non-governmental organisations with a different standing in the international legal 
arena. Specifically in circumstances of (non-) international conflict, the Geneva 
Conventions consider a large role for the ICRC, an organisation with a very particular 
status, as it is neither intergovernmental nor non-governmental.236 Given the 
character of this research into the legal framework on the rights and duties under 
international law in the provision of humanitarian assistance, a focus will be placed 
upon those organisations with a particular standing or enforcement possibility in 
international law, in order to assess potential rights and duties that they might have. 
This is not to say that local NGOs do not play an important role on the ground in the 
factual distribution of food, water and medicine to those in need of assistance. 
The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols refer to the ICRC or 
another organisation that follows its principles of humanity and impartiality for the 
provision of humanitarian assistance.237 In its Articles, the Geneva Conventions and 
Protocols declare that the ICRC or a comparable humanitarian and impartial 
organisation may be involved in the provision of humanitarian assistance in times of 
conflict or occupation amounting to a crisis.238 Outside the realm of occupation and 
conflict, resort must be had to sources other than international treaties, to determine 
the roles laid out for international organisations.  
A clear distinction has been made between the work of the ICRC and the IFRC,239 
which also becomes apparent in determining the role of the latter as a provider of 
humanitarian assistance. The IFRC itself declares:  
 
“The IFRC carries out relief operations to assist victims of disasters […]. The IFRC's work 
focuses on four core areas: promoting humanitarian values, disaster response, disaster 
preparedness, and health and community care”.240 
 
Although the IFRC is the largest humanitarian organisation in the world, with 187 
national societies in countries around the globe,241 a central role is also played by the 
UN in the coordination of humanitarian assistance for those in need in the 
international community. Such a leading and coordinating role was already envisaged 
by the UN General Assembly in its 1991 Resolution 46/182.242 The Inter-Agency 
Standing Committee (IASC) was created in 1992, following a call thereto in this 
prominent Resolution on ‘Strengthening the coordination of humanitarian emergency 
                                                        
236 See Section 2.3.2.2 International Organisations.  
237 Common Article 3, Articles 10, 59 61 and 63 GC IV; Article 70 AP I; Article 18(2) AP II. 
238 Ibid. Further Chapters will discuss the exact status of the rights of such organisations in the provision 
of humanitarian assistance.  
239 See (n 52) on the tasks and mandate of the ICRC and IFRC, as well as their mutual relationship. 
240 For more information on the role and tasks of the IFRC: <http://www.ifrc.org/en/who-we-are/vision-
and-mission/> accessed  3 January 2011. 
241 Ibid. 
242 UNGA Res 46/182 (19 December 1991) UN Doc. A/RES/46/182 (n 46) Annex I, Guiding Principles 
5 and 12, and Section VI ‘Coordination, Cooperation and Leadership’. 
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assistance of the United Nations’.243 Its envisaged task of being primary coordinator 
for the UN and other organisations delivering international humanitarian assistance, 
was confirmed in a subsequent General Assembly Resolution.244 Following the 
structural changes within the UN in the 1990s, the IASC falls within the larger 
framework of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs created in 
1998,245 and carries out OCHA’s coordination task of providing effective 
humanitarian assistance through combined efforts of humanitarian organisations. 
OCHA is mandated as a whole to function as part of the UN Secretariat, and is 
responsible for the coordination of all humanitarian actors involved in the provision 
of assistance during and in the aftermath of humanitarian crises, including policy and 
advocacy work.246 Both the IASC and OCHA are headed by the Emergency Relief 
Coordinator.247 With OCHA and the IASC, the UN has created a large coordinating 
framework for the provision and delivery of humanitarian assistance, encompassing 
many organisations involved in the delivery of humanitarian assistance such as the 
ICRC and UNHCR.248 Within the European continent, the EU holds a central 
organisational role with regard to the provision of humanitarian assistance by 
European countries. The European ‘counterpart’ of OCHA is the European 
Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), also created in 1992. In more recent 
years, ECHO has undergone changes; becoming first the Directorate-General for 
Humanitarian Aid and since 2010 also encompassing Civil Protection.249 Unlike the 
UN, which had initially focused its humanitarian assistance on situations of natural 
disaster, the European Civil Protection Mechanism does not distinguish between the 
                                                        
243 UNGA Res 46/182 (19 December 1991) UN Doc. A/RES/46/182 (n 46) Annex I Section VI 
‘Coordination, Cooperation and Leadership’ § 38.  
244 UNGA Res 48/57 (14 December 1993) UN Doc A/RES/48/57 (n 158). For more information on the 
IASC, see <http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/pageloader.aspx?page=content-about-default> 
accessed 24 October 2011. Members and Invitees to the IASC include the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), OCHA, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations 
Population Fund (UNFPA), the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UNHABITAT), the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF), the World Food Programme (WFP), the World Health Organization (WHO), the ICRC, the 
International  Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), the IFRC, InterAction, the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR), the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR), the UN Office of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons and the World Bank. 
245 Section 2.2.1 Historical Development. See also 
<http://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/UNOCHA%20Organigramme%202011.pdf> accessed 3 
January 2012.  
246 For more information on the work and mandate of OCHA: <http://www.unocha.org/about-us/who-
we-are> accessed 3 January 2012.  
247 For more information on the Emergency Relief Coordinator, Ms. Valerie Amos: 
<http://www.unocha.org/about-us/headofOCHA> accessed 3 January 2012.  
248 Regarding the IASC’s Members and Invitees see (n 244). Furthermore, although outside the scope of 
this research, it is relevant to mention that the UN is also active in the arena of disaster risk reduction, 
through its International Strategy for Disaster Reduction and the Hyogo Declaration and Hyogo 
Framework for Action of 2005.  
249 For more information on ECHO, operating under the EU Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and 







circumstances in which it comes into action.250 The EU has furthermore instated a 
special commissioner for ‘International cooperation, humanitarian aid and crisis 
response’.251 Efforts are underway for the development of a European Humanitarian 
Aid Voluntary Corps. In practice, all the above-mentioned organisations cooperate 
in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Besides these three large institutions: the 
Red Cross, the UN and the EU, actors such as NGOs and private organisations play 
an extremely large role in the provision of humanitarian assistance. Given the fact 
that this research focuses on the international legal framework, and such 
organisations do not have a crystallised status within this body of law, they shall 
remain outside the scope of this research, which focuses more on the role of 
international organisations. Furthermore, it is beyond the scope of this research to 
address all these private organisations and NGOs, and suffice to mention that when 
in conformity with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality, these 
organisations too are considered as part of the providers of humanitarian 
assistance.252 
 
2.3.2.3 Third States 
 
Lastly, it is relevant to mention the role of third states as providers of humanitarian 
assistance. In the event of a humanitarian crisis, not only the affected state, 
international organisations and NGOs have a large role in the provision of assistance. 
Individual third states, or sometimes coalitions of third states, may be needed or 
called upon to provide assistance to people in need. As seen above in Section 2.2.3, 
it is relevant that the manner of provision of assistance is neutral, and in accordance 
with the principles of humanity and impartiality. Thus, although states may not 
always be neutral, they are quite capable of providing humanitarian assistance in 
conformity with these principles and can therefore be considered providers of 
humanitarian assistance. As seen above, the Geneva Conventions also make 
reference to such a potential role for third states (in particular relation to 
circumstances of occupation), mentioning in Article 61 GC IV ‘Protecting Powers’ 
or ‘Neutral Powers’.253 The UN also counts on third states to participate in the 
provision of humanitarian assistance, calling upon them as early as 1970 to offer: 
                                                        
250 Ibid: “CPM interventions cover all types of major emergencies, including natural and man-made 
disasters, acts of terrorism and technological, radiological and environmental accidents, including 
accidental marine pollution”.  
251 The current Commissioner for ‘Humanitarian Aid & Crisis Management’ is Christos Stylianides: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/stylianides_en> accessed 15 December 2014.  
252 The role of international organisations as well as NGOs in relation to the possible right to provide 
assistance, as well as the possible right to access for such provision will be addressed further in Chapters 
6 and 7. 
253 Article 61 GC IV states: “The distribution of the relief consignments referred to in the foregoing 
Articles shall be carried out with the cooperation and under the supervision of the Protecting Power. This 
duty may also be delegated, by agreement between the Occupying Power and the Protecting Power, to a 
neutral Power, to the International Committee of the Red Cross or to any other impartial humanitarian 
body. Such consignments shall be exempt in occupied territory from all charges, taxes or customs duties 
 
 
Defining Humanitarian Assistance, the Principles for its Provision  
and Determining the Relevant Actors 
67 
 
“[…] emergency assistance to meet natural disasters, including stand-by relief units or the 
earmarking of similar units for the service in foreign countries”.254 
 
This line of reasoning was continued by the UN, as the 1984 Draft Convention also 
envisaged the possibility of an ‘Assisting State’ for the provision of humanitarian 
assistance.255 Furthermore, the UN has called upon and urged ‘the international 
community’ on several occasions with regard to IDPs, refugees or other persons 
protected by international humanitarian law over the past decades to provide 
humanitarian assistance to those within affected states.256 From this choice in word 
use, it is also apparent that not only individual third states provide assistance, but that 
(ad hoc) coalitions of third states are also called upon to aid the affected state. The 
ILC for its part, in its study of the protection of persons in the event of disaster, has 
also considered the possibility of third states partaking in emergency assistance.257 
Tasks for an assisting third state are also considered by Macalister-Smith in his 
International Guidelines for Humanitarian Assistance Operations,258 as well as seen 
in the San Remo Principles259 and the 2003 Bruges Resolution.260 The Mohonk 
Criteria on the other hand use the UN formulation of the ‘international community’ 
as a whole,261 while the IFRC in its 2007 IDRL Guidelines considers that the assisting 
state may make use of civil or military components for its humanitarian assistance, 
although the military component is recommended to be limited in use.262 Given the 
variety and proliferation of actors involved in the provision of humanitarian 
                                                        
unless these are necessary in the interests of the economy of the territory. The Occupying Power shall 
facilitate the rapid distribution of these consignments. All Contracting Parties shall endeavour to permit 
the transit and transport, free of charge, of such relief consignments on their way to occupied territories”. 
254 ECOSOC ‘Assistance in cases of natural disaster’ Res 1546 (XLIX) (30 July 1970) § 6. 
255 UNGA Res 39/367 ‘Draft Convention on Expediting the Delivery of Emergency Relief’ (n 38) Article 
1(f).  
256 See for instance UNGA Res 49/169 (23 December 1994) UN Doc A/RES/49/169 § 11; and UNSC 
Res 1674 (28 April 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1674 § 13. For the current rights and duties of third states in 
the provision of humanitarian assistance, see Chapter 7. 
257 ILC Doc A/CN.4/590, Protection of persons in the event of disasters, Memorandum by the Secretariat, 
§ 250, 11 December 2007. 
258 Macalister-Smith’ ‘International Guidelines for Humanitarian Assistance Operations (n 79) Article 
2(c): “’Assisting State or organization’ means the State or organization providing humanitarian assistance 
at the request or with the consent of the receiving state”. 
259 Guiding Principles on the Right to Humanitarian Assistance’ (n 80) Principle 5. 
260 Bruges Resolution ‘Humanitarian Assistance’ (2 September 2003) (n 82) Article I(5): “’Assisting 
State or organization’ means the State or intergovernmental organization, or impartial international or 
national non-governmental organization which organizes, provides or distributes humanitarian 
assistance”. 
261 ‘The Mohonk Criteria for Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies’, (1995) (n 176) II.4: 
“Where the government or other authority is unable or manifestly unwilling to provide life-sustaining 
aid, the international community has the right and obligation to protect and provide relief to affected and 
threatened civilian populations in conformity with the principles of international law”. 
262 IFRC IDRL Guidelines (2007) (n 223) Article 2(9): “’Assisting State’ means a State providing disaster 
relief or initial recovery assistance whether through civil or military components”. See also the 







assistance, the IFRC also considers the quite effective formulation of ‘assisting 
actor’, in order to encompass all possible contributors to the provision of 
humanitarian assistance.263 
Thus, from the above it is clear that amongst the providers of humanitarian 
assistance, several distinct actors can be discerned. First and foremost, the affected 
state has a large and primary role in the provision of assistance. Furthermore, 
international organisations amongst which primarily the ICRC and IFRC, the UN and 
the EU play a large role, as well as (national) NGOs. Lastly, third states either 
individually, through an (ad hoc) coalition or the international community as a whole 
can be considered, and are on occasion also called upon, for the provision of 
humanitarian assistance. The legal framework of the exact rights and duties of such 
third parties in the provision of humanitarian assistance will be discussed in Chapters 




This Chapter has served the purpose of providing the foundation upon which an 
analysis of the current legal framework regarding humanitarian assistance can be 
based. Before the analysis can take place, it has been relevant to look into the 
historical development of humanitarian assistance, from Henri Dunant’s efforts 
following the battle at Solferino, to the large-scale efforts today of many international 
organisations.264 From this historical overview, the original division and separation 
of the provision of assistance in times of conflict or occupation and the provision of 
assistance in times of natural disaster was put in perspective.265 Following the brief 
historical overview, a discussion of the notion of humanitarian assistance has taken 
place, taking into account the various definitions provided by a large variety of (legal) 
sources, primarily flowing from several institutions and soft law resolutions. A clear, 
legally binding definition is currently still lacking. For the purpose of this research, 
a definition of humanitarian assistance has been proposed, which will be used 
throughout. This definition determines that such assistance, in order to be categorised 
as humanitarian, must ‘consist of food, medicine, shelter and logistics for its 
provision; for urgent purposes and which is indispensable to the survival of the 
people at whom it is aimed’.266 Important elements of this definition of humanitarian 
assistance are the urgency of the need and the indispensable nature of the assistance.  
Having defined humanitarian assistance, the manner in which it may be provided 
to be considered ‘humanitarian’ in nature has also been explored, upon which it has 
                                                        
263 Ibid Article 2(14): “’Assisting actor’ means any assisting humanitarian organization, assisting State, 
foreign individual, foreign private company providing charitable relief or other foreign entity responding 
to a disaster on the territory of the affected State or sending in-kind 
or cash donations”. See also the Annotations to the IDRL Guidelines, 26 October 2007, comments to 
Article 2(14) at p. 13.    
264 Section 2.2.1 Historical Development.  
265 Ibid. 
266 Section 2.2.2 Defining Humanitarian Assistance. 
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been concluded that such assistance must at least be in conformity with the principles 
of humanity, neutrality and impartiality.267 These three principles are embraced by 
not only the ICRC and the UN, but also various other relevant actors in the field. In 
particular the ICJ has contributed to the reinforcement of the notion of humanity, as 
well as the assertion that the provision of assistance must occur in a non-
discriminatory manner. The principle of independence remains an important aspect 
of the deliverance of humanitarian assistance, yet its definition and content vary 
amongst actors in the field.268  
With clearer picture of the notion of humanitarian assistance and the manner in 
which it should be provided set in place, this Chapter has proceeded to discuss the 
various actors involved in the provision and receipt of humanitarian assistance. The 
subjects, or recipients, of such assistance have been found to be civilians, including 
vulnerable groups such as refugees and IDPs.269 Providers of humanitarian assistance 
can be divided into several categories. Firstly, a primary role can be discerned for the 
‘affected state’ or authorities in the affected territory. Other actors include 
international organisations such as the ICRC and IFRC, the UN and the EU. 
Furthermore, whilst NGOs are of great importance to the deliverance of assistance, 
they are too numerous to be discussed independently. Lastly, third states, be it 
individually or through an (ad hoc) coalition are recognised as providers of assistance 
to those in need.270 It remains relevant to note that although many of these actors (in 
particular NGOs) have developed instruments, such as guidelines and resolutions that 
have been used in this Chapter with regard to certain definitional issues, these 
instruments do not have independent legal standing.271 Yet, as they are reflective of 
the perspective of the various actors in the field, they have proven relevant in the 
discussion of these actors and the manner in which these actors perceive humanitarian 
assistance and its provision. The legal framework to be discussed in this research will 
however not lean upon such instruments.  
Having provided an overview of the history of the provision of humanitarian 
assistance and the development of the involvement of various actors, as well as 
having offered a new definition of humanitarian assistance and discussed the manner 
in which it must be provided, the subsequent Chapter will address the various 
circumstances in which humanitarian assistance may be needed. Following on from 
this, the assessment of the scope of application also warrants a discussion on the 
applicable law in these circumstances. 
                                                        
267 Section 2.2.3 The Principles for the Delivery of Assistance. 
268 Section 2.2.3.5. Other Perspectives on the Principles for Providing Humanitarian Assistance. 
269 Section 2.3.1 Recipients of Humanitarian Assistance.  
270 Section 2.3.2 Providers of Humanitarian Assistance.  
271 See Section 1.4.2 Secondary Sources for a more in depth discussion of the concept of ‘soft law’ and 
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Humanitarian assistance as a concept has been defined to include the provision of 
food, medicine, shelter and logistics, for urgent purposes and aimed at the survival of 
those in need. Thus, humanitarian assistance is confined to emergency situations, in 
which civilians are in need of receiving such aid. This Chapter will address which 
particular circumstances can be considered such emergency situations, warranting the 
provision of assistance. As such, the circumstances of armed conflict, occupation and 
(natural) disaster in which humanitarian assistance becomes a factor, are explored. 
Furthermore, the ‘umbrella’ notion of a ‘humanitarian crisis’ is addressed, as a 
concept to encompass these individual circumstances. Indeed, whilst situations of 
conflict or disaster are factual, they invoke legal consequences through the 
applicability of several fields of law containing provisions regarding the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance. In the event of a natural disaster, general public international 
law and human rights law are of relevance, yet in times of armed conflict and 
occupation, international humanitarian law will also have to be considered. Thus, the 
scope of application of humanitarian assistance must be complemented with an 
                                                        
1 ‘Humanitarian Bulletin Syria’ Issue 49, UN OCHA (19 Jun – 16 July 2014) 1-2. 
The conflict in Syria (starting 2011) has often been labeled a ‘humanitarian 
crisis’ by the international media. OCHA provides shocking figures, stating that 
half the population of Syria; 10.8 million, out of 21.4 million citizens, are in need 
of aid. A further 6.4 million are classified as IDPs. OCHA states:  
 
“An estimated 2.5 million people in Aleppo City continue to be affected by water 
shortages since the breakdown of the main water network on 2 June. Despite negotiations, 
technical experts and humanitarian actors have not gained access to the site near the 
Suleiman al Halabi pumping station to conduct necessary repairs”.  
 
Yet, what circumstances make a humanitarian crisis, and which don’t qualify as 
such? When a crisis is established, what law must be applied? This chapter will 








analysis of the relationship between the various applicable fields of law that are of 
relevance in the event of a humanitarian crisis.  
 
3.2 The Circumstances that may Require Humanitarian Assistance 
 
This Section addresses the various circumstances in which the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance can be necessary, given their magnitude, grave nature or 
overwhelming impact. The international legal regulation of humanitarian assistance 
commenced with its regulation in times of occupation, leading to its regulation in 
other circumstances too.2 Given the change in warfare over the past decades resulting 
in a vast increase of non-international armed conflicts, as well as keeping in line with 
chronology where conflict often precedes occupation, this Section firstly addresses 
armed conflict. Subsequently the circumstance of occupation will be addressed, to 
determine in which situations humanitarian assistance may be necessary and lastly 
(natural) disasters are discussed. To consider the scope of application of the legal 
framework concerning humanitarian assistance, the various circumstances in which 
it takes place must be considered. The regulation of the provision of humanitarian 
assistance has followed the general legal regulation of the various circumstances 
such as conflict and disaster, in which aid is provided. Indeed, humanitarian 
assistance need only be provided when it has been ascertained that a humanitarian 
crisis is taking place as part of the factual circumstances of conflict, occupation or 
natural disaster. Upon such an assessment, no international legal dispute will exist 
concerning the status of the situation and thereby the legality of the provision of 
humanitarian assistance.3 Such establishments are furthermore of relevance in 
relation to the role of the affected state sovereign, that has the primary role in the 
provision of assistance when such aid may be needed. The determination of such a 
crisis is often assessed by the sovereign itself but, as seen below, can also be 
established in other manners should the affected state be dismissive with regard to 
the provision of aid.  
 
3.2.1 Defining an Armed Conflict  
 
A primary circumstance potentially warranting the provision of humanitarian 
assistance, is traditionally an armed conflict.4 The legal qualification of this 
immediately enables the provision of assistance to take place within two distinct 
                                                        
2 Heike Spieker, ‘The Right to Give and Receive Humanitarian Assistance’,  in HJ Heintze & A Zwitter 
(eds), Humanitarian Assistance and International Law (Springer 2011) 12.  
3 See in this regard Section 8.2.1 Circumstances of Denial or Obstruction: Determining a Humanitarian 
Crisis. 
4 It is relevant to note that each law has its scope of applicability, divided into ratione materiae, ratione 
personae, ratione loci and ratione temporis. For the purposes of this research however, these notions will 
not be examined individually. In so far as the scope of application of a certain law is relevant to the 
application of provisions of humanitarian assistance, this research will address them ad hoc in the 
following Sections.  
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circumstances; namely an international armed conflict and a non-international 
armed conflict.5 Although increasingly the legal distinction between the two types of 
conflict is being discussed,6 both will be defined separately for the purpose of this 
research. Firstly, regarding the concept of an international armed conflict, Common 
Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions notes:  
 
“In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present 
Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which 
may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is 
not recognized by one of them. The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or 
total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation 
meets with no armed resistance. Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party 
to the present Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in 
their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to 
the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof”. 
 
With the Geneva Conventions, a declaration of war is no longer necessary for the 
rules of international humanitarian law, as laid down in these Conventions, to become 
applicable.7 To avoid states’ arguments that international humanitarian law is not 
applicable in certain instances due to the fact that the state of war has not been 
recognised, the Conventions become applicable from the very moment that hostilities 
take place.8 However, the Conventions do not define this notion of ‘armed conflict’, 
nor does any other treaty, and Pictet notes in the Commentary that any intervention 
of armed forces between two states can be considered an armed conflict, regardless 
of length or intensity.9 Additional Protocol I has furthermore elaborated that an armed 
conflict may include those situations in which a people fight against ‘colonial 
                                                        
5 Much has been written on the concept of armed conflict. Therefore, this research will only briefly 
establish the legal concepts of an ‘international armed conflict’ and a ‘non-international armed conflict’. 
For further reading, see amongst others Robert Kolb and Richard Hyde, An Introduction to the 
International Law of Armed Conflicts (Hart 2008); Anthony Cullen, The Concept of Non-International 
Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge University Press 2010); and Sylvain 
Vité, ‘Typology of armed conflicts in international humanitarian law: legal concepts and actual 
situations’, (2009) 91 International Review of the Red Cross 873, 69 – 94. See also the International Law 
Association, ‘Final Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict in International Law’ of the Committee on 
the Use of Force (Hague Conference 2010).  
6 Ibid ILA ‘Final Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict in International Law’ 8-9. As this research 
will focus for a large part on the lex lata, it remains important to distinguish both types of armed conflict, 
and the relevant provisions regarding humanitarian assistance related thereto.  
7 Jean Pictet, Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 Volumes I-IV (International 
Committee of the Red Cross 1952-1959), Volume IV Commentary GC IV Article 2, 20. See also Frits 
Kalshoven & Liesbeth Zegveld, Constraints on the Waging of War: An Introduction to International 
Humanitarian Law (Cambridge University Press 2011) 30-31. 
8 Pictet, Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (n 7). 
9 Ibid Article 2, 20-21. The Commentary states: “Any difference arising between two States and leading 
to the intervention of armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2, even if one of 
the Parties denies the existence of a state of war. It makes no difference how long the conflict lasts, or 
how much slaughter takes place. The respect due to human personality is not measured by the number of 
victims. Nor, incidentally, does the application of the Convention necessarily involve the intervention of 







domination, alien occupation and racist régimes’ in the exercise of their right to self-
determination, as opposed to viewing them as a non-international armed conflict.10  
For a definition of a non-international armed conflict, Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions is a starting point. Common Article 3 notes that its provisions 
are applicable:  
 
“In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of 
one of the High Contracting Parties”.11 
 
Article 3 follows with the declaration that it is applicable to ‘each party’ to the 
conflict, thereby encompassing non-state actors fighting against the sovereign. From 
this text, it is clear that Common Article 3 distinguishes itself from the 
abovementioned international conflicts, as well as that it presupposed the existence 
of an armed conflict. A clear definition of such a conflict was not to be reached during 
the drafting phase on 1949. The Commentary, while considering that Common 
Article 3 should receive the widest possible scope of application, submits a list of 
conditions that may be considered for a non-international armed conflict.12 
                                                        
10 Article 1 AP I states: “The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for this 
Protocol in all circumstances. In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, 
civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law 
derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public 
conscience. This Protocol, which supplements the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the 
protection of war victims, shall apply in the situations referred to in Article 2 common to those 
Conventions. The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include armed conflicts in which 
peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist régimes in the 
exercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the 
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”. 
11 The full text of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions states: “In the case of armed conflict 
not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each 
Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: (1) Persons taking 
no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and 
those placed ' hors de combat ' by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all 
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or 
faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end, the following acts are and shall remain 
prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: (a) 
violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) 
taking of hostages; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced 
by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as 
indispensable by civilized peoples. (2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An 
impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services 
to the Parties to the conflict. The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by 
means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention. The application 
of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict”.  
12 Pictet, Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (n 7) Common Article 3, 35-36 
stating: “1. That the Party in revolt against the de jure Government possesses an organized military force, 
an authority responsible for its acts, acting within a determinate territory and having the means of 
respecting and ensuring respect for the Convention. 2. That the legal Government is obliged to have 
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Furthermore, Additional Protocol II (AP II) must be considered, which states in its 
primary Article: 
 
“This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 common to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existing conditions of application, 
shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of the Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) and which take place in the 
territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces 
or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control 
over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military 
operations and to implement this Protocol. 2. This Protocol shall not apply to situations of 
internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and 
other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts”.13 
 
This text is considered to set a higher threshold than Common Article 3, which unlike 
large parts of AP II has a customary international law status.14 It must be noted that 
(internal) disturbances or clashes that do not meet the threshold of an armed 
conflict,15 can be distinguished based on their intensity and level of organisation.16 
Protocol II has, both due to its higher threshold and applicability only to state parties, 
excluded more instances than Common Article 3 which holds customary status.17 AP 
II is applicable, as stated in Article 1, only to those non-international armed conflicts 
that take place between a state party and ‘dissident armed forces or other organised 
                                                        
recourse to the regular military forces against insurgents organized as military and in possession of a part 
of the national territory. 3. (a) That the de jure Government has recognized the insurgents as belligerents; 
or (b) That it has claimed for itself the rights of a belligerent; or (c) That it has accorded the insurgents 
recognition as belligerents for the purposes only of the present Convention; or (d) That the dispute has 
been admitted to the agenda of the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations as 
being a threat to international peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. 4. (a) That the 
insurgents have an organization purporting to have the characteristics of a State.(b) That the insurgent 
civil authority exercises de facto authority over persons within a determinate portion of the national 
territory. (c) That the armed forces act under the direction of an organized authority and are prepared to 
observe the ordinary laws of war. (d) That the insurgent civil authority agrees to be bound by the 
provisions of the Convention. The above criteria are useful as a means of distinguishing a genuine armed 
conflict from a mere act of banditry or an unorganized and short-lived insurrection”. It must be noted that 
these conditions are not considered to be comprehensive or ultimate, see in that regard outside of the 
Commentary itself also Prosecutor v. Fatmir Limaj, Haradin Bala, Isak Musliu, (Judgment Trial 
Chamber II) IT-03-66-T (30 November 2005) § 85-86 and ILA ‘Final Report on the Meaning of Armed 
Conflict in International Law’ (n 5)20. 
13 Article 1 Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, 1977 (Additional Protocol II or AP II) 
14 Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann (eds) Commentary on the Additional 
Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Protocol I and II (International 
Committee of the Red Cross 1987) Protocol II Article 1, 1348. See also ILA Committee on the Use of 
Force final report p12.  
15 Ibid Commentary to the Additional Protocols. 
16 Prosecutor v. Tadić a.k.a “Dule” (Judgment Trial Chamber) IT-94-1-T (7 May 1997) § 562. See also 
ILA ‘Final Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict in International Law’ (n 5) 28. 
17 Sandoz, Swinarski & Zimmermann Commentary to the Additional Protocols (n 14) Protocol II Article 







armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part 
of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military 
operations and to implement this Protocol’. This allows for a second category of non-
international armed conflicts to be discerned, namely when a level of ‘control’ is 
reached by the armed groups within a state.  
More recently the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) has also given a concrete definition of an armed conflict in the well-known 
Tadić-decision, stating that:  
 
“An armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or 
protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups 
or between such groups within a State. International humanitarian law applies from the 
initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a 
general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful 
settlement is achieved. Until that moment, international humanitarian law continues to 
apply in the whole territory of the warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the 
whole territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place 
there”.18 
 
With regard to an international armed conflict, the ICTY considered the length and 
intensity of such a conflict, deliberating that the Geneva Conventions contain 
language that suggests their application beyond strictly during the existence of armed 
violence.19 Such is of relevance to the provision of assistance: aid may be needed for 
a civilian population that is itself not subject to hostilities, but may have been cut off 
from the outside world, or fled to remote areas. The ICTY furthermore considered 
the ‘geographical scope’ of international armed conflicts, with regard to the 
application of the Conventions. The Chamber concluded that a distinction can be 
made between certain provisions of the Geneva Conventions that can be limited to 
areas of direct hostilities, whilst other provisions, amongst which those pertaining to 
the protection of civilians are not as limited and may apply to the entire territory of 
the states that are in conflict.20 Indeed, the provisions pertaining to the provision of 
humanitarian assistance relate to the protection of civilians. The ICTY reasoned so 
in referral to Article 6(2) of GC IV, which declares that the Convention remains 
applicable until the ‘general close of military operations’21 and argued that a stricter 
                                                        
18 Prosecutor v. Tadić a.k.a “Dule” (Appeals Chamber Decision on the Defence motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction) IT-94-1-AR72 (2 October 1995) §70 [Emphasis added EEK].  
19 Ibid § 67. 
20 Ibid § 68. 
21 Article 6 GC IV states: “The present Convention shall apply from the outset of any conflict or 
occupation mentioned in Article 2. In the territory of Parties to the conflict, the application of the present 
Convention shall cease on the general close of military operations. In the case of occupied territory, the 
application of the present Convention shall cease one year after the general close of military operations; 
however, the Occupying Power shall be bound, for the duration of the occupation, to the extent that such 
Power exercises the functions of government in such territory, by the provisions of the following Articles 
of the present Convention: 1 to 12, 27, 29 to 34, 47, 49, 51, 52, 53, 59, 61 to 77, 143. Protected persons 
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reading of the Article and similar ones, would defeat the very rationale behind GC 
III and GC IV.22 The Geneva Conventions after all, as part of humanitarian law, aim 
to protect those caught in conflict, which is also what the provision of humanitarian 
assistance attempts to do. Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention furthermore 
notes that the Convention shall apply ‘from the outset of any conflict’.23 The line of 
reasoning of the ICTY also follows the official Commentary, which remarks in 
relation to the protection of civilians, that the Fourth Convention should be applied 
immediately once a civilian population comes into contact with foreign armed 
troops.24 Thus, the application of the Geneva Conventions can be considered to 
commence with the establishment of an international armed conflict, and the 
application of provisions in relation to the civilian population can be established in 
regard to an entire territory. Thus, humanitarian law provides different levels of 
protection to those in need according to the specific category of armed conflict in 
which persons in need of aid find themselves. 
Yet whereas the application of AP II requires for one of the parties to be a state 
party to the Conventions and Common Article 3 alternatively requires for the 
territory to be that of a state party, in recent years armed conflicts amongst armed 
groups in so-called ‘failed’ states have provided another type of non-international 
armed conflict. With a lack of sovereign authority, these conflicts often do not meet 
the threshold of AP II (also AP II does not have universal application, as discussed 
above), nor do they sometimes fit the framework of Common Article 3. Indeed in 
internal strife, a common defence for the non-application of international 
humanitarian law is the argument that no armed conflict exists, or that no responsible 
sovereign may be in place. Such circumstances, regardless of their classification, 
however may warrant the provision of assistance, as a crisis for a civilian population 
may be taking place. Humanitarian assistance however continues to be a need for all 
those in circumstances of crisis, regardless of the classification of the conflict. 
Whether or not a sovereign authority in a territory has indeed declared the existence 
of a conflict is therefore not necessary for the application of humanitarian law, and 
therefore also for the application of the provisions related to the delivery of 
humanitarian aid. This enhances the protection of those persons caught in 
circumstances where the affected state sovereign is unwilling or unable to provide 
aid. 
 
                                                        
whose release, repatriation or re-establishment may take place after such dates shall meanwhile continue 
to benefit by the present Convention”. 
22 Prosecutor v. Tadić a.k.a “Dule” IT-94-1-AR72 (n 18) § 68. The Appeals Chamber here also referred 
to Article 3(b) of AP I, which states that: “Without prejudice to the provisions which are applicable at all 
times: (…) (b) the application of the Conventions and of this Protocol shall cease, in the territory of 
Parties to the conflict, on the general close of military operations and, in the case of occupied territories, 
on the termination of the occupation, except, in either circumstance, for those persons whose final release, 
repatriation or re-establishment takes place thereafter. These persons shall continue to benefit from the 
relevant provisions of the Conventions and of this Protocol until their final release, repatriation or re-
establishment”. 
23 Article 6 GC IV (n 21). 







3.2.2 Armed Conflicts and the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance 
 
When applied to the provision of assistance, the immediate application of the 
Conventions and their Protocols means that those provisions within humanitarian law 
related to the provision of emergency aid, become applicable upon establishment of 
the armed conflict. The mere existence of armed violence reaching the threshold of 
an armed conflict leads to the applicability of international humanitarian law and 
thereby also the Geneva Conventions. From the above, it can be concluded that the 
actual establishment of the existence of an armed conflict remains a factual 
determination.  
Although the Commentary suggests a wide application of Common Article 3, with 
regard to non-international armed conflicts, the Tadić judgment is stricter in its 
interpretation. In its much-cited definition of a non-international armed conflict, the 
ICTY considers the need for a certain intensity and duration as well as a certain 
organisation of armed groups, for a situation to amount to a non-international armed 
conflict. The ICTY confirmed this to be an exhaustive list, as it declared the purpose 
of the armed forces’ violence to be irrelevant.25 As with an international armed 
conflict, the Trial Chamber in the Tadić case equally observed a broad scope of 
application with regard to time and territory. In referral to Article 2 of AP II, the 
ICTY concluded that the application should not be limited to the ‘actual hostilities’, 
nor to a limited geographical scope.26 Article 2 of Additional Protocol II itself reads 
equally broad that it is applicable to all persons ‘affected by an armed conflict’.27 
Thus, with regard to the provision of humanitarian assistance, it can be concluded 
that once the threshold set by AP II of a situation of non-international armed conflict 
is met, all people affected by the conflict are to be protected by the provisions of AP 
II, for the purposes of the delivery of humanitarian aid.  
From the above, it remains clear that establishing what entails an armed conflict, 
be it international or non-international, remains a factual, objective determination. 
As such, establishing whether a situation amounts to an armed conflict, thereby 
invoking the application of international humanitarian law; amongst which the 
provisions in relation to humanitarian assistance, remains to be done on a case-by-
case basis. Yet, once this conflict is established, it can be said that for an international 
                                                        
25 Prosecutor v. Fatmir Limaj, Haradin Bala, Isak Musliu, (Judgment Trial Chamber II) IT-03-66-T (30 
November 2005) § 170: “the determination of the existence of an armed conflict is based solely on two 
criteria: the intensity of the conflict and organisation of the parties, the purpose of the armed forces to 
engage in acts of violence or also achieve some further objective is, therefore, irrelevant”. 
26 Prosecutor v. Tadić a.k.a “Dule” IT-94-1-AR72 (n 18) § 69.  
27 Article 2 AP II states: “1. This Protocol shall be applied without any adverse distinction founded on 
race, colour, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, 
birth or other status, or on any other similar criteria (hereinafter referred to as “adverse distinction”) to 
all persons affected by an armed conflict as defined in Article 1. 2. At the end of the armed conflict, all 
the persons who have been deprived of their liberty or whose liberty has been restricted for reasons related 
to such conflict, as well as those deprived of their liberty or whose liberty is restricted after the conflict 
for the same reasons, shall enjoy the protection of Articles 5 and 6 until the end of such deprivation or 
restriction of liberty”. 
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armed conflict, the provisions regarding the protection of civilians through the 
provision of humanitarian assistance can be considered applicable as soon as an 
armed conflict exists, even if said civilians are not in the direct vicinity of hostilities. 
The absence of hostilities from a specific area does indeed not automatically lead to 
the inference that persons may not be suffering from the consequences of the armed 
conflict and be in need of humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, regarding a non-
international armed conflict, the temporal scope is equally wide, as well as the 
geographical scope, with Article 2 of AP II referring to all those ‘affected’ by the 
armed conflict.28 Problematic to the provision of assistance in times of non-
international armed conflict however remains the fact that a level of control by armed 
groups is needed in the conflict, for the application of AP II, which contains further 
protection of civilians and their access to humanitarian assistance than the framework 
of Article 3. A subsequent issue remains the lack of universal applicability of AP II. 
Furthermore, although international humanitarian law may not be applicable in 
circumstances that do not amount to armed conflicts, such as instances of civil unrest, 
these circumstances may warrant the provision of humanitarian assistance. As such, 
this research recommends that it is necessary to regard the provision of humanitarian 
assistance from one overarching perspective, rather than looking into the various 
circumstances separately.29 When addressing the provision of assistance from the 
needs of persons, rather than from the perspective of the factual circumstances, 
greater protection may be provided.  
 
3.2.3 Defining Occupation  
 
Whereas conflict and natural disaster make up the majority of circumstances in which 
humanitarian assistance is needed, the law pertaining to such assistance is well 
developed in times of occupation, due to the creation of the Geneva Conventions in 
the aftermath of World War II. As a result of this existing framework, it is necessary 
to also address occupation as a legal concept. ‘Occupation’ was first elaborately 
regulated in the 1907 Hague ‘Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War 
on Land’ (1907 Hague Convention).30 A first definition was provided by the Institute 
of International Law,31 which in 1880 stated in its ‘Laws of War on Land’: 
 
“Territory is regarded as occupied when, as the consequence of invasion by hostile forces, 
the State to which it belongs has ceased, in fact, to exercise its ordinary authority therein, 
and the invading State is alone in a position to maintain order there. The limits within 
which this state of affairs exists determine the extent and duration of the occupation”.32 
                                                        
28 For further reading on the notion of a non-international armed conflict, see Lindsay Moir, The Law of 
Internal Armed Conflict (Cambridge University Press 2002). 
29 See Section 3.3.3. Defining a Humanitarian Crisis for the definition of a humanitarian crisis as 
overarching concept.  
30 1907 Hague ‘Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land’ (opened for signature 18 
October 1907, entered into force 26 January 1910). 
31 See for information on the Institute of International Law Chapter 2 (n 81). 







The first actual codification of the concept of occupation was provided in Article 42 
of the annex to the 1907 Hague Convention, ‘Regulations concerning the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land’ (1907 Hague Regulations): 
  
“Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the 
hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been 
established and can be exercised”.33 
 
Over time, the Regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention have become 
accepted as norms of customary international law.34 Two cumulative conditions can 
be determined from this definition: namely that an authority has been established, 
and that the actual exercise of such an authority can take place.35 With two World 
Wars still in mind at the time of drafting, Common Article 2(2) of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, although not providing a definition, adds to the aforementioned by 
stating that the Geneva Conventions are applicable in cases of partial or total 
occupation of a territory of a High Contracting Party, even if such occupation is not 
met with armed resistance.36 Article 154 of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
furthermore states that the Geneva Convention is ‘supplementary’ to the Hague 
Regulations, and thereby also to its definition of the notion of occupation.37 The 
Additional Protocols, adapting to the developments in the past few decades, do not 
focus on occupation but rather on forms of armed conflict. As such, the Geneva 
Conventions – created in the aftermath of World War II – remain the last 
codifications relating to the concept of occupation.  
                                                        
33 Article 42 ‘Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land’ of the Hague ‘Convention 
respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land’.  
34 ‘International Military Tribunal Nuremberg Judgment and Sentences’ (1947), 41 American Journal of 
International Law, 1, 248-249. This acknowledgement was also reiterated by the ICJ in its Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 
I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136, § 78 and 89.  
35 Yoram Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation  (Cambridge University Press 2009) 
42.  
36 Article 2 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 provides: “(1)In addition to the provisions 
which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war 
or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, 
even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them. (2) The Convention shall also apply to all cases 
of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation 
meets with no armed resistance. (3) Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the 
present Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. 
They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and 
applies the provisions thereof”. 
37 Article 154 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states: “In the relations between the Powers who are 
bound by the Hague Conventions respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, whether that of July 
29, 1899, or that of October 18, 1907, and who are parties to the present Convention, this last Convention 
shall be supplementary to Sections II and III of the Regulations annexed to the above-mentioned 
Conventions of The Hague”. See also Prosecutor v. Mladen Naletilić, aka Tuta & Vinko Martinović, aka 
“Štela (Trial Judgment) IT-98-34-T  (31 March 2003) § 215. 
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From the compilation of the abovementioned definitions, several elements can be 
derived. Firstly, some form of authority must be established which can be exercised, 
secondly this authority must cover parts of or the whole territory and lastly, 
occupation is not dependent on having met armed resistance.38 The notion of the 
‘exercise of authority or control’, which is relevant in the discussion of the provision 
of humanitarian assistance, has been subject to multiple distinct interpretations.39 The 
ICJ has furthermore clarified in its  Case Concerning Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo that authority not only ‘can be exercised’ as intended by the 
Hague Regulations but that it in fact be exercised.40 The Court furthermore noted that 
in order to establish the exercise of authority, it is necessary for groups or movements 
to be placed ‘under the control’ of the intervening state, whereas the establishment 
of administrative control in a certain area – in casu the Kisangani Airport – does not 
suffice to be considered an occupying power in the sense of Article 42 of the 1907 
Hague Regulations.41 The actual amount of control necessary to determine whether 
occupation indeed is established has been addressed on various occasions by the 
ICTY, which like the ICJ in later years, concluded that the law of occupation only 
applies to those areas actually under control of the occupying power.42 Indeed, the 
establishment is subject to a factual determination and it is suggested that the 
commencement of occupation at least requires a level of control that is indeed 
‘actually exercised’. The theoretical viewpoint that authority ‘can be exercised’ is 
problematic, as it will be very difficult to establish after the fact, whereas the factual 




                                                        
38 Daniel Thürer, ‘Current challenges to the law of occupation’, Speech delivered to the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, 6th Bruges Colloquium, 20-21 October 2005, p. 4.  
39 For a further discussion on the beginning of occupation and the element of control, see Eyal Benvenisti, 
The International Law of Occupation (Oxford University Press 2012) and Dinstein, The International 
Law of Belligerent Occupation (n 35). See for an alternative view also Michael Siegrist, ‘The Functional 
Beginning of Belligerent Occupation’ (2011) 7 eCahiers de l’ Institut (Graduate Institute Geneva). For 
the purpose of this research, a focus will lie on the establishment of a certain level of control, also relevant 
to the provision of humanitarian assistance.  
40Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 168, § 173.  See also, ibid, Siegrist. 
41 Ibid,  Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo § 177.  
42 Prosecutor v. Mladen Naletilić, aka Tuta & Vinko Martinović, aka “Štela IT-98-34-T  (n 37) § 214-
218. The Trial Chamber provided the following guidelines for the determination of the establishment of 
authority: “[…] the occupying power must be in a position to substitute its own authority for that of the 
occupied authorities, which must have been rendered incapable of functioning publicly; the enemy’s 
forces have surrendered, been defeated or withdrawn. In this respect, battle areas may not be considered 
as occupied territory. However, sporadic local resistance, even successful, does not affect the reality of 
occupation; the occupying power has a sufficient force present, or the capacity to send troops within a 
reasonable time to make the authority of the occupying power felt; a temporary administration has been 








3.2.4 Occupation and the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance 
 
The determination of commencement of occupation remains relevant in order to 
ascertain the applicability of the law containing provisions related to the delivery of 
emergency aid, as seen with regard to the start of an armed conflict. Other than in 
circumstances of conflict however, circumstances of occupation are fewer and further 
between. Moreover, when occupation is established, the need for humanitarian 
assistance today, as opposed to during World War II, may well be far less than its 
immediate need during conflict or in the aftermath of a (natural) disaster. In order to 
address this transition period from the law of conflict to the law of occupation, the 
ICTY determined that ‘actual authority’ of the occupying power may not be 
necessary, rather ‘a state of occupation exists upon the falling of civilians into “the 
hands of the occupying power”’.43 Similarly, according to the official Commentary, 
the protection of individuals under the Fourth Geneva Convention does not depend 
on the establishment of a state of occupation as defined in Article 42 of the 1907 
Hague Regulations, but is immediately applicable as soon as these individuals are in 
contact with the Occupying Power.44  
Yet, the Commentary’s determination does not also assume that all obligations 
relating to occupation under the Geneva Convention become applicable at this early 
stage. Several provisions in the Geneva Conventions, amongst which relevantly those 
provisions related to humanitarian assistance, presuppose a certain duration of 
occupation before amounting to obligations for the occupier, rather than arising 
within the initial stages of invasion.45 How long such a duration may be, is left 
unanswered. Thus, whereas the ICTY considers the Convention immediately 
applicable with regard to the protection of civilians, the Commentary distinguishes 
immediate applicability among certain provisions whilst others, relating to 
                                                        
43Prosecutor v. Mladen Naletilić, aka Tuta & Vinko Martinović, aka “Štela IT-98-34-T  (n 37) § 221.  
44 Pictet, Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (n 7) Article 6, 60: “In all cases of 
occupation, whether carried out by force or without meeting any resistance, the Convention becomes 
applicable to individuals, i.e. to the protected persons, as they fall into the hands of the Occupying Power. 
It follows from this that the word "occupation" (…) has a wider meaning than it has in Article 42 of the 
Regulations annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907. So far as individuals are concerned, the 
application of the Fourth Geneva Convention does not depend upon the existence of a state of occupation 
within the meaning of the Article 42 referred to above. The relations between the civilian population of 
a territory and troops advancing into that territory, whether fighting or not, are governed by the present 
Convention. There is no intermediate period between what might be termed the invasion phase and the 
inauguration of a stable regime of occupation. Even a patrol which penetrates into enemy territory without 
any intention of staying there must respect the Conventions in its dealings with the civilians it meets. 
When it withdraws, for example, it cannot take civilians with it, for that would be contrary to Article 49 
which prohibits the deportation or forcible transfer of persons from occupied territory. (…) The 
Convention is quite definite on this point: all persons who find themselves in the hands of a Party to the 
conflict or an Occupying Power of which they are not nationals are protected persons. No loophole is 
left.” 
45 Ibid. See 6.5.4 Rights of Persons to Receive Assistance in Times of Occupation for a more in depth 
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humanitarian assistance, may not be immediately invoked.46 Similarly, this 
distinction was reiterated by the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission that stated:  
  
“The Commission also recognizes that not all of the obligations of Section III of Part III 
of Geneva Convention IV (the section that deals with occupied territories) can reasonably 
be applied to an armed force anticipating combat and present in an area for only a few 
days. Nevertheless, a State is obligated by the remainder of that Convention and by 
customary international humanitarian law to take appropriate measures to protect enemy 
civilians and civilian property present within areas under the control of its armed forces. 
Even in areas where combat is occurring, civilians and civilian objects cannot lawfully be 
made objects of attack”.47 
 
Although slightly more vague, this interpretation follows along the line of distinction 
suggested by Pictet, as it mentions ‘a few days’ presence as being insufficient for the 
application of all provisions. Furthermore, a more restrictive approach is put forward 
by several military manuals, suggesting that occupation can only exist if the 
occupying power has the level of authority and control needed to be able to fulfil all 
the obligations required of it by the law of occupation.48 From the above, different 
approaches can be discerned with regard to the moment of commencement of 
occupation. This moment then determines the level of authority involved that is 
necessary for the establishment of the application of the law of occupation and the 
obligations resting upon the occupying power.49 Again, whilst the determination of 
the state of occupation results in the applicability of legal rights and obligations, it 
remains factual and shall often occur after its establishment by for example the 
International Court of Justice.  
For the purpose of this research centred around humanitarian assistance, it 
remains relevant to consider the approaches to the level of authority necessary to 
establish obligations upon the occupying power discussed above and to establish 
rights of civilians in the provision of humanitarian assistance. Whereas the provision 
of humanitarian assistance could be essential from the earliest possible stage, should 
persons be in such need, the Commentary’s restrictive line of interpretation also 
concurs with the ICJ’s Armed Activities in Congo Judgment, where the Court 
declared that the law of occupation becomes applicable upon the establishment and 
exercise of authority in a certain area.50 Thus, it appears possible to suggest that some 
form of distinction can be considered between the application of the law of 
occupation in general, and the specific application of provisions relating to 
humanitarian assistance, amongst which Article 59 GC IV. Yet, legal uncertainty 
remains with such conclusions, as ‘longer presence’ or ‘a few days’ do not clearly 
                                                        
46 Ibid.  
47 Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related Claims - 
Eritrea's Claims 1, 3, 5, 9-13, 14, 21, 25 & 26 (Partial Award of 19 December 2005), § 27. 
48 Thürer, ‘Current challenges to the law of occupation’ (n 38), 5.  
49 See 2.3.2 Providers of Humanitarian Assistance for an in depth discussion on the various actors 
involved in the provision of humanitarian assistance.  







state at which point exactly the obligations arise for the occupying power to 
commence providing assistance if the situation calls for this.  
In the past decades, states have been hesitant to be designated as occupying power, 
and not many circumstances are legally established as such to draw from.51 The ICRC 
has – with a pragmatic view – therefore established that it adopts the ‘maximalist’ 
approach to factual circumstances on the ground which although risking a premature 
qualification of occupation, aims to extend the greatest protection possible to 
civilians.52 Although pragmatic, the legal basis appears to be somewhat more 
confined, as a result of which it is questionable to what extent the ICRC’s position 
finds legal support from others. If the definition of humanitarian assistance is taken 
into consideration, especially also considering the fact that its provision is connected 
to a situation of ‘crisis’, the viewpoint that immediate application of Article 59 occurs 
once the beginning of occupation is established, may be somewhat premature. Not 
only must the situation of occupation be thus, that it amounts to a humanitarian crisis, 
but an occupier can furthermore only be called upon to comply with Article 59 GC 
IV concerning assistance in times of occupation, if and when the amount of control 
established suffices. This threshold of control must be carefully distinguished from 
the amount of control necessary to establish the state of occupation, as less time may 
indeed be required for this latter establishment. Two distinct thresholds therefore 
exist. For the application of the provisions relevant to the supply of humanitarian 
assistance, a second threshold of control must be established, and a longer timeframe 
can be determined. Unfortunately the law remains somewhat unclear as to at which 
point in time precisely obligations under Article 59 GC IV arise for an occupying 
power to start with the provision of humanitarian assistance, and clarification would 
enhance legal certainty. Yet, as suggested above, the stricter approach of both Pictet 
and the ICJ hold a broader support than the more maximalist approach of the ICRC. 
Therefore, this former approach will be taken as premise for future Chapters, in 
relation to humanitarian assistance.53 
 
3.2.5 Defining a (Natural) Disaster  
 
Where the above Sections focus largely on treaty provisions in international 
humanitarian law, the definition of a (natural) disaster has not been regulated by 
treaty law, nor is it of course specifically part of international humanitarian law. The 
transition from the use of force in times of armed conflict (and occupation) to forces 
of nature entails a transition away from the legal regime of international humanitarian 
law discussed above. As done in the above Sections, an attempt will be made to 
                                                        
51 Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation (n 35) 10-11.  
52 Thürer, ‘Current challenges to the law of occupation’ (n 38), 5-6. 
53 For a more in depth discussion on the law of occupation and its beginning, see Benvenisti, The 
International Law of Occupation (n 39); Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation (n 
35); and also Siegrist, ‘The Functional Beginning of Belligerent Occupation’ (n 39). 
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define the factual circumstance in which humanitarian assistance may be necessary, 
in order to establish more precisely when this provision in fact takes place.  
For a definition of a natural disaster, it is necessary to turn to various soft law 
regulations, as a legal definition that is generally accepted in international law seems 
to be absent.54 Some first indications of what a natural disaster requiring the provision 
of humanitarian assistance entails can be sought in the context of the UN 
‘International decade for natural disaster reduction’.55 At the end of the 1980s, as part 
of the establishment of this ‘Decade for natural disaster reduction’,56 the UN 
proclaimed natural disasters to include:  
 
“earthquakes, windstorms (cyclones, hurricanes, tornadoes, typhoons), tsunamis, floods, 
landslides, volcanic eruptions, wildfires and other calamities of natural origin”.57 
 
Contrary to the previous definitions of armed conflict and occupation, the approach 
to defining a natural disaster is of a more immediate and practical nature. A few years 
later the UN furthermore included ‘grasshopper and locust infestations, drought and 
desertification’ in its definition of a natural disaster.58 The Tampere Convention 
relates the notion of ‘natural hazard’ to its potential of creating a disaster in a more 
general sense: 
 
“’Natural hazard’ means an event or process, such as an earthquake, fire, flood, wind, 
landslide, avalanche, cyclone, tsunami, insect infestation, drought or volcanic eruption, 
which has the potential for triggering a disaster”.59 
 
Although most of the soft law principles concerning humanitarian assistance do not 
define a natural disaster as such, the 2003 Institut de Droit International’s Bruges 
Resolution does note that a disaster of natural origin includes amongst others those 
natural hazards as also mentioned above, but also cites torrential rains, epidemics and 
interestingly, famine.60 The latter, and arguably also epidemics, does not necessarily 
have a ‘natural’ origin.  
                                                        
54 Preliminary report on the protection of persons in the event of disasters’ (5 May 2008) International 
Law Commission, UN Doc. A/CN.4/598 § 46.  
55 UNGA Res 42/169 (11 December 1987) UN Doc A/RES/42/169 ‘International decade for natural 
disaster reduction’ § 3; UNGA Res 44/236 (22 December 1989) UN Doc A/RES/44/236 ‘International 
decade for natural disaster reduction’ §1. 
56 See 2.2.1 Historical Development.  
57 UNGA Res 42/169 (11 December 1987) UN Doc. A/42/169 (n 55) Preambular § 3. 
58 UNGA Res 44/236 (22 December 1989) UN Doc A/RES/44/236 (n 55) Annex § 1. 
59 Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and 
Relief Operations, 18 June 1998, Article 1(9).  
60 Resolution ‘Humanitarian Assistance’ (2 September 2003) Institute of International Law, Sixteenth 







One of the main organisations primarily involved with relief for the disaster-
stricken, the IFRC,61 envisages a very broad range of disasters that can be included 
within the ‘umbrella-phrase’ of natural disaster:  
 
“Natural hazards are naturally occurring physical phenomena caused either by rapid or 
slow onset events which can be geophysical (earthquakes, landslides, tsunamis and 
volcanic activity), hydrological (avalanches and floods), climatological (extreme 
temperatures, drought and wildfires), meteorological (cyclones and storms/wave surges) 
or biological (disease epidemics and insect/animal plagues). Technological or man-made 
hazards (complex emergencies/conflicts, famine, displaced populations, industrial 
accidents and transport accidents) are events that are caused by humans and occur in or 
close to human settlements. This can include environmental degradation, pollution and 
accidents”.62 
 
As can be seen, the IFRC categorises the various types of natural hazards that fall 
within the wider notion of a disaster. Particularly focusing on such natural disasters, 
the IFRC developed the ‘Guidelines for the domestic facilitation and regulation of 
international disaster relief and initial recovery assistance’ (IDRL Guidelines). These 
Guidelines, although a non-legal initiative, are intended to provide assistance to 
enable States to facilitate humanitarian assistance by international organisations.63 
The IFRC’s initiative has been supported by the UN General Assembly, which 
encourages individual states to make use of the Guidelines.64 OCHA on the other 
hand takes a more abstract and theoretical approach, with a definition of natural 
disaster which does not actually include any examples. As such, OCHA envisages 
that a disaster will: 
 
“[…] seriously affect the society, economy and/or infrastructure of a region. Depending 
on population vulnerability and local response capacity, natural disasters will pose 
challenges and problems of a humanitarian nature”.65 
 
OCHA furthermore echoes the definition provided by the IASC that although the 
term is coined as a ‘natural’ disaster, the magnitude of its consequences are 
                                                        
61 See Chapter 2 (n 50) on the mandate of the IFRC and Section 2.3.2.2 International Organisations for 
its particular role.  
62 <http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/disaster-management/about-disasters/definition-of-hazard/> 
accessed 10 November 2011.  
63 For more information on the IFRC’s IDRL Programme: <http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/idrl/idrl-
guidelines/> accessed 29 December 2011.  
64 UNGA Res 63/137 (11 December 2008) UN Doc A/RES/63/137 § 6; UNGA Res 63/139 (5 March 
2009) UN Doc A/RES/63/139 ‘Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief 
assistance of the United Nations, including special economic assistance: strengthening of the 
coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations’ § 8; UNGA Res 63/141 (10 
March 2009) UN Doc A/RES/63/141 ‘International cooperation on humanitarian assistance in the field 
of natural disasters, from relief to development’ § 5.  
65 OCHA/ReliefWeb, Glossary of Humanitarian Terms (2008): “Natural Disaster”.  
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determined by human (in)action.66 The IASC had stated previously that a natural 
disaster is a consequence of a natural hazard which overwhelms local capacity to 
respond as well as seriously affecting the development of a region.67 
The International Law Committee has the opportunity to provide a more legal 
definition through its current study into the ‘protection of persons in the event of 
disasters’.68 Considering the absence of such a legal definition of a disaster, the ILC 
has formulated in its Draft Article 3 in relation to disasters:  
 
“’Disaster’ means a calamitous event or series of events resulting in widespread loss of 
life, great human suffering and distress, or large-scale material or environmental damage, 
thereby seriously disrupting the functioning of society”.69  
 
Although not formulating any particular examples of such an event, the ILC does 
provide some criteria, such as a certain severity, which disrupts society. The ILC 
itself has noted that three elements are relevant; namely that an international 
component is not a prerequisite for the qualification as a natural disaster, that a 
threshold of disturbance to the society in which it takes place must be considered and 
furthermore that a degree of suffering of those affected must be reached.70 From an 
international legal perspective, a state or region’s capacity, or willingness to manage 
the circumstances, are then relevant.71 Indeed this approach allows for the notion of 
‘disaster’ to also contain man-made components, as well as being of natural origin 
and exacerbated by human (in)action.  
 
3.2.6 Disasters and the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance 
 
From the above, it is clear that rather large-scale, severe and intense (natural) 
phenomena, with a disrupting influence on the society in which they take place, can 
be classified as a (natural) disaster. No particular distinction with regard to duration 
seems to be discernible, or whether such a disaster may be sudden or slow in its 
development. For the purpose of this research it is however not necessary to create 
an exhaustive list of all those natural circumstances that may amount to a natural 
disaster. Relevant to the provision of assistance is whether or not the occurrence of a 
disaster results in a need for the provision of emergency aid to those persons suffering 
from the destructive forces of the disaster; regardless of which specific type of natural 
                                                        
66 Ibid and IASC, ‘Protecting Persons Affected by Natural Disasters, IASC Operational Guidelines’ 
(2006), 8. 
67 Ibid, ‘Protecting Persons Affected by Natural Disasters, IASC Operational Guidelines’. 
68 ILC Report to the General Assembly UN Doc A/62/10 (7 May-5 June and 9 July-10 August 2007) § 
375. 
69 ILC ‘Protection of persons in the event of disasters’ Draft Articles UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.831 (15 May 
2014) Draft Article 3. 
70 ILC ‘Preliminary report on the protection of persons in the event of disasters’ UN Doc. A/CN.4/598 
(n 54) § 47. 







phenomenon it was. Indeed, it is an occurrence of a crisis that results in the need for 
the affected sovereign authorities to address the provision of humanitarian assistance.  
It must furthermore be noted that the notion of ‘man-made’ disasters72 is 
sometimes discerned from the concept of natural disasters. Such man-made disasters 
may include nuclear accidents, chemical spills, or the breaking of dams.73 The 
relationship and overlap between both is quite clear, as they are sometimes 
interrelated or follow from one another.74 It is often not possible to clearly distinguish 
between a man-made disaster, or one truly flowing from natural causes.75 Thus, a 
drought may cause a famine, but other components may also attribute to such a result. 
Similarly, a natural disaster, such as a wildfire can be caused by human beings with 
matches. Although many of the above sources mainly note examples of natural 
disasters, a more abstract definition of the notion of a disaster can be proffered, 
namely: 
 
a sudden or slow-onset (natural) occurrence or course of events that may 
include a variety of environmental origins (including biological, 
climatological, geophysical, hydrological, etc.), resulting in an overwhelming 
of the local or national capacity and an immediate need for assistance to a 
civilian population. 
 
From the above, it is clear that ascertaining exactly what level of severity determines 
a natural disaster is quite difficult, especially in practice. Furthermore, it is not a legal 
term in and of itself, as opposed to the concept of occupation or armed conflict. Yet, 
it is also less relevant to determine the exact commencement or the ‘intensity’ as 
determining the existence of a natural disaster does not invoke a new particular set 
of applicable rules. Whereas the determination of an armed conflict or situation of 
occupation invokes the applicability of international humanitarian law, this is not the 
case for the determination of a natural disaster. In that event, (merely) human rights 
law and general customary international law remain applicable for provisions relating 
to humanitarian assistance.76 The determination of the situation therefore does not 
have legal consequences related to the applicability of a body of law.  
                                                        
72 The question of responsibility for certain man-made disasters falls outside the scope of this research 
and will thus not be addressed. This research focuses on the provision of assistance upon the existence 
of a crisis, and the legal rights and duties related thereto.  
73 Carlo Focarelli, ‘Duty to Protect in Cases of Natural Disasters’, (2010) Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
International Law § 5. 
74 Ibid § 5-6.  
75 ILC ‘Preliminary report on the protection of persons in the event of disasters’ UN Doc. A/CN.4/598 
(n 54) § 49. See also Elisabeth Ferris, ‘Humanitarian Perspectives on “Protection of Persons in the Event 
of Disasters’,  Brookings Project, at Roundtable on ‘ Canada and International Law, Department of 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade’,  April 2009, p. 1. 
76 See Section 3.4 The Relationship between Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law on 
the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law (as well as general 
customary international law). 
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Interestingly the ILC also recognises, as has been suggested in this research that 
a need for protection of persons ‘can be said to be equally strong in all disaster 
situations’.77 Persons requiring food, water and shelter do not have a choice 
concerning which circumstances instigated their need. Their legal protection should 
therefore in fact be equal, as their needs are equal. However, crucial to the ILC study 
and attempt at codification is the fact that it is not applicable to situations in which 
international humanitarian law is applicable, and can therefore in the future not aid 
persons needing humanitarian assistance as a result of, for example, a non-
international armed conflict.78 Despite the developments that the ILC will make in 
its study on the protection of persons, it remains closed to those persons affected by 
armed conflict or occupation. An overarching study into those circumstances in 
which humanitarian assistance is needed remains essential, to expose the current 
rights and obligations, under international humanitarian law or other corpora juris, 
pertaining to humanitarian assistance in all circumstances requiring the provision of 
assistance.  
 
3.3 Providing Assistance: Establishing the Existence of a Humanitarian Crisis  
 
Having established what humanitarian assistance entails, it becomes relevant to 
define the precise circumstances in which humanitarian assistance may be provided. 
From the above, it is clear that humanitarian assistance, when provided, occurs 
mainly in three circumstances, namely armed conflict, occupation and (natural) 
disaster.79 Yet humanitarian assistance may not be necessary every time such a 
situation arises. For instance, not every natural disaster may lead to states reverting 
to the provision of (external) humanitarian assistance.80 Only if and when such a 
circumstance leads to an actual humanitarian crisis or emergency with a level of 
severity warranting the provision of aid, does humanitarian assistance become a 
relevant factor. Also, circumstances of (prolonged) occupation may lead to a situation 
in which emergency aid is not needed, as the occupier may allow for a society to 
function normally to a large extent. Furthermore, a humanitarian crisis may develop 
in circumstances that may not be solely qualified as either a natural disaster or an 
armed conflict, but a combination of both, such as severe droughts occurring in non-
international armed conflicts on the African continent. Their legal qualification 
remains relevant to the provisions determined by applicable law, such as international 
humanitarian law in times of armed conflict. Therefore, a definition of an overarching 
and all-encompassing situation in which humanitarian assistance is necessary must 
be provided. 
 
                                                        
77 ILC ‘Preliminary report on the protection of persons in the event of disasters’ UN Doc. A/CN.4/598 
(n 54) § 49. [Emphasis added EEK].  
78 ILC ‘Protection of persons in the event of disasters’ Draft Articles UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.831 (n 69) 
Article 21.  
79 Section 1.1 Introduction.  
80 Ed Tsui, ‘Analysis of Normative Development in Humanitarian Resolutions since the Adoption of 







3.3.1 An Over-Arching Approach to the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance 
 
Given the fact that humanitarian assistance has been researched mostly from the 
perspective of the various (legally qualifiable) circumstances in which it takes place, 
namely occupation, armed conflict and (natural) disaster, an overarching definition 
of such a crisis or emergency has not often been provided. Whilst the majority of 
legal provisions can be read as tailored to specific circumstances, not always was 
such a clear distinction held in practice and by actors in the field. The UN has 
previously referred to ‘natural disasters and other emergency situations’.81 A 
separation of all situations in which humanitarian assistance is needed seems 
artificial, and it is therefore the purpose of this Section to develop an overarching 
definition of the concept of a ‘humanitarian crisis’. The artificiality of distinguishing 
between such situations must be lifted from the perspective that people in need of 
assistance should be receiving such assistance regardless of whether their need stems 
from the effects of an armed conflict or a natural disaster.  
Viewing the provision of humanitarian assistance from such an overarching 
perspective is advantageous for several reasons. Not only does it allow for equal 
protection of persons in need of aid, but such an encompassing view of the legal 
framework also deliberately goes against fragmentation of the law, allowing for more 
coherence. To have one singular approach to the framework on the provision of 
assistance and assessing the basic legal rights and duties for all actors defragments 
the whole notion of humanitarian assistance. Advantages can be found in providing 
a legal definition of a humanitarian crisis as an umbrella-notion also because upon 
establishing a legal definition, legal regimes can become applicable, granting greater 
protection to those needing assistance. Ultimately, such protection is the purpose of 
the provision of assistance and its legal framework. Thus, an overarching approach 
also falls in line with the principle of humanity and the notion of human dignity as 
discussed in Section 2.2.3.1. A human being’s need for food or shelter is no different 
in times of conflict or following an earthquake, and should therefore be addressed 
with the same manner of importance and protection.  Furthermore, providing a 
singular definition of a circumstance that results in a need to provide assistance 
provides more clarity for the state sovereign functioning as the affected state. 
Various actors in the field adhere to a variety of terms such as ‘crisis’, 
‘emergency’ and ‘disaster’; further distinguished for example as ‘slow-onset 
emergencies’, ‘man-made disasters’, or ‘complex emergencies’.82 For the purpose of 
                                                        
81 See for example UNGA Res 46/182 (19 December 1991) UN Doc. A/RES/46/182, General Assembly 
Resolution ‘Strengthening the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations’, 
§ 33 as well as UNGA Res 43/131 (8 December 1988) UN Doc A/RES/43/131 ‘Humanitarian Assistance 
to victims of natural disasters and similar emergency situations’ § 1.  
82 In Section 2.3.2 Providers of Humanitarian Assistance and beyond, various actors in the field of 
humanitarian assistance are addressed. For the purpose of example, several actors’ definitions are 
mentioned here. For the terminology used by the IFRC see <http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/disaster-
management/about-disasters/definition-of-hazard/> accessed 21 October 2011; for OCHA see the 
Glossary of Humanitarian Terms in relation to the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (2004) as 
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this research it thus becomes important to determine a working definition of a 
humanitarian crisis,83 that may serve as a common notion for the circumstances in 
which invoking the provision of humanitarian assistance is relevant, namely in the 
above defined situations of conflict, (natural) disaster and occupation. Such an 
overarching definition may eventually also be of use to and applicable in such 
situations that lead to a call for humanitarian assistance, such as for instance internal 
disturbances, but that cannot be qualified as armed conflicts, thereby not invoking 
the protective clauses of international humanitarian law.84  
 
3.3.2 The Material Scope of Application 
 
In situations of occupation or conflict, support for the determination of circumstances 
when humanitarian assistance may be required can be sought in certain relevant treaty 
provisions.85 As such, Article 59 of the Fourth Geneva Convention succinctly 
declares that relief schemes are necessary if a population of an occupied territory is 
‘inadequately supplied’.86 Yet the determination of this inadequacy is left entirely 
open-ended and Article 59 does not mention what level of ‘inadequacy’ must be 
reached for relief schemes to be started, which leads to uncertainty as to who will be 
making such a determination. Determining whether or not a territory is adequately 
                                                        
well as OCHA/ReliefWeb, Glossary of Humanitarian Terms (2008); for the World Health Organization, 
see: <http://www.who.int/hac/about/definitions/en/index.html> accessed 21 October 2011.  
83 Although both ‘humanitarian crisis’ and ‘humanitarian emergency’ can be, and are used, in this 
research the phrase ‘humanitarian crisis’ will be mainly used. Given the fact that both the Oxford and 
Merriam-Webster dictionaries consider unforeseeability as an element of an emergency, a choice has 
been made to use ‘crisis’ when referring to a situation in which a need may exist for humanitarian 
assistance, as not all situations in which humanitarian assistance becomes necessary are unforeseen. The 
Oxford dictionary provides that an emergency is: “a serious, unexpected, and often dangerous situation 
requiring immediate action”. Similarly, the Merriam-Webster dictionary provides: “an unforeseen 
combination of circumstances or the resulting state that calls for immediate action” although in second 
instance also considers “an urgent need for assistance or relief”. Rather, when defining a crisis, the 
Oxford dictionary defines this as “a time of intense difficulty or danger” and the Merriam Webster 
dictionary declares it to be “an unstable or crucial time or state of affairs in which a decisive change is 
impending; especially: one with the distinct possibility of a highly undesirable outcome […]; a situation 
that has reached a critical phase”.  
84 See Section 6.5.2 Rights of Persons to Receive Assistance in Times of Conflict on the possible right 
to receive humanitarian assistance in times of armed conflict. 
85 In further Chapters, these provisions will be dealt with in depth and more intensively. At this stage, 
they are for illustrational purposes.  
86 Article 59 of GC IV states: “If the whole or part of the population of an occupied territory is 
inadequately supplied, the Occupying Power shall agree to relief schemes on behalf of the said 
population, and shall facilitate them by all the means at its disposal. Such schemes, which may be 
undertaken either by States or by impartial humanitarian organizations such as the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, shall consist, in particular, of the provision of consignments of foodstuffs, 
medical supplies and clothing. All Contracting Parties shall permit the free passage of these consignments 
and shall guarantee their protection. A Power granting free passage to consignments on their way to 
territory occupied by an adverse Party to the conflict shall, however, have the right to search the 
consignments, to regulate their passage according to prescribed times and routes, and to be reasonably 
satisfied through the Protecting Power that these consignments are to be used for the relief of the needy 







supplied will then have to be determined on a case-by-case basis.87 From the 
Commentary to the corresponding Article 70 of Additional Protocol I a similar ‘case-
by-case’ observance can be deduced in times of international armed conflict, in 
relation to the urgency of the provision of assistance and the lack of specific legal 
qualification of the term ‘inadequacy’.88 Likewise, pertaining to non-international 
armed conflicts, Article 18 of Additional Protocol II provides for humanitarian 
assistance in the event ‘the civilian population is suffering undue hardship owing to 
a lack of the supplies essential to its survival’.89 Also in this instance, the 
Commentary argues the impossibility of providing exact criteria for the 
determination of ‘undue hardship’, and relates this to a comparison with a more 
generally accepted standard of living.90 Obviously, this may lead to problematic 
circumstances in which an occupying force may consider territory adequately 
supplied, whilst (parts of) the international community may not agree.91 And, more 
topical, it may result for example in circumstances of non-international armed 
conflict where the sovereign does not wish to allow third parties to provide assistance 
in territory over which it has lost control.  
It should however be possible to establish a minimum degree for which common 
ground can be found. The nature of ‘relief schemes’ as seen above in the discussion 
on the definition of humanitarian assistance, is related to the delivery of those 
supplies urgently needed for immediate survival.92 Thus, it must be assumed that the 
level of ‘inadequacy’ should therefore be comparable to such a level of urgency that 
one can speak of amounting to a ‘humanitarian crisis’.93 Whether or not access to a 
territory can then be established, dependent on the (in)adequacy of the supply, will 
be discussed in Chapter 8 Section 3. Equally, such difficulties may exist in relation 
to (natural) disaster, where a State may claim that it is in fact not overwhelmed by 
the disaster, and local capacity is equipped for an appropriate response.94 Such 
difficulties in the determination of the adequacy of supply to a civilian population in 
                                                        
87 See in this regard Chapter 8. 
88 Sandoz, Swinarski & Zimmermann Commentary to the Additional Protocols (n 14) Protocol I Article 
70, 817.  
89 The full text of Article 18 AP II states: “Relief societies located in the territory of the High Contracting 
Party, such as Red Cross (Red Crescent, Red Lion and Sun) organizations, may offer their services for 
the performance of their traditional functions in relation to the victims of the armed conflict. The civilian 
population may, even on its own initiative, offer to collect and care for the wounded, sick and 
shipwrecked. If the civilian population is suffering undue hardship owing to a lack of the supplies 
essential for its survival, such as foodstuffs and medical supplies, relief actions for the civilian population 
which are of an exclusively humanitarian and impartial nature and which are conducted without any 
adverse distinction shall be undertaken subject to the consent of the High Contracting Party concerned”. 
90 Sandoz, Swinarski & Zimmermann Commentary to the Additional Protocols (n 14) Protocol II Article 
18, 1479.  
91 See, likewise, Article 55 GC IV. Thus, some possibilities lie with the Protecting Power to safeguard 
the access to emergency supplies of the population. See on the possible right to access in times of 
occupation Section 7.5.4 The Potential Right to Access and the Law of Occupation.  
92 Section 2.2.2 Defining Humanitarian Assistance.  
93 The exact definition of a ‘crisis’ is addressed in Section 3.3.3 Defining a Humanitarian Crisis.  
94 See Section 7.5.6 The Potential Right to Access in Times of (Natural) Disaster.  
 
 
State Sovereignty as a Contextual Concept  
regarding Humanitarian Assistance 
93 
times of conflict and disaster stress the importance of research into the various rights 
and obligations currently existing under international law in relation to humanitarian 
assistance. Furthermore, in relation to armed conflict, as will be seen in Chapters 6 
and 7, the provisions concerning the rendering and deliverance of humanitarian 
assistance are quite dispersed and particular.95  
These difficulties in ascertaining the moment in time, circumstance and severity 
of suffering of the affected civilian population highlight the connection between the 
concept of humanitarian assistance and the concept of state sovereignty. Assessing 
‘who’ or ‘what’ determines the threshold for the need of the provision of 
humanitarian assistance is closely related to the rights and duties of a state sovereign 
in international law.96 This Section focuses on the scope of application of a 
humanitarian crisis as a concept, whereas these junctions between the rights of those 
in need of assistance and the rights of sovereigns will be addressed in subsequent 
Chapters.  
Aside from matters of occupation, thoroughly codified with the horrors of World 
War II in mind, international humanitarian law as such does not state at which level 
of severity an (international or non-international) armed conflict can be considered a 
humanitarian crisis, thereby ensuring the provisions with regard to humanitarian 
assistance become operable.97 Yet, determining which instances may result in the 
deliverance of humanitarian assistance would provide more legal certainty.  Thus, in 
the absence of a clear statement concerning the moment at which the provision of 
‘relief’ becomes applicable under international humanitarian law, its application 
must be derived from the fact that relief is directly related to the event of its necessity 
as seen above in regard to the definition of humanitarian assistance: it only entails 
the essential elements for a persons’ survival.98 The San Remo Principles also 
acknowledge that not every situation of occupation or conflict may lead to the 
involvement of humanitarian assistance because, although not defining the concept 
of ‘emergency’, the Principles do apply that specific term in addressing humanitarian 
assistance.99 From the discussion of the application of humanitarian assistance to 
situations of occupation, it is apparent that lack of legal clarity may lead to attempts 
to deter the deliverance of assistance in such times. Thus by analogy, aspects of 
                                                        
95 The Geneva Conventions contain very specific provisions with regard to the rights of civilians and 
other protected persons, which will be discussed more in depth in Chapter 6. These include amongst 
others those cited in Article 27 of GC IV. 
96 See in this regard Chapters 4 and 8.  
97 Pictet, Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (n 7) Article 10, 98-99. Pictet argues 
that given the unforeseeability of future warfare, choices have been made to leave certain situations open, 
as at the time of the drafting of the Convention, it was unclear what needs may be given rise to in future 
times. Furthermore, Article 23 of GC IV only mentions ‘essential foodstuffs’ that are to be distributed as 
rapidly as possible without a corresponding clarification at which point in time such foodstuffs do indeed 
become ‘essential’. 
98 Section 2.2.2 Defining Humanitarian Assistance. See also Pictet, Commentary on the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 (n 7) Article 23, 180-181. 
99 ‘Guiding Principles on the Right to Humanitarian Assistance’ (April 1993) The International Institute 







willingness to cope with the inadequacy of supply become a relevant criterion in the 
consideration of the determination of a humanitarian crisis. 
As the provisions in the law of occupation and international humanitarian law are 
rather limited, an analogous view to natural disaster must be considered in order to 
distinguish more clearly at which point one can speak of a situation warranting the 
provision of humanitarian assistance. Operating outside the scope of humanitarian 
law, the UN General Assembly recognised that many emergencies’ dimensions and 
durations are often beyond the capacity of the affected state, making international 
assistance of cardinal importance.100 Thus, the General Assembly connected the 
existence of an ‘emergency’ to the capacity of the affected state to deal with the 
occurring event. A few years before, the UN 1984 ‘Draft Convention on expediting 
the delivery of emergency assistance’ had already formulated that a:  
 
“’Disaster’ means any natural, accidental or deliberate event (not being an ongoing 
situation of armed conflict) as a result of which assistance is needed from outside the State 
upon whose territory the event occurred or which has been affected by the consequences 
of the event”.101 
 
Following the Draft Convention and the UN General Assembly, the UN Department 
of Humanitarian Affairs defined an emergency to be a ‘sudden and usually 
unforeseen event that calls for immediate measures to minimise its adverse 
consequences’.102 Given the fact that the phrase ‘emergency’ is often linked to a 
certain degree of unexpectedness,103 other terms are used too. As such, the UN 
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction stated a ‘disaster’ to be a: 
 
“serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society causing widespread 
human, material, economic or environmental losses which exceed the ability of the 
affected community or society to cope using its own resources”.104 
 
A clear link can thus be established between the unfolding of an event and the (local) 
capacity to deal with this, for the determination of the existence of a humanitarian 
crisis. Similarly, also with regard to the notion of a disaster the IFRC also considers 
the relationship between a state’s own capacities in relation to the extent of its 
                                                        
100 UNGA Res 46/182 (19 December 1991) UN Doc. A/RES/46/182 (n 81) Annex I § 5: “The magnitude 
and duration of many emergencies may be beyond the response capacity of many affected countries. 
International cooperation to address emergency situations and to strengthen the response capacity of 
affected countries is thus of great importance […]”.  
101 UNGA Res 39/367 (18 June 1984) UN Doc. A/39/367/Add.2 and E/1984/96/Add.2 ‘Draft Convention 
on Expediting the Delivery of Emergency Relief’ Article 1(b). 
102 OCHA/ReliefWeb, Glossary of Humanitarian Terms (2008), 24. 
103 See (n 83) on definitions of emergency. 
104 OCHA/ReliefWeb, Glossary of Humanitarian Terms (2008), 22. The UN International Strategy for 
Disaster Reduction is the UN Secretariat overseeing the implementation and development of disaster 
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vulnerability when a ‘hazard’ occurs.105 Most of these analyses pertain to the notion 
of ‘emergency’ or ‘disaster’ within a non-conflict or -occupation setting. Yet, a 
humanitarian crisis may not only unfold due to a lack of a state’s capacity to handle 
a certain situation, since a state itself may be at the root cause of the crisis, as 
previously discussed. Thus, local capacity may be unable to cope with a certain crisis 
situation, due to conflict or occupation. The CRED defined a disaster to be a:  
 
“Situation or event, which overwhelms local capacity, necessitating a request to national 
or international level for external assistance […] An unforeseen and often sudden event 
that causes great damage, destruction and human suffering. Though often caused by 
nature, disasters can have human origins. Wars and civil disturbances that destroy 
homelands and displace people are included among the causes of disasters”.106 
 
Furthermore, the Tampere Convention states that a disaster, which may be caused by 
‘accident, nature or human activity’ is any sudden or long-term serious disruption of 
a functioning society posing a serious threat to human life, health, property or the 
environment.107 Capacity and willingness to handle the emergency at hand can 
therefore be deduced as continuous variables in the state’s ability to provide 
assistance.  
The various definitions above consider that a humanitarian crisis may unfold itself 
not only in a situation of (natural) disaster, but also in conflict or occupation, thus 
providing an overlap of various fields of law. Indeed, as argued before: persons in 
need of food, water and shelter should not be dependent on the nature of the crisis 
for the actual provision of aid. Such considerations also support the suggestion made 
in this research that the approach to the legal framework of humanitarian assistance 
must occur through an overarching perspective. Indeed, such situations in which 
assistance is necessary are furthermore not always separate and a ‘complex 
emergency’ is a notion of particular relevance in the discussion of humanitarian 
assistance. Disasters, both man-made and natural, often occur in regions already 
suffering from crises such as internal disturbances or conflict. Interestingly, the 
notion of a ‘complex emergency’ has been subject to various definitions, perhaps 
connected to the fact that it is a situation in which various fields of law come together, 
as a result of the fact that such a situation can be a combination of both conflict and 
natural disaster. The UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee defines a complex 
emergency as:  
 
“A humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable 
breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an 
                                                        
105 <http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/disaster-management/about-disasters/what-is-a-disaster/> 
accessed 14 July 2011. The IFRC views a disaster to be: “a sudden, calamitous event that seriously 
disrupts the functioning of a community or society and causes human, material, and economic or 
environmental losses that exceed the community’s or society’s ability to cope using its own resources”. 
106 <http://www.emdat.be/glossary/9#term81> accessed 14 July 2011.  EM-DAT is the ‘International 
Disaster Database’ of CRED, see Chapter 1 (n 3). 
107 Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and 







international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency 
and/or the ongoing United Nations country program”.108 
 
From this definition, a need for ‘international response’ can be considered, if the turn 
of events results in national capacities being overwhelmed, or results from national 
inadequate authorities. Referring back to the IASC’s definition, the IFRC also 
considers complex emergencies, as opposed to single disasters, as a type of disaster 
that is the result of a combination of causes, both man-made and natural.109  
Outside the UN or Red Cross context, the Bruges Resolution also refers in its 
definition of disaster to the endangerment of ‘life, health, physical integrity, the right 
not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, or other fundamental 
human rights, or the essential needs of the population’, which may occur through a 
variety of circumstances either of natural origin or caused by armed conflicts or 
violence.110 The Mohonk Criteria also focus on complex emergencies, elaborately 
stating:  
 
“[…] a “complex emergency” is a humanitarian crisis which may involve armed conflict 
and which may be exacerbated by natural disasters. It is a situation in which prevailing 
conditions threaten the lives of a portion of the affected population who, for a variety of 
reasons, are unable to obtain the minimum subsistence requirements and are dependent on 
external humanitarian assistance for survival”.111 
 
                                                        
108 IASC, 10th meeting, December 1994. The IASC was established in June 1992, following the call 
thereto in the UNGA Res 46/182 (19 December 1991) UN Doc. A/RES/46/182 (n 81). See for the IASC’s 
task as primary coordinator for organisations delivering international humanitarian assistance Section 
2.3.2 Providers of Humanitarian Assistance. 
109 The IFRC also provides examples of possible complex emergencies: “Some disasters can result from 
several different hazards or, more often, to a complex combination of both natural and man-made causes 
and different causes of vulnerability. Food insecurity, epidemics, conflicts and displaced populations are 
examples […] Such “complex emergencies” are typically characterized by: extensive violence and loss 
of life; displacements of populations; widespread damage to societies and economies; the need for large-
scale, multi-faceted humanitarian assistance; the hindrance or prevention of humanitarian assistance by 
political and military constraints; significant security risks for humanitarian relief workers in some areas. 
On a national level, conflict may involve warlike encounters between armed groups from the same 
country which take place within the borders. Such outbreaks of war may pose large-scale medical 
problems such as epidemics, lack of water, accumulation of rubbish, displaced persons, refugees, food 
shortage, hunger etc. Internationally, war may break out between two or more armies from different 
countries. Similarly such conflict may cause large scale mass movements of refugees and displaced 
persons.” See for further examples <http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/disaster-management/about-
disasters/definition-of-hazard/complex-emergencies/> accessed 24 October 2011. 
110 Bruges Resolution ‘Humanitarian Assistance’ (2 September 2003) (n 60) § 2: “Disaster” means 
calamitous events which endanger life, health, physical integrity, or the right not to be subjected to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment, or other fundamental human rights, or the essential needs of the 
population, whether of natural origin (such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, windstorms, torrential 
rains, floods, landslides, droughts, fires, famine, epidemics), or man-made disasters of technological 
origin (such as chemical disasters or nuclear explosions), or caused by armed conflicts or violence (such 
as international or internal armed conflicts, internal disturbances or violence, terrorist activities)”.  
111 ‘The Mohonk Criteria for Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies’, (1995) reprinted in 17 
Human Rights Quarterly 1, 196-197, specifically at footnote 7 of their text.  
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Therefore, similar to previous definitions, according to this set of criteria, the 
overwhelming nature of the emergency requires external or international help, 
whereas this emergency may originate from a variety of sources. Although the EC in 
1996 did not define a humanitarian crisis in its ‘Council Regulation concerning 
humanitarian aid’, and confined itself solely to the purposes of aid,112 in 2008 the EU 
clearly defined:  
 
“Humanitarian crises include both man-made and natural disasters. Their impact is 
increasingly severe, linked to a number of factors, such as the changing nature of conflict, 
climate change, increasing competition for access to energy and natural resources, extreme 
poverty, poor governance and situations of fragility”.113 
 
Thus, the EU also acknowledges an overlap in various circumstances that may 
warrant the provision of assistance. Indeed, although the approach to the legal 
provisions pertaining to the provision of assistance has occurred through separate 
regimes, the organisations involved in its actual provision all recognise the 
circumstance that a crisis can occur in a more overarching manner. Such support can 
also be found in the above secondary sources that have developed the various 
guidelines and principles discussed. Therefore, it becomes necessary to indeed 
approach the legal framework of the provision of assistance in such a manner also. 
The law often follows practice, and there is no reason for the law pertaining to the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance to be any different.  
 
3.3.3 Defining a Humanitarian Crisis 
 
From the above, in the determination of the situation in which humanitarian 
assistance becomes necessary, several criteria or common factors can be considered 
in relation to the definition of a humanitarian crisis.114 Clearly, the legal value of 
these criteria must be seen in light of the fact that most of the abovementioned sources 
attempting to explicitly define elements of a crisis are considered secondary sources 
in international law.115 Yet, common factors can be deduced in determining the 
definition of a humanitarian crisis for the purpose of this research. As seen, these 
criteria can be and indeed are, applied to the general notion of a humanitarian crisis, 
not distinguishing this crisis into separate (factual) circumstances of application. It is 
clearly relevant from both a practical and legal perspective to establish a definition 
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of a humanitarian crisis which can be applicable to a situation of conflict, disaster, 
and of occupation in order to assess the current legal regime for the provision of 
humanitarian assistance. Such importance exists factually because often such 
circumstances overlap, and legally because the rights of persons needing food, shelter 
and the like should not differ according to their actual circumstances. These needs 
are so closely related to the essence of humanity and human dignity that they warrant 
protection in all situations persons may find themselves in. Furthermore, one overall 
approach would align with the notion of state sovereignty, which entails constant 
responsibilities for the sovereign authority as discussed in Chapter 4. Based upon the 
analysis of the statements above, it is suggested by this research that a humanitarian 
crisis can be defined as: 
 
a situation deriving from a variety of origins, including natural or man-made 
disaster, armed conflict and occupation, causing grave damages of a personal 
or material nature to persons, where (national/external) assistance is needed 
as the local capacity is either overwhelmed, unable or sometimes unwilling to 
manage the circumstances.  
 
The above definition is a proposition, rather than an exhaustive list of potential crises. 
For this purpose, it is not defined how many persons should be ‘affected’, as this may 
vary according to the specific circumstance at hand. Such a number of persons 
furthermore stands in close relation to the affected state or local authority being 
‘overwhelmed’; a state of being which may differ in various circumstances.  
Within this Chapter, the three most common (legally qualifiable) situations that 
may lead to a humanitarian crisis, namely occupation, armed conflict and (natural) 
disaster, have been explored. This research will address the provision of assistance 
equally, as all three circumstances can potentially lead up to a humanitarian crisis, at 
which point humanitarian assistance becomes relevant to all three situations. As 
stated above,116 if persons are suffering and in need of emergency assistance, the legal 
qualification of the situation should not be decisive or crucial in the possibility to 
provide aid. Indeed, all persons in need of assistance should be entitled to receive 
such assistance on an equal legal basis. Therefore, the legal protection of these 
persons should be equal. Currently however, the viewpoint is often held that the legal 
qualification of the circumstance in which a person may be requiring assistance, 
namely either occupation, armed conflict or disaster, is extremely relevant to the legal 
regulations concerning the provision of relief – or lack thereof. As such, these three 
circumstances have been defined. Ascertaining which qualifications exist for the 
various circumstances, will allow for the determination of the applicable rules of 
humanitarian assistance. Therefore, having established the various circumstances in 
which provision may be relevant, as well as exploring the concept of a ‘humanitarian 
crisis’ it becomes relevant to address the interrelationship of the various fields of law 
that are applicable in times of occupation, conflict and natural disaster.    
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3.4 Scope of Application: The Relationship between Human Rights Law and 
International Humanitarian Law  
 
This Section addresses the particular fields of human rights law and humanitarian 
law that play a distinct role in the analysis of the legal framework pertaining to the 
provision of humanitarian assistance.117 This research attempts to set out the current 
existing legal framework, and ascertain the minimum rights and duties of actors in a 
circumstance of crisis. When multiple fields of law apply simultaneously, it is 
relevant to assess their relationship in order to establish the applicable law in a given 
circumstance. Whilst general international law is certainly relevant to the legal 
framework on the provision of emergency aid, that body of law does not contain 
specific rights and duties tailored to crisis-situations.118 Other bodies of law, such as 
for example environmental law, play a role in disaster prevention, and thereby fall 
outside the scope of this research. Similarly, another specific corpus juris, namely 
refugee law, only becomes applicable in cross-border situations where refugees 
require protection by a host state, often in a stadium beyond the provision of 
emergency aid. The timeframe in which humanitarian assistance takes place thereby 
lays a focus on two fields of law that both contain specific provisions pertaining to 
rights and duties involved in the delivery of humanitarian assistance; humanitarian 
law and human rights law. As Coupland puts it, their names already show that these 
corpora juris are ‘traditionally associated with humanity’.119 Whilst the IFRC has 
developed IDRL Guidelines, these guidelines are not a legislative initiative, and 
similarly, whilst many states have adopted international disaster response laws, such 
laws operate at a national level, falling outside the scope of this research. 
Humanitarian assistance, provided in times of conflict and peace, is  however at the 
heart of human rights law and humanitarian law, and operates at the intersection of 
these fields of law, in particular in times of a complex emergency.  
These two fields of law both contain a variety of provisions that will prove 
relevant throughout the following Chapters in this research into the legal framework 
pertaining to the provision of humanitarian assistance. Indeed, many of the following 
Chapters analyse the particular provisions of human rights law and humanitarian law 
in order to establish the current legal regime of the various rights and obligations in 
relation to the provision of humanitarian assistance. The delivery of humanitarian 
assistance is in fact dependent on the provisions relating to this in these two particular 
fields of law. The premise of this research that the provision and receipt of 
humanitarian assistance in any circumstance (be it occupation, conflict or disaster) 
should be equally provided for to the greatest extent possible under international law, 
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regardless of whether it be through human rights law or humanitarian law, results in 
the need to explore the interrelationship between the two fields of law. This 
exploration must occur at a more abstract level to ascertain this interrelationship at 
the outset of this research prior to delving into the individual provisions of the bodies 
of law. Much has been written on the interplay between these two fields of law, in 
particular in recent years on the convergence of both fields.120 This potential 
convergence, given the mutual goal of a greater protection of persons at all times, 
indeed concurs with the viewpoint of an overarching approach to the provision of 
humanitarian assistance that is put forward in this research.  
 
3.4.1 Development of the Interaction between both Fields of Law  
 
While the initial development of humanitarian assistance within the framework of 
international humanitarian law has been addressed in Chapter 2, the entrance of 
human rights into the international legal arena has prompted a further development 
of the legal framework on the provision of humanitarian assistance. As such, the 
development of the interaction between human rights law and humanitarian law is of 
relevance considering their application to the framework within which the delivery 
of humanitarian assistance takes place. Understanding the manner in which these 
fields of law have developed will enhance the understanding of the actual provisions 
contained within both bodies of law pertaining to the delivery of emergency aid. 
Human rights law as relevant to the provision of humanitarian assistance will be 
addressed in Chapter 5, with a specific view to the ‘right to receive humanitarian 
assistance’ as a human right. The interaction of humanitarian law and human rights 
law however can be explored at this stage from a more theoretical viewpoint, prior 
to the assessment of the various specific rights and duties, and is key to the 
assessment of the issues that may arise in the consideration of the ‘right to receive 
humanitarian assistance’ as a human right, and the consequences thereof, as well as 
the provisions related to the delivery of emergency assistance as incorporated in 
humanitarian law. For this reason, a brief overview of their joint development is 
provided prior to the discussion of their legal interaction in light of the provision of 
humanitarian assistance. Understanding the development of both fields of law and 
their interaction will enhance the discussion of the factual interaction of the bodies 
of law in circumstances of crisis today.  
In the immediate aftermath of World War II, when human rights entered the 
international arena, both fields of law did not interact immediately. Human rights law 
and humanitarian law were considered ‘separate and distinct’ as they had clearly 
developed independently from one another.121 For several decades, although both 
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fields of law envisaged the protection of human beings, the perception was that the 
two areas of law did not have ideological similarities, amongst others due to the 
divergence in their addressees.122 Indeed, whereas human rights are an individual’s 
claims against the state (or another individual),123 humanitarian law sought to govern 
the relations between entities in conflict, as well as the protection of those caught in 
such conflicts.124 The lack of convergence between both corpora juris was 
furthermore largely inspired by the viewpoints of two main institutions concerned 
with their maintenance and implementation: the UN and the ICRC.125 The United 
Nations, which emphasised its stance against the use of force, did not want to deal 
with or acknowledge the law of war any more than the ICRC wished to lose its well-
preserved neutrality and therefore chose to stay away from the political agenda of the 
UN, which included human rights.126 Intermittently, statements did emerge that 
placed human rights and international humanitarian law within the same context, 
such as the closing statement of the President of the ‘Diplomatic Conference for the 
Establishment of International Conventions for the Protection of War Victims’ of 
1949, Max Petitpierre, who commented: 
 
“[…] we shall celebrate the anniversary of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man 
which was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December the 10th, 
1948. It is (…) interesting to compare that Declaration with the Geneva Conventions. Our 
texts are based on certain of the fundamental rights proclaimed in it – respect for the human 
person, protection against torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading punishments or 
treatment. (…) The Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Geneva 
Conventions are both derived from one and the same ideal (…) namely that of freeing 
human beings and nations from the suffering of which they are often at once the authors 
and the victims […]”.127 
 
Such comments, although indicative of the mindset of some, were certainly not 
representative for the majority of the viewpoints of states involved in the preparatory 
works of the 1948 ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (UDHR) and the Geneva 
Conventions.128 As a result, the UDHR did not address the matter of human rights in 
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times of conflict, nor do these human rights receive proper attention in the travaux 
préparatoires of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.129 The subsequent Commentaries by 
Pictet follow suit, making only cautious references to human rights, most frequent in 
relation to GC IV and Common Article 3.130 Although wary of the notion that 
international humanitarian law should be applicable between a state and its nationals, 
the Commentaries cling to the accepted idea at that time that the application of 
humanitarian law is between the belligerent state and ‘enemy nationals’.131  
The discussion on the true interaction between human rights and humanitarian 
law did not occur until the late 1960s at the ‘International Conference on Human 
Rights’ in Teheran, due to many ongoing conflicts at the time such as those in 
Vietnam, Nigeria and the Middle East, resulting in an increase in interest.132 The 
1968 Teheran Conference marked the beginning of contact through UN means, 
specifically as the Conference adopted a Resolution entitled ‘Human Rights in 
Armed Conflict’.133 The Resolution was subsequently adopted by the UN General 
Assembly, urging the Secretary General to take up studies into the codification needs 
of international humanitarian law, specifically tailored towards the protection of 
civilians, prisoners and combatants.134 The ensuing Secretary General reports of 1969 
and 1970, equally using the phrasing ‘human rights in armed conflict’,135 signalled 
the UN’s choice of placing the discussion on human rights within the context of 
armed conflict.136 Indeed, the General Assembly continued in this line, adopting 
several resolutions in subsequent years on the topic of human rights in armed conflict, 
one of which specifically refers to the Third Geneva Convention.137 Equally, the UN 
commenced to envisage a more active role for itself as an organisation, asserting the 
need for the development of more substantive rules of procedure for the 
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implementation of humanitarian law, as existing rules according to the UN could not 
adequately meet all present-day situations of armed conflict.138 The 1968 Teheran 
Conference can thus be seen as a pivotal catalyst for the branching out of the UN’s 
vision on human rights, to the point where the organisation sees their possible 
applicability in times of armed conflict. In fact, the UN General Assembly declared 
with regard to the provision of humanitarian assistance that: 
  
“The provision of international relief to civilian populations is in conformity with the 
humanitarian principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and other international instruments in the field of human rights. The 
Declaration of Principles for International Humanitarian Relief to the Civilian Population 
in Disaster Situations, as laid down in resolution XXVI adopted by the twenty-first 
International Conference of the Red Cross, shall apply in situations of armed conflict, and 
all parties to a conflict should make every effort to facilitate this application”.139 
 
In this statement, the General Assembly clearly recognises the role of humanitarian 
assistance in transcending the boundaries between both fields of law. Still faced with 
the common viewpoint that human rights law and humanitarian law operated in 
different contexts, which could result in a vacuum of protection for individuals, 
several efforts were made during the 1980s to bridge this gap.140 One of the well-
known soft law results is the 1990 Turku ‘Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian 
Standards’.141 Hereinafter, the UN Commission on Human Rights declared in 1998 
that ‘irrespective of their historical roots’ both international humanitarian law and 
human rights law both focus on the dignity of the human person and respect for 
human values, from which logically follows that:  
 
“There is thus no reason why certain acts which may be unlawful in normal times and in 
situations of internal armed conflict should be lawful in situations of internal violence”.142 
 
This declaration is a confirmation of earlier statements made by both the ICJ and 
ICTY with regard to the belief that both areas of law are not entirely separate. The 
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ICJ had acknowledged in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the threat or 
use of nuclear weapons that a large part of humanitarian law is fundamental to the 
respect of the human person and ‘elementary considerations of humanity’ as 
discussed in Section 2.2.3.1 The Principle of Humanity, as well as noting that the law 
of armed conflict is permeated with an ‘intrinsically humanitarian character’.143 
Through such a declaration, the Court indeed acknowledged the common foundation 
of both fields of law in the notion of ‘humanity’. In the Case of The Prosecutor v. 
Anto Furundzija, the ICTY Trial Chamber recognised: 
 
“The essence of the whole corpus of international humanitarian law as well as human 
rights law lies in the protection of the human dignity of every person, whatever his or her 
gender. The general principle of respect for human dignity is the basic underpinning and 
indeed the very raison d’être of international humanitarian law and human rights law; 
indeed in modern times it has become of such paramount importance as to permeate the 
whole body of international law”.144 
 
This position was subsequently reiterated in the ICTY’s Celebici-judgment.145 
Following the UN’s ‘change of heart’, and both the ICJ and ICTY’s recognition of 
the interplay of both fields of law, other actors in the international arena have also 
acknowledged that although their development may have been pronged, both corpora 
juris base themselves on the notion of human dignity and equally envisage greater 
protection for humanity.146 As a result, it is well established today by the ICJ, other 
Tribunals, and international organisations that the two bodies of law share a common 
basis on which they both rely. In particular such declarations by the ICJ and the 
international tribunals hold international legal value in this regard and contribute to 
this research’s perspective that an overarching perspective can be held towards the 
legal framework on the provision of humanitarian assistance.  
Two points of critique relevant to the provision of humanitarian assistance must 
lastly be briefly addressed with regard to the growing merger and simultaneous 
application of human rights law and international humanitarian law. It has been 
argued that this simultaneous application of both fields of law can have the effect of 
firstly not only exacerbating conflicts, but secondly also affecting the neutrality of 
humanitarian law. With regard to the first argument, Meron notes that ‘humanization’ 
of armed conflict; namely the greater protection of individuals’ rights in times of 
conflict, may have the unwanted side-effect of prolonging hostilities or even making 
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conflicts more acceptable.147 Nonetheless, Meron does argue that convergence of the 
two branches of law may be an ‘enrichment’ to both human rights law and 
international humanitarian law.148 Concerning the second aspect, namely the 
neutrality of humanitarian law and especially the neutrality of organisations 
operating within this sphere such as the ICRC, it must be noted that the ICRC itself 
has indeed emphasised that there is no merger of the two corpora juris.149 Historical 
differences, namely that humanitarian law developed through notions of chivalry and 
reciprocity, whereas human rights law is based on the premise that individuals must 
be protected from abuse of power by authorities, continue to also form arguments 
against their joint interpretation.150 As such, the ICRC held in its 2005 study into the 
current status of customary international humanitarian law that although human 
rights law does ‘support, strengthen and clarify analogous principles’ of humanitarian 
law, they remain two separate and distinct branches of law.151 Yet, Henckaerts and 
Doswald-Beck do acknowledge that both corpora juris reinforce each other ‘in all 
situations’, not limited to times of armed conflict.152 Indeed, while a neutral 
humanitarian law will provide for the greatest chance of parties to a conflict 
respecting this law,153 human rights law in and of itself is not ‘coloured’ or ‘biased’ 
in any way. Human rights law as a legal body must be separated from their 
incorporation into the mandates of various organisations. Concerns for the neutrality 
of humanitarian assistance, with a view to a ‘rights-based’ approach many 
organisations have adopted are however valid.154 It must be noted that humanitarian 
assistance can only be considered that, if and when the principles of humanity, 
neutrality and impartiality are respected.155 Both concerns therefore, although 
understandable, do not interfere with the perspective that indeed these two fields of 
law have developed parallel to one another, and converge in the foundation that 
humanity and human dignity are of the essence; both fields of law attempt to protect 
exactly that concept. Humanitarian assistance strives to achieve that same goal, and 
therefore this research stipulates that civilians finding themselves in a humanitarian 
crisis must be treated equally in their protection by the law, regardless of the 
circumstance they find themselves in: a need for humanitarian assistance can be 
equally great in the aftermath of a cyclone as during a non-international armed 
conflict, and the law should offer equal protection to persons regardless of these 
circumstances. In fact, the law should be developed in the interest of the victims of 
such circumstances. In the following Sections, the particular interrelation between 
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and interaction of these fields of law is addressed in further detail, to ascertain in 
which manner the law protects such victims to the greatest extent.  
 
3.4.2 Applicability of Human Rights in Armed Conflict and Occupation 
 
Determining that both human rights law and humanitarian law have a shared goal 
and common denominator does not determine whether both corpora juris can indeed 
be simultaneously applicable and thus whether they do indeed interact. It has been 
clearly established that international humanitarian law is applicable in the event of 
an occupation or (non-)international armed conflict.156 However, the applicability of 
human rights in times of occupation or armed conflict has not been as clearly 
established, considering the late ‘arrival’ of this body of law to the international scene 
post World War II. As discussed in Section 3.3, international human rights law 
provisions may provide a distinct basis for the provision of humanitarian assistance. 
As such, exploring their continued application in times of occupation or armed 
conflict is relevant to establishing which rights and obligations may exist with regard 
to the provision of assistance in such times. This assessment supports the premise of 
this research that a common, overarching approach must be taken in the provision of 
humanitarian assistance. Establishing which provisions may be applicable at all times 
shall contribute to providing clarity with regard to the rights of recipients of 
humanitarian assistance and moreover to the duties and responsibilities of the state 
sovereign as affected state.  
 
3.4.2.1 Relevance of Continued Applicability and Acceptance Thereof  
 
When both human rights law and humanitarian law are applicable simultaneously, 
the rights and duties pertaining to the provision of humanitarian assistance (discussed 
in Chapters 6 and 7) can be sought in both fields of law equally, should assistance be 
necessary in times of conflict or complex emergency. Enhanced protection for those 
persons in need of aid is thereby provided. The previous Section has noted that 
interaction between both fields of law did not really commence until the late 1960s. 
In a 1970 Report, the UN Secretary General noted that:  
 
“United Nations instruments already in force and those which still require ratifications in 
order to become fully operative, may be invoked to protect human rights at all times and 
everywhere and thus complete in certain respects and lend support to the international 
instruments especially applicable in conditions of war or armed conflicts.”157 
 
From this Report follows an assisting role for human rights in armed conflict, 
clarified and confirmed by the General Assembly’s Resolution 2675 (XXV) of that 
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same year, declaring that indeed in light of the protection of civilians in times of 
armed conflict, fundamental human rights as encompassed in international 
instruments ‘continue to apply fully in situations of armed conflict’.158 More 
momentum was gained in the 1990s, both in jurisprudence and in soft law. The 1993 
Vienna Declaration on Human Rights expressed concern for human rights violations 
in times of armed conflicts and called upon all parties to such conflicts to not only 
observe humanitarian law, but to also observe ‘as minimum standards for protection 
of human rights, as laid down in international conventions’.159As noted previously, 
the ICTY declared in its Furundžija-case that the notion of human dignity forms the 
basis and ‘the very raison d’être of international humanitarian law and human rights 
law’.160 The ICJ has somewhat simultaneously ascertained in several Advisory 
Opinions that the ICCPR and in particular the human right to life has continued 
applicability in times of armed conflict, as well as in more recent years subsequently 
broadening this to encompass ‘human rights conventions’ more generally.161 In fact, 
in the binding judgment in the Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of 
the Congo the Court recalled its earlier findings on the relationship between human 
rights and international humanitarian law, confirming with regard to the conflict 
situation at hand that:  
 
“both branches of law, namely international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law, would have to be taken into consideration”.162  
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of a State’s emergency powers. The Covenant requires that even during an armed conflict measures 
derogating from the Covenant are allowed only if and to the extent that the situation constitutes a threat 
to the life of the nation. (…) Furthermore, article 4, paragraph 1, requires that no measure derogating 
from the provisions of the Covenant may be inconsistent with the State party’s other obligations under 
international law, particularly the rules of international humanitarian law. (…) States may in no 
circumstances invoke article 4 of the Covenant as justification for acting in violation of humanitarian 
law”. Thus, although derogation from human rights law is permitted, such derogation may not violate 
international humanitarian law in the process. In particular in relation to humanitarian assistance 
however, as discussed in Section 5.2.2 Derogability, Human Rights and the Provision of Humanitarian 
Assistance, the relevant human rights treaty provisions are non-derogable. See also Legal Consequences 
of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 
2004, p. 136, § 106: “More generally, the Court considers that the protection offered by human rights 
conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict, save through the effect of provisions for derogation 
of the kind to be found in Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”.  







Whilst the ICJ may be valued for setting a standard in today’s world lacking a ‘world 
supreme court’, Higgins has rightfully addressed the appropriateness of the General 
Assembly asking Advisory Opinions from the Court on one state’s compliance with 
human rights treaty obligations as they are ‘monitored, in much greater detail, by a 
treaty body established for that purpose’, given the amount of states within that 
Assembly ‘not in compliance with their obligations’ under various human rights 
treaties.163 The Human Rights Committee established in a (non-binding) General 
Comment in this regard that the ICCPR ‘applies also in situations of armed conflict 
to which the rules of international humanitarian law are applicable’.164 Regional 
human rights courts, including the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and 
the Inter-American Court on Human Rights (IACtHR), have also determined the 
continued applicability of the human rights treaties under their jurisdiction in times 
of armed conflict.165 The IACtHR herein focused in particular on the right to life, and 
personal integrity.166 Derogability of certain clauses in human rights treaties fall 
outside the scope of this particular discussion on the interrelation of these two bodies 
of law, as they pertain to specific clauses in specific treaties, and will be addressed 
in relation to the provision of humanitarian assistance in Chapter 5.167  
 
3.4.2.2 The Potential Extraterritorial Scope of Application of Human Rights Treaties  
 
The developments regarding the potential extraterritorial scope of application of 
human rights treaties remain a matter of continued debate, and are clearly more 
contested than the applicability of human rights in times of armed conflict. In relation 
to the provision of humanitarian assistance, extraterritorial application of human 
rights obligations are particularly relevant in the circumstances of international 
armed conflicts and occupation. As discussed, increasingly non-international armed 
conflicts and (natural) disasters dominate the situations requiring a need for the 
provision of humanitarian assistance to persons in need of aid, where 
extraterritoriality of human rights application is not a relevant matter for the 
continued application of this body of law. Yet, international armed conflicts and 
circumstances of occupation still occur, sometimes also resulting in a need for the 
provision of humanitarian assistance, and as such the notion of the extraterritorial 
application of human rights obligations must be addressed.  
                                                        
163 Separate opinion Judge Higgins § 27 in the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136. Higgins was herein 
commenting on the singling out of Israel’s compliance with the ICCPR and ICESCR as one state within 
the General Assembly.  
164 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31 (26 May 2004) on the nature of the general legal 
obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant (art. 2) UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 § 11. 
165 Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v. Russia (App nos 57947/00, 57948/00 and 57949/00) ECHR 24 
February 2005; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Bámaca-Velasquez v. Guatemala 
(November 25 2000) (Merits), Series C No. 70 § 207.  
166 Ibid Bámaca Velasquez v Guatamala.  
167 See in this regard also ‘Draft articles on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties, with commentaries’, 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission (2011) Vol. II Part Two, 33-34.  
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As a result of the evolution in international practice, and in particular relation to 
the ‘war on terror’, some of the legal discussion is currently shifting from the matter 
of whether human rights law is indeed directly applicable in times of armed conflict, 
to how this law is applicable in relation to international humanitarian law.168 This 
‘how’ includes the potential extraterritorial application of human rights law. It must 
be noted that multiple states have continued to reiterate their objection to the possible 
extraterritorial application of the various human rights covenants in general, as well 
as distinguishing between continued application over persons abroad, versus 
continued application in areas where a state may exercise a certain level of authority 
or control.169  
The ICJ has assessed that human rights instruments have continued application 
‘in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own 
territory’.170 In particular relation to the International Convention on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), the Court determined that the treaty does not 
contain a general restriction pertaining to territorial application and that in fact its 
provisions ‘generally appear to apply’ – as is the case with other similar instruments 
– ‘to the actions of a State party when it acts beyond its territory’.171 Such wording, 
although somewhat more hesitant, does align with the earlier assertion in the Congo 
v. Uganda-case.  
As mentioned above, this determination is of particular relevance to situations of 
international armed conflict and occupation; as in the event of a non-international 
                                                        
168 Noam Lubell, ‘Challenges in applying human rights law to armed conflict’, (2005) 87 International 
Review of the Red Cross 860, 738. 
169 Karen da Costa, The Extraterritorial Application of Selected Human Rights Treaties (Martinus Nijhoff 
Brill Leiden 2013) 60. See for example the United States that has asserted (Concluding Observations of 
the Human Rights Committee: United States of America UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.50, A/50/40 (1995) 
§ 284) and continued to reaffirm its “long-standing position that the Covenant does not apply 
extraterritorially. States Parties are required to ensure the rights in the Covenant only to individuals who 
are (1) within the territory of a State Party and (2) subject to that State Party’s Jurisdiction” in United 
States Responses to Selected Recommendations of the Human Rights Committee October 10, 2007. See 
also UN Doc CCPR/C/ISR/2001/2 (4 December 2001) § 8 and the Human Rights Committee’s 
Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report of Israel, UN Doc CCPR/CO/78/ISR (21 August 
2003), § 11, where Israel argues that the pending armed conflict bars any such application; as well as 
CESCR ‘Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – Israel’, 
(23 May 2003) UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.90 § 15. See furthermore the perspective of the Netherlands in 
UN Doc CCPR/CO/72/NET/Add.l, (2003) § 19 that argued with regard to the fall of Srebrenica and the 
applicability of Article 2 ICCPR that: “the Government disagrees with the Committee's suggestion that 
the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are applicable to the conduct 
of Dutch blue helmets in Srebrenica (para. 8). Article 2 of the Covenant clearly states that each State 
Party undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals "within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction" the rights recognized in the Covenant, including the right to life enshrined in article 6. It 
goes without saying that the citizens of Srebrenica, vis-à-vis the Netherlands, do not come within the 
scope of that provision. The strong commitment of the Netherlands to investigate and assess the 
deplorable events of 1995 is therefore not based on any obligation under the Covenant”.  
170 ICJ Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (n 40) § 216. 
171 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(Georgia v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order of 15 October 2008, I.C.J. Reports 2008, 







armed conflict the determination of continued simultaneous application of human 
rights law in times of conflict suffices to ascertain the latter’s application in that 
particular territory. Indeed, establishing extraterritorial application of human rights 
law will allow human rights provisions to function as a basis upon which duties may 
exist to provide humanitarian assistance outside of a state’s territory. As such, an 
obligation to provide humanitarian assistance and a right to receive it outside of a 
state’s territory may not only be sought in humanitarian law, but could then be sought 
directly in human rights law also, as a second source in times of international armed 
conflict or occupation. The continued applicability of human rights law may 
potentially provide for a broader protection of persons in need of humanitarian 
assistance in these circumstances, through the applicability of a wider legal 
framework. In Section 3.2.4 it has already been noted that certain provisions, amongst 
which those related to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, may only be required 
of an occupying force when a certain level of control has been established. Such an 
assessment stands in relation to the acts required of the occupying power in the 
provision of such assistance. In that regard, the ICJ indeed found that human rights 
law is applicable to such acts that a state performs in the ‘exercise of its 
jurisdiction’.172 Thus, the ICJ similarly connects the extraterritorial applicability of 
human rights law to the exercise of control by a state.  
With regard to the ICCPR, the HRC noted in its 2004 General Comment 
pertaining to ‘The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties 
to the Covenant’ that a theory of ‘power or effective control’ equally applies.173 
Rather early on in the debate, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
stated that such applicability rests upon the ‘authority and control’ of a state, rather 
than a ‘particular geographic area’.174 Similarly, the ECtHR determined in its 
Loizidou v. Turkey judgement concerning Northern Cyprus that the provisions of the 
ECHR remain applicable in the event a state exercises extraterritorial ‘effective 
control’.175 Clearly, such extraterritorial application may be of relevance to the duties 
and rights in times of an international armed conflict or occupation, and favourable 
arguments find their logic in the common goal of both human rights law and 
international humanitarian law; namely the protection of persons. Legally however, 
it must be established what such a level of ‘control’ entails to establish whether 
human rights law may function as a source for the determination of a right to receive 
                                                        
172 ICJ Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (n 40) § 216.  
173 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31 (26 May 2004) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 
13 § 10: “[…] the enjoyment of Covenant rights is not limited to citizens of States Parties but must also 
be available to all individuals, regardless of nationality or statelessness, such as asylum seekers, refugees, 
migrant workers and other persons, who may find themselves in the territory or subject to the jurisdiction 
of the State Party. This principle also applies to those within the power or effective control of the forces 
of a State Party acting outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such power or 
effective control was obtained, such as forces constituting a national contingent of a State Party assigned 
to an international peace-keeping or peace-enforcement operation”.  
174 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Coard et al v USA (Report No 109/99 Case 10.951) 
(29 September 1999) § 37. 
175 Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections) (App no 15318/89) ECHR 23 March 1995, § 62. 
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assistance in times of international armed conflict or occupation or a duty to provide 
such assistance for the sovereign authority.  
What precisely can be determined as ‘effective’ control or authority has not yet 
definitively crystallised in international law with regards to this extraterritorial 
human rights application. Nevertheless, certain determinations with regard to 
temporal and personal scope can be derived from (regional) case law, as these issues 
have been addressed in more detail by various human rights courts. The Loizidou-
case before the ECtHR concerned a situation of rather prolonged occupation, which 
according to the ECtHR can lead to the continued applicability of human rights 
law.176 Furthermore, the ECtHR found in Ilascu and others v. Moldova and Russia 
that Russia was responsible for certain violations although the presence of Russian 
troops in Moldova was for a restricted time.177 Therefore, the temporal scope 
according to the ECtHR can be quite broad, ranging from a relatively short period of 
time to prolonged occupation, but the ECtHR has been known to only allow for 
extraterritorial application of the Convention as a matter of exception.178 Therefore, 
the personal scope should also be assessed, as effective control or authority is divided 
between territory outside the own state and individuals outside the territory but 
remaining under the state’s control.179 As such, the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights asserted in Coard et al v. USA that agents of a state in another territory 
may continue to be under the control of the country of origin.180 Similarly, the ECtHR 
also found such control to exist, although distinguishing between effective control 
over ‘ground operations’ whereby a state exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction as 
opposed to aerial attacks, thereby adhering to a more ‘effective territorial control’ 
approach.181 The ECtHR elaborated that the entire range of rights under the ECHR 
must be observed by States Parties when exercising control over a particular area, 
while it is not necessary to establish whether ‘detailed control over the policies and 
actions of the subordinate local administration’ is exercised.182 Consequently, 
although the extra-territorial applicability of human rights law is increasingly 
                                                        
176 Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections) (App no 15318/89) ECHR 23 March 1995. 
177 Ilascu and others v Moldova and Russia (App no 48787/99) ECHR 8 July 2004, 318. 
178 Cedric Ryngaert, ‘Clarifying the Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (Al-Skeini v the United Kingdom)’ (2012) 28 Merkourios - International and European Security 
Law 74, 59.  
179 Lubell, ‘Challenges in applying human rights law to armed conflict’ (n 168) 740. 
180 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Coard et al v USA (Report No 109/99 Case 10.951) 
(29 September 1999) § 37. 
181 See amongst others Bankovic and others v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States (Decision as to 
the Admissibility) (App no 52207/99) ECHR 12 December 2001 § 67-73 and in particular § 80; and 
Öcalan v Turkey (App no. 46221/99) ECHR 12 May 2005. The Court determined in the latter (§ 91) that 
“(…) It is common ground that, directly after being handed over to the Turkish officials by the Kenyan 
officials, the applicant was effectively under Turkish authority and therefore within the “jurisdiction” of 
that State for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention, even though in this instance Turkey exercised 
its authority outside its territory. It is true that the applicant was physically forced to return to Turkey by 
Turkish officials and was under their authority and control following his arrest and return to Turkey”. As 
such, in the Öcalan case, effective authority could be established. 







discussed and addressed in jurisprudence,183 as seen above the extent of the notion of 
‘effective’ control or authority remains a matter of continued debate and courts are 
continuing to be restrictive in their application of the concept.  
Furthermore, for a large part the discussion through jurisprudence has 
concentrated itself around the ICCPR and ECHR, whereas the provision of 
humanitarian assistance can also be placed within the range of rights found in the 
ICESCR. As such, the assessment of the potential extraterritorial application of these 
rights is of particular relevance also. Although the ICJ, ECtHR and IACtHR did not 
determine that the assessment of extraterritorial application of human rights was 
solely pertinent to civil and political rights, they have not positively and bindingly 
established extra-territorial obligations for states with regard to economic, social and 
cultural rights. The ICJ has merely noted that ‘it is not to be excluded’ that such rights 
may also apply extraterritorially should a state exercise its territorial jurisdiction, but 
safeguarded this statement by addressing the fact that the ICESCR may be lacking a 
provision on its scope of application as it ‘guarantees rights which are essentially 
territorial’.184 Indeed, it has been argued that there are no indications that the drafters 
of the ICESCR ever intended such an extraterritorial application of the convention.185 
However, the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) itself 
declared that a state party’s obligations under the ICESCR ‘apply to all territories 
and populations under its effective control’, referring also to the obligations of actors 
‘under the jurisdiction’ of States Parties.186 Furthermore, the ‘Maastricht Principles 
on Extra-Territorial Obligations (ETOs) of States in the area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights’ (Maastricht Principles) were recently adopted with a view to 
furthering the acceptance of such extraterritorial application.187  
As mentioned, the potential extraterritorial application of human rights provisions 
relevant to the provision of humanitarian assistance remains limited to circumstances 
                                                        
183 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study (n 149), 305-
306 (Fundamental Guarantees). 
184 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136, § 112. In soft law recently the ‘Maastricht Principles on Extra-
Territorial Obligations (ETOs) of States in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ of 28 
September 2011 in Geneva, at a UN side-event were adopted with a view to furthering the acceptance of 
such extraterritorial application.  They are co-sponsored by the International Commission of Jurists and 
Maastricht University. 
185 Michael J Dennis, ‘Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed 
Conflict and Military Occupation’, (2005) 99 American Journal of International Law 1, 127. 
186 CESCR ‘Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – 
Israel’, (23 May 2003) UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.90 § 31 and CESCR General Comment 20 (Article 2 
ICESCR) UN Doc E/C.12/GC/20 ‘Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights’ (2 July 
2009) § 14. 
187 The ‘Maastricht Principles on Extra-Territorial Obligations (ETOs) of States in the area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights’ of 28 September 2011 in Geneva, at a UN side-event. They are co-sponsored 
by the International Commission of Jurists and Maastricht University, and have been signed by over 40 
distinguished jurists, thereby clearly adding to the opinio juris in this area. The final version of the 
Principles was adopted 29 February 2012. See for a further discussion also Fons Coomans, ‘Application 
of the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights in the Framework of International 
Organisations’, (2007) Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 11, 359–390. 
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of international armed conflict or occupation which amount to a humanitarian crisis. 
Should a humanitarian crisis occur in times of an international armed conflict or 
during occupation, the extraterritorial application of human rights may be of 
relevance. In particular the potential application of economic, social and cultural 
rights is of relevance, as such rights place a positive obligation upon states to perform 
an active function (such as the provision of food).188 Indeed, providing humanitarian 
assistance is such a positive obligation that pertains to the fulfilment of certain human 
rights by the affected state in a circumstance such as a humanitarian crisis.189 
However it is precisely this category of rights that has not seen as much 
extraterritorial recognition by courts, compared to human rights such as the right to 
life, enshrined in the ICCPR and ECHR. Yet, as will be addressed in Chapter 6, the 
duties of the affected state in times of occupation and international armed conflict are 
quite well-developed in humanitarian law with regard to the provision of 
humanitarian assistance. Whilst it remains relevant to reaffirm that human rights do 
not cease to exist in times of conflict or occupation, the need to rely on the so far 
contested notion of extraterritorial application of certain human rights, is therefore 
not immediately necessary for the protection of persons in need of aid. Even with the 
acceptance that indeed human rights do find continued extraterritorial application, 
the level of ‘effective control’ or authority necessary for their fulfilment remains to 
be determined on a case-by-case basis, potentially in court. Should such a control 
then be definitively established, a primary right to be observed in particular relation 
to the provision of emergency aid would then potentially be the right to life, as the 
category of economic, social and cultural rights is challenged with additional 
difficulties regarding potential extraterritorial application.  
 
3.4.3 Hierarchy or Convergence of International Legal Norms?  
 
Having established that human rights law finds continued applicability in times of 
armed conflict and occupation and that their application is also continued in times of 
natural disaster and non-international armed conflict, the simultaneous and reciprocal 
relationship between human rights law and international humanitarian law must be 
assessed.190 Such an assessment may determine which provisions that may invoke a 
right or duty relating to humanitarian assistance, to be discussed in subsequent 
Chapters, would perhaps receive precedence over another provision relating to 
humanitarian assistance. Determining which theories are applicable in the assessment 
of such a relationship will allow for the more practical determination of the existing 
specific rights and duties in subsequent Chapters. As just established, human rights 
law has a general application, whereas humanitarian law is tailored specifically to 
                                                        
188 See Section 3.4.2.2 The Potential Extraterritorial Scope of Application of Human Rights Treaties.  
189 See Chapter 5 The Potential Human Right to Receive Humanitarian Assistance, regarding the specific 
human rights related to humanitarian assistance.  
190 This Section is an updated version of earlier work published: ‘A humanitarian crisis: reframing the 
legal framework on humanitarian assistance’, in Zwitter A et al (eds) Humanitarian Action: Global, 







circumstances of armed conflict. Thus, the doctrine of ‘lex specialis derogat lex 
generalis’, which is generally accepted in national law, immediately springs to mind. 
Yet, given the decentralised structure of the international legal body, applying this 
domestic regime to the international field does not necessarily immediately resolve 
the relationship between human rights law and humanitarian law.191 How to balance 
the possible conflicting norms must however be addressed, as this may be the case in 
the provision of humanitarian assistance.192  
The ICJ has as such not only declared affirmatively that human rights remain 
applicable in times of armed conflict, it has also addressed the particular relationship 
between both fields of law. Doing so firstly in its 1996 Nuclear Weapons-Opinion, 
the Court focused in particular on the right to life:  
 
“The Court observes that the protection of the International Covenant of Civil and Political 
Rights does not cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant 
whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency. 
Respect for the right to life is not, however, such a provision. In principle, the right not 
arbitrarily to be deprived of one's life applies also in hostilities. The test of what is an 
arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be determined by the applicable lex 
specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the 
conduct of hostilities. Thus whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain 
weapon in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 
6 of the Covenant, can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed conflict 
and not deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself”193  
 
In its analysis, the ICJ asserts that whilst human rights law continues to be applicable, 
the notion of ‘arbitrary deprivation of life’ in relation to the use of particular weapons 
must be determined by humanitarian law as the lex specialis in times of hostilities. 
At a more abstract level, the Court elaborated on its position in the ensuing Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
Advisory Opinion stating:  
 
“As regards the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law, 
there are thus three possible situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of 
international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; 
yet others may be matters of both these branches of international law. In order to answer 
the question put to it, the Court will have to take into consideration both these branches of 
                                                        
191 Krieger, ‘A Conflict of Norms’ (n 121), 269. 
192 A discussion of conflicting norms in general international law remains outside the scope of this 
research. See however amongst others Articles 53 and 64 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties; Article 103 UN Charter; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment 27 June 1986 I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14, § 
177-179, 186; and ‘Fragmentation Of International Law: Difficulties Arising From The Diversification 
And Expansion Of International Law’, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission 
(13 April 2006) UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682. 
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international law, namely human rights law and, as lex specialis, international 
humanitarian law”.194 
 
The Court herein evolves its position in the Nuclear Weapons-Opinion where it 
addressed the law of conduct of hostilities to be the ‘lex specialis’, but now also 
recognises the potential of matters falling exclusively within the domain of human 
rights law, while broadening its stance to include all human rights as opposed to the 
right to life. Thus the ICJ takes a somewhat more conciliatory approach.195 In the 
above assessment, the ICJ provides three possible scenarios to which the ‘lex 
specialis’-doctrine may be applicable. These scenario’s then depend on the content 
of the rights involved. The ICJ confirmed this approach in its subsequent ruling (as 
opposed to the previous two being Advisory Opinions) in the Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo-case and thereby appears – at least for the time being – to 
have taken the abovementioned approach towards the relationship between human 
rights law and humanitarian law.196 In this approach by the Court humanitarian 
assistance, taking place both in times of conflict and peace and finding regulation in 
both fields of law, would then fall into the third category proposed by the ICJ. The 
approach in which international humanitarian law functions as lex specialis is found 
equally in the work of the Inter-American Commission.197 The specific rights and 
obligations with regard to the provision of humanitarian assistance can however be 
found in both corpora juris, and furthermore provide for a disparate protection of 
persons depending on the specific circumstance, such as conflict or natural 
disaster.198 This, and a broader need for conflict resolution, therefore leads to the need 
for a more comprehensive solution to conflicts between the law.  
An alternative approach can be seen in the practice of the Human Rights 
Committee that stated regarding the ICCPR:  
 
“[…] the Covenant applies also in situations of armed conflict to which the rules of 
international humanitarian law are applicable. While in respect of certain Covenant rights, 
more specific rules of international humanitarian law may be especially relevant for the 
                                                        
194 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136, § 106.  
195 Jean d’Aspremont & Elodie Tranchez, ‘The quest for a non-conflictual existence of international 
human rights law and humanitarian law: which role for the lex specialis principle?’ in Robert Kolb and 
Gloria Gaggioli (eds) Research Handbook on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law ( Edwar Elgar 
2013), 241.  
196 ICJ Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (n 40) § 216. For a different reading see Krieger, 
‘A Conflict of Norms’ (n 121), 271, who argues in reference to the Nuclear Weapons-case that the ICJ 
restricts itself to specific instances, and does not consider international humanitarian law to override 
human rights law ‘en bloc’.  
197 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Coard et al v USA (Report No 109/99 Case 10.951) 
(29 September 1999) § 42. 







purpose of the interpretation of the Covenant rights, both spheres of law are 
complementary, not mutually exclusive”.199 
 
The HRC is hereby taking the approach of complementarity, declaring that the rights 
enshrined in the ICCPR must be interpreted in light of humanitarian law principles 
in times of armed conflict. This approach is also embraced amongst others by Philip 
Alston in his role as UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary 
executions, declaring that humanitarian law must be examined for the interpretation 
of human rights law in times of armed conflict.200 Such an approach appears to 
suggest humanitarian law as a lex specialis, as it is argued that this body of law must 
be examined for the interpretation of a human rights principle in times of armed 
conflict. While indeed human rights law and humanitarian law continue to 
complement each other, such a haphazard interplay will result in a rather non-
homogenous development of norms. This approach furthermore deviates somewhat 
from the ICJ’s approach, as it does not necessarily view humanitarian law firmly as 
the lex specialis obtaining preference over human rights law in times of armed 
conflict, but rather would see human rights law interpreted in light of humanitarian 
law. The complimentarity-based approach however does align with the notion that 
both human rights law and humanitarian law find their basis in the concept of human 
dignity, and as such share a common goal.  
Yet another method is taken by Marco Sassòli, who argues that it remains 
somewhat unclear which body of law is the ‘lex specialis’ in situations where both 
are applicable.201 As Sassòli states, the relationship between human rights law and 
humanitarian law must in case of conflict indeed be examined according to the ‘lex 
specialis’-doctrine, but humanitarian law is not necessarily the more specialised law 
in each particular circumstance:  
 
“The principle does not indicate an inherent quality in one branch of law, such as 
humanitarian law, or of one of its rules. Rather, it determines which rule prevails over 
another in a particular situation. Each case must be analysed individually”.202 
 
                                                        
199 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31 on the nature of the general legal obligation 
imposed on States parties to the Covenant (art. 2), UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (26 May 2004) § 
11. 
200 UN Doc A/HRC/4/20/Add.1, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary 
executions, Philip Alston – Addendum -Summary of cases transmitted to Government and replies 
received , 12 march 2007 p. 348: “Thus, under current international law, human rights law is applied 
alongside international humanitarian law during armed conflict, and the interpretation of human rights 
law requires examination of international humanitarian law”. See furthermore for a discussion of various 
authors Quénivet, ‘The History of the Relationship Between International Humanitarian Law and Human 
Rights law’ (n 121) 8-10. 
201 Marco Sassòli and Laura M Olson, ‘The relationship between international humanitarian and human 
rights law where it matters: admissible killing and internment of fighters in non-international armed 
conflicts’, (2008) 90 International Review of the Red Cross 871, 600.  
202 Ibid 603-604. 
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How then such a determination must be made, should according to Sassòli be done 
through a formal observation of which law in the particular circumstance has the most 
interfaces with the situation; the norm which has a more precise content, and/or with 
a more ‘personal scope of application’.203 Thus, depending on the particular 
circumstances, either human rights law, or humanitarian law, may be the lex specialis 
at a particular time. Yet, the lex generalis always remains present in the 
background.204 This practice has indeed also been established in the ILC’s Report of 
the ‘Study group on the fragmentation of international law’, that argues the relational 
character of the special and the general rule.205 Such an approach could also be read 
into the HRC’s above comment with regard to ‘specific’ humanitarian rules. 
Concurring with Sassòli, Doswald-Beck and Krieger both note that especially in 
circumstances such as non-international armed conflicts the general prevalence of 
humanitarian law would not seem fitting, despite it being a situation of armed 
conflict, as human rights law is often more specific.206 Such a gap-filling method by 
human rights law has also been the approach of the ECtHR in the situation of non-
international armed conflicts.207 In some specific instances, the inverse has even been 
                                                        
203 Ibid  604.  
204 Ibid 605.  
205 ‘Fragmentation Of International Law: Difficulties Arising From The Diversification And Expansion 
Of International Law’, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission (13 April 2006) 
UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 § 104 and 112. 
206 Louise Doswald-Beck, ‘The right to life in armed conflict: does international humanitarian law 
provide all the answers?’ (2006) 88 International Review of the Red Cross 864, 903; and Krieger, ‘A 
Conflict of Norms’ (n 121), 273. 
207 Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v. Russia [Isayeva I] (App nos 57947/00, 57948/00 and 57949/00) 
ECHR 24 February 2005 § 167 and 169; Isayeva v. Russia [Isayeva II] (App no 57950/00) ECHR 24 
February 2005, § 173; and Ilascu and others v Moldova and Russia (App no 48787/99) ECHR 8 July 
2004, 318. The debate whether or not (regional) human rights courts or other bodies should be applying 
humanitarian law remains outside the scope of this research. However, it is relevant to note the self-
restriction imposed by the ECtHR in Bankovic and others v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States 
(Decision as to the Admissibility) (App no 52207/99) ECHR 12 December 2001 § 75: “[…] had the 
drafters of the Convention wished to ensure jurisdiction as extensive as that advocated by the applicants, 
they could have adopted a text the same or similar to the contemporaneous Articles 1 of the four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949”. Compare in this regard the more forward approach of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, Juan Carlos Abella v Argentina (‘Tablada Case’) (Case no 11.137) (18 
November 1997) § 161: “[…] But the Commission’s ability to resolve claimed violations (…) arising out 
of an armed conflict may not be possible in many cases by reference to (…) the American Convention 
alone. This is because the American Convention contains no rules that either define or distinguish 
civilians from combatants and other military targets, much less, specify when a civilian can be lawfully 
attacked or when civilian casualties are a lawful consequence of military operations. Therefore, the 
Commission must necessarily look to and apply definitional standards and relevant rules of humanitarian 
law as sources of authoritative guidance in its resolution of this and other kinds of claims alleging 
violations of the American Convention in combat situations”. However, this decision has been 
subsequently overturned by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Las Palmeras v 
Colombia (4 February 2000) (Preliminary Objections) Case no 67, Series C, § 33; and Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, Case of Bámaca-Velasquez v. Guatemala (November 25 2000) (Merits), Series 
C No. 70 § 209: “Indeed, there is a similarity between the content of Article 3, common to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, and the provisions of the American Convention and other international instruments 
regarding non-derogable human rights (such as the right to life and the right not to be submitted to torture 







argued; where with regard to the right to food in conflict situations, human rights law 
has been considered the lex specialis.208  
Without concurring with this latter perspective per se, as it is all dependent on 
specific circumstances, this more converging, harmonious approach would indeed be 
more befitting the developments that have taken place in the evolution of the 
relationship between international human rights and humanitarian law over the past 
few decades. Indeed, where international humanitarian law began as strictly 
addressing states, and human rights law did not apply in times of armed conflict, it is 
now clear that both corpora juris pursue the same goal: the greater protection of 
persons. In fact, perhaps the time has come to affirmatively declare that both are cast 
along the same lines and share a common denominator. As such, Krieger suggests 
the ‘most favourable principle’ as an interpretative method, through which the norm 
that grants the greatest protection to the individual would be applied.209 This would 
also align with Doswald-Beck’s argument to take into consideration the object and 
purpose of international humanitarian law, as both this body of law and human rights 
law aim to protect persons and prevent the loss of life.210  
It is precisely for this specific purpose that humanitarian assistance is provided in 
times of a humanitarian crisis, and such an interpretative method would indeed not 
only be relevant, but also find ground in the approach common to international 
humanitarian law to interpret provisions ‘protectively’; to err on the side of 
caution.211 For this reason it has indeed been necessary to establish the current 
relationship between humanitarian law and human rights law, in order to apply the 
theory behind this relationship to practical circumstances on the ground where 
humanitarian assistance may be necessary and a determination must be made as to 
which rights and duties exist. Furthermore, this method of interpretation falls in line 
with Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, stating that 
as a basic interpretative rule, jointly with the object, purpose and context of a treaty, 
also other relevant applicable rules of international law must be considered.212 This 
clause comes as a general rule of interpretation, and was created with a view to the 
                                                        
(2000), that the relevant provisions of the Geneva Conventions may be taken into consideration as 
elements for the interpretation of the American Convention”.  
208 ‘The Right to Food – Note by the Secretary-General’ (23 July 2001) UN Doc A/56/210 § 114: “[…] 
International human rights law must be complemented by international humanitarian law that protects 
the right to food in situations of armed conflict. This must include the prohibition of starvation of civilians 
as a method of warfare and forced displacement, as well as respect for the rules on relief and humanitarian 
assistance, so that relief is not blocked, diverted or delayed. The right to food, along with other economic, 
social and cultural rights, must be treated as equal in status and implementation to civil and political 
rights […]”. 
209 Krieger, ‘A Conflict of Norms’ (n 121), 274. 
210 Doswald-Beck, ‘The right to life in armed conflict: does international humanitarian law provide all 
the answers?’ (n 206). 
211 Kuijt (n 190), 78-79.  
212 Article 31(1) and (3)(c) Vienna Convention state: “1.  A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the 
light of its object and purpose. […] 3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: […] 
(c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties”. 
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evolution of the law.213 Thus, given the joint evolution of human rights law and 
humanitarian law over the past decades, with an enhanced focus on the protection of 
persons both in times of conflict and peace, a proper interpretation of provisions in 
either field of law relating to the provision of humanitarian assistance should be 
interpreted with the other body of law in mind also. In this regard, human rights law 
can furthermore play a vital role as individuals are provided with more direct means 
of redress, as opposed to humanitarian law in case of violations.214  
Furthermore, as humanitarian assistance takes place in times of peace and in times 
of war, such a converging approach is necessary to ensure that the same rights and 
duties in relation to the receipt and provision of humanitarian assistance exist in all 
circumstances. Equally, the UN Special Rapporteur on the protection of persons in 
the event of disasters has argued that several regimes are applicable to the protection 
of persons, and that such bodies of law are necessarily dependent upon each other:  
 
“[…] the regimes of protection of persons are international humanitarian law, international 
human rights law and international law relating to refugees and internally displaced 
persons. These regimes may apply simultaneously to the same situation because they 
essentially complement each other. In addition, they are guided by a basic identity of 
purpose: the protection of the human person in all and any circumstances. The three areas 
of law underscore the essential universality of humanitarian principles”.215 
 
Such an approach is precisely the premise put forward in this research: the protection 
of persons should be provided for to the greatest extent possible, regardless of the 
legally qualifiable situation these persons may be situated in. This holds especially 
true for circumstances such as complex emergencies, where an overlap of multiple 
bodies of law is inevitable. Thus, the provision of humanitarian assistance must be 
sought on the basis of those provisions of humanitarian law and human rights law 
that are most specific and provide the utmost protection in a given circumstance. It 
is precisely this approach to the lex specialis-rule, which in fact departs from the 
original notion of the rule, that will be applied throughout this research pertaining to 
the various rights and obligations applicable to the provision of humanitarian 
assistance. This interdependence, and growing realisation that a common minimum 
standard should exist that is applicable at all times has already been asserted 
earlier.216 Indeed, such a common standard could assist in the joint interpretation of 
                                                        
213 Commentary to the Vienna Convention, (1966) Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. 
II, 222 (Draft Article 27). 
214 Krieger, ‘A Conflict of Norms’ (n 121), 289.  
215 ILC ‘Preliminary report on the protection of persons in the event of disasters’ UN Doc. A/CN.4/598 
(n 76) § 52. 
216 See amongst others the Turku ‘Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards’ (n 141), UNCHR 
Report of the Secretary General “Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Fundamental Standards of 
Humanity” (25 February 2004) UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/90; Prosecutor v. Furundzija (Trial Judgment) IT-
95-17/1-T (ICTY 10 December 1998) and Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic (aka “Pavo”), 
Hazim Delic and Esad Landžo (aka “Zenga”) (Celebici-case) (Appeals Chamber) IT-96-21-A (20 
February 2001);  see also HJ Heinzte, ‘Convergence Between Human Rights Law and International 







human rights law and humanitarian law, especially in the event of doubt as to the 




With a view to establishing the scope of application of humanitarian assistance, the 
circumstances in which such assistance may be of need have been explored. In this 
context, this Chapter has discussed and defined the notions of international and non-
international armed conflict, occupation and (natural) disaster.217 As this research is 
based on the premise that a person in need should receive assistance, regardless of 
whether that person finds themselves in the aftermath of a natural disaster, in the 
midst of a conflict or occupation, it has been relevant to define an overarching 
concept of a ‘humanitarian crisis’. Indeed, this overarching notion is relevant from 
two specific perspectives. Not only does this concept build forth on the premise that 
the legal framework with regard to the provision of humanitarian assistance must be 
viewed in its totality, it furthermore establishes a determination of a certain level of 
severity that may be warranted in order for humanitarian assistance to be needed. Not 
every situation of occupation, conflict or disaster warrants the provision of 
humanitarian assistance, but in fact a certain threshold must be met in order for the 
delivery of emergency assistance to be necessary. As such, it has been put forward 
that such a humanitarian crisis is ‘a situation deriving from a variety of origins, 
including natural or man-made disaster, armed conflict and occupation; causing 
grave damages of a personal or material nature to persons, where (national/external) 
assistance is needed as the local capacity is either overwhelmed, unable or sometimes 
unwilling to manage the circumstances’.218 The notion of a humanitarian crisis 
functions as a basis upon which the further development of the legal framework 
concerning the rights and obligations relating to the provision of humanitarian 
assistance may take place.  
 Such rights and obligations relating to humanitarian assistance primarily 
find their legal base in international humanitarian law and human rights law. As such, 
it has been relevant to discuss the relationship between the two corpora juris, 
assessing their pronged development and subsequent interaction over the past 
decades.219 Establishing that both fields of law find a common denominator in the 
greater protection of humanity, the primary goal of humanitarian assistance, and that 
especially the ICJ and several other international courts and tribunals as well as the 
UN have a positive perspective on their interaction, the broad applicability of human 
rights was further examined. Indeed over the past years, and particularly since the 
ICJ’s addressing of the matter, the concept of the potential extra-territorial 
                                                        
Crosscut Through Legal Issues Pertaining to Humanitarianism (Springer 2011) 85, regarding the fact 
that such a convergence is welcome.  
217 Sections 3.2.1 Defining an Armed Conflict, 3.2.3 Defining Occupation and 3.2.5 Defining a (Natural) 
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application of human rights law has been widely discussed. On several occasions 
regional bodies such as the ECtHR and IACtHR have expressed their (restrained) 
approach to the matter.220 The extent of the concept of ‘effective’ control in the extra-
territorial application of human rights law however remains under debate. The extra-
territorial applicability of human rights is particularly relevant to the provision of 
humanitarian assistance in times of international armed conflict and occupation, as 
this may result in state obligations beyond the national territory.221 Yet, for the 
provision of humanitarian assistance, such extraterritorial application is not 
necessarily relevant. Also, the discussion on the existence of the extra-territorial 
application of human rights law lead to a renewed discourse on the relationship and 
possible hierarchy between human rights and humanitarian law, which has 
subsequently been addressed.222  
Discussion remains regarding the relationship between the two fields of law as 
the ICJ, other courts, UN bodies and legal scholars do not always concur on the 
manner in which both corpora juris interact, and a development has taken place over 
the past decades. Indeed, the lex specialis-principle can be interpreted in various 
ways, such as the tiered approach of the ICJ, recognising a different body of law to 
be applicable at various times; with humanitarian law as the lex specialis, whereas 
the UN takes a more complementary approach. Lastly in scholarship amongst others 
Sassòli recognises the lex specialis-principle to not necessarily imply humanitarian 
law as the specific law in times of armed conflict per se, but that the rule applies the 
more specific law in a particular given circumstance.223 This could then result in the 
application of a stand-alone provision of human rights law in times of international 
armed conflict if such a provision would be more specific than a particular rule of 
humanitarian law on that topic. Sassòli’s approach has been furthermore embraced 
by the ILC’s Report of the ‘Study group on the fragmentation of international law’, 
the UN Special Rapporteur on the protection of persons in the event of disasters and 
other scholars. Indeed, with a view to the above established pursuance of a similar 
common goal that can be found between human rights and humanitarian law, namely 
the greater protection of persons at all times, it is submitted that the lex specialis-
principle must be read accordingly: in times of potential conflicting norms between 
human rights law and humanitarian law, the most specific provision allowing for the 
greatest protection of persons must be applied. Such a converging approach also 
concurs with the viewpoint that the provision and receipt of humanitarian assistance 
in any circumstance should be equally protected to the greatest extent possible under 
international law, regardless of whether it be through human rights law or 
humanitarian law. Indeed, as will be addressed in Chapter 4, such protection also 
flows forth from the notion of state sovereignty, which is a constant throughout all 
circumstances in international law.  
                                                        
220 Section 3.4.2 Applicability of Human Rights in Armed Conflict and Occupation. 
221 See Chapter 5 The Potential Human Right to Receive Humanitarian Assistance.  
222 Section 3.4.3 Hierarchy or Convergence of International Legal Norms? 







With this Chapter, the scope of application of humanitarian assistance has been 
assessed, as well as the applicable fields of law. Therefore, the proceeding Chapters 
can provide a more substantive analysis of the rights and duties relating to the 
provision of assistance, such as addressing the question whether a possible (human) 
right to receive humanitarian assistance exists. In doing so, several individual human 
rights will be explored. Given the fact that human rights law remains applicable in 
times of (natural) disaster, armed conflict and occupation, this field of law needs to 
be assessed first, before examining the various rights and obligations specifically 
pertaining to the provision of humanitarian assistance in times of occupation, armed 
conflict or disaster. Prior to discussing ‘Part II Rights and Duties in Humanitarian 
Crises’ of this research, the following Chapter will address the concept of state 
sovereignty, which plays a continuous role throughout the legal framework on the 
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The previous Chapters have set out the framework in which humanitarian assistance 
operates. Chapter 2 has addressed the concept of humanitarian assistance, as well as 
the principles by which it is provided, and the actors involved in receipt and 
provision. Chapter 3 discussed the legal boundaries of the framework; ascertaining 
the notion of a humanitarian ‘crisis’ and addressing the interplay of various fields of 
law related to the provision of assistance. As the rights and duties involved in the 
provision of humanitarian assistance are incorporated into various bodies of law, 
these will be addressed in depth in Part II of this research. To close Part I however, 
the concept of state sovereignty must be addressed. The notion of state sovereignty 
is intrinsically linked to the legal rights and duties pertaining to the delivery of 
emergency aid as addressed in this research. In the instances in which humanitarian 
assistance is provided, the sphere of state sovereignty is touched upon, given the role 
                                                        
1 <http://www.unocha.org/south-sudan/crisis-overview> accessed 17 September 2014.  
Over the past decades, the Sudan has been faced with a vast array of conflicts, 
natural disasters, internal uprisings and the creation of a new, independent 
state. The international community has at various points in time provided 
humanitarian assistance, amongst which most recently following the creation 
of the Republic of South Sudan:  
 
“The Republic of South Sudan faces considerable humanitarian challenges, which have 
increased substantially since the outbreak of violence across the country in mid-december 
2013”.  
 
In the face of so many problems, the international community is debating 
whether or not to provide more robust assistance. However, such a role for 
the international community might face issues relating to the sovereignty of 
a state. What exactly does the notion of state sovereignty entail? How does 
this notion relate to concepts such as ‘humanitarian intervention’ or ‘the 
responsibility to protect’? This Chapter will assess the concept of state 
sovereignty as it exists in the international legal order today, in particular in 








of the particular sovereign in allowing the delivery of assistance. The notion of 
sovereignty is extremely relevant to the legal rights and obligations involved in the 
provision of humanitarian assistance, as the affected state plays a primary role in the 
delivery of aid, as well as playing a role in the provision of aid by third parties. State 
sovereignty as a concept in relation to the provision of humanitarian law can be both 
an obstacle, and a vehicle in the provision of emergency aid. Sovereignty forms an 
obstacle in the event an external actor wishes to gain access to a territory and is 
obstructed, and functions as a vehicle in the event a government implements all 
options to provide assistance. In the recent conflict in Syria and the difficulties 
gaining access for the purpose of the provision of humanitarian assistance, such 
effects can be seen.2 Prior to the subsequent Chapters’ discussion of the various 
international legal rights and obligations existing under international law in the 
provision of humanitarian assistance in times of a humanitarian crisis, the notion of 
sovereignty in relation to the provision of humanitarian assistance must be addressed 
as part of this research. Over the past decades, the notion of state sovereignty has 
furthermore been subject to intense legal debate, due to the emergence of concepts 
such as ‘humanitarian interventions’ and the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (RtoP).3 The 
fact that the notion of state sovereignty functions as a thread throughout the 
discussion of the existing rights and obligations relating to the provision of 
assistance, as well as the fact that it is currently a debated topic, therefore warrants a 
more in depth analysis of the concept, prior to devoting the following Chapter to the 
various rights and duties in the provision of humanitarian assistance in times of a 
humanitarian crisis. Indeed, the notion of state sovereignty and the current debate on 
its changing character influence the possibilities of providing humanitarian 
assistance, as will be seen below. However, as discussed more in depth in Chapters 
7 and 8, the increased need for the provision of humanitarian assistance is – vice 
versa – also influencing the concept of state sovereignty.  
 
4.2 Sovereignty as a Concept in International Law 
 
The international legal order has embraced the concept of an egalitarian division of 
nation states since the peace of Westphalia in 1648.4 Resulting from this approach to 
the international legal order, the concept of state sovereignty has been embedded in 
political and legal relations between states for many centuries. From the peace of 
                                                        
2 See in this regard UNSC Res 2139 (22 February 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2139.  
3 Section 4.2.2 Reconceptualising Sovereignty? 
4 This research will not discuss the formation of sovereign states as such nor the creation of the 
international division according to such sovereign states, but rather take this as a premise for further 
discussion of the notion of state sovereignty in so far as it relates to the concept of humanitarian 
assistance. For an in-depth view on the coming into existence of the world into such sovereign states see 
amongst others: Nico J Schrijver, ‘Begrensde Soevereiniteit: 350 jaar na de vrede van Munster’, Oration 
for the acceptance of the Professorship in international law at the Law Faculty of the Free University of 
Amsterdam (15 May 1998); T Jacobsen, C Sampford & R Thakur (eds) Re-envisioning Sovereignty: The 
End of Westphalia? (Ashgate 2008); and Malcolm Shaw, International Law (Cambridge University Press 
2003) 13-20.  
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Westphalia until well into the nineteenth century, the ‘sacred’ concept of state 
sovereignty was not to be tampered with.5 Today, state sovereignty is increasingly 
considered restricted, in relation to a sovereign’s actions towards those within its 
jurisdiction.6 Prior to assessing the current state of international law and state 
sovereignty, with its embracement of the notion of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’, a 
brief overview of developments in the past century is given, for the purpose of 
contextualisation in relation to the provision of humanitarian assistance.  
 
4.2.1 Historical Context and Relevant Principles in Relation to Humanitarian 
Assistance   
 
As put by Robert Jackson, prosecutor at the Nuremberg Tribunals in 1949, the notion 
of sovereignty at the beginning of the twentieth century could be phrased as: 
 
“each state is sovereign, its right absolute, its will unrestrained, and free to resort to war at any 
time, for any purpose”.7 
 
This egalitarian approach to states’ mutual relations can be seen as the external aspect 
of state sovereignty: par in parem non habet imperium, as laid down in Article 2(1) 
UN Charter,8 as well as expressed by the ICJ in the Corfu Channel case: 
 
“Between independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation 
of international relations”.9 
 
                                                        
5 Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, ‘Westphalian Sovereignty in the Shadow of International Justice? A Fresh 
Coat of Paint for a Tainted Concept’ in T Jacobsen, C Sampford & R Thakur (eds) Re-envisioning 
Sovereignty: The End of Westphalia? (Ashgate 2008) 211. 
6 Section 4.2.2 Reconceptualising Sovereignty? 
7 Robert H Jackson, ‘Nuremberg In Retrospect: Legal Answer To International Lawlessness’ (1949) 35 
American Bar Association Journal 813.  
8 The full text of Article 2 UN Charter states: “The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the 
Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles. 1.The Organization is 
based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members. 2.All Members, in order to ensure to 
all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations 
assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter. 3.All Members shall settle their international 
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not 
endangered. 4.All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations. 5.All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance 
in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to 
any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action. 6.The 
Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with 
these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security. 
7.Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters 
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit 
such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application 
of enforcement measures under Chapter VII”. 








As such, a state cannot be subjected to the authority of another state in the 
international legal order.10 Conversely, Article 2(7) of the UN Charter stipulates that 
within the boundaries of international law, sovereign states are entitled to determine 
the domaine reservé; their domestic jurisdiction, freely and without interference from 
the United Nations.11 Implied here is also the fact that such domestic jurisdiction is 
to remain free from interference from other states. This aspect is considered the flip-
side of the same coin of sovereignty, namely the internal aspect of state 
sovereignty.12 It is both this domaine reservé and the permeability of the external 
aspect of sovereignty which is subject to debate, as the international legal order has 
begun to redefine the boundaries of sovereignty. Such discussion aligns with the 
increase of non-international conflicts and the so-called ‘war on terror’ in recent years 
that have attracted international concern. The need to provide humanitarian aid in 
such circumstances indeed contributes to this discussion.  
These boundaries to the notion of state sovereignty are both instated and confined 
by international law, making international law the sphere in which the discussion on 
the definition and content of state sovereignty takes place. Several principles 
interconnected with the notion of state sovereignty in international law are of 
particular importance in relation to the concept of humanitarian assistance, amongst 
which the above mentioned principle of ‘non-intervention’, as well as the principle 
of ‘respect for the domestic jurisdiction’ and the principle of ‘consent’. These three 
principles will be addressed further in this Section, as the legal content of the concept 
and the consequences deriving from these principles must be discussed prior to the 
development of sovereignty into the 21st century. Whilst it has been established that 
the provision of humanitarian assistance must occur in accordance with the principles 
of humanity, neutrality and impartiality, gaining access to a territory is key in the 
actual delivery of external aid. The rights and duties involved in the provision of aid 
by third parties form a large part of the legal framework, in the event the affected 
state is unable or unwilling to provide assistance. As such the changing notion of 
sovereignty and its principles are essential in the establishment of the content of the 
law regarding the rights and duties in the provision of assistance. 
 
4.2.1.1 The Principle of Non-Intervention 
 
The principle of non-intervention is widely recognised in international law as one of 
the basic premises upon which the international legal order is framed, amongst others 
laid down in Article 2(4) UN Charter.13 Closely related is the somewhat ‘softer’ 
principle of non-interference. In the second half of the 20th century, sovereignty 
                                                        
10 See Schrijver, ‘Begrensde Soevereiniteit: 350 jaar na de vrede van Munster’ (n 4) 11; and Shaw, 
International Law (n 4) 1013.  
11 See (n 8) for the full text of Article 2 UN Charter. 
12 R Jennings, ‘Sovereignty and International Law’ in G Kreijen (ed), State, Sovereignty and 
International Governance (Oxford University Press 2002) 32. 
13 See (n 8) for the text of Article 2. See also ILC ‘Protection of persons in the event of disasters’ 
Memorandum by the Secretariat, UN Doc A/CN.4/590 (11 December 2007) § 20. 
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indeed remained defined as ‘let’s leave each other alone’.14 In particular in relation 
to the provision of assistance, the principle of non-intervention is relevant in two 
regards. Firstly, as mentioned above, it is relevant to address the differentiation 
between delivering humanitarian assistance, and forcefully gaining access to a 
territory; thereby violating the principle of non-intervention. Secondly, should lawful 
access be established, a differentiation must be made between those ‘intervening’ by 
forceful measures, and those providing emergency aid. As such, addressing the 
content of this principle is relevant to the establishment of the legal framework on 
the provision of humanitarian assistance. 
With the establishment of the UN, the Security Council and the notion of 
collective security, measures taken by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter to remedy violations of international peace cannot be considered to be a 
breach of the principle of non-intervention.15 This was indeed confirmed by the UN 
General Assembly in its 1965 ‘Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in 
the Domestic Affairs of Sates and the Protection of their Independence and 
Sovereignty’.16 The General Assembly furthermore declared the prohibition of 
intervention in any form in the ‘internal or external affairs’ of another State, 
condemning any such action of its Member States.17 Although the Declaration can 
be placed in the political realities of the Cold War at that time, and dealing largely 
with decolonisation issues, it does reflect the mindset of the then 117 UN Members. 
Subsequently in 1970, the General Assembly reaffirmed this take in its ‘Declaration 
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation 
among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations’ (Friendly 
Relations Declaration), declaring that both the principle of non-intervention as well 
as the principle of sovereign equality remain pillars of international law.18 Yet again 
in 1981, the General Assembly adopted a ‘Declaration on the Inadmissibility of 
Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States’ once more reaffirming 
the relevance of the principles of non-intervention and non-interference in 
international law, and furthermore providing for an extensive deliberation of what 
these principles entail.19  
                                                        
14 Louis Henkin, ‘That “S” Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, Et Cetera’, (1989) 
68 Fordham Law Review 1, 3. 
15 Vincent Chetail, ‘The contribution of the International Court of Justice to international humanitarian 
law’, (2003) 85 International Review of the Red Cross 850, 265-266. The role of the UN Security Council 
and its stance on non-intervention in relation to the provision of humanitarian assistance will be discussed 
in Chapters 7 and 8 
16 UNGA Res 2131 (XX) (21 December 1965) ‘Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the 
Domestic Affairs of Sates and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty’ §8.  
17 Ibid § 1. 
18 UNGA Res 2625 (XXV) (24 October 1970) ‘Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations’, Annex.  
19 UNGA Res 36/103 (9 December 1981) UN Doc A/RES/36/103 ‘Declaration on the Inadmissibility of 
Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States’, Annex. The Declaration distinctly sets 








Whereas the Nicaragua-case has been seen to be relevant in the discussion of the 
principles pertaining to the delivery of humanitarian assistance (discussed in Chapter 
2), the ICJ also notes generally in regard to the content of the principle of non-
intervention that:  
 
“the principle forbids all States or groups of States to intervene directly or indirectly in 
internal or external affairs of other States. A prohibited intervention must accordingly be 
one bearing on matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle of State 
sovereignty, to decide freely. One of these is the choice of a political, economic, social and 
cultural system, and the formulation of foreign policy. Intervention is wrongful when it 
uses methods of coercion in regard to such choices, which must remain free ones. The 
element of coercion, which defines, and indeed forms the very essence of, prohibited 
intervention, is particularly obvious in the case of an intervention which uses force.”20 
 
The importance of access to a territory for the purpose of providing aid almost goes 
without saying, and although the ICJ refers back to the 1965 ‘Declaration on the 
Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of Sates and the Protection of 
their Independence and Sovereignty’, the Court unfortunately foregoes the 
opportunity to settle the debate on the possible right to intervene on humanitarian 
grounds, as it does not clearly address the principle of consent or the principle of non-
intervention in that context. 21 However, the ICJ did deal with the provision of 
humanitarian assistance itself as a potential unlawful intervention within the territory 
of a state, rather than intervening for the purpose of assistance. Given the fact that 
the Court noted in the Nicaragua-case that the United States Congress had restricted 
assistance to ‘contras’ in Nicaragua, the Court argued that:  
 
“There can be no doubt that the provision of strictly humanitarian aid to persons or forces 
in another country, whatever their political affiliations or objectives, cannot be regarded 
as unlawful intervention, or as in any other way contrary to international law (…) In the 
view of the Court, if the provision of “humanitarian assistance” is to escape condemnation 
as an intervention in the internal affairs of Nicaragua, not only must it be limited to the 
purposes hallowed in the practice of the Red Cross, namely “to prevent and alleviate 
human suffering”, and “to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human 
being”; it must also, and above all, be given without discrimination to al1 in need in 
Nicaragua, not merely to the contras and their dependents.”22 
 
Thus, although the ICJ does not address the possibility of an intervention for 
humanitarian purposes, it excludes the strict provision of humanitarian assistance 
from being a violation of the principle of non-intervention and thereby being an 
                                                        
20 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 
Merits, Judgment 27 June 1986 I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14, § 205. The Court furthermore concluded (§ 
209) that: “The Court therefore finds that no such general right of intervention, in support of an opposition 
within another State, exists in contemporary international law”.  
21 Ibid § 203.  
22 Ibid § 242-243. 
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infringement on state sovereignty. Furthermore, not only the offer of assistance is 
considered lawful by the ICJ, the provision itself is also considered to not infringe 
upon the principle of non-intervention as the Court declares ‘the provision of strictly 
humanitarian aid to persons or forces in another country, (…) cannot be regarded as 
unlawful intervention, or as in any other way contrary to international law’. Indeed, 
the offer of assistance must be distinguished from the manner in which it is 
delivered.23 Yet, unfortunately, the notion of an intervention by means of force, for 
possible humanitarian purposes and indeed the concrete provision of aid, and thereby 
foregoing the principles of non-intervention and consent, is not addressed by the 
Court.24 In fact, the Court asserts that the provision of assistance by a third state is 
lawful and must not be considered an intervention, without addressing how this 
assistance reaches the territory of provision. This leaves the international community 
somewhat in limbo as to how the neutral, impartial and humanitarian assistance could 
reach the needy recipients.  
Following the ICJ’s 1986 Nicaragua Judgement, the General Assembly 
maintained in several resolutions pertaining to the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance that such delivery should not interfere with state sovereignty or violate the 
principle of non-intervention.25 Where the General Assembly ‘reaffirms the 
sovereignty of affected states’ and declares that assistance should be delivered with 
the consent of the affected state,26 the ICJ has avoided such declarations. In 
subsequent Chapters, this relationship between the provision of assistance and access 
to a territory for such assistance will be addressed in further detail.27  
 
4.2.1.2 The Principle of Consent 
 
Historically, international law is founded on the principle of consent. This principle 
was affirmed by the Permanent Court of International Justice declaring in the 1927 
Lotus case:   
 
“International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law binding 
upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by 
usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and established in order to 
regulate the relations between these co-existing independent communities or with a view 
                                                        
23 Carlo Focarelli, ‘Duty to Protect in Cases of Natural Disasters’, (2010) Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
International Law § 15. See Chapter 7 Third Parties and the Provision of Assistance: The Right to Offer 
Assistance and the Related (Potential) Right to Access.  
24 See Chapters 7 and 8.  
25 UNGA Res 43/131 (8 December 1988) UN Doc A/RES/43/131 ‘Humanitarian Assistance to victims 
of natural disasters and similar emergency situations’ § 2; UNGA Res 46/182 (19 December 1991) UN 
Doc. A/RES/46/182, General Assembly Resolution ‘Strengthening the coordination of humanitarian 
emergency assistance of the United Nations’, Annex I, Principle 3; and UNGA Res 45/100 (14 December 
1990) UN Doc A/RES/45/100 ‘Humanitarian Assistance to victims of natural disasters and similar 
emergency situations’, § 2.  
26 Ibid UNGA Res 43/131 § 2; UNGA Res 46/182 Annex I, Principle 3, and UNGA Res 45/100 § 2.  








to the achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot 
therefore be presumed”.28 
 
Even today, international law continues to build on the ideas set out in the Lotus case, 
although it has been argued that the notion of sovereignty is changing.29 With regard 
to the provision of humanitarian assistance, the outset has been no different, although 
the absence of consent for the delivery of assistance is increasingly seen to become 
an issue sparking legal debate regarding enforcement options and the boundaries of 
sovereignty. In theory and in practice, a state is only bound by those aspects of 
international law to which it freely consents, with the exception of course of 
principles of jus cogens.30 As such, a state may accede to a human rights treaty, yet 
in doing so leans heavily on state sovereignty in its decision to accede, the moment 
to accede, and even with regard to the extent to which it accedes, through a choice in 
reservations.31  
Although the principle of consent is particularly relevant in relation to 
international treaty law, states have chosen not to invoke this aspect of their 
sovereignty in relation to their accession to both the four 1949 Geneva Conventions 
and their 1977 Additional Protocols, forming the basis of international humanitarian 
law, as well as the relevant provisions of human rights law relating to humanitarian 
assistance.32 Treaty law formation is however different from customary international 
law, where objecting, as opposed to consciously consenting, is the manner in which 
a state may avoid being bound by newly formed international law.33 As will be seen 
in Part II, existing customary international law pertaining to humanitarian assistance 
has generally also been codified in major human rights treaties and the Geneva 
Conventions and their Protocols; to which states, as just mentioned, have not made 
reservations relevant to this research into the framework on humanitarian assistance.  
Shaw argues that the principle of consent underlies the entire spectrum of 
international law, without which the system would not be operable.34 Thus, although 
the principle of consent is to be considered one of the cornerstones of international 
law, with regard to international law and humanitarian assistance, this aspect of the 
                                                        
28 S.S. Lotus (France. v. Turkey.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7), The Case of the S.S. Lotus 
France v. Turkey Judgment September 1927, § 44 – 47.  
29 See Section 4.2.2 Reconceptualising Sovereignty?.  
30 Articles 11-15 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969). Entered into force on 27 
January 1980. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331; Shaw, International Law (n 4), 9; Dinah 
Shelton, ‘International Law and “Relative Normativity”’ in Malcolm Evans (ed), International Law 
(Oxford University Press 2010) 144-145. See Section 8.3.1 The ARSIWA, Peremptory Norms and the 
Denial of Humanitarian Assistance. 
31 Henkin, ‘That “S” Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, Et Cetera’ (n 14), 5 and 
Robert McCorquodale, ‘The Individual and the International Legal System’ in Evans, International Law 
(n 30) 295.  
32 See infra Chapters 5 and 6 for a more elaborate discussion. 
33 Shaw, International Law (n 4), 85. Shaw (p. 9) also points out the situation where newly existing states 
that are formed in international law clearly do not blindly adopt the existing body of customary 
international law without the option of objecting to it as part of its formation.  
34 Ibid 10.  
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principle of consent does not form a barrier in the provision of aid, as generally states 
have acceded to the relevant treaties codifying rights and duties in the provision of 
assistance. Yet a related notion of the principle of consent remains crucial throughout 
the entire legal framework regarding the provision of humanitarian assistance. Whilst 
states may have acceded to treaties regulating such provision of aid, their accession 
cannot be construed as an automatically implied consent to the factual provision 
itself. Indeed, such specific consent to individual acts of assistance must be 
determined on a case-by-case basis and are directly related to the specificities found 
in the particular provisions in human rights treaties and humanitarian law as related 
to the delivery of emergency aid. These will be addressed further in Part II of this 
research and in particular Chapter 8 Section 3. However, given that this form of 
consent concerns allowing external assistance into the territory of a sovereign state, 
it is closely related to the last principle that is discussed in this Section, namely the 
principle of domestic jurisdiction.  
 
4.2.1.3 The Principle of Domestic Jurisdiction 
 
The final principle, the principle of domestic jurisdiction is directly related to the 
notion of territorial integrity and non-intervention, as discussed above. It entails that 
international law cannot perforate with authority into the state’s territory, regardless 
of the ‘justness’ of the cause.35 Codification of the principle can be found in Article 
2(7) of the UN Charter, clearly stating that its member states shall abide by the fact 
that certain matters remain outside the international realm and are solely governed 
by national jurisdiction.36 According to the UN Charter, the only exceptions to the 
principle of non-intervention and the duty not to intervene in matters essentially 
within domestic jurisdiction, are Article 51 relating to the notion of self-defence, and 
the provisions laid down in Chapter VII of the UN Charter whereby the Security 
Council may allow for the use of force through collective security.37 The latter option 
was quite advanced at the time, as states relinquished parts of their sovereignty to the 
‘permanent five’ of the Security Council for decision-making. Furthermore, although 
Article 2 UN Charter considers the respect for sovereignty and for the domestic 
jurisdiction of all member states as part of the foundational principles of its 
                                                        
35 Henkin, ‘That “S” Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, Et Cetera’ (n 14), 10.  
36 See (n 8) for the full text of Article 2 UN Charter. 
37 Article 51 UN Charter states: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, 
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. 
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to 
the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security 
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security”. See furthermore Articles 39, 41 and 42 of the UN 
Charter for the matters concerning collective security. Although an in-depth discussion of this concept 
falls beyond the scope of this research, it will be addressed in relation to the provision of humanitarian 









Organization, the words remain absent in the rest of the Charter, with the exception 
of a brief reference to sovereignty in Article 78.38  
In relation to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, in particular, it becomes 
clear that as sovereign, the state has a role in determining access to the domaine 
reserve, as well as determining within its jurisdiction matters concerning such 
provision. The extent of these sovereign rights specifically pertaining to the duties 
involved in the provision of emergency aid will be further addressed in Chapters 7 
and 8. A relevant question remains however who the sovereign is in a domestic 
jurisdiction that appears to be a vacuum? What of failed states with no clear authority, 
or an authority helpless to deal with terrorism or other threats? Such ‘failed’ states 
find themselves in the midst of humanitarian crises, where the international 
community is willing to provide assistance. What respect for sovereignty and 
domestic jurisdiction must the international legal world have for an exploding or 
imploding state, and what are the consequences for the existence of sovereignty?39 
Henkin posed this question also in relation to the existence of humanitarian crises, 
asking:  
 
“who is responsible for the devastating consequences of natural disasters- floods, 
hurricanes and earthquakes that have devastated economies and blighted hopes for 
economic and social development, and economic and social rights for hundreds of millions 
of people seeking human dignity?”40 
 
If the domestic jurisdiction is absent, or the sovereign unwilling to assist in such 
circumstances of grave humanitarian emergencies, what does the notion of 
sovereignty entail but a hollow phrase? Yet, as Crawford argues, sovereignty is an 
attribute of the state rather than a precondition, and the (temporary) absence of a 
functioning government does not immediately deprive an entity of its statehood and 
thereby also of its sovereignty.41 With statehood remaining in place, a primary 
responsibility continues to exist for the provision of humanitarian assistance, despite 
a potential lack of government to carry out such responsibilities. It follows from this, 
that in the absence of such provision due to a possible inability to provide, the 
international community may and could step in. Indeed, the provision of assistance 
from the exterior may be a vehicle in the diminishment of state failure.42 Such a role 
for the international community follows from the changes in the international legal 
order with regard to the concept of state sovereignty as it is recognised today, in the 
                                                        
38 Article 78 UN Charter declares in relation to the Trusteeship: “The trusteeship system shall not apply 
to territories which have become Members of the United Nations, relationship among which shall be 
based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality”. 
39 Henkin, ‘That “S” Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, Et Cetera’ (n 14), 8. See 
Chapter 6. 
40 Henkin, ‘That “S” Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, Et Cetera’ (n 14), 9.  
41 James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford University Press 2006) 32, 55-
57. 
42 The Netherlands Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV), Report ‘Failing States A Global 
Responsibility’ No. 35 (May 2004) 51.  
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beginning of the 21st century. As such, the provision of humanitarian assistance plays 
a role in this principle of state sovereignty too. While the principles of non-
intervention, consent and respect for domestic jurisdiction form an essential part of 
state sovereignty, a concept in itself that has consistently been considered a 
fundamental right of the nation-state, their absoluteness has changed with the passing 
of time since the peace of Westphalia.43 These changes in legal perspective have 
followed a practice in which not only ‘failed’ states have appeared in the international 
arena, but also increasingly non-international armed conflicts take place where a 
sovereign is hesitant or unwilling to allow access to third parties for the provision of 
assistance.44 The need for the provision of humanitarian assistance indeed influences 
such changes. The enforcement of the delivery of humanitarian assistance must be 
differentiated from its provision, as the role of the international community in such 
circumstances can be twofold: on the one hand the provision of assistance, and on 
the other hand the use of (military) force to create an environment that enables those 
providing humanitarian aid to access a territory. The legal rights and obligations with 
regard to the possible provision of humanitarian assistance by third states or 
international organisations will be addressed further in Chapters 6 and 7, whereas 
enforcement issues will be discussed in Chapter 8. To properly understand the 
concept of sovereignty as it stands today, a brief overview of the debate pertaining to 
the notion, and several international initiatives that have added to this discussion must 
be addressed.  
 
4.2.2 Reconceptualising Sovereignty? 
 
In the 21st century, more than 350 years after Westphalia, the international legal order 
no longer looks the same as the international legal order of 1648. A wide variety of 
actors has arrived on the international scene, most notably international organisations 
and individuals that now form part of the discourse alongside sovereign states, in 
particular in relation to the field of human rights law.45 The embracement of 
international human rights law following World War II has most certainly altered the 
view of state sovereignty and the relationship of a sovereign to those within its 
jurisdiction. Interestingly however, the notion that sovereignty and the State’s power 
is related to the collective agreement of the individuals comprising this State can be 
dated as far back as Grotius.46 Thus, although more emphasis has come to lay on new 
actors and their direct role in international law today, the collective agreement of the 
                                                        
43 Maogoto, ‘Westphalian Sovereignty in the Shadow of International Justice? A Fresh Coat of Paint for 
a Tainted Concept’ (n 5), 212. 
44 See Chapters 7 and 8.  
45 Schrijver, ‘Begrensde Soevereiniteit: 350 jaar na de vrede van Munster’ (n 4), 25. and A van Staden 
and H Vollaard, ‘The Erosion of State Sovereignty: Towards a Post-territorial World?’ in Kreijen, State, 
Sovereignty and Internatioinal Governance (n 12), 171 and Henkin, ‘That “S” Word: Sovereignty, and 
Globalization, and Human Rights, Et Cetera’ (n 14), 8; Anne Marie Slaughter, ‘Intervention, Libya, and 
the Future of Sovereignty’, The Atlantic (4 September 2011).  
46 Schrijver, ‘Begrensde Soevereiniteit: 350 jaar na de vrede van Munster’ (n 4) 11 and Jennings, 








individuals and their influence on the powers of a state and its actions in the 
international legal field is many centuries old. A primary reference to this concept 
can in fact be found in the 1581 Dutch Act of Abjuration: ‘Plakkaat van 
Verlantinghe’, considered the Netherlands’ declaration of independence and 
dismissal of the Spanish king.47 With the division of the international legal order in 
1648 also came the theories on such a division between sovereign and society, 
amongst which most notably Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau in the 16th and 17th 
centuries, discussing the concept of a ‘social contract’.48 At the heart of this 
discussion lies the consideration of which bond actually governs the relationship 
between sovereign and society. Given the primary role of the affected state in the 
provision of humanitarian assistance to those within its jurisdiction that may be in 
need, following a humanitarian crisis, such a relationship between sovereign and 
society warrants discussion. 
Argued by some, the relationship between society and sovereign is one of mutual 
reinforcement, as both are dependent on each other to exist.49 Indeed this too is the 
position of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, as they deny the ‘natural’ powers of a 
sovereign, arguing that if all humans are born free, the relationship with a government 
or sovereign is one of agreement or contract.50 An agreement or contract commonly 
brings forth rights and obligations for both parties. Certainly, this take on the bond 
between sovereign and society would imply that it is a reciprocal relationship; a so-
called two-way street. Building on this premise, and relating this in particular to the 
provision of humanitarian assistance, arguably the provision of such assistance can 
be considered a duty in the fulfillment of the reciprocal relationship of state 
sovereignty. Indeed, if a duty to provide humanitarian assistance can be found in 
international law, such a duty could fall within the scope of state sovereignty. 
Conversely, this duty may invoke a right of individuals to receive such assistance 
based on this provision in international law, as part of the reciprocal relationship 
between sovereign and society.51 This notion of reciprocity, whereby a population 
has handed over certain responsibilities to the sovereign then conversely includes the 
population’s right to expect fulfillment of such duties in return. In relation to the 
provision of humanitarian assistance, this would then indeed include the 
                                                        
47 The ‘Plakkaat van Verlatinghe’ of 1581 is considered the declaration of independence of the 
Netherlands, dismissing the Spanish king Filips II whose family had reigned over the territory for years, 
by the Netherlands ‘Staten Generaal’ on behalf of the entire population. It would be the first step in the 
creation of the Dutch Republic. For the text of the Plakkaat van Verlatinghe: 
<http://www.let.rug.nl/~usa/D/1501-1600/plakkaat/plakkaat.htm> accessed  5 July 2012. 
48 See Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan (1651), John Locke's Second Treatise of Government (1689) and  Jean-
Jacques Rousseau's Du contrat social (1762). Although an in-depth discussion of these treatises falls 
outside the scope of this research, their considerations remain relevant today for the discussion of the 
relationship between sovereign and society. 
49 Francesca Piccin & Elia Pusterla, ‘Defending eroded states’ sovereignty: the European Union 
humanitarian aid policy’ GARNET Conference ‘The European Union in International Affairs’ (22 April 
2010) 5. 
50 Christopher Morris (ed), The Social Contract Theorists: Critical Essays on Hobbes, Locke and 
Rousseau (Rowman & Littlefield 1999) ix.  
51 See Chapter 6. 
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responsibility of the sovereign to provide for those within its jurisdiction, as will also 
be further established in Chapter 5 pertaining to humanitarian assistance and human 
rights law. This reciprocal relationship is often referenced also in the more 
contemporary notion of sovereignty, to which we have gradually progressed over the 
past century, while redefining the boundaries of the concept of sovereignty.52  
 
4.2.2.1 The Post-World War II Era 
 
Although the Westphalian concept of state sovereignty rested firmly in international 
relations between states until well into the nineteenth century, World War I and the 
excesses that took place at the hands of sovereign states became the first challenge 
for this well-established notion of sovereignty.53 Subsequently, the effects of World 
War II ‘pierced the veil’ of sovereignty further, especially considering the impact of 
the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials.54 These Trials, which for the first time subjected 
the classic notion of sovereignty to the newly developing international perspectives 
on peace and human rights, would prove to be a true turning point, as it was during 
these Trials that individual criminal responsibility at an international level was 
established for those in positions of authority; representing the sovereign state.55 
These developments have been seconded by the continued creation of various human 
rights treaties. The notion of sovereignty as a ‘shield and sword’ towards the rest of 
the international world is no longer tenable, especially with the developments that 
have taken place over the last decades since the establishment of the UN. With the 
UN Charter, the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials, also came greater attention for 
individual rights and human rights law.56 At the same time, an enhanced perspective 
on (individual) responsibility under international law was seen. Such an approach to 
international law logically affected and corroded the ‘old’ concept of state 
sovereignty in international law. With a focus on individual and human rights, 
placing ‘human beings’ and their protection at the centre of the international legal 
discourse, the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials proved that sovereign states could no 
longer ‘hide’ behind the shield of sovereignty. The international community no 
longer stood idly by watching atrocities take place, as states acted under their ‘shield’ 
of sovereignty. The firmly held grip on sovereignty that had lasted until World War 
II, began to wrench. The subsequent ratification of the various international and 
                                                        
52 See Section 4.2.3 The Responsibility to Protect, the UN and Humanitarian Assistance.   
53 Maogoto, ‘Westphalian Sovereignty in the Shadow of International Justice? A Fresh Coat of Paint for 
a Tainted Concept’ (n 5) 213. 
54 See ‘The Charter and Judgment of the Nürnberg Tribunal: history and analysis’ Memorandum 
submitted by the Secretary General (3 March 1949) UN Doc. A/CN.4/5; see for the Tokyo International 
Military Tribunal N. Boister & R. Cryer (eds.) Documents on the Tokyo International Military Tribunal: 
Charter, Indictment and Judgments 2008 Oxford / New York. See also J Maogoto & K Kindiki, ‘A people 
Betrayed – the Darfur Crisis and International Law: Rethinking Westphalian Sovereignty in the 21st 
Century’, (2007) 19 Bond Law Review 2, 108-109.  
55 Jackson, ‘Nuremberg In Retrospect: Legal Answer To International Lawlessness’ (n 7); and Maogoto, 
‘Westphalian Sovereignty in the Shadow of International Justice? A Fresh Coat of Paint for a Tainted 
Concept’ (n 5) 215. 








regional human rights treaties indeed also expresses the willingness of many states 
to adhere to these standards, imposed upon them by international law.57 Furthermore, 
this shifted focus had a moral connotation, perhaps influenced by the recent horrors 
of World War II. It is precisely this moral aspect, rooted in the principle of humanity, 
which also plays a role in the provision of humanitarian assistance.  
Although the UN Charter indeed eradicated the sovereign right to wage wars and 
resort to violence, as well as fuelling an embracement of international human rights 
law, the following decades also embraced a positive notion of sovereignty in relation 
to the Cold War and concurrent period of the de-colonisation and birth of many new 
independent states in Africa and Asia during the 1960s and 1970s.58 These new and 
sometimes weak states logically sought to strengthen their sovereignty after 
struggling to free themselves from colonial imperialism.59 Evidence hereof can be 
found in the 1970 General Assembly’s ‘Declaration on Principles of International 
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States’, which 
elaborates on the principle of ‘sovereign equality’ amongst states, asserting amongst 
others the territorial integrity and ‘political independence’ of all states.60 Similarly, 
and conceived in the same era, Article 3 of Additional Protocol II regarding non-
international armed conflicts asserts the principle of non-intervention. The Article 
declares that the provisions of AP II may not be invoked to affect the sovereignty of 
another state, nor may they be invoked as a ‘justification for intervening, directly or 
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the armed conflict or in the internal or external 
affairs’ of a state party to the Protocol.61 Such declarations fit within the 
abovementioned timeframe of decolonisation, but at the same time in legal 
scholarship the realisation of the protection of persons, following the developments 
in humanitarian and human rights law in the post-World War II era was not lost. As 
put by Elihu Lauterpacht:  
                                                        
57 Henkin, ‘That “S” Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, Et Cetera’ (n 14),  4.  
58 Jennings, ‘Sovereignty and International Law’ (n 12), 29; Henkin, ‘That “S” Word: Sovereignty, and 
Globalization, and Human Rights, Et Cetera’ (n 14), 1-2.  
59 Maogoto & Kindiki, ‘A people Betrayed – the Darfur Crisis and International Law: Rethinking 
Westphalian Sovereignty in the 21st Century’ (n 54) 110-111.  
60 UNGA Res 2625 (XXV) (24 October 1970) ‘Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations’, Annex, The principle of sovereign equality of States: “All States enjoy sovereign 
equality. They have equal rights and duties and are equal members of the international community, 
notwithstanding differences of an economic, social, political or other nature. In particular, sovereign 
equality includes the following elements: a. States are judicially equal; b. Each State enjoys the rights 
inherent in full sovereignty; c. Each State has the duty to respect the personality of other States; d. The 
territorial integrity and political independence of the State are inviolable; e. Each State has the right freely 
to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems; f. Each State has the duty to 
comply fully and in good faith with its international obligations and to live in peace with other States”.  
61 Article 3 AP II states: “1. Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked for the purpose of affecting the 
sovereignty of a State or the responsibility of the government, by all legitimate means, to maintain or re-
establish law and order in the State or to defend the national unity and territorial integrity of the State. 2. 
Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked as a justification for intervening, directly or indirectly, for any 
reason whatever, in the armed conflict or in the internal or external affairs of the High Contracting Party 
in the territory of which that conflict occurs”. 
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“to give effect, through appropriate limitation and international supervision of the internal 
sovereignty of States, to the principle that the protection of human personality and of its 
fundamental rights is the ultimate purpose of all law, national and international”.62 
 
It is precisely such a perspective that furthers the legal framework on the provision 
of humanitarian assistance. Indeed, towards the 1980s and in a shift towards the end 
of the Cold War, a renewed focus on various humanitarian crises around the globe 
can be seen. Solutions were sought for the provision of humanitarian aid to those in 
circumstances warranting the receipt of food, water and shelter, whilst without 
immediately clear legal means to obtain such aid. In the 1980s the phrase 
‘humanitarian intervention’ was formulated by Mario Bettati and Bernard Kouchner 
taking stance against the ‘old’ notion of state sovereignty; on occasion used as a 
shield against international criticism on mass atrocities.63  
 
4.2.2.2 Humanitarian Interventions and Humanitarian Assistance 
 
The concept of humanitarian intervention entails the use of force by one or more 
states (as a group) intervening in the territory of another state for humanitarian 
purposes, either directly related to gross human rights violations, or other violations 
of human dignity sometimes related to internal conflict or strife.64 A clear 
differentiation must be made between humanitarian assistance and humanitarian 
intervention and is set out here. The use of force in the context of a humanitarian 
intervention falls distinctly outside the scope of the UN Security Council’s concept 
of ‘collective security’ under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The timeframe of this 
concept must be seen within the context of the Cold War, where the Security Council 
was often paralysed and unable to find common ground for resolutions in crisis-
situations.65 The notion of a humanitarian intervention must be juxtaposed with the 
concept of humanitarian assistance in this research, which in itself does not 
encompass the use of force. Although a humanitarian intervention aspires to 
ameliorate circumstances of people within a certain territory, as such having a 
humanitarian purpose, it is certainly not the same as humanitarian assistance. In 
Chapter 2, such assistance has been defined as restricted to the provision of 
emergency facilities, provided in a manner that abides by principles of humanity, 
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impartiality and neutrality.66 This definition inevitably excludes the access to a 
territory by means of force as part of the provision of humanitarian assistance. Yet, 
in subsequent Chapters the use of force as a manner in which access may be gained 
to a territory in order to provide assistance will be discussed.67 The notion of a 
humanitarian intervention operates outside the realm of unambiguously accepted 
usage of force in international law, whilst humanitarian assistance does not ‘use’ 
force itself. It is of paramount importance to clearly distinguish the differences 
between the concept of humanitarian assistance and that of humanitarian 
intervention, whilst remaining aware that humanitarian interventions were argued by 
Kouchner and Bettati as a means to (amongst others) provide humanitarian 
assistance. Its development in relation to the concept of state sovereignty and 
humanitarian assistance warrant a discussion within this research.  
The development of  a ‘humanitarian intervention’ as a concept must be noted 
against the backdrop of conflicts over the past four decades, which have increasingly 
developed from interstate conflicts, to intrastate conflicts such as Rwanda and the 
former Yugoslavia.68 Defenders of humanitarian interventions argue that human 
rights violations cannot be protected with the veil of sovereignty, resulting in the fact 
that the latter should subside for the protection of the former, as the international 
legal protection of human rights must be considered at least as important as the norm 
of protection of state sovereignty.69 The development of this concept gave rise to 
fierce debate over the legality of humanitarian interventions, with proponents like 
Kouchner on one side, and on the other side those like Ian Brownlie, who argued 
strongly against its legality on grounds such as the embedment of state sovereignty 
in the UN Charter.70 This debate relevantly puts forward the tension that arose 
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between the concept of state sovereignty, and the growing international concern for 
large-scale human rights violations and mass atrocities.71 Indeed, it has been argued 
that the international protection of human rights inevitably clashes with the concept 
of state sovereignty.72 Alternatively, Slaughter has argued that there is not so much a 
loss of power of the sovereign, but a change over time in the manner in which the 
sovereign can exercise such a power.73 Furthermore Tesón, one of the earliest 
proponents of a right to humanitarian intervention, argues that grounds for such an 
intervention can be found within the view of sovereignty as a contract with a 
population. As such, the large-scale human rights violations that lead up to the 
intended intervention must be seen as the government not fulfilling its sovereign 
duties to its population.74 Conversely, it has been argued that the concept of 
humanitarian intervention was doomed from the start, by attempting to forego the 
role of state sovereignty, inevitably frustrating and exasperating many states.75  
Semantics may even have played a role, as a term containing ‘intervention’ will 
not sit well with most sovereign powers in the world, clinging tightly to the age-old 
principle of non-intervention. Furthermore, the unilateral or group aspect that forms 
part of the notion of humanitarian intervention, rather than the embracement of the 
initiative by the entire international community of states through Security Council 
action, clearly form their own objections,76 as a risk of (greater) conflict arises 
through the misuse of such interventions on humanitarian grounds when they are not 
properly defined, or regulated through international channels.77  
Yet, following the end of the Cold War era, combined with the steady rise of 
conflicts such as those in the Former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Rwanda and Somalia, 
state sovereignty is deemed by some to be declining.78 As discussed above, the 
continued rise of the role of international human rights law in the international field 
has also contributed to this viewpoint. Indeed, for the first time in 1991, the Security 
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Council placed international human rights at the centre of a resolution, holding the 
nation-state more and more responsible at the international level for the (domestic) 
treatment of its individuals.79 The Security Council clearly stated it: 
 
“Condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including 
most recently in Kurdish-populated areas, the consequences of which threaten 
international peace and security in the region; […] Demands that Iraq, as a contribution to 
removing the threat to international peace and security in the region, immediately end this 
repression and in the same context expresses the hope that an open dialogue will take place 
to ensure that the human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens are respected”.80 
 
Thus, in direct relation to a humanitarian issue, the Security Council altered its view 
from the position that such matters fall solely within the domestic jurisdiction of a 
state, and brought the matter to the international sphere. The change in political 
climate within the Security Council upon the ending of the Cold War has furthermore 
been a catalyser in such developments, as also seen with the creation of ad hoc 
tribunals such as the ICTY and ICTR that once again reaffirmed that certain excesses 
of sovereign power can no longer be shielded and now fall within the protected sphere 
of international law.81 From solely entailing rights for the nation-state, the concept of 
sovereignty has slowly begun its alteration towards entailing obligations which may 
be enforced at the international level. With regard to the provision of humanitarian 
assistance, such a shift means a greater opportunity for those in need of assistance to 
have their needs met, as the international community increasingly acknowledges 
restraints on sovereignty and a related role for the community itself to contribute to 
the protection of persons. The provision of humanitarian aid itself is clearly a means 
to provide such protection in humanitarian crises.  
The four major developments discussed above; namely (1) the greater 
international interdependence and globalisation, (2) the participation of new actors 
in the international legal world, most notably individuals, (3) the proliferation of 
human rights treaties and the ensuing embracement of human rights law, as well as 
(4) the development of more and more international tribunals or courts have all 
contributed to the systematical erosion of the Westphalian concept of sovereignty. In 
fact, increasingly, sovereignty is considered the ‘capacity to participate in 
cooperative regimes’ pursuing the collective interest of all states operating in the 
world.82 However, what can then be considered to ‘fill the gap’ left by a possible 
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departure from our centuries-old division of the international legal order? If the 
Westphalian concept of sovereignty is eroded, yet the concept of sovereignty itself 
remains intact within the international legal framework, a ‘newer’ idea or notion of 
this concept must have been developed alongside the erosion of the Westphalian 
concept of sovereignty to ensure its continued applicability in international law.  
In 1995, the then Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General on 
Internally Displaced Persons Francis Deng suggested:  
 
“The very notion of sovereignty implies both responsibility and an international system 
which imposes accountability on the state in the mutual interest of the state and the 
international community”.83 
 
Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan noted the influence of globalisation and 
international cooperation on sovereignty, as he attempted to reformulate the concept, 
by noting two distinct aspects of sovereignty: that of the state, and that of the 
individual.84 At that time a regional attempt was made by the African Union, which 
in 2000 overturned the non-interference principle of the Organization of African 
Unity and declared that the Union has the right to interfere with a Member State in 
the event of ‘grave circumstances’, which specifically include war crimes, genocide 
and crimes against humanity.85 That same year Annan again called for an answer to 
the problem inherent to the notion of humanitarian intervention: 
 
“if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how 
should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and systematic violations of 
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human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity? We confront a real 
dilemma. Few would disagree that both the defence of humanity and the defence of 
sovereignty are principles that must be supported. Alas, that does not tell us which 
principle should prevail when they are in conflict. (…) The protection of fundamental 
human rights, once considered the province of sovereign states alone, is now a universal 
concern transcending both governments and borders.86  
 
In a humanitarian crisis with a sovereign unwilling to provide humanitarian 
assistance and allow access to the international community for that purpose, it is 
precisely this dilemma between the conflict of the protection of humanity and the 
protection of state sovereignty that is faced. As humanitarian assistance is of 
relevance in the relief of those facing a humanitarian crisis for which a humanitarian 
intervention is proposed, Annan argued through this ‘Millennium Report’ that the 
notion of sovereignty and the protection of human rights needed to be reconciled, and 
Annan continued to place the topic at the forefront of the international debate. 
Following this UN Millennium Report, the Canadian government-sponsored 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) attempted 
such a possible framework, ‘reconceptualising’ sovereignty.87 The ICISS efforts 
resulted in a study on a new approach to the topic of humanitarian intervention, from 
the perspective of responsibility for individual states and the international 
community. This indeed initiated the process which would become the birth of the 
doctrine of ‘Responsibility to Protect’, a phrase coined by the ICISS in its 2001 
report.88  
 
4.2.3 The Responsibility to Protect, the UN and Humanitarian Assistance 
 
Trying to find an answer to the questions raised in the many debates following the 
humanitarian intervention in Kosovo in 1999, as well as the situations in Rwanda and 
Somalia, the ICISS report of 2001 has attempted, through use of the phrase 
‘Responsibility to Protect’ (RtoP), to address humanitarian intervention in a different 
light, and also notes that it is far broader than a narrow military intervention.89 Rather 
than using the much criticised term of ‘right of humanitarian intervention’, the ICISS 
approaches the matter from the notion that sovereignty includes a responsibility on 
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the part of the sovereign.90 Although arguably a ‘rhetorical trick’,91 the ICISS posits 
that sovereignty as responsibility is not only a change in terminology but also a 
‘change in perspective’, as the notion of humanitarian intervention is not only 
‘tainted’ in language, but furthermore narrow in scope, and focuses on the rights of 
the interveners, rather than those of the beneficiaries.92 In fact, the ICISS states that 
the new perspective on sovereignty as responsibility could add to the realisation that 
the notion must be considered from the perspective of those beneficiaries, placing 
primary responsibility with the affected state, and trying to broaden the scope: 
 
“the responsibility to protect means not just the “responsibility to react, but the 
responsibility to prevent” and the “responsibility to rebuild” as well”.93 
 
When focusing on the aspect of the doctrine relevant to the provision of humanitarian 
assistance, namely the phase in which the international community may play a role 
in the provision of such assistance, the ICISS notes that coercive measures, which 
may include ‘political, economic or judicial measures’ may be required from the 
international community and in extreme cases even military measures, thereby 
limiting the principle of non-intervention.94 Such extreme cases however are limited 
to cases of such gravity that they ‘genuinely shock the conscience of mankind’ or 
which present ‘a clear and present danger to international security’.95 The principle 
of RtoP attempts to address responsibility for individual states to protect their 
citizens, as well as for international organisations, civil society and the international 
community in general if the state cannot, and encompasses the responsibility to 
prevent atrocities through diplomatic, economic, political and, if need be, forceful 
measures.96 As such, the doctrine would fit the purpose of the provision of 
humanitarian assistance in times of a humanitarian crisis. Its development has indeed 
altered the discourse on the provision of humanitarian assistance through a renewed 
look towards the existing rights and duties within the legal framework, as discussed 
in Chapter 7 and 8.  
The ICISS has furthermore elaborately set out the doctrine of RtoP through the 
use of core principles and various criteria, and finally made recommendations to the 
UN General Assembly, Security Council and Secretary General.97 While the ICISS 
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Report with regard to this notion of sovereignty as responsibility can certainly not be 
seen as a source of international law upon which a new principle can be built, the 
Report has fostered the debate, and brought the concept within the parameters of the 
UN discourse on the subject matter. Furthermore, phrasing the notion of sovereignty 
in such a ‘positive’ sense as to entail responsibilities of the state to ensure protection 
of its civilians implies not only the inclusion and facilitation of international efforts 
but furthermore an accountability for the state to care for its population.98 
 
4.2.3.1 UN Endorsement of the Responsibility to Protect 
 
Given the fact that the ICISS Report was published in the wake of the events of 11 
September 2001, the Report stood somewhat in the shadow of the ensuing focus of 
the international world on this event and its consequences; the ‘war on terror’. It was 
only a few years later in 2004 that the UN’s ‘Report of the Secretary General’s High 
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change’ (High-Level Panel Report) of 2004, 
argued that indeed a growing acceptance exists within the international community 
to fill the vacuum of a ‘continuum’ spanning both prevention and reaction, as well as 
rebuilding, in the event a state affected by catastrophe is unable or unwilling to do so 
itself following a crisis,99 and furthermore stated to: 
 
“endorse the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect, 
exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the 
event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of 
international humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or 
unwilling to prevent”100 
 
With this endorsement, following the words of the ICISS, a primary reference to the 
Responsibility to Protect lingo is found in a UN context. Thus, the idea that an 
intervention – within the context of Security Council action – for the purpose of 
relieving a people of large-scale human rights law or humanitarian law violations 
might be justified was considered within the UN. As with the provision of 
humanitarian assistance, a primary responsibility lies with the affected government, 
and only as a last resort does the High-Level Panel Report envisage UN intervention 
by means of the use of force. Distinct from the ICISS however is the UN High-Level 
Panel Report’s position that such a responsibility to protect through military 
measures is only to be carried out by the Security Council, as opposed to a coalition 
of the willing and able or regional organisations.101 However, the High-Level Panel 
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Report places the concept of Responsibility to Protect in direct relation to the 
strengthening of the UN’s collective security system, as well as its institutional 
reform.102 This approach opened the door to subsequent embracement by other UN 
organs. Indeed, while noting the sensitivities surrounding the issue, Kofi Annan’s 
Report of March 2005 entitled ‘In Larger Freedom’ endorses the principle of RtoP; 
thereby foregoing his own notion of ‘two concepts of sovereignty’ introduced a few 
years before.103 That same year the World Summit Outcome Document also endorsed 
the notion, declaring:  
  
“Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the 
prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary 
means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international 
community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility 
and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability. The 
international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use 
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with 
Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to 
take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in 
accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in 
cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be 
inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need 
for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and 
its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We 
also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build 
capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and 
conflicts break out”.104  
 
Through the World Summit Outcome Document, adopted by the General Assembly 
at its 2005 follow-up summit to the UN’s Millenium Summit in 2000, the acceptance 
of the notion of RtoP is brought to a new level within the UN. It is furthermore 
indicative of its development and evolving status towards greater acceptance in 
international law. Both the High-Level Panel Report and Kofi Annan’s perspective 
as Secretary General are indicative of a willingness within the UN to endorse this 
principle. Yet, it remains up to the UN Member States to indeed endorse the notion, 
as well as the Security Council as executive organ. Clearly, the World Summit 
Outcome Document, voicing the approval of the 193 Member States is not of equal 
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standing to the previous Reports, but surpasses it in international legal relevance. The 
endorsement of the Member States in the General Assembly indicated a new era for 
the principle of RtoP, towards its use in practice. As such, from this point onwards 
the concept has continued to influence the actions taken by UN organs and as such is 
relevant to the discussion of the legal framework on the provision of humanitarian 
assistance. From here, a ‘trickle down’ effect can be observed into the work of other 
organs of the UN. It has become apparent through the embracement of RtoP within 
the UN context that indeed sovereignty and non-intervention remain cornerstone 
principles in international law, but that with a view to the protection of persons and 
humanity, these principles should ‘constitute a starting point for the analysis, not a 
conclusion’.105 
Yet, from these various approaches prior to the embracement by the World 
Summit Outcome Document, it also becomes apparent that each time the principle 
of RtoP is endorsed, it is rephrased. In the World Summit Outcome Document, the 
latest refinements entail an adaptation to the situations in which the UN considers the 
principle of RtoP to be applicable: the four core crimes of genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Arguably this alteration and restriction 
to four crimes chafes at the essence of the principle, and also may impede its potential 
application to humanitarian crises that do not amount to these four core crimes. In 
particular, the enforcement of the provision of humanitarian assistance in 
circumstances of natural disasters will be more difficult to frame within this context, 
as several of the elements of these four core crimes presuppose the existence of an 
armed conflict.106 But, this is indeed the slimmed down notion that has been accepted 
in relation to the notion of sovereignty by the UN and therefore what international 
legal practice must deal with.  
Eventually in 2006, the Security Council formally reaffirmed the World Summit 
Outcome Document’s text on RtoP, retaining the application to the four core crimes 
as proposed by the World Summit.107 Responses have been positive, as continued 
identical endorsement of the principle enhances its clarity and its possible 
incorporation as an international norm.108 The UN Security Council has started to 
endorse the principle, amongst others in its Resolution 1706 of August 2006 
pertaining to the Sudan and Resolution 1894, pertaining thematically to the 
protection of civilians in times of armed conflict.109 In these resolutions, the Council 
‘recalls’ the statements made in the World Summit Outcome Document, but has 
neglected to elaborate on the content of RtoP or provide further clarifications.  
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 The principle of RtoP, though currently still developing within UN organs, is an 
indication of the continued debate with regard to the notion of state sovereignty. With 
initial UN endorsement through the World Summit Outcome Document and the 
successive Security Council affirmation thereof, the question arises: where to from 
here? What does the principle of RtoP ‘do’ for or with the concept of sovereignty? 
Can the principle of responsibility to protect be considered an emerging international 
(legal) norm, and is this relevant for the current understanding of the international 
legal concept of state sovereignty or a state’s existing responsibilities under 
international law? And following on from this, in what way is it therefore relevant to 
this research pertaining to humanitarian assistance? Certainly the concepts have 
undergone changes over the past decades, and the appearance of RtoP in the 
international arena must be considered. Given the fact that the principle of RtoP 
suggests the potential use of force in circumstances where humanitarian crises 
amount to the selected four core crimes, it is relevant to the discussion of the legal 
framework concerning the provision of humanitarian assistance. When matters of 
humanitarian access will be discussed, the developing principle of Responsibility to 
Protect will be taken into consideration also.110 Indeed, the notion of RtoP is closely 
associated with the idea of ‘responsible sovereignty’, namely that sovereigns have 
duties towards those within their jurisdiction.111 Such duties include the provision of 
humanitarian assistance, as will be discussed in Part II of this research, in particular 
in Chapter 6. 
 
4.2.3.2 Humanitarian Assistance and the Development of RtoP in Practice 
  
Determining whether RtoP has evolved from a ‘political catchword’ to a legal norm 
is relevant to the determination of the boundaries of both sovereignty and other 
relevant obligations, in relation to the provision of humanitarian assistance.112 As 
Stahn argues, RtoP is testimony of a shift in international law, where the principle of 
state sovereignty is now confined by the protection of ‘human security’.113 In 2007 
UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon appointed Edward Luck as a Special Advisor, 
tasked with ‘conceptual development and consensus building’ within the UN, to 
assist the General Assembly with the notion of RtoP.114 Furthermore, Ban continued 
his predecessor’s support for the principle, and in 2009 his report ‘Implementing the 
responsibility to protect’ attempts to set the tone for operationalising RtoP, 
acknowledging respect for human rights as an essential element of ‘responsible 
sovereignty’.115 Ban follows the four central crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity, as set out by the World Summit Outcome and 
                                                        
110 See Chapters 7 and 8.  
111 Focarelli, ‘Duty to Protect in Cases of Natural Disasters’ (n 23) § 27.  
112 Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’ (n 91) 120.  
113 Ibid 100-101. 
114 <http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/edwardluck.shtml> accessed 10 July 2012.  









considers their protection in three pillars.116 In subsequent years, Ban has continued 
to report on the principle of RtoP, thereby addressing its relevance in UN context.117 
Interestingly, considering the aftermath of a conflict, the Secretary General calls upon 
greater endorsement of the International Criminal Court as part of RtoP.118 The 
Report was recognised by the first General Assembly resolution on RtoP, which after 
a thorough debate, limited itself to ‘continue its consideration’ of the principle, a 
fairly meagre stance.119  
The questions at hand remained however whether RtoP can be operationalised, 
whether this is desirable, and what (legal) benefits regarding the enhanced provision 
of humanitarian assistance in crises it would introduce. While RtoP is attempting a 
shift towards responsibility for protection of populations, it inevitably asserts the 
possibility for military intervention if and when a state does not live up to its 
responsibilities and refuses assistance through ‘pillar two’ of RtoP, thereby involving 
sovereignty-related issues.120 Much can be said in favour of the comprehensive 
attitude of the RtoP doctrine. Yet from the humanitarian perspective, a fear has been 
expressed that justifying military intervention when a state does not cooperate with 
international assistance under pillar two, compromises the neutrality of such 
assistance.121 However, in the absence of the provision of humanitarian assistance, 
enforcement may be necessary to ensure delivery of aid to those in need, as discussed 
in Chapter 8. As always, assistance must be provided in accordance with the 
principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality in order to be considered truly 
‘humanitarian assistance’.122 Over the past decade since the launch of the concept, 
RtoP has generated debate amongst scholars and practitioners: viewed by some as 
the answer to the problem of the concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’ and by others 
as overstepping the legal boundaries of sovereignty.123 As the doctrine of RtoP is 
                                                        
116 Ibid § 11. The first pillar concerns ‘The protection responsibilities of the State’, the second pillar 
regards ‘International assistance and capacity-building’ and pillar three discusses ‘Timely and decisive 
response’, which includes military action through Security Council authorization. Responses to the ‘three 
pillars’ approach have been diverse, as some argue this to be a logical step in the progression of human 
rights protection, whilst others fear problems with the third pillar, considering the role it grants the 
Security Council. See in this regard Magnuson, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the Decline of 
Sovereignty: Free Speech Protection under International Law’ (n 70) 267; and Susan Harris Rimmer, 
‘New Issues in Refugee Research: Refugees, internally displaced persons and the ‘responsibility to 
protect’’, (2010) UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service Research Paper No. 185, 4. 
117 ‘Early Warning, Assessment, and the Responsibility to Protect’, Secretary General Report UN Doc 
A/64/864 (14 July 2010); ‘The Role of Regional and Sub-regional Arrangements in Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect’,  Secretary General Report UN Doc A/65/877–S/2011/393 (27 June 2011) and 
‘Fulfilling our collective responsibility: international assistance and the responsibility to protect’ 
Secretary General Report UN Doc A/68/947–S/2014/449 (11 July 2014). 
118 ‘Implementing the responsibility to protect’ UN Doc A/63/677 (n 115) § 18-19. 
119 UNGA Res 63/308 (7 October 2009) UN Doc A/RES/63/308.  
120 ‘Implementing the responsibility to protect’ UN Doc A/63/677 (n 115) § 56. 
121 ‘Implementing the responsibility to protect’ UN Doc A/63/677 (n 115) § 29 and 56; and Feinstein, 
‘Darfur and Beyond: What is Needed to Prevent Mass Atrocities’ (n 96) 17.  
122 See Section 2.2.3 The Principles for the Delivery of Assistance. 
123 Some have even argued that a state ‘forfeits its sovereignty’ when the international community 
condemns its actions. Sovereignty is then passed to the international community. See in this regard 
 
 
State Sovereignty as a Contextual Concept  
regarding Humanitarian Assistance 
149 
growing from infancy into greater maturity, its true test will come in the following 
years: can the doctrine be translated from words on paper into practice on the ground? 
RtoP may prove to have great benefits when the protection of populations is at stake, 
but it may also prove to have unforeseen downsides, as a proliferation of new ‘norms’ 
must be cautioned against. Risks of a possible narrow scope of RtoP include 
‘classifying’ humanitarian crises, and possibly leaving some on the back-burner 
because they do not fall within the scope of RtoP. In particular considering the legal 
framework on the delivery of humanitarian assistance, such risks exist for crises not 
amounting to the four ‘core crimes’; as mentioned above. The elements of the crimes 
restrict certain instances to armed conflict, while in practice complex emergencies or 
natural disasters may equally result in situations where sovereigns are unwilling or 
hesitant to provide assistance and allow aid into the territory from external sources. 
It has been argued that the high threshold of the four crimes should be restricted to 
the ‘third pillar’ of RtoP concerned with possible military intervention, to allow more 
leeway to broader preventive international (humanitarian) assistance in the second 
pillar.124 This thought is definitely relevant to the further development of 
international assistance under the cloak of RtoP, and the maintenance of broad civil 
society support for the doctrine of RtoP, but may be too forward for the UN’s position 
in this regard. Given the restriction of RtoP within UN context to the four core crimes 
of ‘genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’, the role that 
the Responsibility to Protect can play with regard to the humanitarian assistance is 
limited from the outset. Circumstances of natural disaster, which often lead to a 
humanitarian crisis and a need for humanitarian assistance, are excluded from the 
‘third pillar’ military benefits of RtoP, unless it may be argued that a crime against 
humanity could be committed by a government against its own population, should it 
deny the provision of assistance in the aftermath of a natural disaster.125 A clear 
attempt to argue this already took place in 2008, when initiatives led by Kouchner 
were made to apply RtoP to access the victims of a cyclone in Myanmar, yet failed.126  
Although much of the legal debate concerning the doctrine of RtoP has been on 
the changing notion of sovereignty, the doctrine is also attempting to establish more 
clear boundaries concerning humanitarian assistance and the invocation of military 
force for this purpose. Indeed, whereas the notion of humanitarian intervention 
argued a right to intervene in the event of gross human rights violations, the principle 
of RtoP only warrants the use of military force in the event of genocide, war crimes, 
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ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, within the context of Security Council 
action. Thus, access by force as a manner of enforcement in the provision of 
humanitarian assistance, which in itself needs to remain neutral as discussed above, 
shall only be permitted under the cloak of RtoP in the event of the four core crimes. 
This view is also accepted by Ban Ki Moon, as the Secretary General’s 2009 report 
denounces the extension of RtoP to cover grounds such as HIV/AIDS or natural 
disasters, arguing this would undermine the 2005 World Summit Outcome, which 
only entails the four abovementioned crimes for which states already have existing 
legal obligations.127 As such, RtoP is not extending into new grounds, but embracing 
the existing notions of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic 
cleansing. The sovereignty-related issues surrounding UN (in)action relating to 
Libya and Syria are fuelling the fierce debate, necessitating cautiousness about the 
meaning and limits of RtoP. In order to be considered as a new legal principle, the 
application of RtoP as a concept must be continued: consistently, identically and as 
a result, internationally accepted. Yet, as the Security Council faced the threats to 
international peace and security during the uprisings related to the ‘Arab Spring’ 
starting in 2011, and ensuing threats related to the forces of ‘the Islamic State (IS)’, 
it became apparent that the principle so warmly endorsed in 2005, was sometimes 
difficult to apply in practice.128 Whilst Chapter 7 and 8 address Security Council 
action in relation to the provision of humanitarian assistance in more detail, the 
following paragraphs address the general incorporation of the principle, to establish 
its relevance in practice and as related to the concept of humanitarian assistance.  
In the spring of 2011, responding to the serious human rights violations and strife 
in Libya, the UN Security Council, in a unanimously adopted resolution, made its 
primary reference to RtoP in practice, calling upon the ‘Libyan authorities 
responsibility to protect its population’.129 Subsequently only one month later the 
Security Council once again reiterated its stance, calling upon the:  
 
“responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population and reaffirming 
that parties to armed conflicts bear the primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to 
ensure the protection of  civilians”.130 
 
In both resolutions the Security Council acted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
imposing sanctions and in the latter authorising member state action, which was 
followed by the NATO operation.131 The Security Council followed suit that same 
month in a resolution concerning Côte d’Ivoire, reiterating the RtoP ‘lingo’ used for 
the Libyan authorities, as well as referring back to its resolutions embracing the RtoP 
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principle.132 Both Resolution 1973 and 1975, where the Security Council acted under 
Chapter VII, are considered evidence of the Council’s proactive attitude, considering 
the choice to use force for the protection of civilians and framing such force within 
the context of the Responsibility to Protect.133 As such, the Security Council 
authorised its member states: 
 
“to take all necessary measures (…) to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under 
threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi”.134 
 
Thus, the principle of RtoP was connected in practice to the use of military force in 
the protection of civilians.  
A subsequent resolution concerning Libya, as well as several resolutions focusing 
on Yemen and Sudan, have shown the Security Council to initially be quite prone to 
the incorporation of RtoP in its practice.135 In these ensuing resolutions, the Council 
reiterated its earlier perspective on a government’s ‘responsibility to protect 
civilians’ or ‘responsibility to protect its population’.136 Unfortunately, the situation 
in Syria throughout the following years until 2014 has shown that the Security 
Council’s action was dependent on the political will of its member states, faltering in 
the creation of a similar clear-cut resolution for Syria.137 Subsequent resolutions that 
were passed by the Security Council with regard to Syria, fail to incorporate RtoP 
language.138 Indeed, whilst with the passing of time the Security Council asserted the 
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need for the provision of humanitarian assistance, the use of force to implement such 
assistance has not been addressed.139 Arguably, use of the phrase was cautioned 
against as some member states felt that the lingo in the Libyan resolutions enabled a 
rather too robust response.140 The Security Council’s stance with regard to RtoP 
cannot at this stage be unambiguously asserted.  
The Secretary General also seems to take a step back from the enthusiastic 
embracement of RtoP following the 2005 World Outcome, voicing concern in May 
2012 about the continuous joint discussion of the ‘protection of civilians’ and the 
‘responsibility to protect’. Ban argues that although they may serve a common 
purpose, the two notions must not be confused: 
  
“First, the protection of civilians is a legal concept based on international humanitarian, 
human rights and refugee law, while the responsibility to protect is a political concept, set 
out in the 2005 World Summit Outcome (see General Assembly resolution 60/1). Second, 
there are important differences in their scope. The protection of civilians relates to 
violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in situations of armed 
conflict. The responsibility to protect is limited to violations that constitute war crimes or 
crimes against humanity or that would be considered acts of genocide or ethnic cleansing. 
Crimes against humanity, genocide and ethnic cleansing may occur in situations that do 
not meet the threshold of armed conflict”.141 
 
Indeed, this sentiment is reflected by others concerned with the legal value of the 
principle of RtoP as a parallel discourse may not be helpful for the further 
development of the protection of persons in a situation of crisis. Considering the 
provision of humanitarian assistance, it is however relevant to note that Ban has 
argued in his discussion of the ‘protection of civilians’ that the four core crimes that 
can set the military component of RtoP into motion, may occur outside of an armed 
conflict. Thus, the Secretary General argues that these crimes can indeed take place 
in a crisis-like circumstance that does not necessarily meet the threshold for 
applicability of international humanitarian law. As such, some argue that regardless 
of whether or not consensus can be reached on the normative and legal value of the 
notion of RtoP and its acceptance by the international legal community, it can 
definitively be established that the principle, focusing on the four crimes of genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, reflects widely accepted 
‘core principles’ of both human rights and international humanitarian law.142  
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Thus, with a view to the provision of humanitarian assistance, it remains helpful 
to look to the development of the principle of RtoP with regard to possible increasing 
responsibilities of governments for the provision of humanitarian assistance, and 
ensuing possible international responsibilities that may arise should a national 
government not comply with its responsibilities under international law. These 
specific individual responsibilities and circumstances will be discussed in subsequent 
Chapters and remain outside the more theoretical application of the concept of 
sovereignty in relation to the legal framework of humanitarian assistance that this 
Chapter addresses.  
 
4.2.3.3 Towards a new Definition of Sovereignty 
 
The development of the principle of RtoP has not occurred in a legal vacuum. Indeed, 
the principle of RtoP did not develop as a stand-alone concept, but reflects an overall 
development in international law over the past decades.143 As a result, the content of 
RtoP engages with other well-established notions of international law, thereby 
possibly providing for a favourable continuance of its incorporation in international 
law, resulting also in a development of its legitimacy.144 As such, the development 
of RtoP and its subsequent embracement by the UN has placed the discussion on the 
definition of ‘state sovereignty’ back to the forefront of the international legal 
discourse, with renewed vigour.145 Both concepts interact, develop simultaneously 
and influence each other. As argued by Ryngaert, the ‘moral-political notion’ of the 
principle of RtoP echoes today’s concept of  ‘relative sovereignty’ where a state in 
fact would forfeit its sovereign rights under the principle of non-intervention and 
domestic jurisdiction in the event it fails to comply with the most basic norms of 
international law.146 In particular relation to the provision of humanitarian assistance, 
Ryngaert argues that as a result of this notion of relative sovereignty, a state can thus 
not prohibit third parties from asserting ‘their ‘international’ responsibility vis-à-vis 
populations in need on the territory of the former state, and from overriding the 
absence of state consent to provide humanitarian assistance’.147 Tomuschat had also 
already asserted along these lines that consequences exist when a state abuses its 
sovereign rights by engaging in ‘gross atrocities, such as genocide and ethnic 
cleansing’, as the result may be that a state forfeits the protection granted to it under 
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the principles that sovereignty encompasses in international law.148 As such, 
Tomuschat poses that when tension exists between the principle of sovereignty and 
that of respect for human rights, one of the two must yield, and the international 
community is increasingly affirming the potential to pierce the veil of the principle 
of sovereignty: 
 
“Sovereignty is not a natural, inherent quality of any entity recognized as a state. Rather, 
it is a distinction conferred on that entity by the international community as a recognition 
of its ability and willingness to take care of law and order and to administer justice within 
the group of human beings organized under its roof. Inevitably, failure to discharge the 
general function which legitimates the existence of a government must entail certain 
consequences”.149  
 
Indeed, Tomuschat echoes the words of Elihu Lauterpacht a few decades earlier, but 
today the practice of the international community seems to have caught up with legal 
theory, through the development of the Responsibility to Protect.150 As Annemarie 
Slaughter argues, it is now necessary to: 
 
“understand sovereignty as at once a government's control of a defined territory and 
population and as a particular relationship between a government and its citizens. 
International law still upholds and safeguards a government’s power and control over its 
citizens, including its right to invoke states of emergency and use force to maintain 
domestic order. But it also now protects the citizens of a particular state when their 
government fails grossly in its obligations toward them”.151 
 
This premise that human rights exist as inalienable rights of persons, in concurrence 
with a state’s primary responsibility for the fulfillment thereof, is indeed consistent 
with the UN Charter. Precisely how far international law will go in the protection of 
civilians through the provision of humanitarian assistance when a government fails 
in its obligations towards them, will be discussed in subsequent Chapters.152 
Benvenisti has in this regard already taken the premise that sovereigns must be seen 
as ‘trustees of humanity’ that are ‘embedded within a more encompassing global 
order’, as the international community has developed increasingly into a global order 
of interdependency and multiple stakeholders, which must be realigned with 
sovereigns’ original authorities.153 As such trustees, Benvenisti argues that 
sovereigns have obligations to not only do no harm, but to in fact contribute to global 
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welfare, and in the event this is not done, the sovereign must be subjected to an 
‘external accountability review’ with a view to the relevant stakeholders.154 
This discussion on and rephrasing of the notion of sovereignty might prove a 
practical solution in pleasing both the protagonists of greater human rights protection, 
and those that hold on to the principles of non-intervention, consent and domestic 
jurisdiction. After all, both aspects continue to be two sides of the same coin of 
sovereignty. This indeed follows the idea that RtoP is, amongst other factors, 
contributing to the manner in which the international legal community identifies and 
even defines these principles on which traditional sovereignty is built.155 Indeed, 
bringing the notion of the social contract into the 21st century and following 
Slaughter’s argument, if a government fails to protect its citizens, it does not uphold 
its end of the contract. As international law now directly recognises individuals as 
subjects, the civilian should then perhaps indeed be free to request and receive 
protection, for the purpose of this research: humanitarian assistance, from sources 
outside its own government. Humanitarian assistance can thus not only be seen as a 
tool for governments in the fulfillment of their sovereign responsibilities, but also as 
a vehicle through which the international community can provide a population in 
need with facilities a government is failing to do. Thus, like sovereignty, 




In the above Chapter, the relationship between the concept of state sovereignty and 
the provision of humanitarian assistance has been addressed. The three core 
principles of state sovereignty, namely non-intervention, consent and domestic 
jurisdiction, each have their own particular relationship with the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance, and thereby with the rights and duties involved in the legal 
framework on humanitarian assistance.  
Regarding the relationship between the principle of non-intervention and the 
provision of humanitarian assistance, it must be noted that particularly ‘intervention’ 
must be distinguished from the provision of assistance, as assistance can only be 
considered humanitarian if provided in a neutral manner, excluding the use of force. 
Although the ICJ in the Nicaragua-case touched upon the matter, it unfortunately did 
not address the notion of intervention by force for a possible facilitation of the 
provision of aid.156 Indeed, the potential use of force as an enforcement method for 
the provision of humanitarian assistance – although related – must be clearly 
distinguished from the sec provision itself. The subsequently discussed principle of 
consent as related to treaty law does not play a large role in this particular research 
concerning humanitarian assistance. Yet, as will be discussed in subsequent 
Chapters, this cornerstone in international law remains relevant when considering the 
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various rights and duties of states as they relate to the provision of assistance in 
general, within international law as based upon the specific provisions in human 
rights and humanitarian law concerning the potential delivery of aid by third parties. 
Lastly, the principle of domestic jurisdiction was addressed, in particular in relation 
to the circumstance of a ‘failed state’ as can be relevant in the provision of 
humanitarian assistance which only takes place in a humanitarian crisis. Indeed, 
while a failed state may not be able to take charge in a crisis, statehood remains in 
place. Therefore, the primary responsibility for the provision of assistance continues 
to lie with the affected state. However, the provision of assistance from third parties 
may be a tool or vehicle through which state failure can be diminished.  
Following the three valued principles in relation to the concept of sovereignty and 
humanitarian assistance, this Chapter has focused on the concept of sovereignty itself 
and what it entails today. Through a brief historical analysis of the birth of the 
concept, and its development in recent decades following World War II, it has been 
possible to address the realities in the international legal order that led to the 
development of the much plagued notion of humanitarian intervention, and the more 
recent developments surrounding the principle of responsibility to protect.157  
It has been observed that the notion of a ‘social contract’ as posited by Hobbes, 
Locke and Rousseau, with a relationship of mutual reinforcement between society 
and sovereign brings forth rights and duties for both parties, and with regard to 
humanitarian assistance, it can then be argued that the provision of such assistance 
could be seen as a duty for the sovereign in fulfilling its part of the agreement with 
society. Subsequently, if international law should encompass a duty to provide 
assistance, state sovereignty would then oblige a government to provide assistance. 
Equally, individuals may then claim the right to receive assistance from a sovereign 
based on such a provision in international law. Indeed, the development of human 
rights law following World War II and the role of this body of law in international 
law today has furthermore increasingly supported the view that sovereignty is 
‘permeated’ and that the sovereign must protect and fulfil the rights of those within 
its jurisdiction. This relationship of mutual enforcement is also viewed in both the 
concepts of ‘humanitarian intervention’ and ‘responsibility to protect’ as both notions 
address the permeability of state sovereignty, envisaging rights for the international 
community to assert the protection of a population should the sovereign not do so.  
While common ground can be found in the rationale of both principles, the notion 
of humanitarian intervention, clearly distinguishable if not essentially different from 
humanitarian assistance, did not find general acceptance in international law, given 
the unilateral use of force (outside the realm of the Security Council) that is 
incorporated in the doctrine. Thus, the international community turned to a new 
principle, in the hope that redefining the rationale might prove a more constructive 
solution to the barriers of state sovereignty. Indeed, while RtoP is currently still 
developing, the principle does reflect the larger adaptation that the concept of state 
                                                        
157 See Sections 4.2.2 Reconceptualising Sovereignty? and 4.2.3 The Responsibility to Protect, the UN 
and Humanitarian Assistance. 
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sovereignty has undergone through changes in international law in general over the 
past decades, and the renewed attention it receives from international legal scholars 
and practitioners. Changes in warfare, including the rise of non-international armed 
conflicts leading to humanitarian crises, as well as the asymmetrical warfare have 
been conducive to this. Whilst the incorporation of RtoP in general does not have to 
be a negative development; indeed allowing for a broader international responsibility, 
for the purpose of the assessment of the legal framework on the provision of 
assistance, some obstacles remain. Next to obstacles that can be seen in bringing RtoP 
into practice through Security Council resolutions; leading to doubts as to its practical 
efficacy, in particular for this research it is relevant to note the restriction of RtoP 
application by the UN to the four core crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and ethnic cleansing. This restriction is relevant to a discussion in 
subsequent Chapters concerning the use of force in obtaining access to a territory for 
the provision of aid, as it distinctly excludes such enforcement for humanitarian 
crises that do not encompass such four crimes.  
It can however be concluded that for the purposes of this research into 
humanitarian assistance, the Westphalian notion of sovereignty must be 
reconsidered, to not only retain the old notion of governmental jurisdiction and 
control but to also encompass a greater protection of civilians, through sovereign 
responsibilities. In particular in the event a government fails to comply with its 
obligations towards these civilians, such as in the fulfillment of the provision of 
humanitarian assistance, such responsibilities must be enforceable at an international 
level.158 Both aspects together form the two-sided coin of sovereignty. Thus 
sovereignty can indeed be both a vehicle and an obstacle in the provision of 
humanitarian assistance, dependent on the perspectives of the particular sovereign. It 
is therefore crucial to examine the current rights and obligations resting on both states 
and the recipients of assistance under international law, to more clearly define these 
sovereign responsibilities. Assessing the state of the law will enable those dependent 
on humanitarian assistance to truly enforce the receipt of assistance, should a 
government not be inclined to provide assistance. Holding up the ‘shield’ of 
sovereignty will no longer be possible if it can be established that the non-provision 
of humanitarian assistance can amount to a clear breach of an international 
obligation. In fact, such a revision of the concept of sovereignty aligns with the old 
notion of the ‘social contract’ allowing individuals to perhaps indeed request and 
receive humanitarian assistance from the exterior. The following Chapters in Part II 
of this research will determine the exact extent of the protection of civilians through 
the provision of humanitarian assistance and shall commence with a discussion of 
human rights law, as the development of these rights have been instrumental in the 
increased provision of humanitarian assistance. 
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Part II of this research focuses on the analysis of the lex lata pertaining to the legal 
framework on the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In this light, Chapter 6 
addresses the rights and duties in international law of the various stakeholders, such 
as the affected persons and the affected state. These various rights and obligations 
are codified for a large part in human rights law and humanitarian law, as Section 3.4 
has addressed. The nature of these bodies of law and the provision of humanitarian 
assistance share a common denominator in the concept of human dignity, as also 
addressed in Section 2.2.3.1. In fact, this notion of dignity is the opening address of 
the 1948 ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, as it states that the ‘recognition 
of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the 
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world’.2 Other 
early referrals to the general relationship between humanitarian assistance and human 
rights law can be found in the work of the General Assembly.3 
                                                        
1 UNGA Res 2675 (XXV) (9 December 1970) ‘Basic principles for the protection of civilian populations 
in armed conflict’ § 8. 
2 UDHR Preamble § 1. Full text of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (10 December 1948) 
available at <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/> accessed 19 July 2012. 
3UNGA Res 2675 (XXV) (9 December 1970) (n 1) § 8.  
Over the past decades, human rights law has proliferated. In many disaster 
situations, international organisations express concern for violations of the 
affected population’s human rights. The provision of humanitarian 
assistance has been connected to this body of law for a long time. As the 
General Assembly asserted in 1970:  
 
“The provision of international relief to civilian populations is in conformity with 
the humanitarian principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and other international instruments in the field of human 
rights”.  
 
But how did the provision of humanitarian assistance edge into this body of law? 
Moreover and more relevantly, in what way does human rights law in fact 
incorporate the provision of humanitarian assistance? This Chapter addresses 
specifically which rights to receive assistance and duties to provide it exist in 






Crucial to the more in-depth analysis of the legal framework on the provision of 
humanitarian assistance is the assessment of the incorporation of this concept into 
human rights law. Chapter 2 has provided the historical overview of the birth of 
humanitarian assistance in humanitarian law, but with a view to this research’s more 
encompassing approach to the provision of humanitarian assistance, human rights 
law must be addressed as well. An approach through this body of law will allow for 
applicability in all circumstances of crisis.4 Given the very essence of humanitarian 
assistance: ensuring the survival of persons in emergency situations, through the 
provision of food, water and shelter, the concept itself allows for a placement within 
the human rights framework. The question whether a potential human right to receive 
humanitarian assistance exists can then only be answered through the establishment 
of what this right entails. This Chapter therefore assesses the background of the 
potential human right to receive humanitarian assistance, and examines which 
established human rights it may build upon or emerge from. These rights include the 
right to life, food, health and water.5 A focus is placed on these four rights as opposed 
to potential other human rights such as the right to housing with a view to this 
research’s definition of humanitarian assistance.6 The timeframe and nature of the 
concept (related to emergency situations) distinguishes humanitarian assistance from 
broader concepts such as development assistance, as a result of which a choice has 
been made to focus on those rights that directly and distinctly stand in relation to the 
provision of food, water, shelter and emergency supplies for the survival of persons 
in times of a humanitarian crisis. Following the examination of the potential 
independent existence of the receipt of humanitarian assistance as a human right, the 
right to life, food, health and water are discussed to determine whether they in 
themselves provide for a right to receive humanitarian assistance under existing 
human rights law.  
Through an analysis of the history and development of human rights in general, 
as well as the content of the specific rights to life, food, health and water, this Chapter 
will determine whether or not a human right to receive humanitarian assistance is 
currently emerging in international law. This Chapter addresses the issue of a 
potential human right to humanitarian assistance in a two-tiered manner: firstly the 
question whether an independent human right to humanitarian assistance exists is 
addressed through an analysis of human rights law; secondly, upon the assessment 
of such potential existence, the potential existing basis in the already established body 
of individual human rights is addressed. With a view to the continuous proliferation 
of human rights, a restrained view is taken on the development of ‘new’ rights, when 
existing rights may suffice in the protection of persons in times of humanitarian 
crises. Given the nature of the provision of assistance, the matter of derogability from 
human rights treaties is taken into account.  
                                                        
4 See Section 3.4.2 Applicability of Human Rights in Armed Conflict and Occupation.  
5 The notion of humanitarian assistance as adopted in this research focuses on the initial provision of 
emergency aid. In this regard, the ‘human right to housing’ is left outside the scope of this research.  
6 See Section 2.2.2 Defining Humanitarian Assistance.  
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The assessment of the existence of a potential human right to receive assistance 
is relevant at the beginning of Part II of this research as subsequent Chapters deal 
with the specific rights and duties in the provision of humanitarian assistance in times 
of occupation, conflict and natural disaster amounting to a humanitarian crisis. 
Although various sources in international law other than human rights law may 
provide for a right to receive such assistance and a duty to provide it in several 
circumstances, determining the level of protection under human rights law is of 
crucial relevance to the legal protection of those affected by humanitarian crises. The 
continued application of human rights law in times of applicability of humanitarian 
law as discussed in Section 3.4.2 evidences and highlights this crucial nature: it is the 
body of law that is applicable in all circumstances that may amount to a humanitarian 
crisis, both in times of conflict and peace. It is for this reason that this Chapter 
assesses the status of protection under human rights law prior to the examination of 
the possible specific rights and duties involved in the provision of assistance through 
various other sources of international law, in times of a humanitarian crisis.  
 
5.2 The Development of Human Rights Relevant to Humanitarian Assistance  
 
Although Chapters 2 and 3 have addressed the longstanding origins of humanitarian 
assistance as a concept, placing this assistance within a human rights context makes 
a transition to the 21st century. Following the atrocities witnessed by the international 
community during World War II, the United Nations have been crucial to the 
development of these rights and their embedding in the international legal world. 
This embedding commences with the organisation’s Charter stating in Article 1(3) 
that one of the purposes of the UN is to promote and encourage fundamental 
freedoms for all, as well as achieving international cooperation in ‘solving 
international problems of a humanitarian character’.7 Furthermore, articles 55 and 56 
of the UN Charter, calling upon the UN as an organisation and its Member States 
individually to take action to achieve the promotion of universal respect for, and 
observance of human rights, have also contributed to the internationalisation of these 
rights.8 Indeed, as an obligation resting upon society is implied in order to meet the 
                                                        
7 Michael Palumbo, Human Rights: Meaning and History (Krieger 1982) 11-12; Lori Damrosch (ed), 
International Law: Cases and Materials (West Group 2001) 650. 
8 The full text of Article 55 of the UN Charter states: “With a view to the creation of conditions of stability 
and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect 
for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote: a. 
higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and 
development; b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and 
international cultural and educational cooperation; and c. universal respect for, and observance of, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion”; Article 
56 of the UN Charter states:” All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-
operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55”. See also 
Thomas Buergenthal, ‘Human Rights’ in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (March 
2007) § 7; Christian Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism (Oxford University Press 
2008) 69-96. For a discussion on the extraterritorial application of human rights, see Section 3.4.2 






demands of these rights,9 the international community has sought the reassurance that 
these concepts would no longer remain within the national domain through the 
adoption of the well-known and major human rights declarations and treaties, 
amongst which most importantly the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
1965 ‘International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial 
Discrimination’10 (ICERD), the ‘International Covenant on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights’11 (ICESCR) and the ‘International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights’12 (ICCPR), both of 1966. Various provisions in the ‘International Bill of 
Rights’ (encompassing the UDHR, ICESCR and ICCPR) are considered to have 
become customary international law.13 Where the UDHR is widely recognised for 
establishing a universal and equal basis for all human rights,14 the European 
Convention for Human Rights (ECHR), adopted in 1950, has been widely recognised 
for its similar influence at a regional level.15 Both the American and African continent 
have subsequently developed regional human rights treaties, namely the American 
Convention for Human Rights (ACHR / Pact of San José) and the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR / African Charter).16   
                                                        
9 Louis Henkin, The Age of Rights (Columbia University Press 1990) 3. 
10 Full text of the ICERD (21 December 1965) available at 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cerd.htm> accessed 19 July 2012.  
11 Full text of the ICESCR available at <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm> accessed 19 
February 2012. 
12 Full text of the ICCPR available at <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm> accessed 19 July 
2012. 
13 Erica-Irene Daes, Freedom of the Individual under Law: A Study on the Individual’s Duties to the 
Community and the Limitations of Human Rights and Freedoms under Article 29 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1990) 5; Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism (n 8) 
4; Buergenthal, ‘Human Rights’ (n 8) § 9; and Thomas Buergenthal, ‘The Evolving International Human 
Rights System’, in (2006) 100 American Journal of International Law 790. Not all rights included in the 
ICESCR and ICCPR can be found in the UDHR and vice versa. An example is the abolition of the death 
penalty, provided for in the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR (UNGA Res 44/128 of 15 December 
1989) which was not provided for as part of the right to life in the UDHR. Also, many rights declared in 
the UDHR have been elaborated upon in the subsequent treaties, to include more specificities.  
14 The preamble to the UDHR itself declares in its final paragraph the UDHR to be a: “a common standard 
of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, 
keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect 
for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their 
universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States 
themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction”.  
15 Full text of the ECHR available at <http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-
B457-5C9014916D7A/0/CONVENTION_ENG_WEB.pdf> accessed 19 July 2012. See also 
Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism (n 8) 31.   
16 Full text of the ACHR (“Pact of San José, Costa Rica”) available at 
<http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/Basics/convention.asp> accessed 19 July 2012. The Convention 
was adopted November 22, 1969 and entered into force July 18, 1978. Full text of the ACHPR (Banjul 
Charter) is available at <http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/achpr/banjul_charter.pdf> accessed 19 
July 2012. The Charter was adopted 27 June 1981 and entered into force 21 October 1986.  
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The ‘Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action’17 that was adopted by the 
world conference on the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the UDHR in 1993, states 
that:  
 
“All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The 
international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on 
the same footing, and with the same emphasis”.18 
 
The Vienna Declaration thus not only reaffirms the UDHR, but furthermore reaffirms 
the interdependency and interrelation of human rights, which is of relevance to their 
analysis in consideration of the provision of humanitarian assistance as such 
provision simultaneously addresses various human rights. In essence therefore, all 
rights must be considered to be coherent rather than assuming friction amongst 
them.19 Granted, whilst this Declaration must be seen in the context of its time, as it 
was developed in the wake of the end of the era of communism, this perspective has 
however been adopted within the UN, and continues to be reaffirmed by the General 
Assembly.20  
The various regional human rights courts assist in the progressive interpretation 
of existing rights, as do the ‘treaty bodies’ such as the committees pursuant to the 
ICERD, ICESCR and ICCPR that monitor the proper implementation and regard or 
compliance for their respective treaties.21 Yet these committees also provide for 
interpretation of the content of the specific provisions of these treaties, thereby 
providing insight into these international standards which are relevant for the 
evaluation of their content, as well as relevant for the determination of the specific 
obligations resting upon State Parties to the treaties.22 Outside this treaty-based 
system, such interpretations may also be provided with regard to specific individual 
human rights by so-called ‘Special Rapporteurs’, instated by the former UN Human 
                                                        
17Full text of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action is available at 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(symbol)/a.conf.157.23.en> accessed 19 July 2012. 
18 ‘Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action’ UN Doc A/CONF.157/23 (12 July 1993) § 5.  
19 Tarlach McGonagle, ‘International and European Legal Standards for Combating Racist Expression: 
Selected Current Conundrums’, Expert Seminar: Combating Racism while respecting Freedom of 
Expression (2007) 40. For a perspective on the need to combine the current pronged human rights treaties 
and monitoring bodies into one single comprehensive approach, see Nico J Schrijver, ‘Paving the Way 
Towards…One World Wide Human Rights Treaty’, (2011) 29 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 
3, 257-260. 
20 UNGA Res 63/176 (20 March 2009) UN Doc A/RES/63/176 ‘Globalization and its impact on the full 
enjoyment of all human rights’, preamble.  
21 See more in detail Chapter 8. Official statement concerning the purpose of the CERD is available at 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/index.htm> accessed 19 July 2012 and the purpose of the 
HRC at <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/index.htm> accessed 19 July 2012; and see for the 
CESCR <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/> accessed 19 July 2012.  
22 The ICJ has followed the authoritative interpretation of the HRC of the ICCPR, amongst others in its 
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 






Rights Commission or now the Human Rights Council, on thematic issues.23 Thus, 
the UN ‘s Charter-based system and the treaty-based mechanisms are both relevant 
to the determination of the rights and duties concerning the provision of humanitarian 
assistance.24 Through these various developments and interpretative mechanisms, 
international human rights law develops simultaneously at the regional and 
international level, also at the same time giving rise to the development of certain 
rights into customary international law.  
 
5.2.1 ‘Generations’ of Human Rights in Relation to Humanitarian Assistance 
 
Given the nature of the concept of humanitarian assistance, the emergence of a 
potential human right to receive humanitarian assistance can only be considered 
within the context of the general developments of the various human rights that are 
acknowledged today, and which can be roughly divided into three sections. It is 
widely recognised that the Cold War has influenced the division of the ICESCR and 
ICCPR into two treaties with two distinct characters: the ICESCR holds rights of an 
economic, social and cultural nature, whereas the ICCPR holds many civil and 
political rights. Several ensuing regional human rights instruments have followed this 
division, such as the ECHR and ACHR that both focus on rights of a mostly civil and 
political nature. The more recent African Charter encompasses a wider spectrum of 
human rights, as well as so-called ‘peoples’ rights’. 
Legal discourse has also concentrated these themed rights into categories or 
‘generations’, a phrase first coined by Vasak in the late 1970s.25 Civil and political 
‘negative’ rights were considered to entail that the state refrain from action, whereas 
economic social and cultural ‘positive’ rights impose a positive obligation upon 
states. Such an obligation is often seen as a tiered approach consisting of three levels; 
namely the obligation to respect, the obligation to protect, and the obligation to fulfill 
the right.26 With a particular view to the four human rights selected in specific 
relation to the provision of humanitarian assistance, the right to life is included in the 
‘civil and political rights’ spectrum, warranting the state to refrain from the arbitrary 
                                                        
23 See for a current list of thematic mandates 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Themes.aspx> accessed 19 July 2012. 
24 See Section 2.2.1.1 The Role of the UN in the Development of Humanitarian Assistance. 
25 Karel Vasak, “Human Rights: A Thirty-Year Struggle: the Sustained Efforts to give Force of law to 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”, UNESCO Courier 30:11 (Paris: UNESCO, November 
1977).  
26 CESCR General Comment 12 (Article 11 ICESCR) UN Doc E/C.12/1999/5 ‘The right to adequate 
food’ (12 May 1999) § 15. Especially developed by Asbjorn Eide and used particularly in relation to 
economic, social and cultural rights. See in this regard also Asbjorn Eide, ‘State Obligations Revisited’ 
in Wenche Barth Eide & Uwe Kracht (eds) Food and Human Rights in Development (Volume II) 
(Intersentia 2005) 137-157; Wenche Barth Eide & Uwe Kracht, ‘The Right to Adequate Food in Human 
Rights Instruments: Legal Norms and Interpretations’ in Eide Wenche Barth & Kracht Uwe (eds) Food 
and Human Rights in Development (Volume II) (Intersentia 2005) 106-107. See also Thorsten Kiefer & 
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deprivation thereof, whereas the rights to food, health and water demand positive 
action of the affected state. 
So-called ‘third generation rights’ – which would include the potential individual 
human right to receive humanitarian assistance – came to the international plane 
during the 1970s, often supported by (newly) developing countries.27 According to 
Vasak, a parallel could be drawn between the French Revolution’s motto ‘liberté, 
egalité, fraternité’ and the content of various types of human rights, as a result of 
which ‘fraternité’ refers to a third generation of solidarity rights.28 This later notion 
of solidarity rights also concurs with the new concept of collective- or group rights,29 
which the possible right to receive humanitarian assistance could form part of.30 
Although humanitarian assistance is by nature indeed delivered to a group of people 
as a whole due to the existence of a humanitarian crisis affecting a larger amount of 
persons, and it may therefore be considered by some a ‘group’ right; invoking a 
human right must still occur on an individual basis. Solidarity rights as a whole may 
be divided into two distinct sections, both tied to the political developments of the 
final decades of the twentieth century.31 Within the first section, these rights are said 
to include the right to self-determination, the right to development and the right to 
participate in the benefits from the common heritage of humankind, whereas the 
second section includes the right to peace, the right to a sustainable environment, the 
right to communication and relevant to this research, the right to humanitarian 
assistance.32 Prior to the discussion of this potential human right to receive 
                                                        
27 ‘Report of the independent expert on human rights and international solidarity (Mr. Rudi Muhammad 
Rizki)’ UN Doc A/HRC/4/8 (7 February 2007) § 9. 
28 Vasak, “Human Rights: A Thirty-Year Struggle: the Sustained Efforts to give Force of law to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (n 25); see also Zehra F Kabasakal Arat, Human Rights 
Worldwide: A Reference Handbook (ABC Clio 2006) 35-36; and Richard Pierre Claude & Burns H 
Weston (eds), Human Rights in the World Community: Issues And Action (University of Pennsylvania 
Press 2006) 21. 
29 See Section 5.3 A Human Right to Receive Humanitarian Assistance in International Law?. 
30 It is relevant to note that there are two concepts of ‘solidarity’ in the context of human rights. Firstly, 
the term is used as an umbrella for several rights, but secondly is also considered a narrow right in and 
of itself. Note the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in ‘Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights: Human rights and international solidarity’ UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/96 (1 February 2006) § 16.  
31 Claude & Weston Human Rights in the World Community: Issues And Action (n 28) 22. 
32 Vasak, “Human Rights: A Thirty-Year Struggle: the Sustained Efforts to give Force of law to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (n 25); ‘Report of the independent expert on human rights and 
international solidarity (Mr. Rudi Muhammad Rizki)’ UN Doc A/HRC/4/8 (7 February 2007) § 41; and 
‘Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Human rights and international solidarity’ (Note by the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights) UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/96 (1 February 2006) § 29. See also 
Claude & Weston Human Rights in the World Community: Issues And Action (n 28) 22 and Rohan J 
Hardcastle & Adrian T L Chua, ‘Humanitarian Assistance, Towards a Right of access to victims of 
natural disaster’, (1998) 38 International Review of the Red Cross 325, 592. See furthermore Articles 19, 
20, 22 and 23 of the ACHPR as well as Common Article 1 of the ICCPR and ICESCR on the right to 
self-determination. The right to Development has been declared in UNGA Res 41/128 (4 December 
1986) UN Doc A/RES/41/128 Annex ‘Development Declaration’ although it has not been affirmed later 
in legally binding documents; the Right to Peace firstly was called for in the UN Human Rights 
Commission’s Resolution 5 (XXXII) (27 February 1976) and later in UNGA Res 33/73 (15 December 
1978) UN Doc A/RES/33/73 ‘Declaration on the preparation of Societies for Life in Peace’, but both 






humanitarian assistance under treaty law and customary international law, as well as 
a reflection on its duty bearers and right holders a more general discussion on the 
derogability of human rights in times of crisis is needed.  
 
5.2.2 Derogability, Human Rights and the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance  
 
The existence of a humanitarian crisis, when humanitarian assistance is needed, is by 
nature a time of emergency for a state. However, legally such emergency 
circumstances are also provided for. Most of the international and regional human 
rights treaties focusing on civil and political rights include so-called ‘derogation 
clauses’, allowing for the derogation from certain rights in times of emergency.33 
Approaching the delivery of humanitarian assistance from a human rights perspective 
can thus only be possible if derogation of such relevant human rights, such as the 
right to life, food, health and water in times of a humanitarian crisis is not possible. 
Indeed, should it be possible to derogate from such rights, an approach to 
humanitarian assistance through human rights would not be possible.  
The ICCPR declares in Article 4 that ‘in time of public emergency which threatens 
the life of the nation’ derogation from certain rights is possible, yet Article 4(2) 
ICCPR states that under no circumstances derogation from the right to life, relevant 
to this research, is possible.34 The fact that no derogation is possible does not thereby 
mean that ‘conceptually’ no limitations or restrictions could be considered justified, 
as this is to be determined independently from derogability.35 Yet, the Human Rights 
Committee considers the non-derogability of the right to life as an expression of this 
right’s peremptory nature in international law, thereby implicitly indicating that 
justifying limitations or restrictions upon this right will be challenging for states 
parties.36  
Both the ECHR and ACHR regionally contain derogation clauses. Similar to the 
ICCPR, the ECHR allows for derogation from certain rights in times of public 
emergency, but excludes the right to life from such derogability.37 The ACHR has 
the lowest threshold with regard to its derogation clause, allowing for the possibility 
to derogate from certain rights within the ACHR not only in times of public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation, but also in times of any other emergency 
                                                        
Environment was mentioned in the Stockholm Declaration of 16 June 1972, UN GA Res 45/94 (14 
December 1990) UN Doc A/RES/45/94 and Article 24 AChHPR as well as Article 11 of Additional 
protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights.  
33 Article 4 ICCPR, Article 15 ECHR and Article 27 ACHR. 
34 See in support of this CCPR General Comment 5: ‘Derogation of rights (Art. 4)’ (31 July 1981) and 
General Comment 29 pursuant to Article 4 ‘States of Emergency’  UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 
(31 August 2001), as well as the General Comments on Article 4: CCPR General Comment 6: ‘The right 
to life (art. 6)’ (30 April 1982) § 1 and CCPR General Comment 14 ‘Nuclear weapons and the right to 
life (Art. 6)’ (9 November 1984) § 1.   
35 Ibid General Comment 29: State of Emergency (Art. 4) § 7-8.  
36 Ibid §11.  
37 Article 15(1) and (2) ECHR. 
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that may threaten ‘the independence or security of the State Party’.38 However, 
despite its more lenient derogation clause, the ACHR restricts its scope by listing far 
fewer rights than the ICCPR and ECHR and in particular relevance to this research, 
excludes the right to life from derogation.39 Lastly, the AChHPR, containing relevant 
references to the right to life and health, does not contain a derogation clause.40 Thus, 
for the purpose of this research with regard to humanitarian assistance and to the 
obligations state parties might have under the right to life as incorporated in human 
rights instruments in relation thereto, derogability is not relevant.  
With a view to economic, social and cultural rights, it has on occasion been argued 
that the nature of these rights does not allow for a derogation clause in international 
treaties, although the European Social Charter contains such a clause.41 Yet the nature 
of these rights, requiring positive action from the state; as an obligation of ‘conduct’ 
rather than ‘result’, results in a different approach to their fulfilment. Such a different 
approach then also exists in times of emergencies. Indeed, the ICESCR which 
contains relevant provisions regarding the right to food and health does not contain a 
derogation clause. Article 4 ICESCR only allows for states to limit the rights in the 
treaty on certain occasions, if and when: 
 
“(…) such limitations as are determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible 
with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare 
in a democratic society”.42 
 
Thus, in order to limit a right under the ICESCR, a state must comply with this 
tripartite enumeration, namely that (1) the limitation be determined by law, (2) it be 
compatible with the nature of the rights as enshrined in the ICESCR and (3) it be only 
for the promotion of the general welfare in a democratic society. Clearly, this is not 
as far-reaching as a general derogation clause which would allow for states to entirely 
suspend their obligations towards the fulfilment of a certain right. This strict 
limitation clause again flows from the nature of the rights enshrined in the ICESCR: 
following a situation of conflict or disaster amounting to a humanitarian crisis, it will 
be expected that the affected state shall not be able to provide as fully in such rights 
as the right to food or health as it had been able to do before the crisis-situation, due 
to a severe change in circumstances.  
Furthermore, the criteria as set out in Article 4 ICESCR must also be seen as 
distinct from measures taken in conformity with Article 2 of the ICESCR, dedicated 
to the progressive realisation of human rights.43 Indeed, Article 2 is more relevant to 
                                                        
38 Article 27(1) ACHR.  
39 Article 27(2) ACHR.  
40 Article 4 AChHPR concerns the right to life; Article 16 AChHPR concerns the right to health.  
41 Stefanie Jansen-Wilhelm, ‘A duty to accept humanitarian assistance under the ICESCR’ in Zwitter A 
et al (eds) Humanitarian Action: Global, Regional and Domestic Legal Responses (Cambridge 
University Press 2014) 174-201. See Part V Article F of the ESC. 
42 Article 4 ICESCR.  
43 Amrei Müller, ‘Limitations to and Derogations from Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2009) 9 






the analysis of the rights enshrined in the ICESCR and their specific relationship to 
the provision of humanitarian assistance. The scope of Article 2 ICESCR is 
particularly relevant to the provision of humanitarian assistance, an act which by 
nature takes place in circumstances of crisis, rather than circumstances in which the 
full width and breadth of a human right may be explored. The lack of a derogation 
clause in the ICESCR does not imply complete and progressive fulfilment in times 
of crisis, as explored in Article 2 ICESCR. Whilst the relevant rights to the provision 
of humanitarian assistance therefore do not allow for derogation, the law must take 
the practical matters in times of a humanitarian crisis into account.  
 
5.2.3 Progressive Realisation in the ICESCR 
 
Article 2 ICESCR explores the depth of the economic, social and cultural rights and 
the manner in which they must be fulfilled. As such Article 2 of the ICESCR 
envisages a positive obligation resting upon state parties to undertake steps and 
guarantee the rights laid down in the ICESCR: 
 
“1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to 
the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures. 2. The States Parties to the 
present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant 
will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
3. Developing countries, with due regard to human rights and their national economy, may 
determine to what extent they would guarantee the economic rights recognized in the 
present Covenant to non-nationals”.  
 
From this text, arguably the rights enshrined in the ICESCR can be considered 
layered, as opposed to absolute. Certainly Article 2(3) provides a corridor for the 
non-fulfilment with regard to non-nationals. However, it is not so clear-cut, as Article 
2(1) provides for several notions to be considered, amongst which ‘progressive 
development’ and the requirement of seeking international cooperation when 
national resources fall short, such as in times of a humanitarian crisis.44 Indeed, whilst 
‘progressive development’ may not be expected from the affected state in times of 
emergencies, Article 2 and Article 4 establish that the rights as enshrined in the 
ICESCR continue to be applicable and must therefore be fulfilled by the affected 
state in a more basic manner.  
The CESCR has in this regard elaborated and assessed in what way the rights and 
related obligations for the affected state within the ICESCR can be realised in such 
circumstances. As such the CESCR differentiates between ‘progressive realization’ 
as incorporated within Article 2 ICESCR and so-called ‘minimum core obligations’. 
                                                        
44 The aspect of international cooperation will be addressed further in Chapter 7.  
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This differentiation is of particular relevance to the provision of humanitarian 
assistance, in relation to the right to food and health within the ICESCR. As such the 
CESCR observes that:  
 
“[…] a State party in which any significant number of individuals is deprived of essential 
foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most 
basic forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the 
Covenant”.45 
 
Clearly, a ‘significant number’ as mentioned by the Committee is not a fixed amount 
and shall vary depending on circumstances, but shall certainly be reached in the event 
of a humanitarian crisis, considering that such a crisis ‘overwhelms’ a State’s local 
capacity.46 Thus in the event of a crisis ‘essential foodstuffs’, ‘essential primary 
health care’ and ‘basic shelter’ must continuously be provided by the affected state 
in order to fulfil its duties under the ICESCR, despite being in an emergency 
situation. The Committee envisages that indeed the full realisation of rights as 
incorporated in the ICESCR are meant to be achieved progressively, yet the 
undertaking ‘to take steps’ in this regard, is an obligation which is of immediate 
effect, and therefore must be taken relatively soon upon the ICESCR’s entry into 
force for a particular State Party.47 Such steps must be taken ‘by all appropriate 
means’, which must be considered fully without limit and in its natural meaning.48 
Furthermore, the notion of ‘progressive realization’ must, according to the 
Committee, be read in light of the objective of the ICESCR: namely to establish clear 
obligations for all State Parties to enable the full realisation of all rights as formulated 
in the Convention.49 This objective includes the obligation to actively move towards 
the fulfilment of these rights in the most effective and prompt manner possible, and 
emphatically excludes any conscious ‘retrogressive measures’ unless these were to 
be justified in light of the entire set of rights as incorporated in the ICESCR.50 Whilst 
it is therefore understandable that ‘progressive development’ may not occur in times 
of a humanitarian crisis, ‘retrogressive’ measures touching upon the core content of 
rights are excluded. Article 2(1) in this regard differentiates between the economic 
circumstances of the States Parties, but has the intention of functioning as a binding 
                                                        
45 CESCR General Comment 3 on Article 2 (14 December 1990) § 10. 
46 See Section 3.3.3 Defining a Humanitarian Crisis where the notion of a humanitarian crisis has been 
defined. 
47 CESCR General Comment 3 (n 45) § 1 and § 2. 
48 Ibid § 4. 
49 Ibid § 9. See in this regard also Principles 32-35 of the ‘Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial 
Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, discussed in more detail in 
Section 3.4.2 Applicability of Human Rights in Armed Conflict and Occupation.   
50 CESCR General Comment 3 (n 45) § 9. In further detail CESCR General Comment 8 (12 December 
1997) UN Doc E/C.12/1997/8 ‘The relationship between economic sanctions and respect for economic, 






obligation upon all parties to the Convention, despite existing differences between 
obligations of result and of conduct.51 
Furthermore and particularly relevant to the provision of humanitarian assistance, 
although Article 2 ICESCR speaks of ‘progressive realization’, a ‘minimum core 
obligation’ can be discerned according to the CESCR within the fulfilment of the 
economic, social and cultural rights as encompassed by the ICESCR. Such a 
‘minimum core obligation’ incorporates at least the fulfilment of certain ‘minimum 
essential levels’ of each of the rights as otherwise the ICESCR would indeed be 
deprived largely of its essence, as seen above.52 Indeed, the fulfilment of the 
obligations in the Convention must be considered to the ‘maximum available 
resources’ of a particular state party.53 Naturally, not all states have an equal amount 
of resources at their disposal and to that extent the Committee notes that especially 
vulnerable members of society ought to be particularly protected, through the use of 
not only those resources available to the state through its own particular sources, but 
most certainly also those as available through international cooperation and 
assistance, by way of the international community at large.54 Although the 
considerations of the CESCR are not binding, this stance indeed is a reflection of the 
text of Article 2(1) ICESCR that calls upon international cooperation in the fulfilment 
of these rights. From such comments it may be inferred that the CESCR envisages a 
protection of those vulnerable members of society, in the event of a humanitarian 
crisis, and an obligation to prevent hunger that goes beyond the individual state and 
reaches a certain level of international cooperation.55 
 
5.3 A Human Right to Receive Humanitarian Assistance in International Law? 
 
From the above follows the pertinent question: is a ‘human right to receive 
humanitarian assistance’ acknowledged in international law? And if so, does it exist 
independently, or does it follow from other human rights such as the human rights to 
life, food, health and water? It has already been established that a potential human 
right to humanitarian assistance can arguably be ranked in the category of so-called 
‘solidarity rights’ or ‘third generation rights’, also considered by some to be ‘group 
rights’.56 Also, the provision of humanitarian assistance, as has been established, 
occurs with respect for the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality.57 
When relating these principles to human rights law at an abstract level from the outset 
of human rights law, rather than focusing on the individual rights to food or health 
for example, the provision of humanitarian assistance must occur in a non-
                                                        
51 Philip Alston & Gerard Quinn, ‘The Nature and Scope of State Parties’ Obligations under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 1, 
172. 
52 CESCR General Comment 3 (n 45) § 10. 
53 See Article 2(1) ICESCR.  
54 CESCR General Comment 3 (n 45) § 11-12. See also Article 2(1) ICESCR. See Chapter 7. 
55 Jansen-Wilhelm, ‘A duty to accept humanitarian assistance under the ICESCR’ (n 41). 
56 See Section 5.2.1 ‘Generations’ of Human Rights in Relation to Humanitarian Assistance.  
57 See Section 2.2.3 The Principles for the Delivery of Assistance. 
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discriminatory manner, as is incorporated within these principles themselves.58 This 
holds true regardless of whether or not an actual individual human right to receive 
humanitarian assistance exists, as obligations for states regarding non-discrimination 
exist separately and independently. Whilst the right to be exempt from (racial) 
discrimination is not a substantive norm in and of itself with regard to the provision 
of humanitarian assistance, it forms the basis for the existence of such a right in 
general. In particular in circumstances of non-international armed conflict, but also 
in international armed conflict or natural disasters in complex emergencies, (racial) 
discrimination may serve as an underlying factor in the non-delivery of humanitarian 
assistance. Racial discrimination is considered the violation of a norm of jus cogens, 
and accession to the ICERD has been near universal.59 Article 5 ICERD determines 
that states party to the treaty must undertake to ‘prohibit and to eliminate’ all forms 
of racial discrimination and in particular – relevant to the provision of humanitarian 
assistance – in the enjoyment of (amongst others) the right to security of person and 
the ‘protection against bodily harm’, economic, social and cultural rights; including 
the right to health.60  
The ICJ has also acknowledged that the delivery of humanitarian assistance must 
occur on the basis of non-discrimination in its well-known Nicaragua-judgment, 
stating that ‘an essential feature of truly humanitarian aid is that it is given “without 
discrimination” of any kind’.61 Furthermore, in a more recent case concerning 
Georgia and Russia, the Court had the opportunity to address the provision of 
assistance specifically within the context of the ICERD, upon Georgia’s claim that 
Russia obstructed assistance based on ethnicity.62 The Court ordered both parties to:  
 
“facilitate, and refrain from placing any impediment to, humanitarian assistance in support 
of the rights to which the local population are entitled under the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination”.63 
 
                                                        
58 See in this regard Article 1 ICERD. 
59 See Section 8.2.2 The ARSIWA, Peremptory Norms and the Denial of Humanitarian Assistance for a 
more in depth analysis of current norms of jus cogens and responsibility for violation thereof. The status 
of ratification of the ICERD on 20 September 2014 was 177 State Parties.  
60 The relevant text of Article 5 ICERD states: “In compliance with the fundamental obligations laid 
down in article 2 of this Convention, States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial 
discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, 
or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following rights: 
[…] (b) The right to security of person and protection by the State against violence or bodily harm, 
whether inflicted by government officials or by any individual group or institution; […] (e) Economic, 
social and cultural rights, in particular: […] (iii) The right to housing; (iv) The right to public health, 
medical care, social security and social services”.  
61 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America), Merits, Judgment 27 June 1986 I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14 § 243. 
62 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(Georgia v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order of 15 October 2008, I.C.J. Reports 2008, 
p. 353 § 80. 






In doing so, the ICJ asserted that the provision of humanitarian assistance forms the 
fulfilment of substantive human rights. The duty to refrain from racial discrimination 
in the provision of humanitarian assistance can therefore be seen as underlying 
substantive human rights and forming the basis for the incorporation of humanitarian 
assistance within the human rights discourse relating to more substantive rights. 
Indeed, both the ILC and the EU for example have included ‘non-discrimination’ as 
part of the principles by which humanitarian assistance must be delivered.64 
 
5.3.1 Humanitarian Assistance as a Potential Human Right in International Treaty 
Law 
 
In order to determine whether indeed an international human right to receive 
humanitarian assistance exists, it is therefore necessary to determine whether this 
right is incorporated in various internationally legally binding documents or 
customary international law, laying clear rights upon individuals to resolve the 
aspirational character of the right and issues relating to enforcement possibilities. 
Thus, it must be determined whether an international legal framework exists 
supporting the independent existence of the human right to humanitarian assistance, 
existing separately from the right to life, food, health or water. 
Looking solely to the international and regional treaties, the ‘human right to 
humanitarian assistance’ has quite clearly not been independently incorporated on a 
large scale. The UDHR, ICESCR and ICCPR do not explicitly mention the notion of 
humanitarian assistance at all. The specific ‘Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women’ (CEDAW) and ICERD neither reference the notion, 
despite the ICJ’s assertion concerning the ICERD as a basis through which the 
provision of humanitarian assistance needs to be fulfilled.65 However, several other 
specific human rights treaties do acknowledge the concept of humanitarian 
assistance. As such, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)66 stipulates in 
Article 22 that a child that is considered a refugee or that is seeking such a status has 
the right to receive: 
 
“appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance in the enjoyment of applicable rights 
set forth in the present Convention”.67  
                                                        
64 See Section 2.2.3.5 Other Perspectives on the Principles for Providing Humanitarian Assistance. 
65 The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, full text available at 
<http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw.htm> accessed August 2, 2012, adopted 18 
December 1979 and entered into force 3 September 1981. Currently the CEDAW has parties 187. 
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(Georgia v. Russian Federation (n 62) § 149. 
66 The Convention on the Rights of the Child, full text available at 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm> accessed 19 July 2012, adopted 20 November 1989 and 
entered into force 2 November 1990. Currently the CRC has 193 parties, thereby making the content of 
the rights enshrined in the treaty almost universally applicable. 
67 Article 22 CRC notes: “1. States Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure that a child who is 
seeking refugee status or who is considered a refugee in accordance with applicable international or 
domestic law and procedures shall, whether unaccompanied or accompanied by his or her parents or by 
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Such a right must be ensured by states parties according to the CRC. However, as 
can be seen in the text of the article, the concept of humanitarian assistance has been 
linked distinctly to the fulfillment of the other rights in the Convention, and is not 
phrased individually as an independent right. Thus, although the CRC recognises the 
need of a refugee (seeking) child to receive humanitarian assistance, such receipt is 
solely acknowledged as part of the enjoyment of the rights enshrined in the 
Convention, rather than being separately incorporated. Secondly, the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities declares that States Parties have the duty to 
ensure the proper protection of persons with disabilities in situations like 
humanitarian emergencies, armed conflict or natural disaster.68 Thus, this inclusion 
of ‘protection’ in the Convention does not entail a particular human right to receive 
humanitarian assistance, but merely notes their protection in situations like a 
humanitarian crisis, given the particular needs that may be relevant for this group. 
Such a determination falls short of declaring a right to humanitarian assistance for 
persons with disabilities. It can however be compared to the manner in which the 
CRC incorporates humanitarian assistance within its framework. 
At the international level therefore, humanitarian assistance is only considered in 
a human rights context as related to children seeking a refugee status, or already 
considered to be refugees, as well as in relation to persons with disabilities, although 
neither treaty incorporating this notes a distinct right to receive humanitarian 
assistance. Furthermore, the concept is absent as a distinct human right in the three 
main regional treaties ACHR, ECHR and ACHPR, as well as in the European Social 
Charter, the Additional Protocol to the ACHR in the area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights and the Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights of Women in Africa. 
Thus, both in the civil and political rights arena, as in the economic, social and 
cultural rights arena, the right is not recognised independently in the major treaties.  
Conversely, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child contains 
a provision that echoes the CRC, declaring the right of children that are refugees or 
seeking such a status to receive humanitarian assistance ‘in the enjoyment of the 
rights set out in this Charter and other international human rights and humanitarian 
                                                        
any other person, receive appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance in the enjoyment of 
applicable rights set forth in the present Convention and in other international human rights or 
humanitarian instruments to which the said States are Parties. 2. For this purpose, States Parties shall 
provide, as they consider appropriate, co-operation in any efforts by the United Nations and other 
competent intergovernmental organizations or non-governmental organizations co-operating with the 
United Nations to protect and assist such a child and to trace the parents or other members of the family 
of any refugee child in order to obtain information necessary for reunification with his or her family. In 
cases where no parents or other members of the family can be found, the child shall be accorded the same 
protection as any other child permanently or temporarily deprived of his or her family environment for 
any reason, as set forth in the present Convention”. 
68 Article 11 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities states: “States Parties shall take, 
in accordance with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law 
and international human rights law, all necessary measures to ensure the protection and safety of persons 
with disabilities in situations of risk, including situations of armed conflict, humanitarian emergencies 






instruments to which the States are Parties’.69 Thus, the African Charter on the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child envisages such receipt of humanitarian assistance not only 
in the enjoyment of the rights that may be laid out within its own Charter, but also in 
the enjoyment of the rights set out in any other instrument that a state party to the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child may be a state party to. 
Consequently, a state party to the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child that is also a party to the ICCPR must ensure the receipt of humanitarian 
assistance in the enjoyment of the rights in the ICCPR for the refugee child. The 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child adds to this provision that:  
 
“The provisions of this Article apply mutatis mutandis to internally displaced children 
whether through natural disaster, internal armed conflicts, civil strife, breakdown of 
economic and social order or howsoever caused”.70 
 
Thus, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child envisages a broader 
protection, not only for those children that may be considered refugees or seeking 
that status, but also internally displaced children, in a crisis-like situation that may be 
caused by a variety of factors. Consequently, as both the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child as well as the CRC contain provisions pertaining to 
the right of the child to receive humanitarian assistance albeit as part of the enjoyment 
of their rights, it may be argued that the ‘refugee child’ or ‘internally displaced child’ 
has a certain right to humanitarian assistance under (regional) international law.  
Furthermore, in the context specifically of IDPs, states on the African continent 
do envisage more protection of humanitarian assistance through international law, 
declaring in Article 5(9) of the 2009 Kampala Convention that states must respect 
the right of IDPs to request humanitarian assistance in accordance with international 
law.71 Yet, the Kampala Convention does not specifically place such a right to request 
assistance within the context of human rights law, but phrases it within the context 
of general international law. This recent Kampala Convention’s incorporation indeed 
aligns with the abovementioned similar incorporation of such protection under the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. It cannot be concluded that 
therefore an independent, human right to humanitarian assistance for refugee children 
in international or regional African treaty law has crystallised as the incorporation of 
humanitarian assistance both in the CRC and in the African Charter on the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child remains directly linked and consequential to the ‘enjoyment 
of human rights’ and in the Kampala Convention it is placed under the umbrella of 
general international law. This phrasing in itself must lead to the conclusion that 
within these two former treaties, although they make mention of the notion, the 
concept of a ‘right to receive assistance’ is not considered an independent human 
                                                        
69 Article 23 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. 
70 Ibid.  
71 African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa 
(Kampala 22 October 2009) Article 5(9) states: “States Parties shall respect the right of internally 
displaced persons to peacefully request or seek protection and assistance, in accordance with relevant 
national and international laws, a right for which they shall not be persecuted, prosecuted or punished”. 
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right. However, from the phrasing it can be inferred that ‘humanitarian assistance’ is 
placed within the human rights discourse, as its provision must be conceived through 
other human rights and stands in relation to the fulfilment of these rights. This also 
aligns with the stance taken by the ICJ in the 2008 Georgia v. Russia case. Thus, 
although the less than plentiful independent incorporation of humanitarian assistance 
into the binding international and regional codified human rights framework may 
lead to the inferable suggestion that an independent ‘right to receive’ does not exist 
in treaties today, the concept has been placed within the human rights discourse by 
two treaties. However, as the international human rights framework is comprised of 
not only treaty law, but also of customary international law, the necessity exists to 
determine whether the concept of humanitarian assistance has been embraced in that 
context.  
 
5.3.2 Humanitarian Assistance as a Potential Human Right in Customary 
International Law 
 
Determining the existence of a human right to humanitarian assistance requires the 
establishment of both opinio juris and state practice on this matter.72 In recent years, 
no developments have taken place at the interstate level that can immediately or 
directly be related to evidence of such an emerging right in customary international 
law. Much of the reference to a human right to receive humanitarian assistance in 
international law flows from interpretative documents and soft law: international and 
regional organisations and various instruments have often asserted the existence of a 
‘right to receive humanitarian assistance’.  
Within the UN framework, the UN General Assembly and Security Council have 
to date not declared a view on the existence of such a human right.73 Such an 
expression, in particular from the General Assembly as the largest UN body, would 
have provided a useful (although not necessary) indication of potential state practice. 
However, within the UN several Special Rapporteurs on various related thematic 
issues have proffered the existence of such a right, or at least framed the delivery and 
receipt of humanitarian assistance within a human rights context. As early as 1993, 
Francis Deng argued that the existing body of human rights law does not address the 
access of civilians to humanitarian assistance, and that an entitlement and right to 
such access and assistance must be advocated, as part of the fulfilment of customary 
economic, social and cultural rights.74 At that time Deng submitted that an 
entitlement could be argued for individuals to ‘receive international assistance’ when 
                                                        
72 See Section 1.4.1 Primary Sources on the requirements for the determination of customary international 
law. 
73 The two UN bodies have however, outside a human rights context, often referred to the concept of 
humanitarian access with a view to states’ obligations relating to facilitating the provision of assistance 
or allowing access to humanitarian organisations. See for a further discussion Chapter 7. 
74 Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis Deng, ‘Further promotion and 
encouragement of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the question of the programme and 
methods of work of the commission human rights, mass exoduses and displaced persons Internally 






the affected state is ‘unwilling’ to provide.75 Also, the Special Rapporteur on 
internally displaced persons has affirmed that humanitarian assistance is indeed 
‘intrinsically linked to human rights’, while the Independent Expert on human rights 
and solidarity foresees an imminent recognition of third generation rights due to the 
‘urgency of the demand from many international actors’, possibly even through the 
obligations laid down in Article 2 ICESCR that could according to some be read as 
a basis for solidarity rights claims, which the Independent Expert considers 
humanitarian assistance to form a part of.76 Likewise, the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) reported that such an emerging right to humanitarian assistance 
is ‘increasingly accepted’ by the international community.77 Moreover, the (soft law) 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, created within the UN context by 
Francis Deng, envisage a ‘right to request and receive’ humanitarian assistance from 
the national authorities specifically for IDPs.78 Subsequently, the ‘Operational 
Guidelines on Human Rights and Natural Disasters’, developed under the auspices 
of the Representative on human rights of internally displaced persons, declared that 
persons affected by such disasters have the right to request and receive assistance 
from their own governments79.  
Taking all these initiatives together, it can be concluded that several pillars within 
the UN framework are clearly supportive of the establishment of a human right to 
humanitarian assistance, and in some respects even assert its current existence. 
Whilst such developments can function as indicators of the existence of a degree of 
opinio juris, the individual member states have continuously refrained from such 
expressions, as these assertions are absent from both the General Assembly, Human 
Rights Council and Security Council resolutions. As such, the value of these 
assertions by other UN bodies in the determination of the establishment of a 
                                                        
75 Ibid § 22. 
76 Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced 
persons, Walter Kälin, Addendum Mission to Somalia, UN Doc A/HRC/13/21/Add.2 (21 January 2010) 
§ 34; ‘Report of the independent expert on human rights and international solidarity (Mr. Rudi 
Muhammad Rizki)’ UN Doc A/HRC/4/8 (7 February 2007) § 13 and § 43. 
77 FAO Legislative Study ‘Right to Adequate Food in Emergencies’ (2002) § 2.3.2. 
78 ‘Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, submitted pursuant to 
Commission resolution 1997/39’, Addendum ‘Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement’ (Guiding 
Principles on IDPs) (11 February 1998) UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 Principle 3. See Chapter 2 (n 
198) for the background of these principles. Although they have been embraced by many organisations 
in the field, including UNHCR and OHCHR, the General Assembly has solely expressed its appreciation 
of the Principles and noted their importance as an international legal framework for IDPs. See UN GA 
Resolutions 58/177 (12 March 2004) UN Doc A/RES/58/177 § 7; and UNGA Res 60/1 (24 October 
2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1 ‘World Summit Outcome Document’ § 132; UNGA Res 60/168 (7 March 
2006) A/RES/60/168 ‘Protection of and assistance to internally displaced persons’ § 8, and UN GA Res 
62/168 (6 March 2008) UN Doc A/RES/62/153, § 10.  
79 ‘Operational Guidelines on Human Rights and Natural Disasters’ by the Representative on human 
rights of internally displaced persons, UN Doc A/HRC/4/38/Add.1 (26 January 2006) § 12. See 
furthermore the elaborately updated ‘Operational Guidelines on Human Rights and Natural Disasters’ 
UN Doc A/HRC/16/43/Add.5 (31 January 2011) which provides more detailed information on various 
human rights based approaches to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, in particular Group B with 
regard to rights related to the provision of food, health, shelter and education.  
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developing norm of customary international law remains secondary, in particular in 
the absence of pro-active action by UN member states themselves.  
From a European perspective, the Council of the European Union interestingly 
enough declared rather forwardly in its 1996 Regulation concerning humanitarian aid 
that: 
 
“people in distress, victims of natural disasters, wars and outbreaks of fighting, or other 
comparable exceptional circumstances have a right to international humanitarian 
assistance where their own authorities prove unable to provide effective relief”.80 
 
The subsequent 2008 EU Joint Statement however no longer mentions such a right 
to receive assistance and consequently it appears that the EU now also takes a 
somewhat more subdued approach with a view to the possible existence of a right to 
receive humanitarian assistance.81 Nevertheless, the 1996 Regulation remains 
binding and applicable upon member states of the EU. The two major international 
organisations involved in the provision of humanitarian assistance through OCHR 
and ECHO respectively can at this stage both, though not convincingly, assert state 
practice and endorse the existence of such an independent right to assistance. 
Similarly, some early initiatives in this field, such as the (failed) 1984 Draft 
Convention on Expediting the Delivery of Emergency Relief and the 1991 
International Guidelines for Humanitarian Assistance Operations do not place the 
receipt of such assistance in a human rights context. 
That being said, several other (soft law) international declarations, functioning as 
secondary sources of international law, do perceive the (emerging) existence of this 
right to receive assistance. A primary reference can be found in the San Remo 
Guiding Principles on the Right to Humanitarian Assistance that argue a distinct right 
to request and receive humanitarian assistance. The San Remo Guiding Principles 
envisage such a right for those persons affected by emergencies, who may then turn 
to national or international organisations to receive assistance.82 Furthermore, the San 
Remo Principles note the conditions needed for the invoking of such a right:  
 
“The right to humanitarian assistance may be invoked: (a) when essential humanitarian 
needs of human beings in an emergency are not being met, so that the abandonment of 
victims without assistance would constitute a threat to human life or a grave offence to 
human dignity; (b) when all local possibilities and domestic procedures have been 
exhausted within a reasonable time, and vital needs are not satisfied or are not fully 
satisfied, so that there is no other possibility to ensure the prompt provision of supplies 
and services essential for the persons affected”.83 
                                                        
80 European Council Regulation concerning humanitarian aid (EC) No. 1257/96 (20 June 1996) Preamble 
§ 4. 
81 ‘Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States 
meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission’ (European 
Consensus on Humanitarian Aid)  (30 January 2008) EU Doc 2008/C/25/01. 
82 ‘Guiding Principles on the Right to Humanitarian Assistance’ (April 1993) The International Institute 
of Humanitarian Law in San Remo, Principle 2. 






Thus, the San Remo Principles connect the right to request and receive assistance to 
an international source, upon the exhaustion of national sources. In this manner, the 
approach somewhat reflects the wording of Article 2(1) ICESCR, in which a duty is 
codified for a state to seek international assistance in the fulfilment of rights. As the 
International Institute of Humanitarian Law in San Remo, which brought forth these 
Principles, is not comprised of certain member states, these Principles cannot be 
considered to contribute to the notion of state practice. However, they may well 
contribute to the potential development of opinio juris as the Institute represents the 
ideas of contemporary judicial scholars. Similarly, the Mohonk Criteria, developed 
through a collaboration of religious communities and under the auspices of (then) 
UN affiliate J.M. Ebersole, recognise the right to humanitarian assistance as deriving 
from fundamental human rights, and state that a right to receive such assistance may 
be requested from the affected authorities, or national and international 
organisations.84 More recently, the Bruges Resolution, developed by the renowned 
Institute de Droit International has declared that withholding assistance to victims of 
humanitarian crises is a violation of human rights, and that such victims are: 
 
“entitled to request and receive humanitarian assistance. Assistance may be sought on 
behalf of the victims, by the members of the group, by local and regional authorities, the 
government of the affected State, and national or international organizations”.85 
 
Similar to the San Remo Principles and Mohonk Criteria, the Bruges Resolution sees 
a ‘right to receive’ that is connected to a ‘right to request’ such assistance from a 
variety of sources, amongst which of course primarily the affected state itself. As can 
be held for the San Remo Institute, the Institut de Droit International is representative 
of current legal scholarship and can therefore contribute to the development of the 
establishment of opinio juris on this matter. Lastly, although not framed in a human 
rights context, the ‘Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief’, developed by several of the 
largest disaster response agencies, states that the right to receive humanitarian 
assistance is a ‘fundamental humanitarian principle which should be enjoyed by all 
citizens’, clearly with a view to strengthening the receipt of such assistance.86 
Throughout the years therefore, also in legal scholarship, both opponents and 
proponents of the creation and potential existence of an independent human right to 
humanitarian assistance continue to debate its existence.87  
                                                        
84 ‘The Mohonk Criteria for Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies’, (1995) reprinted in 17 
Human Rights Quarterly 1, 196 (preamble).  
85 Resolution ‘Humanitarian Assistance’ (2 September 2003) Institute of International Law, Sixteenth 
Commission, Bruges Session Principle I.1 and I.2.  
86 ‘Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster 
Relief’, Annex VI to the resolutions of the 26th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent, Geneva, 1995 Prepared jointly by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies and the ICRC, Principle 1. For further information on the Code of Conduct see 
<http://www.ifrc.org/en/publications-and-reports/code-of-conduct/> accessed 11 January 2015.  
87 See amongst others Yoram Dinstein, ‘The Right to Humanitarian Assistance’ (2000) LIII Naval War 
College Review 4, 77 for a negative perspective and for a positive perspective Bosko Jakovljevic, ‘Right 
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Thus, in many non-binding instruments and through the work of the EU and 
Special Rapporteurs within the UN system, reference to the receipt of humanitarian 
assistance as a human right can be found. Such references can be considered evidence 
of existing, and continuously developing opinio juris with regard to the potential 
establishment of a human right to receive humanitarian assistance. However, the 
absence of such references in General Assembly, Human Rights Council and 
Security Council resolutions cannot be neglected. It is through these bodies that states 
can express their desire to formulate such a right, and the absence of such expressions 
remains an indication of the absence of state practice as well as further opinio juris. 
Nor can the fact be overlooked that states parties to the international and regional 
treaties as discussed in Section 5.3.1 have refrained from making statements with 
regard to humanitarian assistance either through interpretative comments or 
reservations.88 Evidence of state practice of the existence of a human right to 
humanitarian assistance is thus clearly lacking. Given the fact that customary 
international law is dependent on two equal components, and in the case of the 
potential human right to humanitarian assistance merely one could potentially be 
considered fulfilled, and even that is at quite a stretch, it cannot be satisfactorily 
concluded as existing in international law today.  
 
5.3.3 Humanitarian Assistance and Collective Human Rights: Rights-holders and 
Duty-bearers  
 
States’ hesitance towards the acknowledgment of a potential human right to 
humanitarian assistance could be further explained with a view towards the notions 
of rights-holders and duty-bearers in the specific case of a potential human right to 
receive humanitarian assistance. Section 5.2.1 has discussed that as an independent 
human right, the receipt of humanitarian assistance would most likely be categorised 
as a so-called ‘solidarity’ or ‘group right’ by its proponents. A discourse exists on the 
determination of who may be rights-holders of such collective human rights. 
Acknowledging the discourse is relevant to the discussion of a potential human right 
to receive humanitarian assistance, especially as the determination of a ‘group’ or 
‘people’ may be problematic in the event of invoking the possible human right to 
humanitarian assistance.  
This discourse needs to be addressed to place the potential human right to 
humanitarian assistance in its proper framework. Henkin has noted the traditional 
view that international human rights law is primarily concerned with the rights of 
                                                        
to Humanitarian Action and State Sovereignty’ in (eds) Stefania Baldini & Guido Ravasi, Humanitarian 
Action and State Sovereignty; Refugees: a continuing challenge (Institute of International Humanitarian 
Law 2000) 99-100; as well as David Fisher, ‘Right to Humanitarian Assistance’ in Walter Kälin, Rhodri 
C Williams, Khalid Koser and Andrew Solomon (eds) Incorporating the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement into Domestic Law: Issues and Challenges (American Society of International Law 2008) 
50-51. 
88 It must be noted that reservations that are incompatible with the ‘object and purpose’ of the treaty are 






individuals, as opposed to the rights of groups.89 Burguenthal on the other hand 
argues that human rights law today consists of a vast body of ‘individual and group 
rights’ as proclaimed in many international human rights instruments,90 whereas 
Alston finds middle ground, arguing they do exist, but are rare.91 Furthermore, the 
notion of a group right is also considered by some to be inter-changeable with a so-
called ‘collective right’.92 Although both approaches to human rights are clearly 
distinct and the existence of collective or group rights is not acknowledged by all, the 
approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive, as an individual must invoke such 
a group right, thereby calling upon the possible breach of his or her individual right.93  
Some reluctance towards the acceptance of group- or collective rights finds its 
origin in the uncertainty as to whom the rights-holders of such rights are.94 In the 
event of the possible invoking of a human right to receive assistance, a humanitarian 
crisis must exist.95 The sheer existence of such a crisis as defined in Chapter 2 in 
itself determines that a large group of people is affected in the possible fulfilment of 
their rights. Yet, possibly problematic with regard to the establishment of the right-
holder of a human right to humanitarian assistance may be the fact that such a group 
can often only clearly be discerned after the occurrence of a humanitarian crisis. 
Unlike those ‘peoples’ for example invoking the right to self-determination,96 a group 
that is possibly entitled to receive humanitarian assistance under international law is 
not always as clearly discernible or previously determined: this will occur ex post 
facto due to the nature of a humanitarian crisis and is thereby a factor in legal 
uncertainty. The determination of such a ‘collective’ is furthermore not only 
temporally challenging for the law, but also dependent on the particular circumstance 
that amounts to a humanitarian crisis, which may be for example either conflict or 
natural disaster. As such, its scope will vary from occasion to occasion, should it be 
bestowed on an ever-changing group. Consider in this regard the recent non-
international conflicts in Libya and Syria, with a view to the establishment of rights-
                                                        
89 Louis Henkin, ‘Group Defamation and International Law’ in MH Freedman & EM Freedman (eds) 
Group Defamation and Freedom of Speech: The Relationship Between Language and Violence 
(Greenwood Press 1995) 124. This research will not address issues regarding the universality of human 
rights, but will take the premise that human rights are indeed based on universality. See in support of this 
premise: Alison Dundes Renteln, International Human Rights: Universalism Versus Relativism (Sage 
Publications 1990) 47; Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism (n 8) 69-96; H Steiner, 
P Alston & R Goodman, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals (Oxford 
University Press 2007) 517-540.  
90 Buergenthal, ‘Human Rights’ (n 8) § 10. 
91 Steiner, Alston & Goodman, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals (n 89) 153. 
92 ‘Report of the independent expert on human rights and international solidarity (Mr. Rudi Muhammad 
Rizki)’ UN Doc A/HRC/4/8 (7 February 2007) § 9; Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Idealism and 
Realism (n 8) 35; ibid Steiner, Alston & Goodman. See infra further in this Section regarding various 
collective rights and humanitarian assistance. 
93 See for example article 27 ICCPR. 
94 N Roht-Arriaza & SC Aminzadeh, ‘Solidarity Rights: Development, Peace, Environment, 
Humanitarian Assistance’ in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2007) § 18. 
95 See Section 3.3.3 Defining a Humanitarian Crisis on the definition of such a crisis.  
96 See Article 1 ICCPR and Article 1 ICESCR, as well as CCPR General Comment 12: ‘The right to self-
determination of peoples (Art. 1)’ (13 March 1984).  
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holders caught in internal strife. In both circumstances, groups within one nation and 
population clashed, and civilians on both sides of the conflict were often in need of 
assistance.97 Determining a single group to be the right-holder of the collective right 
would leave the other group without the legal standing to claim the right to assistance. 
Also, the occurrence of a natural disaster may invoke problems in the determination 
of rights-holders as the disaster or its direct consequences could be trans-boundary. 
Such trans-boundary effects may then also result in the circumstance where two or 
more groups, peoples or collectives of various nationalities may be in need of 
humanitarian assistance. Difficulties may then arise in applying this right to different 
‘groups’ simultaneously for the same disaster. Thus, a potential human right to 
receive humanitarian assistance would have to be bestowed upon the group in need 
of emergency aid as a whole, rather than making an artificial distinction between one 
people (as possibly in the circumstance of a non-international armed conflict) or an 
unnecessary distinction between two peoples in other situations such as natural 
disasters with trans-boundary effects. As such, to argue the possible existence of a 
human right to receive aid as a collective right, the right-holder would be determined 
to be the entire collective of persons in need of emergency assistance.  
Although it is relevant to be aware of possible difficulties with regard to the 
establishment of the exact rights-holders, the so-called collective rights also face 
issues with regard to the determination of specific duty-bearers. General acceptance 
exists with regard to the premise that the corollary of the existence of a right is the 
subsequent existence of a duty.98 Furthermore, primary duty-bearers of such rights 
remain either states (or those exercising sovereign duties) under international law, or 
alternatively horizontally other individuals.99 Yet, solidarity or collective rights 
function on the premise as already laid out in the UDHR that: 
 
“Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms 
set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized”.100 
 
Thus, solidarity or collective rights look to the social and international community 
for fulfilment.101 The current ‘duties’ under international law for the international 
community as a whole remain unclear, making the discourse on a specific duty-bearer 
                                                        
97 For a declaration of the ICRC regarding the provision of assistance to civilians in various Syrian cities 
see <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/update/2012/syria-update-2012-10-25.htm> 
accessed 9 November 2012. See also the WFP’s call for the need to provide assistance in Libya 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/02/us-libya-food-wfp-idUSTRE7214TM20110302> accessed 
9 November 2012; and the ICRC’s comments on their need to provide continued assistance 
<http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2012/23-10-libya-aid-distributed-fighting-
drags-bani-walid.htm> accessed 9 November 2012.  
98 Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism (n 8) 58. 
99 Steiner, Alston & Goodman, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals (n 89) 505; 
ibid Tomuschat.  
100 Article 28 UDHR. 
101 For the perspective of the UN Independent Expert on Human Rights and Solidarity Rui Baltazar Dos 
Santos Alves on ‘solidarity’ see ‘Report of the independent expert on human rights and international 






in the context of collective rights highly theoretical. Indeed, previous Chapters have 
discussed the various actors involved in the provision of humanitarian assistance and 
in fact concluded that not only the affected state is primarily involved in the provision 
of assistance: various organisations and third states can and may also be involved. 
Yet, when placing the receipt of humanitarian assistance within a human rights 
context, it is relevant to note that international human rights law has not recognised 
such actors as duty-bearers in a general context. Therefore, duty-bearers also within 
the framework of solidarity rights, and in the context of this research more 
specifically regarding a potential human right to receive humanitarian assistance, 
should continue to be first and foremost the affected states. The role allowed for the 
international community as a whole will be discussed further in Chapters 7 and 8.  
Tomuschat has argued with a rather stringent approach that collective rights, 
looking towards the international community for fulfilment, should not be defined as 
human rights but ‘rather as agreed objectives which the international community has 
pledged to pursue’.102 Although such a narrow approach does not necessarily reflect 
the approach of the entire legal scholarship, it signals a clear existing discussion on 
the place of ‘third generation’ rights within the human rights discourse. At this stage, 
both the notion of collective right-holders and collective duty-bearers prove to be not 
undisputed in international law today. Should a human right to humanitarian 
assistance therefore be desired and developed, framing it within such a collective will 
not enhance legal certainty for those in need of assistance. These legal challenges 
facing the potential declaration of the existence of a human right to receive 
humanitarian assistance highlight some explanation for the lack of state action in the 
declaration of such a right.  
 
5.3.4 Preliminary Conclusion  
 
Problematic to the notion of these collective or solidarity rights, remain their fairly 
novel status, their premise on a collective rather than an individual, as well as from a 
practical perspective a more difficult enforcement as they have a rather aspirational 
and general character, specifically with regard to the absence of a clear duty-
bearer.103 As a result, both the existence of the concept as well as the exact content 
of the possible rights remain a subject of debate to this day. Therefore, considering 
the sensitivities surrounding the notion of human rights ‘generations’, many use the 
concept of ‘categories’ of rights to avoid implications of an existing hierarchy.104 
                                                        
102 Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism (n 8) 59. 
103 Kabasakal Arat, Human Rights Worldwide: A Reference Handbook (n 28) 37 and Claude & Weston 
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Such a statement, that all human rights are indivisible and interdependent, was of 
course also put forward by the Vienna Declaration of 1993.105 The determination of 
what consists as a human right did not halt with the creation of the UDHR in 1948. 
Throughout the past decades, and naturally in the decades to come, the determination 
of the content of (new) human rights evolves according to the developments in 
international society as a whole.106 Although the discussion regarding the right-
holders and duty-bearers of collective rights is topical and must be resolved through 
progressive development, it is but one aspect of the determination of the existence of 
such an independent right.  
From another perspective, the evidence of the existence of such an independent 
human right has been sought in existing international law, considering both treaty 
law and customary international law. Currently, it can only be concluded that states 
have remained unwilling to bridge the gap and challenge of assessing the rights-
holder and the question of the determination of duty-bearing responsibilities. No 
major international or regional human rights treaties directly make reference to 
humanitarian assistance as a human right. Furthermore, the CRC and the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child merely refer to humanitarian 
assistance with regard to the refugee or IDP child, and solely in connection to the 
enjoyment of that child’s human rights. The Kampala Convention, although 
incorporating humanitarian assistance, has not referred specifically to the human 
rights law framework.  
Also customary international law cannot provide solace in the determination of 
an existing independent human right to receive humanitarian assistance, as state 
practice remains lacking. Indeed, while subsequent Chapters address state practice 
with regard to the provision of humanitarian assistance, the current Chapter has 
sought to find the basis for this assistance in a human rights context. Specifically 
within that context, no state practice can be distilled regarding the existence of an 
individual human right to receive humanitarian assistance. Opinio juris does appear 
to exist within the UN framework and other international and regional initiatives, 
despite its absence in the work of relevant bodies such as the General Assembly, 
Human Rights Council and Security Council. However, more crystallisation and 
development of the law is needed before the potential human right to humanitarian 
assistance can be established should it be desired. Therefore, protection of those in 
need of assistance must currently be sought through other rights that are generally 
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5.4 Humanitarian Assistance Within the Context of Existing Human Rights 
 
In a circumstance such as a humanitarian crisis, where humanitarian assistance is 
needed, several specific existing human rights may be affected, such as the right to 
life, the right to food, the right to health and the right to water. The latter are often 
considered together, as the right to an adequate standard of living.107 Given their 
distinct discussion in scholarship however, as well as their distinct relevance to the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance, they will be equally discussed separately in this 
Chapter.108 The conceptual boundaries of this research are thereby formed through 
the scope of the definition of humanitarian assistance as provided in Sections 2.2.2 
and 3.3.3. These four independently existing rights: the right to life, food, health and 
water, form the core of the content of humanitarian assistance, as their fulfilment 
ensures the survival of persons during and in the aftermath of humanitarian crises. 
Fisher has argued such rights (including in his view the rights to housing and 
clothing) to be ‘component rights’ in relation to the right to receive assistance.109 
These individual rights would then function as ‘components’ or ‘building blocks’ in 
the provision of humanitarian assistance. In order to establish whether or not the right 
to receive humanitarian assistance may be incorporated and contained within these 
existing rights, this Section addresses the four abovementioned rights as related to 
the provision of assistance. The content of their legal protection is addressed, in 
particular relation to the needs of people in humanitarian crises; i.e. needing food, 
water and medicine for their immediate survival.110 Elements of treaty and customary 
international law are examined to establish the current existing legal framework on 
human rights law as applicable for the protection of persons through the provision of 
humanitarian assistance, in the absence of an independent human right to that end. 
As humanitarian assistance is the provision of food, water, medicine and shelter for 
the immediate survival of persons in emergency situations, such provision can well 
be derived from the rights to life, food, health and water.111 With a view to the 
progressive development of human rights in a changing and developing world, it is 
relevant to examine the application of existing human rights to newly arising 
problems or to matters outside the framework for which they were originally intended 
but might equally be very well suited.  
 
5.4.1 The Right to Life  
 
Of the four individual human rights to be discussed, first and foremost the human 
right to life must therefore be considered, in order to determine in what way this 
                                                        
107 Article 11 ICESCR. 
108 See Section 2.2.2 Defining Humanitarian Assistance .  
109 Fisher, ‘Right to Humanitarian Assistance’ (n 87) 53. 
110 It remains beyond the scope of this research to fully address these four rights in all their depth. A focus 
will remain on those aspects of the rights as relevant to the provision of humanitarian assistance. 
111 See also in this regard this author  ‘A humanitarian crisis: reframing the legal framework on 
humanitarian assistance’, in Zwitter A et al (eds) Humanitarian Action: Global, Regional and Domestic 
Legal Responses (Cambridge University Press 2014) 61.  
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human right may be connected to the receipt of assistance in times of a humanitarian 
crisis. In many circumstances, the receipt of humanitarian assistance makes the 
difference between life and death for those persons in the midst of a humanitarian 
crisis. As such, the non-provision of assistance stands in close relation to the loss of 
life and the potential violation of the right to life. Having established that no 
derogation from this right is possible in times of emergency, the right to life remains 
to be protected by the state in the event of a humanitarian crisis.112 Yet, the content 
of this right must be examined, for the purpose of its possible relevance to those in 
need of emergency assistance wishing to call upon this human right.  
The UDHR states that ‘everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of 
person’.113 This formulation is clearly from the perspective of the right of the 
individual, rather than an obligation that may lie upon the state, distinguishing it from 
several of the rights discussed in subsequent Sections. Although many discussions 
were held on possibly including other clauses as part of the formulation to this right, 
none of these are pertinent to the discussion of the right to life in the context of 
humanitarian assistance.114 The ICCPR is somewhat more explicit than the UDHR, 
stating in Article 6(1) that: 
 
“Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No 
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life”. 
 
None of the current declarations and reservations to this right made by state parties 
are relevant to this research into the right to life as related to the provision of 
humanitarian assistance.115 The ICCPR bases itself on the premise that each 
individual has an inherent right to life, thus not only granting the right to life to each 
individual, but also declaring it inherent to each human, thereby placing an obligation 
on states to facilitate a legal system that protects this right.116 Such an obligation has 
also been reiterated by the Human Rights Committee in both its General Comments 
to Article 6, declaring that the State has a supreme duty to not only prevent wars or 
                                                        
112 See Section 5.2.2 Derogability, Human Rights and the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance. 
113 Article 3 UDHR.  
114 Proposals were made amongst others to include the unborn child, abolition of the death penalty, and 
physical integrity of persons. See for an in depth discussion LA Rehof, ‘Article 3’, in G Alfredsson & A 
Eide (eds) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Common Standard of Achievement (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 1999) 91-94.  
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<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
4&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec> accessed 24 May 2012.  






similar emergencies which may cause loss of life, but indeed that the State has an 
obligation to adopt positive measures to protect the right to life.117 Such measures 
should, according to the HRC, include the reduction or elimination of malnutrition, 
epidemics and similar situations that may endanger the right to life.118 These remarks 
by the HRC on the obligation for States to implement positive measures, reducing 
famine and preventing emergencies that may threaten the right to life can certainly 
be viewed in light of the provision of humanitarian assistance, as indeed the provision 
of food, water and shelter enhances the survival of those facing a humanitarian crisis. 
It may therefore indeed be suggested that according to the HRC, the provision of 
humanitarian assistance could form part of the fulfilment of a state’s obligation to 
ensure the right to life under Article 6 ICCPR. Furthermore, Article 6 of the ICCPR 
forbids the ‘arbitrary’ deprivation of life, an issue the HRC considers a matter of the 
utmost gravity when occurring at the hands of the authorities.119 This is somewhat 
distinct from the ECHR which prohibits the ‘intentional’ deprivation of life in its 
Article 2, but like the ICCPR also considers the right to life to entail an obligation of 
protection from the State.120 Arguably, ‘intentional’ deprivation is a lesser threshold 
than ‘arbitrary’ deprivation, thus giving those individuals under the ECHR a greater 
protection.121 Furthermore, the ECHR provides an exhaustive list of the deathly use 
of force allowed by authorities under the Convention.122 However, the degree to 
which the State is held to certain ‘positive obligations’ similar to those mentioned by 
the HRC with regard to the ICCPR, has not been dealt with to a detailed extent by 
the European Court of Human Rights.123 Although in the case of Budayeva and others 
v. Russia, concerning possible responsibility of the state following a mudslide, the 
European Court held in relation to the right to life that:  
 
                                                        
117 CCPR General Comment 6: ‘The right to life (art. 6)’ (30 April 1982) § 2 and CCPR General Comment 
14 ‘Nuclear weapons and the right to life (Art. 6)’ (9 November 1984) § 2. 
118 Ibid CCPR General Comment 6 § 5. 
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120 Article 2 of the ECHR reads: “1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be 
deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction 
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inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than 
absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful 
arrest or to prevent escape of a person lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of 
quelling a riot or insurrection”. The reservation made by Malta (23 January 1967) with regard to the 
defence as referred to in Article 2(2)(a) is not relevant to this current discussion of the right to life in 
relation to the possible right to humanitarian assistance. A full list of reservations and declarations can 
be found at 
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=005&CM=8&DF=24/05/2012
&CL=ENG&VL=1> accessed 24 May 2012.  
121 Rehof ‘Article 3’ (n 114) 95. 
122 See Article 2(2) ECHR.  
123 Only on several occasions has the former European Commission on Human Rights dealt with this 
matter, not relating to the context of humanitarian assistance: European Commission X v Ireland, Appl. 
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“The Court reiterates that Article 2 does not solely concern deaths resulting from the use 
of force by agents of the State but also, in the first sentence of its first paragraph, lays down 
a positive obligation on States to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those 
within their jurisdiction […] This positive obligation entails above all a primary duty on 
the State to put in place a legislative and administrative framework designed to provide 
effective deterrence against threats to the right to life”.124 
 
The European Court thereby, although not laying down specificities, does envisage 
a clear and positive obligation to rest upon the state in ensuring that the right to life 
of persons remains protected.  
Other regional instruments containing provisions with regard to the right to life 
include the ACHR and ACHPR. The ACHR largely follows the ICCPR, declaring a 
right to life that must be ‘respected’ and ‘protected by law’ and may not be arbitrarily 
deprived, clearly laying an obligation on State Parties to safeguard this right.125 The 
ACHPR follows suit, with a brief provision that also includes a respect for the 
personal integrity of all human beings.126 At the international level, the CRC, 
specifically geared towards the protection of children, has also declared State Parties 
to have an obligation to not only recognise the right to life, but envisions a higher 
threshold, namely that the State Parties have an obligation to ‘ensure to the maximum 
extent possible the survival and development of the child’.127 No interpretative 
remarks have been made with regard to this phrasing and the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance,128 but such an obligation could be read in conjunction with the obligation 
in Article 22 of the CRC to protect the refugee child through the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance.129  
When considering the above treaties, the affected state therefore would not merely 
have an obligation to abstain from action; i.e. the arbitrary deprivation of life, but 
furthermore to ensure positive action; i.e. ensuring the security of persons within its 
jurisdiction both under the ICCPR and the ECHR. The CRC equally appears to 
envisage such a more positive obligation of the affected state. With a view to the 
provision of assistance, such perspectives on the right to life allow for the perspective 
                                                        
124 Budayeva And Others v Russia (App Nos 15339/02, 21166/02, 20058/02, 11673/02 and 15343/02) 
ECHR 20 March 2008, Final 29 September 2008, § 128-129. 
125 Article 4 ACHR. The interpretive declaration of Mexico (March 24, 1981) does also not relate to the 
possible right to humanitarian assistance. All reservations and declarations can be found at 
<http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-32.html> accessed 24 May 2012.  
126 Article 4 ACHPR states: “Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled to respect 
for his life and the integrity of his person. No one may be arbitrarily deprived of this right”. No 
reservations or declarations of relevance have been deposited with regard to the right to life.  
127 Article 6 CRC. The interpretive declarations of China, Guatemala, Luxembourg and Tunisia with 
regard to the right to life do not influence the discussion of this right in relation to this research into the 
possible right to humanitarian assistance. All reservations and declarations can be found at 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc-reserve.htm> accessed 24 May 2012.  
128 The interpretive declarations of China, Guatemala, Luxembourg and Tunisia with regard to the right 
to life do not influence the discussion of this right in relation to this research into the possible right to 
humanitarian assistance. All reservations and declarations can be found at 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc-reserve.htm> accessed 24 May 2012. 






that the state may indeed be required to provide assistance in certain circumstances 
as part of the fulfilment of the right to life.  
 
5.4.2 Humanitarian Assistance and the Right to Life 
 
Thus, the main international and regional treaty (bodies) both consider the right to 
life to entail certain positive obligations which authorities are required to respect.130 
Furthermore, this right is non-derogable, ensuring its full protection in times of 
emergency or crisis, pre-eminently a time at which the provision of humanitarian 
assistance comes into play; as assistance is only relevant in the event of a 
humanitarian crisis. However, no direct or indirect reference to the provision of 
humanitarian assistance is made in any of the provisions relating to the right to life 
in both international and regional treaties. Similarly the UN Special Rapporteur on 
the Right to Life has in recent years not expressed himself in this regard.  
Only through the interpretive remarks of the HRC of the ICCPR could the 
provision of humanitarian assistance be considered as part of a state’s obligation to 
ensure the right to life under Article 6 ICCPR, as the Human Rights Committee 
envisages an obligation resting upon state parties to reduce or eliminate malnutrition, 
epidemics and other such situations. Indeed, providing humanitarian assistance – 
entailing food, water, medical assistance – can contribute and be a vehicle to such 
reduction or elimination and would then be the fulfilment of the right to life.131 Rather 
than functioning as a right in itself, the provision of assistance then contributes to the 
fulfilment of the right to life. Likewise the CRC’s provision with regard to the right 
to life could be seen in conjunction with Article 22 of that Convention in which an 
obligation lies upon states to provide humanitarian assistance to the refugee child in 
the enjoyment of its human rights, which would naturally include the right to life as 
incorporated in Article 6 CRC. These two interpretative considerations, although 
relevant to note, are however currently clearly not sufficient to be able to conclude a 
clear relationship between the concept of humanitarian assistance as a human right, 
and the human right to life. Nonetheless, they are indicative of the relationship 
between the provision of such assistance in the fulfilment of states’ obligations to 
ensure the respect for the right to life.  
With a specific view towards times of conflict, the concept of the prohibition of 
‘arbitrary deprivation of life’ and security of person must be read in conjunction with 
international humanitarian law, as the protection of life in times of armed conflict is 
addressed specifically in this body of law too, leading to a more detailed 
understanding of the notion of ‘arbitrary deprivation’. Several provisions must be 
taken into account jointly with the human right to life, as protection from violence 
                                                        
130 For a more in depth discussion on the right to life, see Christian Tomuschat, Evelyne Lagrange & 
Stefan Oeter  (eds), The Right to Life (Brill 2010). See also Katja Luopojärvi, ‘Is There an Obligation on 
States to Accept International Humanitarian Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons under 
International Law?’ (2004) 15 International Journal of Refugee Law 4, 691-692.  
131 Ibid Luopojärvi 692-693.  
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directed at civilians forms a large part of the essentialities necessary for their survival 
in times of conflict, and will be addressed more specifically in Chapters 6 and 7.  
 
5.4.3 The Right to Adequate Food  
 
Another pre-existing human right possibly containing or contributing to the existence 
of the right to humanitarian assistance is the human right to adequate food, one of the 
rights categorised as an economic, social and cultural right. The promotion of these 
rights was envisaged as early as 1945, as the UN Charter itself called upon Member 
States separately and jointly to promote amongst others:  
 
“higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social 
progress and development; solutions of international economic, social, health, and related 
problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation”.132 
 
These provisions are arguably considered to behold an obligation upon state parties 
to realise economic, social and cultural rights, giving states therefore a potential duty 
to provide in the right to food.133 Article 25 of the UDHR has translated that original 
call in the UN Charter into the statement that all persons have a right to an adequate 
standard of living, including food.134 Following the UDHR, the ICESCR has 
developed in its Article 11 a provision relating to such an adequate standard of living, 
including the right to food, in which it elaborately declares: 
 
“1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an 
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing 
and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties 
will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect 
the essential importance of international co-operation based on free consent. 2. The States 
Parties to the present Covenant, recognizing the fundamental right of everyone to be free 
from hunger, shall take, individually and through international co-operation, the measures, 
including specific programmes, which are needed: (a) To improve methods of production, 
conservation and distribution of food by making full use of technical and scientific 
knowledge, by disseminating knowledge of the principles of nutrition and by developing 
or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve the most efficient development 
and utilization of natural resources; (b) Taking into account the problems of both food-
importing and food-exporting countries, to ensure an equitable distribution of world food 
supplies in relation to need”. 
 
                                                        
132 See Section 5.2 The Development of Human Rights Relevant to Humanitarian Assistance, as well as 
Articles 55 and 56 UN Charter.  
133 CESCR General Comment 3 (n 45) § 14.  
134 The relevant text of Article 25 UDHR states: “(1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living 
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing 
and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, 






Interestingly, Article 11(2) includes the right to be free from hunger, uniquely 
formulated in the ICESCR as a ‘fundamental right’ and clearly of a more narrow 
scope than the broader formulated ‘right to adequate food’. The Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the treaty body to the ICESCR, has 
elaborated on the content of the right to food as laid down in Article 11 ICESCR and 
determined in one of its ‘General Comments’ that this right is of fundamental 
importance for the enjoyment and fulfilment of all other rights as protected in the 
International Bill of Rights, as well as considering it a right that is ‘linked to the 
inherent dignity of the human person’.135 As such, the CESCR has furthermore 
established that as part of the right to food, access to food is of relevance, and that 
priority and attention thereto may especially be needed for victims of natural disasters 
or people living areas that are likely to be prone to such disasters.136 As seen in 
relation to the right to life, in the case of the right to food a link is also made between 
the provision of humanitarian assistance and the fulfilment of a human right. The 
establishment of ‘adequate’ food envisages a broader spectrum of criteria that need 
to be met than the mere establishment of a minimum intake in order to fulfil the right 
to food. The Committee has noted that this right to food encompasses such food 
which is ‘sufficient, nutritionally adequate and safe, to ensure their freedom from 
hunger’ and that the right to food is realised when every person has access to adequate 
food at all times.137 This definition, although legally non-binding, is considered most 
widely used and accepted.138 Although Article 11 ICESCR is formulated as an 
inherent individual right, emphasis has mostly been placed on the obligation for state 
parties to realise this right. Moreover, the then UN Special Rapporteur on the Right 
to Food (Olivier de Schutter) has argued that such an approach based upon 
obligations to be imposed on various actors can have a positive influence on the 
realisation of the right to food, with more legal certainty for rights-holders and 
accountability for the duty-bearers.139 
                                                        
135 CESCR General Comment 12 (n 26) § 1 and §4.  
136 Ibid, § 13. 
137 Ibid § 6 and § 14. 
138 Kerstin Mechlem, ‘Right to Food, International Protection’ in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (June 2008) § 4. Within the UN context the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food 
has elaborated and declared it to entail: ‘the right to have regular, permanent and free access, either 
directly or by means of financial purchases, to quantitatively and qualitatively adequate and sufficient 
food corresponding to the cultural traditions of the people to which the consumer belongs, and which 
ensures a physical and mental, individual and collective, fulfilling and dignified life free of fear’; see in 
this regard the Report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food ‘The Right to Food’ UN 
Doc E/CN.4/2001/53 (7 February 2001) § 14; and subsequently also ‘The Right to Food’, Report 
submitted by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/10 (9 February 2004) § 
3; ‘The Right to Food’, Report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food UN Doc 
E/CN.4/2005/47 (24 January 2005) § 5; ‘The right to food’, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right 
to food, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/44 (16 March 2006) § 2; as well as subsequently transmitted to the General 
Assembly by the Secretary General in UN Docs A/58/330 ‘The right to food’ (, 28 August 2003) § 3; 
A/60/350 ‘The right to food’ (12 September 2005) §6; and A/62/289 ‘The right to food’ (22 august 2007) 
§4. 
139 HRC Res 9/23 (8 September 2008) ‘Building resilience: a human rights framework for world food 
and nutrition security’, UN Doc A/HRC/9/23, Special Session on the global food crisis § 17.  
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In the above Section 5.2.2.1, a distinction has already been made between the 
notion of ‘progressive realization’ as meant in Article 2(1) ICESCR, and the so-called 
‘minimum core obligations’ found within the substantive provisions of the ICESCR 
according to the CESCR. In light of this viewpoint and the provision of humanitarian 
assistance, it is relevant to note that none of the current reservations or declarations 
made by states party to the ICESCR can be considered to object to the progressive 
realisation of the right to food or its minimum core obligation.140 Considering these 
minimum core obligations flowing from each provision in the ICESCR and laying 
upon State Parties, the CESCR notes in relation to the right to food as codified in 
Article 11 that all states have such an obligation to take steps to ‘mitigate and 
alleviate hunger’ even in the event of a natural disaster or a disaster of another kind.141 
This also falls in line with the ‘fundamental’ aspect of the right to be free from 
hunger, as laid down in Article 11(2) ICESCR. Clearly, no limitation can be made to 
the obligation resting upon a State Party to take immediate steps to provide food in 
the event of a humanitarian crisis. This obligation also follows from the three levels 
in which the obligation to fulfil the right to food can be divided.142 The obligation to 
respect the right to food entails that states may not take measures to prevent access 
to food; the obligation to protect requires that States ensure that individuals do not 
lose their access to food; and the obligation to fulfil is pronged, entailing both the 
obligation to facilitate and strengthen the access to food, whilst also including the 
obligation to actively provide in the right to food if a person or group is unable to 
enjoy the right to food through their own means.143 The CESCR lays an obligation 
on states to actively provide the right to food in the event of a humanitarian crisis, 
pre-eminently a situation in which individuals or groups cannot enjoy the right to 
food through their own means, by stating that ‘this obligation also applies for persons 
who are victims of natural or other disasters’.144  
Thus, the CESCR sees a role for the provision of humanitarian assistance, which 
indeed includes the provision of food in such circumstances of natural or other 
                                                        
140 However, Kuwait has expressed the viewpoint that the rights set forth in the ICESCR are subject to 
the limits of national law, to which Finland and Germany have objected (1997). Furthermore, Pakistan 
has declared that the fulfilment of Article 2 shall be subject to its available resources, which has been 
rejected by France, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Germany (2005). Also, France and Monaco 
have declared Article 11 not to be interpreted as derogating from those provisions governing certain 
rights of aliens. Lastly, Belgium, Monaco and Ireland have expressed a declaration with regard to the 
non-discrimination clause as laid down in Article 2. For the full status of declarations and reservations to 
the ICESCR, see <http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
3&chapter=4&lang=en> accessed 31 May 2012. See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
Articles 19-23 with regard to the law on treaty reservations.  
141 CESCR General Comment 12 (n 26) § 6. 
142 See Section 5.2.2.1 on the three ‘levels’ in which a human rights obligation may be divided, 
particularly in relation to economic, social and cultural rights.  
143 CESCR General Comment 12 (n 26) § 15. This position is reiterated by the Special Rapporteur on the 
Right to Food who states in his Report on the Mission to Nicaragua UN Doc A/HRC/13/33/Add.5 (19 
February 2010) § 7 and had been considered earlier by the Secretary General’s Note ‘The right to food - 
Seed policies and the right to food: enhancing agrobiodiversity and encouraging innovation’ UN Doc 
A/64/170 (23 July 2009) § 6. 






disasters, as part of the fulfilment of the minimum core obligation resting upon states 
as part of the right to food.145 The UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food has 
furthermore reiterated this position on numerous occasions, also declaring that the 
distribution of food as aid in emergency situations forms part of the obligation to 
fulfil the right to food.146 Thus, the state parties to the ICESCR and (in the view of 
the Special Rapporteur also UN Member States) have a clear obligation to not only 
passively facilitate access to food, but furthermore to actively provide in the right to 
food in the event of a humanitarian crisis.147 This duty has been supported by the UN 
Secretary General, who declared that all states under international law have an 
obligation to not only respect, protect and fulfil the right to food, but that this 
obligation entails that a state may not take any measures that may prevent access to 
adequate food.148 Such active provision must be done, as seen above, to the maximum 
of a states’ available resources, which according to Article 2 ICESCR includes the 
use of sources available through international cooperation and assistance.  
The right to food and the provision of food to fulfil this right must indeed be seen 
in light of the joint responsibility of states as considered in Article 56 UN Charter, 
and the CESCR also considers Article 11 to include a duty for State Parties ‘to take 
steps’ to provide the necessary assistance in other countries in the event this may be 
required, through the occurrence of providing humanitarian assistance in times of 
emergency, to ensure full enjoyment of the right to food.149 This view aligns with the 
notion of ‘international cooperation’ as codified in Article 2(1) ICESCR. 
Furthermore, the CESCR envisages an important role and ‘coordinated efforts’ of the 
UN and other international organisations in the realisation of the right to food.150 
Indeed, although Article 11 declares that international cooperation is based on ‘free 
consent’, this cannot be considered to be void of responsibility for the affected state. 
As a result, Article 11 ICESCR could be violated if a state party prevents access to 
food in conflicts or other emergencies, or subsequently in the event it is willing to 
provide food but does not have sufficient independent resources, and does not seek 
assistance from outside its own territory.151 Distinguishing between willingness and 
ability is necessary, although both may lead to a violation of Article 11 ICESCR. 
Arguably, although the cooperation is not optional, the form it may take can be 
considered to be determined in cooperation with the affected state.152 Bearing in mind 
that the ICESCR does not contain a derogation clause, and that the limitations to the 
                                                        
145 See in this regard also Section 5.2.2.1. Progressive Realisation in the ICESCR for the discussion of 
the CESCR on the content of minimum core obligations in the ICESCR.  
146 ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Addendum Mission to Guatemala’ UN Doc 
A/HRC/13/33/Add.4 (26 January 2010) § 66. 
147 CESCR General Comment 12 (n 26) § 28. 
148 ‘The right to food’, Note by the Secretary Genera  UN Doc A/66/262 (4 August 2011) § 11. 
149 CESCR General Comment 12 (n 26) § 36 and § 38. See concerning the responsibilities under Article 
56 UN Charter in more detail Chapter 7.  
150 Ibid § 40. 
151 Ibid § 17 and § 19. See also ‘The right to food’, Report of the Special Rapporteur, Note by the 
Secretary General UN Doc A/63/278 (21 October 2008) § 12 and Chapter 8. 
152 P Alston & K Tomaševski (eds), The Right to Food (Martinus Nijhoff 1984) 40-41. 
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Convention as laid down in Article 4 ICESCR are rather limited,153 such violations 
may indeed occur as state parties cannot claim a ‘state of emergency’ to avoid 
fulfilling at least the minimum core obligations of the right to food. As a result, not 
fulfilling at least the minimum core obligations, such as those in particular relevant 
in relation to humanitarian assistance, the requirement to ‘mitigate and alleviate 
hunger’ may result in a violation of the right to adequate food.  
Besides the ICESCR, other international treaties have incorporated the right to 
food to some degree. A second international instrument considering the right to food 
is the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The CRC notes, in relation to the right 
to health154 that states parties to the CRC have an obligation to provide adequate and 
nutritious foods to children.155 Besides the CRC, other international instruments 
declaring a right to food are the CEDAW in relation to pregnancy and post-natal care 
in Article 12(2), and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 
Article 28.156 Whereas the CEDAW views this right primarily as an obligation of 
State Parties to ensure ‘adequate nutrition’, the CRPD codifies a right to adequate 
food, for which the State Parties have to take appropriate steps to safeguard. As such, 
these three treaties envisage obligations to rest upon states in the fulfilment of this 
right, as does the ICESCR with its provision.  
Regional instruments such as the main ACHR, ECHR or ACHPR contain no 
specific provisions relating to the right to food. Although the ACHR and ECHR have 
a greater focus on civil and political rights, there appears to be no clear reason as to 
why these conventions omit the right to food, although Alston submits the argument 
that some regional instruments include the ‘right to work’, which should theoretically 
enable persons to fulfil the right to food.157 However, the Additional Protocol to the 
ACHR in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights does recognise the right 
to food in Article 12.158 Moreover, Article 15 of the Additional Protocol to the 
ACHPR on the Rights of Women in Africa envisages a right to food security for 
women as a specific group.159 Both Protocols contain far-reaching provisions that are 
of relevance to the provision of humanitarian assistance, and that are absent in their 
underlying treaties that have a higher status of ratification. The Protocol to the ACHR 
contains an obligation lying upon states to undertake measures to improve the 
                                                        
153 See Section 5.2.2 Derogability, Human Rights and the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance for a 
discussion of derogability and limitations in regard to the ICESCR.  
154 See Section 5.4.6 Humanitarian Assistance and The Right to Health.  
155 Article 24(2)(c) CRC: “2. States Parties shall pursue full implementation of this right and, in particular, 
shall take appropriate measures: […] (c) To combat disease and malnutrition, including within the 
framework of primary health care, through, inter alia, the application of readily available technology and 
through the provision of adequate nutritious foods and clean drinking-water, taking into consideration 
the dangers and risks of environmental pollution”. See also Article 27(3) CRC and Section 5.4.6 
Humanitarian Assistance and The Right to Health for a further discussion of Article 24.  
156 The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities was adopted 13 December 2006. As one 
of the more recent international treaties, currently 113 States are party to the convention.  
157 Alston & Tomaševski, The Right to Food (n 152) 28-29.  
158 To date, only 16 states have ratified the Additional Protocol to the ACHR in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights.  






distribution of food, promote greater international cooperation to this end and 
eradicate malnutrition.160 Furthermore, the Additional Protocol to the ACHPR on the 
Rights of Women in Africa notes that states parties shall take measures to establish 
supply systems to ensure food security, which can be of relevance to the provision of 
assistance. Although relatively few states have ratified both Protocols, the provisions 
are of importance to two continents that have been prone to many natural disasters 
and conflicts. As such their further implementation may be of assistance to those 
needing emergency aid on these continents. Although the African Charter itself does 
not recognise a right to food, the treaty body to the Charter, the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples Rights established in 2001 in the Social and Economic Rights 
Action Center (SERAC) and Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v. 
Nigeria (Ogoni Case) that a right to food can be implicitly read in the Charter’s rights 
to life, health and the right of all persons to economic, social and cultural 
development.161 Despite lacking codification therefore, efforts are being made in the 
establishment of such a right by way of jurisprudence.  
Following the provisions as laid down in, amongst others, the ICESCR, the UN 
has expressed itself with regard to the right to food on multiple occasions and through 
various bodies. As such, the former UN Commission on Human Rights had 
reaffirmed the right of every person: 
 
“to have access to safe and nutritious food, consistent with the right to adequate food and 
the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger so as to be able fully to develop 
and maintain their physical and mental capacities”.162 
 
The Commission reiterated this, followed by its successor the Human Rights Council, 
and it has been furthermore adopted by the General Assembly, thereby firmly 
establishing the UN’s human rights bodies’ subscription to the right to food.163 The 
UN General Assembly has furthermore endorsed the approach based on international 
cooperation and assistance as envisaged in Article 2 ICESCR, repeatedly stating that 
it:  
 
“Stresses the importance of international development cooperation and assistance, in 
particular in emergency situations such as natural and man-made disasters, diseases and 
pests, for the realization of the right to food and the achievement of sustainable food 
                                                        
160 Article 12 Additional Protocol ACHR.  
161 Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and Center for Economic and Social Rights 
(CESR) / Nigeria, African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights Case No 155/96 (27th October 
2001) § 64.  
162 UNCHR Res 10 (2000) UN Doc E/CN.4/2000/10 ‘The right to food’ (17 April 2000) § 1.  
163 UNCHR Res 19 (16 April 2004) UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/19 § 2; UNHRC Res 7/14 (27 March 2008 ) 
‘The right to food’ § 2; UNHRC Res 10/12 (26 March 2009) ‘The right to food’ § 2; UNHRC Res 13/4 
(24 March 2010) ‘The right to food’ § 2; UNHRC Res 16/27 (25 March 2011) ‘The right to food’ § 2; 
UNGA Res 59/202 (31 March 2005) UN Doc A/RES/59/202 § 2; UNGA Res 60/165 (2 March 2006) 
UN Doc A/RES/60/165 §2; UNGA Res 61/163 (19 December 2006) UN Doc A/RES/61/163 §2; UNGA 
Res 62/164 (18 December 2007) UN Doc A/RES/62/164 § 2; UNGA Res 63/187 (18 December 2008) 
UN Doc A/RES/63/187 § 2; UNGA Res 64/159 (10 March 2010) UN Doc A/RES/64/159 § 2. 
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security, while recognizing that each country has the primary responsibility for ensuring 
the implementation of national programmes and strategies in this regard”.164 
 
Thus, emphasis lies on the primary responsibility which continues to rest with the 
national government, although the General Assembly does highlight the importance 
of international assistance for the realisation of the right to food in the event of 
humanitarian emergencies, including natural and man-made disasters. More recently, 
the General Assembly has voiced that it recognises a need to strengthen not only 
national but also international assistance, in particular in relation to humanitarian 
emergencies affecting people’s enjoyment of the right to food.165 Also, the Human 
Rights Council has considered that Member States have a primary obligation to 
provide in the realisation of the right to food, although such realisation must occur 
also through international cooperation and assistance, by means of all necessary 
measures to ensure the fulfilment of this right.166 Similar to the General Assembly, 
the Human Rights Council furthermore recognises a need to strengthen international 
assistance in the event people are affected by humanitarian emergencies and their 
enjoyment of the right to food is jeopardised, to ensure that humanitarian assistance 
reaches the affected populations.167 These expressions are not only indicative of the 
UN as an organisation adhering to the existence of a ‘right to adequate food’ but are 
also reflective of such a belief in state practice, given the fact that these UN bodies 
are expressing themselves through their Member States. The Special Rapporteur on 
the Right to Food has moreover noted that states may in fact be considered to be 
under an obligation to provide food aid in certain situations, as the positive obligation 
resting upon states by way of the ICESCR requires them to cooperate internationally 
in order to ensure that the right to food is not violated in a particular country.168 Such 
situations would naturally most likely be in the event of a humanitarian crisis and 
could be part of the provision of humanitarian assistance as a whole. As such the 
Special Rapporteur has argued that ‘international aid remains an important 
component of the right to food’.169 In this light, the General Assembly has moreover 
expressed its concern with regard to the increasing amount of humanitarian 
                                                        
164 UNGA Res 60/165 (2 March 2006) UN Doc A/RES/60/165 § 14; also UNGA Res 61/163 (19 
December 2006) UN Doc A/RES/61/163 § 18; UNGA Res 62/164 (18 December 2007) UN Doc 
A/RES/62/164 § 14 and 22; UNGA Res 64/159 (10 March 2010) UN Doc A/RES/64/159 § 17. 
165 UNGA Res 63/187 (18 December 2008) UN Doc A/RES/63/187 § 16 and § 24; UNGA Res 64/159 
(10 March 2010) UN Doc A/RES/64/159 § 17 and § 25. 
166 UNHRC Res 7/14 (27 March 2008 ) ‘The right to food’ § 14 and § 22; UNHRC Res S-7/1 (22 May 
2008) Special Session ‘The negative impact of the worsening of the world food crisis on the realization 
of the right to food for all’ § 4; UNHRC Res 10/12 (26 March 2009) ‘The right to food’ § 26; UNHRC 
Res 12/10 (12 October 2010) § 5; UNHRC Res 13/4 (24 March 2010) ‘The right to food’ § 11 and § 13; 
UNHRC Res 16/27 (25 March 2011) ‘The right to food’ § 11-13.  
167 Ibid UNHRC Res 7/14; UNHRC Res S-7/1 § preamble; UNHRC Res 10/12 § 16; UNHRC Res 13/4 
§ 20 and § 28; UNHRC Res 16/27 § 20 and § 28. 
168 Report of the Special Rapporteur ‘The right to food’ (21 October 2008) UN Doc A/63/278 § 12; 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food ‘Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights, 
Civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development’ (11 February 
2009) UN Doc A/HRC/10/5 § 5. 






emergencies, and their impact on the realisation of the right to food.170 In this context, 
the FAO has developed ‘Voluntary Guidelines to support the progressive realisation 
of the right to adequate food in the context of national food security’ in which it 
includes the provision of assistance and the allowance of such assistance by the 
affected state.171 The large number of states endorsing the FAO’s Voluntary 
Guidelines contribute to their acceptance and relevance.172 Also, regionally the EU 
aligns itself with the UN and FAO, expressing its acceptance of a right to food and 
the right to be free from hunger, arguing a greater protection for persons through such 
a rights-based approach.173 Given the widespread acceptance of the most basic form 
of the right to food, namely to be ‘free from hunger’, the FAO has asserted that this 
also forms part of the customary body of international law.174 With a view to the 
International Bill of Rights which the (near universal) UDHR and ICESCR form a 
part of, as well as the general acceptance of UN Member States hereof, such an 
assertion does indeed form part of international legal reality. This would then amount 
to the international legal responsibility of states to fulfil such a right to the greatest 
extent possible.  
 
5.4.4 Humanitarian Assistance and the Right to Food 
 
From the above, it becomes apparent that the CESCR and UN organs such as the 
General Assembly, Human Rights Council and the Special Rapporteur on the Right 
to Food see a clear role for the provision of humanitarian assistance, functioning as 
an umbrella concept within which the provision of food is incorporated, as a vehicle 
in emergency situations to fulfil a states’ obligation with regard to the right to food. 
Thus, according to these bodies, the right to food entails the distribution of food aid 
in the event of a humanitarian crisis. The corresponding obligation of this right might 
even exist with a view to international cooperation according to the CESCR and the 
Special Rapporteur. Indeed, the CESCR argues a possible violation of Article 11 
                                                        
170 UNGA Res 59/202 (31 March 2005) UN Doc A/RES/59/202, preamble.  
171 FAO ‘Voluntary Guidelines to support the progressive realization of the right to adequate food in the 
context of national food security’ (Adopted by the 127th Session of the FAO Council November 2004) 
Guideline 15.3. 
172 The FAO Voluntary Guidelines were adopted by the FAO Council and as stems from Article V.1 of 
the FAO Constitution, that Council consists of 49 member nations.  
173 See in this regard amongst others ‘Communication From The Commission To The Council And The 
European Parliament An EU Policy Framework to assist developing countries in addressing food security 
challenges’ (31 March 2010)  Doc SEC(2010)379, 5;  
European Parliament Res ‘Assisting developing countries in addressing food security challenges’ 
(27 September 2011) on an EU policy framework to assist developing countries in addressing food 
security challenges Doc (2010/2100(INI)) § 28. See also FAO Legislative Study ‘Right to Adequate Food 
in Emergencies’ (2002) “Under international human rights law, every human being has the right to have 
physical and economic access at all times to adequate food or to the means for its procurement. In order 
to progressively realize this right, each State has a legal obligation to take steps to the maximum of its 
available resources, both individually and through international assistance and cooperation. As a 
fundamental human right, the right to adequate food applies in emergency situations, including both 
natural disasters and armed conflicts.” 
174 FAO Legislative Study ‘Right to Adequate Food in Emergencies’ (2002) 6. 
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ICESCR in the event a state party denies access to food in times of conflict or 
disaster.175 Clearly the obligation to mitigate and alleviate hunger as part of the 
fulfilment of the right to food must according to these bodies be understood in 
relation to the provision of humanitarian assistance. Such a provision can also be 
found within the specialised treaties such as the CRC and the CRPD that place 
specific obligations upon state parties. This view has also been endorsed by the 
regional Additional Protocol to the ACHR and the Additional Protocol to the ACHPR 
on the Rights of Women in Africa, both considering a duty to provide food assistance 
in some form.  
Thus, although some bodies such as the CESCR, the UN Special Rapporteur 
recognise far-going international obligations resting upon states, more narrowly, the 
right to adequate food as defined in the ICESCR and interpreted by the CESCR to at 
least entail a freedom from hunger, can be considered to exist in a wide variety of 
international treaties and furthermore supported by many UN bodies and its Member 
States. Indeed, considering both the widespread ratification of the ICESCR and the 
wide support for the right within the international community at large, through (the 
membership of) the UN and the FAO, the right to adequate food may arguably be 
considered to have a customary international law status.176 It is submitted that this 
obligation would then in fact include the provision of food as part of the provision of 
humanitarian assistance. Some resistance to the existence of such an obligation 
however continues, as states fear that the ‘obligation to fulfil’ might obligate them to 
provide for all those who are hungry in the world.177 Yet, States Parties to the 
ICESCR and UN Member States have a clear obligation to not only passively 
facilitate access to food, but furthermore to actively provide food aid in the event of 
a humanitarian crisis. This obligation follows from the right to adequate food as 
codified in the ICESCR and Articles 55 and 56 UN Charter while, as the CESCR 
argues, the primary obligation continues to rest upon the affected state:  
 
“Even where a state faces severe resource constraints, whether caused by a process of 
economic adjustment, economic recession, climatic conditions or other factors, measures 
should be undertaken to ensure that the right to adequate food is especially fulfilled for 
vulnerable population groups and individuals”.178  
                                                        
175 See Chapter 7 regarding access by third parties and Chapter 8 concerning enforcement mechanisms.  
176 For further reading on the topic of the right to adequate food, see amongst others Alston & 
Tomaševski, The Right to Food (n 152); Eide Food and Human Rights in Development Volume II (n 26); 
and Laura Niada, ‘Hunger and International Law: The Far-reaching Scope of the Human Right to Food’, 
(2006) 22 Connecticut Journal of International Law 1, 131-201.  
177 In this regard, the United States made a reservation with regard to § 10 of the FAO ‘Declaration of 
the World Food Summit: Five Years Later: International Alliance Against Hunger’ in the FAO Report of 
the World Food Summit: five years later (2002) declaring that it: “believes that the attainment of the right 
to an adequate standard of living is a goal or aspiration to be realized progressively that does not give 
rise to any international obligation or any domestic legal entitlement, and does not diminish the 
responsibilities of national governments towards their citizens. Additionally, the United States 
understands the right of access to food to mean the opportunity to secure food, and not guaranteed 
entitlement”. 
178 CESCR General Comment 12 (n 26) § 28; see also UNGA Res 63/187 (18 December 2008) UN Doc 






Such obligations have been supported in the subsequent adoption of conventions such 
as the CRC, CEDAW, CRPD and regionally in the Additional Protocol to the ACHR 
and the Additional Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights of Women in Africa. Thus 
here too the provision of food aid, as a component of humanitarian assistance in a 
greater scheme, can be considered a vehicle and obligation in the fulfilment of the 
internationally recognised human right to adequate food.  
 
5.4.5 The Right to Health 
 
Following the discussion of the rights to life and food, with regard to the 
determination of the content of the right to receive humanitarian assistance, the 
discussion of the human right to the highest attainable standard of health is 
relevant.179 The WHO Constitution first coined ‘the highest attainable standard of 
health’ as a fundamental human right in 1946, following the mentioning of the need 
for solutions to health problems in Article 55 of the UN Charter the previous year.180 
Briefly touched upon in the previous Section with regard to the right to food, the right 
to the highest attainable standard of health finds its first international declaration in 
Article 25 of the UDHR.181 The ensuing Article 12 ICESCR is considered the main 
international provision concerning this right ‘to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard’ of health.182 The CESCR notes that the content of the right is 
                                                        
25; UNHRC Res 7/14 (27 March 2008 ) ‘The right to food’ § 14 and § 22; UNHRC Res S-7/1 (22 May 
2008) Special Session § 4; UNHRC Res 10/12 (26 March 2009) ‘The right to food’ § 26; UNHRC Res 
10/12 (26 March 2009) ‘The right to food’ § 26; UNHRC Res 12/10 (12 October 2010) § 5; UNHRC 
Res 16/27 (25 March 2011) ‘The right to food’ § 11-13. 
179 As this research focuses on humanitarian assistance, it is beyond its scope to fully analyse all 
abovementioned rights from all viewpoints and therefore focuses on those aspects relevant to 
humanitarian assistance. Yet, for an in depth analysis on the right to health, see Brigit Toebes, The Right 
to Health as a Human Right in International Law (Intersentia 1999).  
180 The Constitution of the World Health Organization was adopted by the International Health 
Conference held in New York from 19 June to 22 July 1946, signed on 22 July 1946 by the representatives 
of 61 States (Off. Rec. Wld Hlth Org., 2, 100), and entered into force on 7 April 1948. For a further 
discussion on the origin of the right to health, see Eibe Riedel, ‘International Protection of the Right to 
Health’, (April 2011) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law.  
181 With regard to the right to health, Article 25 UDHR states: “(1) Everyone has the right to a standard 
of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, 
housing and medical care (…) (2) The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to 
achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for: (…) (c) The prevention, 
treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases”. 
182 Article 12 ICESCR states: “1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. 2. The steps 
to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right shall 
include those necessary for: (a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality 
and for the healthy development of the child; (b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and 
industrial hygiene; (c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and 
other diseases; (d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical 
attention in the event of sickness”. None of the States Parties have made declarations or reservations with 
regard to this Article in the ICESCR.  
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broader than the right to health care and although it does not entail the right to ‘be 
healthy’ it does include: 
 
“a wide range of socio-economic factors that promote conditions in which people can lead 
a healthy life, and extends to the underlying determinants of health, such as food and 
nutrition, housing, access to safe and potable water and adequate sanitation, safe and 
healthy working conditions, and a healthy environment”.183 
 
As the right to health encompasses the right to food, this individual right has been 
discussed first, to be followed by a discussion on the right to water which has a more 
disputed status in international law. The CESCR asserts that the notion of the ‘highest 
attainable standard’ of health as codified in the ICESCR takes various socio-
economic factors into account, as well as a state’s own resources and must therefore 
be considered as the right to the enjoyment of all those resources that may be 
necessary for the enjoyment of such a highest attainable standard.184 Accordingly, 
the right to health entails the access to water and sanitation, as well as an adequate 
supply of food.185 The CESCR acknowledges the difficulty states may have in the 
fulfilment of this right, and affirms that the exact application of the right will be 
dependent on the facilities in a state with regard to availability, accessibility, 
acceptability and quality.186 Of particular relevance in relation to humanitarian 
assistance in this regard is the requirement under Article 12(2)(c) that States Parties 
have a duty to take steps in ‘the prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, 
endemic, occupational and other diseases’, in which the CESCR reads a right to 
treatment which includes ‘the provision of disaster relief and humanitarian assistance 
in emergency situations’.187 Thus, a duty for states to provide adequate disaster relief 
exists according to the CESCR in order for individuals to enjoy the right to the 
highest attainable standard of health under the ICESCR to the fullest extent. This 
duty for states to take steps in the prevention, treatment and control of diseases is 
indeed a clear obligation within the Convention that can be related to the provision 
of humanitarian assistance. Thus, as was concluded in the discussion of the previous 
human rights, the provision of humanitarian assistance by ensuring access to 
minimum levels of food, water and health facilities (as also considered for the 
fulfilment of the right to life) can be a vehicle in the fulfilment of the right to health.    
Like the other rights in the ICESCR, the ‘progressive realization’ of the right to 
the highest attainable standard of health is envisaged. However, as is the case with 
the previously discussed rights, several immediate ‘minimum obligations’ rest upon 
states: namely to guarantee that the right will be exercised without discrimination and 
that concrete steps must be taken towards the fulfilment of the right.188 The provision 
                                                        
183 CESCR General Comment 14 (11 August 2000) UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4 ‘The right to the highest 
attainable standard of health’, § 3- 4 and § 8. 
184 Ibid § 9. 
185 Ibid § 11. See Section 5.4.3 The Right to Adequate Food and Section 5.4.7 The Right to Water. 
186 CESCR General Comment 14 (n 183) § 12.  
187 Ibid §16. 






of humanitarian assistance would then also fall within such a minimum core 
obligation, given the provision of Article 12(2)(c). Furthermore, the tiered approach 
with regard to respecting, protecting and fulfilling the right to health entails specific 
obligations for states. The duty to respect the right to health obligates states to refrain 
from denying access to health services and abstain from any discriminatory practices, 
while the duty to protect requires states to adopt legislation ensuring equal access to 
such services in view of third parties’ provision thereof.189 Lastly, the duty to fulfil 
requires states on the one hand to facilitate the taking of such measures that aid and 
enable persons to enjoy their right to health and on the other hand requires states to 
promote this right by taking actions with regard to maintaining or restoring the health 
of their population.190  
Furthermore, more specifically geared towards international cooperation, the 
CESCR envisages that states should ‘facilitate access’ to health products and services 
in other states and when obliged, provide the necessary aid.191 Also, the CESCR 
explicitly refers to the provision of humanitarian assistance, affirming that states have 
a responsibility to cooperate in the provision of such assistance, elaborating that 
states parties obligations in regard to the right to health include that:  
 
“Priority in the provision of international medical aid, distribution and management of 
resources, such as safe and potable water, food and medical supplies, and financial aid 
should be given to the most vulnerable or marginalized groups of the population. 
Moreover, given that some diseases are easily transmissible beyond the frontiers of a State, 
the international community has a collective responsibility to address this problem”.192 
 
This obligation to provide aid must be read in correlation to the particular core 
obligations concerning the right to health with which states parties must comply, in 
accordance with Article 2 ICESCR.  
From the perspective of the CESCR it follows that special emphasis is placed on 
the provision of health assistance to vulnerable groups within a population; such as 
for example IDPs following a disaster. In that regard, the CESCR already noted in its 
‘General Comment’ relating to Article 2 ICESCR that a state fails in its obligations 
under the ICESCR when a ‘significant number’ of people are deprived of ‘essential 
primary health care’.193 Such could indeed occur in times of a humanitarian crisis, if 
assistance is not provided. Especially in relation to the right to health, the CESCR 
notes that the core obligations arising for states under Article 12 ICESCR entail a 
duty to ensure access to minimum essential levels of food, access to health facilities, 
access to basic shelter and access to water and sanitation and that non-compliance 
with such a duty shall result in a direct violation of Article 12 ICESCR.194  
                                                        
189 Ibid § 34-35.  
190 Ibid § 37.  
191 Ibid § 39. 
192 Ibid § 40. 
193 CESCR General Comment 3 (n 45) § 10 and Section 5.2.2.1. Progressive Realisation in the ICESCR.  
194 CESCR General Comment 14 (n 183) § 43.  
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Although clearly of relevant interpretative value, the enforceability of such an 
obligation as perceived by the CESCR is more difficult.195 Furthermore, the CESCR 
expressly emphasises a duty of states to provide ‘international assistance and 
cooperation’ in enabling other countries to fulfil their core obligations.196 Clearly, 
through such wording, the CESCR envisages distinct international cooperation and 
assistance in the responsibility of states to fulfil the right to health; more particularly 
in their duty to abide by the minimum core obligations. Such ‘international 
cooperation’ in this regard could indeed also be considered ‘international assistance’ 
in the situation of a humanitarian crisis. Interestingly these minimum core obligations 
of the right to health include many of the basic provisions of humanitarian assistance. 
As such, the provision of humanitarian assistance could be considered a fulfilment 
of the minimum core obligation of the right to health as envisaged by the CESCR.  
Furthermore, other possible violations of the right to health occurring through 
either inability or unwillingness by a state in relation to humanitarian assistance 
include amongst others a denial of ‘access to health facilities’; the adoption of laws 
that may interfere with the enjoyment of the right to health; the failure to enforce the 
proper laws to protect this right; or the failure to take necessary protective measures 
for its population.197 Lastly, the CESCR foresees a role for international organisations 
such as the UN and WHO in particular in relation to the provision of humanitarian 
assistance in the event of a humanitarian crisis, as it reiterates its previous stance that 
priority must be given in the distribution of medical aid, water and food to the most 
vulnerable groups of a population.198 Thus, the CESCR acknowledges that in the 
event of a humanitarian crisis, realisation of the right to health could be dependent 
on the involvement of international organisations providing humanitarian assistance, 
again reinforcing its take on international cooperation, which is to be sought by the 
affected state.  
Other than the widely ratified ICESCR, the ICERD also recognises the right to 
health, declaring that States Parties are under the obligation to ensure that the ‘right 
to public health and medical care’ be provided without any form of racial 
discrimination.199 The CERD treaty body has to date not expressed itself on the right 
to health in relation to non-discrimination.200 Furthermore, the CRC has asserted in 
Article 24 that States Parties are obligated to guarantee ‘necessary medical assistance 
and health care to all children’ as part of the right to the highest attainable standard 
of health for children, in particular related to the right to access to such facilities.201 
                                                        
195 See Chapter 8. 
196 CESCR General Comment 14 (n 183) § 45. 
197 Ibid § 50-52. 
198 Ibid § 64-65. 
199 Article Art 5(e)(iv) ICERD. 
200 For more information on the Committee against the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination 
and its General Recommendations, see <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/comments.htm> 
accessed 16 November 2012.  
201 It is relevant to note that although several countries, amongst which Argentina, Ecuador, the Holy See, 
Kiribati and Poland, have made declarations and reservations to the right to health as incorporated in the 
CRC, these are not related to the provision of health as pertaining to humanitarian assistance but rather 






The Committee on the Rights of the Child has however not provided explanatory 
commentaries to the right to health.202 At the regional level, both the ECHR and 
ACHR do not contain provisions relating to the right to health whereas their 
counterparts focusing rather more on the economic, social and cultural rights, do 
contain such provisions. Consequently, the European Social Charter incorporates the 
right to ‘protection of health’, that obligates states to take measures to prevent 
diseases or other causes of ill-health.203 This stipulation related to the prevention of 
epidemic diseases is in particular relevant following circumstances of natural disaster 
that may have extremely damaging impacts on living conditions in certain areas. On 
the other hand, the Additional Protocol to the ACHR in the area of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights stipulates that the right to health must be understood as the 
‘enjoyment of the highest level of physical, mental and social well-being’ and must 
furthermore be considered as a public good, requiring states to ensure amongst other 
facilities essential health care and prevention from diseases.204 The ACHPR declares 
a right to the ‘best attainable state of physical and mental health’, to include a duty 
of states to protect the health of the population.205 Additionally, the African Charter 
on the Rights and Welfare of the Child sees a right for children ‘to enjoy the best 
attainable state of physical, mental and spiritual health’ providing in many duties 
resting upon states parties, amongst which the obligation to provide food and water 
and combat diseases,206 whilst the Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights of Women 
in Africa states a right to health in combination with reproductive rights, focusing 
rather on the latter.207 From the above it can be concluded that whilst many 
international and regional treaties incorporate the right to health, such incorporation 
has occurred in a somewhat haphazard manner, codifying several different 
perspectives on the right to health. A common denominator can however be found 
with a view to the provision of humanitarian assistance, in the duty – an obligation 
of conduct – to prevent diseases and furthermore prioritise the provision of medical 
aid to vulnerable populations.  
Within the UN system, the former Human Rights Commission has elaborated on 
the right to health, declaring that, similar to most of the abovementioned treaty 
provisions, it recognises a universal right to the ‘highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health’.208 The UN Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone 
to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health209 
                                                        
202 For more information on the Committee on the Rights of the Child and its General Comments, see 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/crc/comments.htm> accessed 16 November 2012.  
203 Article 11 European Social Charter. 
204 Article 10 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
205 Article 16 ACHPR.  
206 Article 14 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. 
207 Article 14 Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights of Women in Africa. 
208 UNCHR Res 1989/11 (2 March 1989) UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/1989/11 ‘Non-discrimination in the field 
of health’ § 1. 
209 For an in -depth discussion on the role of the Special Rapporteur in relation to the development of the 
right to the highest attainable standard of health see Paul Hunt & Sheldon Leader, ‘Developing and 
applying the right to the highest attainable standard of health: the role of the UN Special Rapporteur 
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has elaborated, like the CESCR, that this right includes safe drinking water, 
sanitation, adequate food and ‘timely and appropriate health care’.210 The former 
Human Rights Commission has in relation to the right to health called upon the 
international community: 
 
“to enhance relief assistance to populations affected by devastation caused by natural 
disasters as well as by man-made events in order to ensure their physical and mental health 
recovery”.211 
 
Such a direct call to the international community in relation to the provision of 
humanitarian assistance and the right to health had already been made by the Special 
Rapporteur who declared that states not only have a duty to cooperate in the 
fulfilment of the right to health in general, but more specifically also in the provision 
of humanitarian assistance in the event of a humanitarian crisis, such as through the 
provision of water and medical aid.212 Moreover, it has been emphasised by the 
Special Rapporteur that this shared responsibility in relation to humanitarian 
assistance and the right to health encompasses amongst others the provision of aid in 
order to ‘facilitate access to essential health facilities’.213 As such, the Special 
Rapporteur noted that the occurrence of a conflict or another humanitarian disaster 
can place a ‘particular heavy burden’ upon the mental health of a population.214 
Furthermore, the Special Rapporteur has underscored the interdependence of the 
right to health with other essential human rights such as amongst others the rights to 
life and food.215  
Lastly, the UN General Assembly – and thereby providing a reflection of the 
current view of UN Member States – has also embraced the right to the highest 
attainable standard of health on numerous occasions over the past decades, clearly 
establishing that the UN supports the efforts made by the various regional and 
                                                        
(2002-2008)’, in John Harrington & Maria Stuttaford (eds) Global Health and Human Rights: Legal and 
philosophical perspectives (Routledge 2010) 28-62. 
210 Report of the Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Leila Zerrougui; 
the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Leandro Despouy; the Special 
Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Manfred Nowak; 
the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Asma Jahangir; and the Special Rapporteur on 
the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, 
Paul Hunt (27 February 2006) UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/120 ‘Situation of detainees at Guantánamo Bay’ § 
69; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health (31 January 2008) A/HRC/7/11 § 45.  
211 UNCHR Res 2005/24 (15 April 2005) UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2005/24 ‘The right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’ § 3. 
212 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health (13 February 2003) UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/58 § 29; Report of the 
Special Rapporteur (11 February 2005) UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/51 § 62; and Report of the Special 
Rapporteur (31 January 2008) UN Doc A/HRC/7/11 § 60.  
213 Report of the Special Rapporteur ‘The right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health’ (12 September 2005) UN Doc A/60/348 § 60 and  § 64.  
214 UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/51, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment 
of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, 11 February 2005 § 22. 






international treaty bodies to underscore the right to health.216 Such a UN-wide 
embracement and endorsement of the connection between the provision of 
humanitarian assistance and the fulfilment of the right to health must also be seen as 
indicative of the general consensus within the UN to this end. Numerous bodies 
within the organisation clearly view the provision of assistance as a means to ensure 
the enjoyment of the right to health, and thereby reflect the position of their Member 
States.  
 
5.4.6 Humanitarian Assistance and the Right to Health 
 
As can be seen from the above, the discussion of the right to health involves many 
references to the right to adequate food as well as some to the right to water; as both 
food and water are distinctly necessary in the fulfilment of the right to health. 
Equally, various references are made and emphasis is placed on the need for states to 
cooperate internationally. Furthermore, and most importantly, humanitarian 
assistance and the right to health have been distinctly linked, as states have an 
obligation under the ICESCR in the prevention of diseases and according to the 
CESCR in the provision of emergency medical aid therefore, relevant to the 
fulfilment of the right to health in the event of a humanitarian crisis. Such a 
connection has also been made by the UN bodies in their endorsement of the 
existence of a human right to health. Thus, here too the provision of assistance has 
been connected to the fulfilment of the right to health on several occasions, 
strengthening the viewpoint that such provision can often be necessary to ensure that 
these particular human rights are fulfilled.  
Contrary to the central provisions relating to the rights to life and food that greatly 
find common ground as can be seen in the above, the content and scope of the 
provisions concerning the right to health in many international and regional 
conventions, and states obligations in the fulfilment thereof, differ to a significant 
extent from each other as well as from the nearly universally ratified ICESCR. Most 
notably, the degree of elaboration as to what can be considered part of the right to the 
highest attainable standard of health varies. Thus, it remains difficult to establish 
consensus on the current content of notion of ‘health’ or the related ‘right to health’. 
What can be discerned is that in relation to humanitarian assistance, prevention of 
diseases and priority of medical aid to vulnerable populations can be considered part 
of the right to the highest attainable standard of health.  
Thus, although a level of uncertainty exists with regard to the wider scope of 
application of the right to health, a common ground can be found. In particular of 
importance to this research with regard to humanitarian assistance, from the various 
                                                        
216 See amongst others UNGA Res 46/91 (16 December 1991) UN Doc A/RES/46/91 ‘Implementation 
of the International Plan of Action on Ageing and related activities’ § 1 and § 11; UNGA Res 46/119 (17 
December 1991) UN Doc A/RES/46/119 ‘The protection of persons with mental illness and the 
improvement of mental health care’; UNGA Res 48/104 (20 December 1993) UN Doc A/RES/48/104 
‘Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women’, Article 3(f) in relation to women’s rights 
and health; and UNGA Res S-26/2 (27 June 2001) ‘Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS’.  
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treaty provisions it can be discerned that consensus exists as to the fact that part of 
the right to the highest attainable standard of health is undoubtedly the obligation (of 
conduct) resting upon states to prevent diseases and give priority to medical aid 
delivery to vulnerable populations. This would in fact be part of the ‘minimum core 
obligations’ to adhere to under the ICESCR. 
 
5.4.7 The Right to Water  
  
Like the right to adequate food and health, the right to water can be considered one 
of the rights that is relevant and supplies content to the concept of humanitarian 
assistance. However, unlike the right to food and health, none of the large 
international instruments such as the UDHR, ICCPR or ICESCR recognise an 
independent human right to water, nor do the large regional treaties such as the 
ECHR, ACHR and ACHPR. Yet, some of the more specialised international treaties 
do, such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child that considers a duty for States 
Parties to strive to provide through ‘appropriate measures’ that all children are 
provided with clean drinking water.217 Also, the CEDAW lays an obligation upon 
States Parties to ensure women have an adequate water supply, in relation to the 
enjoyment of adequate living conditions, as well as the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, which proclaims States Parties to have the obligation to 
ensure equal access to clean water service for persons with disabilities.218 Likewise, 
the Additional Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights of Women in Africa places the 
obligation upon States Parties in light of the right to food to provide women with 
‘access to clean drinking water’,219 and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare 
of the Child contains the provision that States Parties must provide safe drinking 
water.220 Thus, several international and regional instruments do contain provisions 
pertaining to the ‘right to water’, but in relation to other rights, such as the ‘right to 
the highest attainable standard of health’.221 Therefore, this possible right to water is 
not as well-developed or deeply embedded in the various international and regional 
legal instruments as the right to life, food or health. At most, the incorporation is 
haphazard, as it is regionally linked both to the right to food and the right to health, 
whilst at the international level considered somewhat independently by specialised 
treaties with a specific scope, such as the CRC, CEDAW and the CRPD.  
Thus, whilst codification initiatives do exist, the current status of the right to water 
in international treaty law is far from comprehensive, and far from covering most 
countries in the world with independent and specific treaty obligations. The African 
continent can be considered to have the furthest degree of implementation of the right 
to water, through the abovementioned specialised and regional treaties. Furthermore, 
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these specific references to the right to water must be seen in the larger framework 
of these specialised treaties’ efforts for equality for women and health for children, 
and as a result cannot truly be considered universally comprehensive.222 On the 
European continent, the Committee of Ministers to the Council of Europe 
recommended that the right to water be considered included in the right to be free 
from hunger and the right to an adequate standard of living, as expressed in the 
European Charter on Water Resources.223 This too is an indication that within the 
European human rights framework no independent human right to water is currently 
envisaged or forthcoming.  
Although the ICESCR does not contain an independent provision related to the 
right to water, the CESCR has expressed itself through one of its ‘General 
Comments’. The CESCR declares that the right to water can be derived from Articles 
11 and 12 of the ICESCR, concerning the right to an adequate standard of living and 
to the highest attainable standard of health respectively, as well as being related to 
the right to life.224 The fact that Article 11 ICESCR is not exhaustive in its list of 
provisions needed for an adequate standard of health indeed points in support of this 
interpretation.225 Thus, the CESCR has defined the right to water to entitle every 
person to: 
 
“sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for personal and 
domestic uses. An adequate amount of safe water is necessary to prevent death from 
dehydration, to reduce the risk of water-related disease and to provide for consumption, 
cooking, personal and domestic hygienic requirements”.226 
 
Although the abovementioned definition does not mention a relation to situations like 
a humanitarian emergency, the CESCR argues that adequate water includes 
availability, quality and accessibility, the latter of which should be provided to 
especially ‘vulnerable sections of the population’ such as IDPs.227 Indeed 
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accessibility of water is an aspect that is seen in other interpretations of this right 
also.228 However, this ‘reading’ of a right in the ICESCR where it is clearly not 
incorporated as an individual right has been criticised and been argued to be 
somewhat too pro-active of the CESCR.229 Granted, while the efforts of the CESCR 
can be considered constructive to the interpretation of existing provisions of the 
ICESCR, the attempt to establish a fully-fledged ‘codified’ human right to water 
through a ‘General Comment’ where it does not distinctly appear in the treaty itself, 
appears somewhat premature. While the fact that Article 11 ICESCR does not include 
an exhaustive list of what may be necessary to enjoy an adequate standard of health 
does indeed leave the door open to such suggestions, they should be considered in 
that light: as suggestions. 
By establishing a correlation between the right to water, which is not encompassed 
independently in the ICESCR and the codified rights to an adequate standard of living 
and to the highest attainable standard of health, the CESCR considers the right to 
water to have legally binding implications upon States Parties to the ICESCR. For 
purposes of exploration, this will be discussed here too. The CESCR analyses the 
right to water in relation to Article 2 ICESCR and considers that although, like the 
codified rights of the ICESCR, the right to water indeed must be realised 
progressively, it too is subject to certain legal obligations with immediate effect.230 
With regard to the tiered approach, the CESCR notes that states have an obligation 
to respect the right to water by non-interference with the ‘enjoyment’ of this right, 
whilst obligations to protect require States Parties to the ICESCR to prevent any third 
parties from interfering with a person’s enjoyment of the right to water.231 Lastly, the 
obligation to ‘fulfil’ encompasses the obligations to ‘facilitate, promote and 
provide’.232 To ‘facilitate the right to water’ obligates states according to the CESCR 
to take positive measures in assisting persons in their enjoyment of this right, while 
also obligating them to adopt measures for the full realisation thereof.233 
Furthermore, states are required to ensure access to adequate sanitation as part of the 
fulfilment of the right to water.234 Such access may be of special relevance in the 
aftermath of a disaster or in times of conflict, when large groups of people are 
displaced.  
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Article 2 and 11 ICESCR furthermore require states to cooperate internationally 
in the realisation of the right to water, in particular providing aid where this may be 
needed. The CESCR argues that: 
 
“In disaster relief and emergency assistance, including assistance to refugees and displaced 
persons, priority should be given to Covenant rights, including the provision of adequate 
water. International assistance should be provided in a manner that is consistent with the 
Covenant and other human rights standards”.235 
 
Thus, the States Parties to the ICESCR are under the obligation to cooperate 
internationally in the provision of emergency aid in the event of a humanitarian crisis, 
and the right to water amongst other rights of the ICESCR is to be prioritised in that 
context according to the Committee. In particular, relevant to this research regarding 
humanitarian assistance, the CESCR calls upon states to take steps to ensure that 
water is provided to victims of natural disasters.236 In doing so and linking the right 
to water to the existing rights in the treaty, the Committee arguably attempts to 
establish that states have a legally binding obligation to provide water to victims of 
natural disaster as part of the envisaged human right to water.  
Several of the obligations flowing from the right to water can be considered 
‘minimum core obligations’ according to the CESCR.237 It identifies nine such 
specific obligations resting upon states; most relevant in relation to the provision of 
humanitarian assistance are the obligations to ensure equitable distribution of and 
physical access to a minimum amount of water on a non-discriminatory basis, and to 
take measures in the prevention and controlling of diseases that may be linked to 
water.238 Clearly these minimum core obligations are of relevance in the provision of 
humanitarian assistance, as the existence of any form of a humanitarian crisis can 
include the absence of sufficient access to (clean) water. Thus, from the fact that the 
CESCR notes many core obligations of the envisaged right to water that are related 
to the provision of humanitarian assistance it follows that the provision of 
humanitarian assistance is indeed a manner to obtain the fulfilment of this right to 
water, should it be recognised as such.  
As seen in the previous Sections regarding the rights to food and health, the 
minimum core obligations are not subject to ‘progressive realization’, but are 
amongst the obligations that require states to take immediate steps upon ratification 
of the ICESCR. As a result, in the event a state does not abide by these core 
obligations that are non-derogable according to the CESCR, a violation of the right 
to water will occur in each instance in the view of the Committee, despite the fact 
that the right to water is not independently incorporated in the ICESCR.239 As was 
discussed in relation to the right to food and health, a state’s unwillingness to comply 
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with the duties as set out by these minimum core obligations must be distinguished 
from its inability, although both may equally result in a violation. Especially relevant 
in relation to the provision of humanitarian assistance is the CESCR’s statement that 
a state’s ‘failure to adopt mechanisms for emergency relief’ is to be considered such 
a violation.240 Lastly, also considering the relation to humanitarian assistance, the 
Committee notes the importance of the role of international organisations, 
considering that vulnerable groups should be prioritised in the provision of aid and 
water.241  
Whereas the above evidences that a distinct right to water is lacking in current 
treaty law, the proactive stance of the CESCR certainly contributes to the argument 
that some opinio juris exists to recognise such a right. In this regard, the position of 
the UN and its Member States is considered, with a view to the potential existence of 
a right to water in customary international law. In 2010 the UN General Assembly 
declared by consensus that it:  
 
“recognizes the right to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation as a human right that 
is essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights”.242 
 
Although a relevant step by state practice in the process towards international legal 
recognition of the right to water, this resolution does not envisage duties of a legally 
binding nature to rest upon states. Building forth on this, the Human Rights Council, 
which had for several years already concerned itself with human rights and the access 
to water,243 declared a few months after the General Assembly that it: 
 
“Affirms that the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation is derived from the 
right to an adequate standard of living and inextricably related to the right to the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health, as well as the right to life and human 
dignity”.244 
 
Linking the right to water and sanitation to the right to the highest attainable standard 
of health as well as the right to life enables the Human Rights Council, like the 
CESCR, to place the right to water within the categories of internationally recognised 
human rights obligations of a binding nature. Thus, the UN has embraced the 
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development of the right to water and sanitation to a greater extent over the last few 
years as seen in particular by the fact that the above General Assembly Resolution 
was adopted by consensus.  
However, at this time, a crystallised independent human right to water has not 
been codified in international treaty law. Only to the extent that these instruments do 
recognise such a right, it is seen as a derivative of, or explicitly linked to the right to 
the highest attainable standard of health or the right to an adequate standard of living. 
The UN High Commissioner on Human Rights acknowledges these considerations, 
but with a more progressive perspective argues that clear obligations for states can 
be found within human rights law relating to access to water, and that the time has 
come to consider it a human right.245 A similar approach can be noted by the UN 
Special Rapporteur on the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation,246 
arguing that although a discussion may still be on-going, the right to sanitation can 
be considered not only to follow from obligations found in other rights, but that such 
a right must also be seen as a distinct right on its own account.247 The Special 
Rapporteur furthermore emphasises that states are required to abide by their 
obligations with regard to the respect for the right to sanitation also in time of 
emergency, including disasters and conflicts.248 In that regard, the Rapporteur notes 
an obligation of states to actively provide sanitation services only in certain instances, 
one of these being the aftermath of a natural disaster.249 With regard to the provision 
of humanitarian assistance or aid, the Special Rapporteur has aligned itself with the 
Human Rights Council, which has merely ‘stressed’ the important role of 
international cooperation in the fulfilment of the right to water, with no direct or 
indirect reference to the notion of humanitarian assistance.250 More recently, the 
Rapporteur has however noted that a failure of states to ‘seek and accept international 
assistance where needed’ is a common cause of violation of the right to water as well 
as their failure to ‘respond promptly’ through the provision of assistance in times of 
emergencies and ‘to allow access to humanitarian service providers’.251 As such the 
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Rapporteur is aligning more with the CESCR, claiming a violation of the right to 
water should humanitarian assistance not be provided.  
 
5.4.8 Humanitarian Assistance and the Right to Water  
 
It has become apparent that the development of a right to water and sanitation has 
progressed rapidly over the last decade, following the CESCR’s interpretative 
comments on the right to an adequate standard of living and the highest attainable 
standard of health.252 However, given the lack of proper individual implementation 
in binding international legal documents at this point in time, it is not possible to truly 
speak of a codified human right to water. As a result, the relationship between the 
right to water and sanitation and humanitarian assistance, and a state’s obligations in 
that regard, remains ambiguous. The UN’s human rights bodies indeed embrace a 
progressive approach, but do not assertively declare rights or duties with regard to 
the provision of aid, making it difficult to definitively establish state practice or 
opinio juris amounting to customary international law. It is rather the CESCR that 
has argued that states have a duty in the provision of humanitarian assistance to 
cooperate in the fulfilment of the right to water. While the ICESCR itself does not 
contain an independent right to water, the CESCR has furthermore argued that states 
are in violation of that right in the event they do not adopt measures for emergency 
assistance, in particular related to the victims of disaster situations. Both the CESCR 
and several of the UN bodies therefore take a proactive stance in arguing the 
existence of a right to water, but take a different approach, with only the CESCR 
focusing on the right to water in relation to the provision of humanitarian assistance.  
Thus, with a lack of proper individual implementation of this right through legally 
binding obligations, a current human right to water is undeniably lacking. Its 
haphazard implementation in several of the more specific treaties such as the 
CEDAW, CRPD and CRC – given their limited scope – is not sufficient for an 
unambiguous assertion in this regard. The consensus found within the UN can in fact 
be considered indicative of a potential forthcoming customary international law norm 
concerning the right to water, yet these bodies – as mentioned above – do not 
envisage clear obligations for states with regard to this right. Currently, no option 
rests but to conclude that although developments are continuous, currently no 
independent human right to water exists. As a result, the lack of such a right prevents 
its concrete connection to the provision of humanitarian assistance. However, what 
can be established is that through the interpretative remarks of the UN bodies and in 
particular the CESCR, the provision of humanitarian assistance remains essential to 
the fulfilment of this possible future right to water.  
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This Chapter has analysed the existence of a possible independent human right to 
receive humanitarian assistance. Placing the provision of humanitarian assistance 
within the human rights framework will allow for protection through human rights 
law in circumstances amounting to a humanitarian crisis, regardless of their 
occurrence in times of peace or conflict. Firstly, a brief discussion of the development 
of human rights was necessary, creating a historical context and assessing the various 
categories or generations of human rights.253 Upon establishing that a potential 
human right to humanitarian assistance could be categorised as a so-called ‘third 
generation’, or ‘solidarity’ right, while acknowledging the notion of group rights, the 
content of the possible human right was considered.254 Hereafter, the provision of 
assistance as part of the existing legal framework of the rights to life, food, health 
and water has been considered.  
 
5.5.1 Humanitarian Assistance as an Independent Human Right 
 
From the above Chapter, it becomes clear that certain efforts are being made to 
establish a right to receive humanitarian assistance, despite its current absence from 
international treaty law and practice. Indeed, such a right in relation to refugee and 
IDP-children has been claimed not only internationally in the CRC, but also 
regionally in Africa through the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child and the Kampala Convention. These attempts, next to the efforts of various soft 
law documents, have placed the concept of humanitarian assistance directly within 
the human rights discourse. However, determining whether there is such an emerging 
norm in customary international law may be stretching the norm from its current 
stance. 255 Although the existence of a degree of opinio juris can be derived from the 
various efforts pertaining to establishing a right to receive assistance in the work of 
international organisations, as well as the previously discussed embracement in 
literature of a right to such assistance as part of a ‘third generation’ of human 
rights,256 established state practice is currently absent. Given the considerable 
uniformity and widespread practice needed to be able to consider the formation of 
customary international law, it is too soon to speak of such a development.257 Indeed 
the commitment to recognise responsibility towards the victims of disasters is found 
in many soft law documents, but is not (yet) legally binding as a human right.258 
States have been hesitant or unwilling to acknowledge the existence of a right to 
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receive humanitarian assistance, as can also be derived from the absence of General 
Assembly or Security Council resolutions proclaiming the existence of such an 
independent right. States’ lack of interpretative comments regarding potential 
relevant provisions in the human rights treaties they are party to cannot be seen as 
such an indication however, as the incorporation of humanitarian assistance into the 
human rights framework and discourse developed at a later time than the creation of 
such treaties.  
Another possible issue arising is the more material question of the scope and 
content of the possible right to humanitarian assistance, in relation to the rights-
holders and duty-bearers of such a potential right as also concluded in Section 5.3.4 
(Preliminary Conclusion). ‘Third generation’ or solidarity rights often proclaim 
broad concepts, such as ‘development’ or ‘peace’ for which a wide range of 
government activities could be ranked as part of the state’s obligation to fulfil such a 
right, enhancing the difficulty in establishing what amounts to state practice.259 
However, in the situation of a possible human right to humanitarian assistance, it is 
submitted that the scope and content of such a right would be confined to the essence 
of the notion of ‘humanitarian assistance’ itself, whilst the conditions of its 
application could be said to be intrinsically linked to the existence of a humanitarian 
crisis.260 As such, the potential right to humanitarian assistance would only entail 
those items necessary for the immediate survival of people, and the right to request 
such assistance would only be applicable in the situation of an immediate 
humanitarian emergency. Thus, although the notion of humanitarian assistance is 
indeed a ‘solidarity’ or ‘group’ right by its nature, contrary to the possible right to 
peace or development with rather aspirational characters, it is clearly confined by 
well-defined boundaries in content and scope.  
However, being able to define said content and scope, as well as the conditions 
for its application, does not result in the ability to indeed establish the formation of a 
right to humanitarian assistance. Indeed, problematic to the acceptance of a potential 
right to humanitarian assistance remain the questions that continue to be raised with 
regard to possible rights-holders and the matter of possible duty-bearers (see Section 
5.3.4). Key is in particular the fact that a ‘humanitarian crisis’ must exist for the need 
for humanitarian assistance to become acute. Such a crisis by its very nature results 
in the involvement of various rights-holders and potentially more legally 
problematic, various duty-bearers. Currently indeed, no definitive incorporation can 
be found of such a right in customary international law or treaty law.  
For some, the desirability of developing a (new) human right is questionable, 
thereby challenging the need for such a right to humanitarian assistance, as well as 
its viability.261 Furthermore, it is argued that the enforcement of the provision of 
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assistance is more important than its realisation as a right.262 Yet, framing the receipt 
and delivery of humanitarian assistance in a human rights context is quite possible 
and logical, considering the UN General Assembly’s view in the requirements 
proposed for the development of new human rights and that these should:  
 
“(a) be consistent with the existing body of international human rights law; (b) be of 
fundamental character and derive from the inherent dignity and worth of the human person; 
(c) be sufficiently precise to give rise to identifiable and practicable rights and obligations; 
(d) provide, where appropriate, realistic and effective implementation machinery, 
including reporting systems; (e) attract broad international support”.263 
 
When applying such requirements to humanitarian assistance, it is indeed given that 
the content of humanitarian assistance can be found in the rights to life, food, health 
(and water). It is of fundamental necessity for the survival of persons in the aftermath 
of a humanitarian crisis, it has a clear and identifiable content and scope, there is a 
possibility to identify implementation mechanisms and lastly has support in the 
international community. It may therefore indeed be justifiably developed into an 
independent human right within the UN context. Whether this development occurs 
through the possible incorporation in an international human rights treaty or through 
the further development of state practice in customary international law, however, 
remains to be seen. Although arguments exist against the development of such an 
independent human right, it may however also contribute to the progressive 
development of human rights law and at the same time to the prevention of 
fragmentation of the law, in order to establish equal protection to all persons 
regardless of the disaster they have endured.264  
Whilst it is accepted from the above findings that the way has been freed for the 
potential development of an individual right to receive humanitarian assistance 
should the international community so decide, it is by no means argued in this 
research that such a right must in fact be developed. The creation of new law must be 
cautioned against when existing law can satisfactorily provide in legal protection, as 
the proliferation of norms often results in legal uncertainty concerning their value 
and content. Indeed, the existing human rights framework provides ample protection 
of persons facing humanitarian crises as it requires the provision of emergency aid 
as fulfilment of these existing rights to life, food and health. 
Indeed, it is suggested in this research that as international protection of those in 
need of emergency aid through an individual human right to receive assistance is 
currently lacking, this protection must be sought through other rights that are 
generally accepted in international human rights law. It is through the provision of 
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humanitarian assistance that these internationally recognised rights can be fulfilled 
and persons in the midst of a humanitarian crisis can be protected.  
 
5.5.2 Humanitarian Assistance as a Vehicle in the Fulfilment of Existing Human 
Rights 
 
From the above Section 5.4, it can be concluded that the provision of humanitarian 
aid indeed supports the fulfilment of the essential aspects of the right to life, food and 
health, as has been recognised in the analysis of each of these rights. As such, the 
notion of ‘survival rights’ has been coined,265 and certainly the right to receive 
humanitarian assistance could be considered to fall within this category of rights. It 
has been concluded that in order to fully enjoy one’s right to life, food and health, it 
is necessary to receive humanitarian assistance in certain circumstances. The current 
developments with regard to the potential right to water have been noted, as well as 
the fact that such a right has not yet been codified to date, despite movements within 
the UN to accept this right, which would enable its potential development as a norm 
of customary international law. Given the well-defined provisions and interpretations 
of the right to food and health as related to the receipt of humanitarian assistance, it 
is not necessary for the purpose of this research to assert the existence of such a 
human right to water.  
The ICESCR asserts that certain minimum core obligations must be met with 
regard to the right to food and health, granting persons in times of a humanitarian 
crisis the entitlement to receive such assistance, in order not to compromise the 
fulfilment of their rights. The same holds true regarding the right to not be arbitrarily 
deprived of one’s life. Thus, receiving humanitarian assistance substantially fulfils 
the right to life, food, health (and water) and may thereby be considered a subsidiary 
or underlying right and manner to realise an individual’s right to life, food, health 
(and water).266 In this manner, even though consensus with regard to the existence of 
an independent established human right to receive humanitarian assistance may be 
absent, both with regard to the issues of enforcement through determination of rights-
holders and its codification in treaty law or development in customary international 
law, the provision itself can be seen as a vehicle or a means to fulfil other existing 
human rights. In particular, the interpretative comments of the HRC and the CESCR 
support the stance that certain basic obligations resting upon states with regard to the 
right to life, food, health (and water) can be translated into the obligation under the 
ICCPR and ICESCR to provide humanitarian assistance in a situation of crisis.267 
It remains essential that a people in need of assistance in the aftermath of a natural 
disaster, during conflict, occupation or other situation potentially amounting to a 
humanitarian crisis gain access to such humanitarian aid. Indeed, providing 
humanitarian assistance may be the substantial fulfilment of a states’ obligation to 
ensure a person’s right to life, food and health. Such provision must remain in 
                                                        
265 Kiefer & Brölmann, ‘The Human Right to Water’ (n 26) 208. 
266 Jakovljevic, ‘Right to Humanitarian Action and State Sovereignty’ (n 87) 97.  






accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality. Within a 
human rights context, as has also been asserted by the ICJ, such provision must 
remain in accordance with the International Convention on the Elimination of all 
forms of Racial Discrimination and occur on the basis of non-discrimination.268 This 
latter aspect is of particular relevance in circumstances of non-international armed 
conflict or disaster where the affected persons form part of a (ostracised) minority 
group within a nation.  
Framing the receipt of such assistance within a human rights context enforces the 
basis and standards upon which such provision takes place within the concept of 
human dignity. Furthermore, rather than being considered passive ‘beneficiaries’, 
those needing humanitarian assistance become ‘individual human rights-holders’ 
with claims against specific duty-bearers.269 Thus, as currently no independent 
enforceable human right to receive humanitarian assistance exists, the content of this 
right will have to be further asserted through claiming potential violations of the 
existing rights to life, food, health (and water), which are at the disposal of those 
affected by humanitarian crises. Indeed, the absence of such an individual human 
right by no means implies that no rights or duties with regard to the receipt and 
provision of humanitarian assistance exist. 
As such, the ‘right to receive assistance’ must be distinctly discerned from the 
more narrow ‘human right to receive assistance’. Whilst it is not likely that the latter 
will develop in the near future as an independent human right, such a broader ‘right 
to receive assistance’ in certain circumstances has in fact been established through 
existing human rights. Such a right to receive emergency aid within a human rights 
context is in fact the fulfilment of the rights to life, food and health in times of 
humanitarian crises. In subsequent Chapters, its fulfilment in other corpora juris will 
be further addressed. Such a right to receive may be furthermore found in 
humanitarian law and other provisions of international law that will be addressed in 
more detail in particular relation to obligations of the state sovereign and other actors 
to provide such assistance.  
From this Chapter, it can be concluded that the provision of humanitarian 
assistance functions as a vehicle in the fulfilment of the rights to life, food and health 
in times of humanitarian crises. This conclusion determines that such a right to 
receive assistance exists at all times of crises; whether peace or conflict, as the rights 
to life is non-derogable in times of emergency and the rights to food and health 
contain minimum core obligations that must indeed be implemented. The 
determination that the receipt of humanitarian assistance is a fulfilment of these 
human rights therefore actively supports the approach in this research that the 
provision of humanitarian assistance must be seen in an all-encompassing manner, 
rather than in a fragmented approach. Through the placement of humanitarian 
assistance within the protection of the framework of human rights law, persons in 
need of aid can actively claim such a right to aid in the fulfilment of their human 
                                                        
268 Article 5 ICERD and Section 5.3 A Human Right to Receive Humanitarian Assistance in International 
Law?. 
269 IASC, ‘Protecting Persons Affected by Natural Disasters, IASC Operational Guidelines’ (2006), 2. 
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rights, regardless of whether they find themselves in a non-international armed 
conflict or a natural disaster. This conclusion that the provision of humanitarian 
assistance is the execution of state obligations in the fulfilment of the rights to life, 
food and health is furthermore supported by the opinio juris found in this Chapter on 
the right to receive assistance, as well as the role asserted for state sovereigns’ 
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Where previous Chapters have assessed the background to the legal framework, such 
as the parties involved with humanitarian assistance, its scope of application and 
applicable law, matters of state sovereignty and the current developments in human 
rights law, this Chapter addresses at a more concrete level the specific legal rights 
and duties concerning the provision of humanitarian assistance in the various 
potential circumstances. The current Chapter focuses on the lex lata involved in the 
actual provision of assistance. As part of this assessment, the current developments 
in international law are also considered, such as state practice, treaty law and Security 
Council resolutions, as well as General Assembly resolutions, soft law mechanisms 
and codification initiatives that are currently on-going. This study approaches the 
legal framework concerning the provision of humanitarian assistance from an 
overarching perspective, focusing on the premise that persons in need of food, water 
and shelter in times of a humanitarian crisis should be able to gain access to such 
provisions, regardless of what circumstance put them in such a need. This perspective 
finds support in various areas of international law, as set out below, as well as the 
contemporary concept of state sovereignty as discussed in Chapter 4. The approach 
to these rights and duties must be from the perspective of complementarity and the 
                                                        
1 UNSC Res 1973 (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1973 ‘The situation in Libya’ § 3.  
In the face of the humanitarian crisis in Libya in 2011, the Security Council called 
upon those involved in the conflict, stating it:  
 
“Demands that the Libyan authorities comply with their obligations under international 
law, including international humanitarian law, human rights and refugee law and take all 
measures to protect civilians and meet their basic needs, and to ensure the rapid and 
unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance”. 
 
What exactly are these ‘obligations under international law’ that a state or 
sovereign may have to provide humanitarian assistance? To what extent does 
international law place obligations hereto on the affected state, and what rights 
can the affected persons claim? This chapter addresses these questions within the 







principle of humanity, which aligns with the fundamental aspects of the concept of 
humanitarian assistance. The very notion of humanitarian assistance, as has been 
asserted in previous Chapters, warrants an overarching and inclusive approach. In 
fact, this approach has also been taken in the law itself on numerous occasions. 
Therefore, this Chapter commences the assessment of the legal framework from an 
overall and general legal perspective, reaching the more specific circumstances of 
provision at the end.  
The legal framework regarding the provision of humanitarian assistance can be 
divided into certain legal rights and legal duties. Whilst the horrific images that often 
cross our path through various media sources may cause a desire to provide 
assistance, such assistance is regulated by specific legal boundaries. The affected 
state may be held to certain duties to provide assistance under international law, 
whereas the persons in need of assistance may hold rights to receive such aid under 
international law, dependent on the various corpora juris involved. This Chapter 
therefore concretely addresses the various potential legal duties of the affected state 
in the provision of assistance in times of a humanitarian crisis, as well as the rights 
of the persons in need. A focus lies on the duties of the affected state as primary 
responsible actor; Chapter 7 will address the rights and duties that may be discerned 
for international assistance, which may be provided by third states or international 
organisations. The potential unwillingness of the affected state to provide assistance 
will also be addressed in this regard, as the assessment of such a potential gap in the 
law, taking state sovereignty into account, is crucial to the protection of persons in 
need of aid.  
 
6.2 Duties and Rights under General International Law 
 
The legal framework pertaining to the delivery of humanitarian assistance bases itself 
on several bodies of law, as seen in Chapter 3. From a general perspective, the 
concept of state sovereignty provides a structural guide to the various actors involved 
in the provision of assistance; internally and externally. Therefore, it is relevant to 
assess which duties and rights flow directly from the concept of state sovereignty. 
State sovereignty as a notion must be considered from a more abstract and elevated 
level, in a different manner than the other bodies of law that contain specific 
provisions regarding the delivery of emergency aid. The law pertaining to state 
sovereignty does not contain substantive provisions concerning the provision of 
emergency aid. The assessment regarding the potential rights and duties therefore are 
at a more abstract level, but provide the basis upon which the more substantive 
provisions are founded. 
 
6.2.1 State Sovereignty and the Duty to Provide Humanitarian Assistance 
 
Chapter 4 has addressed the concept of state sovereignty as international society 
views it today. The premise taken in this research regarding the concept of state 
sovereignty, and elaborated in Chapter 4 is that in international law today, 
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sovereignty can and in fact must be seen to include responsibilities and obligations 
towards citizens by a sovereign.2 When this concept is applied to the provision of 
humanitarian assistance, it stands to reason that the primary responsibility and duty 
to provide humanitarian assistance lies with the affected state on whose territory the 
humanitarian crisis takes place. This responsibility and duty naturally flows from the 
understanding of the concept of state sovereignty. Support for an overall and general 
responsibility of the affected state to provide assistance for persons within its 
jurisdiction when a humanitarian crisis arises can be found in the current notion of 
sovereignty, based on international humanitarian law, human rights law and UN 
Security Council and General Assembly resolutions as elaborated in more depth in 
this Chapter.3 In respect of more regional state practice, the EU has equally asserted 
such a primary responsibility of the affected state.4 This reasoning also follows from 
the analysis in Chapter 2 of the actors involved in the provision of assistance, where 
the affected state plays a primary role.5 More recently, this notion of responsibility 
and of the primary role have been supported by the work of the ILC in its 
development of draft articles on ‘Protection of persons in the event of disasters’. In 
particular Draft Article 12 declares a duty of the affected state ‘by virtue of its 
sovereignty’ to ensure those persons on its territory receive assistance.6 
State sovereignty, as a legal concept, is a continued and constant standard 
throughout the entire fabric of international law, regardless of whether a (natural) 
disaster takes place, or a conflict.7 As stated earlier, humanitarian assistance may be 
necessary in various (legally qualifiable) circumstances, invoking a wide range of 
legal regimes, rights and duties. From a general perspective however, state 
sovereignty is a continuous thread in the discussion and determination of the legal 
rights and duties in the provision of assistance. The concept of state sovereignty and 
                                                        
2 Section 4.2.3.3 Towards a new Definition of Sovereignty. 
3 See the provisions of the Geneva Conventions  and multiple human rights treaties in 6.5 Duties and 
Rights in Specific Circumstances under International Law; UNGA Res 38/202 (20 December 1983) UN 
Doc A/RES/38/202 § 4; UNGA Res 43/131 (8 December 1988) UN Doc A/RES/43/131 § 2 and UNGA 
Res 45/100 (14 December 1990) UN Doc A/RES/45/100 § 2, in which the Assembly reaffirmed “the 
sovereignty of affected States and their primary role in the initiation, organization, coordination and 
implementation of humanitarian assistance within their respective territories”; UNGA Res 46/182 (19 
December 1991) UN Doc A/RES/46/182 Annex § 4 (“Each State has the responsibility first and foremost 
to take care of the victims of natural disasters and other emergencies occurring on its territory”); ILC 
‘Protection of persons in the event of disasters’ Memorandum by the Secretariat (11 December 2007) 
UN Doc A/CN/4/590 § 23: “the receiving State has the primary responsibility for the protection of 
persons on its territory or subject to its jurisdiction or control during a disaster”. Such a position can also 
be derived from the fact that many states have adopted at a domestic level legislation pertaining to the 
provision of assistance in the event of a crisis occurring on their territory or under their jurisdiction.  
4 ‘Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States 
meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission’ (European 
Consensus on Humanitarian Aid)  (30 January 2008) EU Doc 2008/C/25/01 § 4: “National authorities in 
countries faced with crisis retain the primary responsibility for protecting populations confronting 
disaster”.  
5 2.3.2.1 The Affected State and subsequent Sections in this Chapter.  
6 ILC ‘Protection of persons in the event of disasters’ Draft Articles UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.831 (15 May 
2014) Draft Article 12. 






the responsibilities found therein also support the perspective taken in this research 
concerning an overarching approach to the provision of humanitarian assistance. As 
the concept of state sovereignty including its legal responsibilities towards citizens 
remains one and the same throughout all aspects of international law and adapts as a 
whole with time, the notion places the same sovereign obligation in that regard upon 
states throughout the various circumstances in which humanitarian assistance must 
be provided. As such, the concept of state sovereignty and the legal obligations 
flowing from this support the overarching manner in which the provision of 
humanitarian assistance can be approached, focusing on the need to provide 
assistance regardless of specific circumstances.  
The failure of proper execution of state sovereignty and its duties leads to state 
responsibility in international law, as Chapter 8 addresses. However, relevant to the 
establishment of the sovereign duties in this Chapter as pertaining to the provision of 
emergency assistance that might incur state responsibility, it is relevant to note at the 
outset that such duties are not refrained to the legal sovereigns per se. As the ICJ has 
addressed in its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the 
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia: 
 
“physical control of a territory, and not sovereignty or legitimacy of title, is the basis of 
State liability for acts affecting other States".8 
 
The duty-bearing responsibility or ‘title’ of sovereignty is then transferred from the 
state, to the de facto controller of a certain territory. This assessment is relevant to 
the provision of humanitarian assistance in particular in times of non-international 
armed conflicts, or for example natural disasters in conflict areas, resulting in 
complex emergencies. Indeed in such situations a power struggle often affects the 
potential to receive aid. The assertion that obligations may be transferred to non-state 
actors such as de facto regimes may furthermore be relevant in circumstances of a 
collapse of state authority. Such humanitarian crises warrant the delivery of 
humanitarian aid, but the state sovereign may be unable to provide this due to a loss 
of control in a specific area. Thus, de facto regimes or other non-state entities can be 
held responsible under international law, when adopting such a pragmatic view as 
done by the ICJ, for the provision of assistance. As such, when considering the 
obligations towards citizens, it has become more and more accepted in international 
law that regimes exercising de facto control, or non-state actors, must abide by the 
substantive provisions concerning the delivery of humanitarian aid in general 
international law, including human rights obligations, as would the state sovereign.9 
                                                        
8 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1971) 
p. 16, § 118. 
9 See amongst others Andrew Clapham, ‘Human rights obligations of non-state actors in conflict 
situations’, (2006) 88 International Review of the Red Cross 863, 522; Christian Tomuschat, ‘The 
Applicability of Human Rights Law to Insurgent Movements’, in Horst Fischer, Ulrika Froissart, Wolff 
Heintschel von Heinegg and Christian Raap (eds), Krisensicherung und Humanitärer Schutz – Crisis 
Management and Humanitarian Protection: Festschrift für Dieter Fleck, Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag 
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Similarly, such entities must abide by international humanitarian law provisions, as 
for example common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Article 1 of 
Additional Protocol II assert their applicability to armed forces not belonging to the 
state sovereign.10 More specifically the Kampala Convention directly addresses the 
responsibilities of armed forces, indicating a continuous increasing acceptance of the 
responsibilities of armed forces as acting ‘authorities’ within a certain territory, 
thereby taking on the responsibilities bestowed upon sovereigns, such as the 
provision of humanitarian assistance.11  
Similarly, it has been increasingly accepted that whilst states are the primary duty-
bearers of obligations under human rights law, non-state actors can hold such 
responsibilities too. Indeed, the Security Council has for many years asserted the 
responsibility of armed groups as ‘parties to a conflict’ to abide by duties under 
human rights law.12 Clearly, in such instances, the Security Council is addressing 
non-state actors in a conflict, as opposed to merely addressing states. The Council 
furthermore addressed the duties of these ‘parties’ under human rights law and 
international law in general, rather than confining their duties to those under 
humanitarian law. Where some believe that non-state actors should only be held 
accountable under international humanitarian law, Clapham aligns with the Security 
Council and argues this perspective to be untenable as the application of humanitarian 
law is often contested in circumstances involving non-state actors, warranting the 
application of obligations under human rights law.13 Alston concurs, declaring that 
although non-state actors may not be signatories to certain human rights treaties, they 
do remain ‘subject to the demand of the international community’ as expressed in the 
UDHR, stating that every organ of the international society should respect human 
rights.14 This stance is also supported by the Articles on the Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), declaring that a successful 
insurrectional movement shall be held responsible for violations of international law 
                                                        
(Berliner Wissenschafstverlag 2004) 586; and H Steiner, P Alston & R Goodman, International Human 
Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals (Oxford University Press 2007) 675, 1420.   
10 See for a more in depth discussion of the applicability of these treaties to non-state actors 3.2.1 Defining 
an Armed Conflict.  
11 African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa 
(Kampala 22 October 2009) Article 7.  
12 See amongst others UNSC Res 1265 (17 September 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1265 § 4; UNSC Res 1863 
(9 July 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1863 § 19 and UNSC Res 2036 (22 February 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2036 
§16 that provides an example, stating that the Council: “Demands that all parties and armed groups take 
appropriate steps to ensure the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and supplies, and further 
demands that all parties ensure full and unhindered access for the timely delivery of humanitarian aid to 
persons in need of assistance across Somalia, consistent with humanitarian, human rights and refugee 
law”. 
13 Clapham, ‘Human rights obligations of non-state actors in conflict situations’ (n 9) 505. 
14 ‘Civil And Political Rights, Including The Question Of Disappearances And Summary Executions: 
Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions’ Report of the Special Rapporteur Philip Alston 
Addendum ‘Mission to Sri Lanka’ UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.5 (27 March 2006) § 25. See also 
August Reinisch, ‘The Changing International Legal Framework for Dealing with Non-State Actors’ in 






incurred prior to their evolvement as a new government or state.15 In relation to the 
provision of humanitarian assistance and responsibilities of non-state actors, support 
can also be sought in practice, when factual agreements are considered between states 
and non-state actors. In many of these agreements, it is stipulated that the recipients 
of humanitarian assistance are entitled amongst others to the right to receive 
assistance according to basic needs, the right to live in security and the rights to legal 
and effective human rights protection.16 Hence, in practice it appears that non-state 
actors are also taking voluntarily certain human rights obligations upon themselves, 
next to the existence of certain obligations under the law.17 The debate is continuous 
and on-going as to the extent of potential other obligations, but as Chapter 8 addresses 
in further detail, when in the exercise of control, armed groups or other non-state 
actors can be held responsible for violations of international (human rights) law.18  
It must therefore be concluded at this point, however, that the current 
understanding of state sovereignty entails an overall and general obligation for the 
affected state to provide assistance to its population when in a humanitarian crisis. In 
the absence of such a sovereign, the non-state actor exercising control shall take up 
such duties (under human rights law). The specificities of such responsibilities will 
be discussed in more depth throughout this Chapter. 
 
6.2.2 State Sovereignty and the Right to Receive Humanitarian Assistance 
 
The law concerning state sovereignty is geared specifically towards the notion of the 
responsibilities of the sovereign state, and as such does not immediately spring to 
mind when considering a potential ‘right to receive assistance’. Yet, although much 
of the law focuses on a duty of the affected state, as conduct is required to provide 
the actual food, water and medicine, state sovereignty has developed to increasingly 
include rights of citizens. Chapter 4 has discussed that the concept of state 
sovereignty suggests a reciprocal relationship between the sovereign and society.19 
As the concept of sovereignty is viewed as a ‘social contract’ between sovereign and 
citizens, the latter obtain rights in relation to the power they have transferred to the 
                                                        
15 Article 10 ARSIWA. See also Article 9 ARSIWA. For a more in depth discussion, see Section 8.2 The 
Law of State Responsibility and Enforcement of Humanitarian Assistance  
16 Jean-Daniel Vigny and Cecilia Thompson, ‘Fundamental Standards of Humanity: What Future?’, 
(2002)  20 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 192-194 concerning the codes of conducts in the 
situations of Burundi, Liberia, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Sudan, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Angola, East and West Timor, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Russian 
Federation.  
17 See for example the Agreement between the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) and 
the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), (Djibouti 9 June 2008) § 8(a) and the Lome Peace 
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front 
of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL), (June 3rd 1999) Article XXVII and Annex 4.  
18 See also Alston (ed) Non-State Actors and Human Rights (n 14); Clapham, ‘Human rights obligations 
of non-state actors in conflict situations’ (n 9); Sections 7.4.1 Security Council Resolutions and the Right 
to Offer Assistance and 7.4.2 Security Council Resolutions and the Right to Access. 
19 4.2.2 Reconceptualising Sovereignty?. 
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sovereign.20 This reciprocity lies in the fact that sovereign rights, bestowed by the 
citizens, are not unlimited and therefore are curtailed to include certain 
responsibilities which those citizens may claim. Thus, the duty which lies upon the 
state to provide assistance by virtue of its sovereign responsibilities may translate 
into a right of individuals seeking such assistance. Indeed, the internal aspect of state 
sovereignty is curtailed and limited by those individuals within its territory that may 
claim invocation of their rights.21 These rights that may be claimed are in fact the 
direct consequence of the reciprocal relationship between sovereign and society. Yet, 
they are not distinctly formulated as such regarding the provision of humanitarian 
assistance, given the more abstract and general level upon which state sovereignty 
operates, allowing for substantive rights in the specific corpora juris relevant to the 
provision of humanitarian assistance. These specific rights therefore can be directly 
found in the more detailed provisions within the international legal framework that 
shall be discussed further below.  
It must however be noted at the outset that although the enforceable legal 
provisions are stipulated in more specific fields of law, they flow directly from the 
reciprocal relationship between sovereign and society, and are the ‘other side’ of the 
two-sided coin of state sovereignty, entailing furthermore the rights of the sovereign 
in relation to third states. As such, the possibility of individuals to claim the receipt 
of humanitarian assistance also follows the overarching approach that is taken in this 
research into the legal framework on humanitarian assistance. This overarching 
approach suggests a common denominator and basis upon which all individuals can 
base themselves, regardless of the typology of the humanitarian crisis they may find 
themselves in. Indeed, whereas specialisation of the law is of relevance in order for 
individuals to base themselves on directly enforceable rights, this must not result in 
fragmentation of the law. Therefore, it is relevant to take into consideration that state 
sovereignty plays a role both as an aspect regarding duties of the sovereign, and 
concerning the rights of individuals on the territory of the affected state in the 
provision of humanitarian assistance. 
 
6.3 Duties and Rights under Human Rights Law 
 
This Section addresses at a more concrete level the various rights and duties under 
human rights law in the provision of humanitarian assistance, in reflection of the 
analysis that has taken place in previous Chapters concerning human rights law. A 
discussion of the current absence of a potential individual human right to 
humanitarian assistance has already taken place above in Chapter 5. Furthermore, the 
continued application of human rights law in times of conflict has been asserted, in 
recognition of the current stance regarding the lex specialis doctrine in relation to 
international humanitarian law, as well as the discussion on the current status of the 
                                                        
20Ibid. 
21 Bosko Jakovljevic, ‘Right to Humanitarian Action and State Sovereignty’ in (eds) Stefania Baldini & 
Guido Ravasi, Humanitarian Action and State Sovereignty; Refugees: a continuing challenge (Institute 






potential extraterritorial application of human rights law.22 Whereas the previous 
Chapter has addressed that the provision of humanitarian assistance functions as a 
vehicle in the fulfilment of the rights to life, food, health (and water) by the sovereign 
state or non-state actor upon which such obligations are placed, this Section 
specifically assesses the various substantive rights and duties on the ground in times 
of a crisis as part of the current existing legal framework on the provision of 
humanitarian assistance.  
At the outset, the consideration that the provision of humanitarian assistance 
functions on the basis of non-discrimination must be reiterated. As addressed in 
Chapter 5, Article 5 ICERD codifies that, in particular relation to the provision of 
humanitarian assistance, states are obliged to ‘prohibit and to eliminate’ all forms of 
racial discrimination in the enjoyment of (amongst rights) the right to security of 
person and the ‘protection against bodily harm’, economic, social and cultural rights; 
including the right to health.23 Thus, the manner in which these substantive rights 
must be fulfilled, regardless of which human rights are specifically at stake, must be 
on the basis of non-discrimination. Such provision on the basis of non-discrimination 
has also been affirmatively held twice by the ICJ. Firstly in its Nicaragua Judgment, 
the Court addressed that ‘an essential feature of truly humanitarian aid is that it is 
given “without discrimination” of any kind’.24 Secondly, placing it directly in the 
context of human rights however, the Court held in its 2008 Order in the case 
concerning the ‘Application Of The International Convention On The Elimination 
Of All Forms Of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation)’ that:  
 
“Both Parties shall facilitate, and refrain from placing any impediment to, humanitarian 
assistance in support of the rights to which the local population are entitled under the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination”.25 
 
Thus, the ICJ also observed that prior to addressing the substantive norms, the law 
dictates at a foundational level that the provision of humanitarian assistance must in 
all circumstances and at all times occur on the basis of non-discrimination, which 
would otherwise indeed be a violation of a norm of jus cogens.  
 
6.3.1 Duties of the Affected State and Non-State Actor under Human Rights Law 
 
Current international human rights law places several distinct obligations upon states 
which relate to the provision of humanitarian assistance. As such, Articles 55 and 56 
of the UN Charter imply an obligation to UN Member States to ensure universal 
                                                        
22 Sections 3.4.2 Applicability of Human Rights in Armed Conflict and Occupation and 3.4.3 Hierarchy 
or Convergence of International Legal Norms?.  
23 See Section 5.3 A Human Right to Receive Humanitarian Assistance in International Law?.  
24 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 
Merits, Judgment 27 June 1986 I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14 § 243. 
25 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(Georgia v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order of 15 October 2008, I.C.J. Reports 2008, 
p. 353 § 149. It must be noted that this decision of the Court was taken by 8 votes to 7.  
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respect for human rights.26 Specifically relating to the provision of humanitarian 
assistance, the rights to life, food, health and water have been discussed in Chapter 5 
as part of this assurance. States have obligations that can be derived from these rights 
concerning the provision of humanitarian assistance and it has been noted that 
derogation from these four rights in times of a humanitarian crisis is not permitted.27 
In this regard, Article 2 of the ICESCR concerning the ‘progressive development’ of 
human rights as well as the ‘minimum core obligations’ has been considered in 
particular.28 
For the purpose of discussing duties on the ground in times of crisis, the first and 
foremost obligations relating to the fulfilment of these rights must be sought with the 
governments of State Parties to human rights treaties.29 Yet, when translating treaty 
obligations into obligations in practice, it is relevant to note the status of obligations 
of human rights protection by non-state actors such as de facto regimes, as for 
example may be the case with the collapse of state authority.30 Section 6.2.1 has 
concluded that, when adopting a pragmatic view, these obligations resting upon states 
as duty-bearers of international human rights can under current international law also 
be extended to non-state actors exercising a certain level of control over a territory, 
as for example in non-international armed conflicts.31 Furthermore, when considering 
the obligations towards citizens, it has become more and more accepted in 
international law that regimes exercising de facto control, or non-state actors, must 
abide by general international law, including human rights obligations.32 Therefore, 
whereas the following Section will address the obligations of states under 
international human rights law concerning humanitarian assistance, such obligations 
must also be considered equally for non-state actors that may be responsible for the 
provision of humanitarian assistance.  
Regarding the right to life, the state has a clear duty to not arbitrarily deprive 
humans of their life.33 Furthermore, the HRC has argued that the right to life within 
the ICCPR includes an obligation to take positive measures with regard to the 
reduction or elimination of malnutrition, epidemics and other such situations that 
                                                        
26 Louis Henkin, The Age of Rights (Columbia University Press 1990) 3.  
27 Section 5.2.2 Derogability, Human Rights and the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance. 
28 Section 5.4.4 Humanitarian Assistance and the Right to Food.  
29 See in this regard also the ‘Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action’ UN Doc A/CONF.157/23 
(12 July 1993) §1: “Human rights and fundamental freedoms are the birthright of all human beings; their 
protection and promotion is the first responsibility of Governments”.  
30 Although the applicability of human rights standards to international organisations of naturally also of 
great relevance, it remains beyond the scope of this research and will therefore not be addressed.  
31 Section 6.2.1.; ‘Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia’ 
ICJ Advisory Opinion (n 8) § 118; Liesbeth Zegveld, The Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups 
in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2002) 229.  
32 See amongst others Clapham, ‘Human rights obligations of non-state actors in conflict situations’ (n 
9) 522; Tomuschat, ‘The Applicability of Human Rights Law to Insurgent Movements’ (n 9) 586; Steiner, 
Alston & Goodman, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals (n 9) 675, 1420.   
33 Article 3 UDHR, 6 ICCPR, Article 2 ECHR, Article 4 ACHR, Article 4 ACHPR. See for an in depth 






might endanger the right to life.34 In practice, this may entail the provision of 
medicine and food in the aftermath of a (natural) disaster or to those fleeing situations 
of conflict. This stance of the HRC has also been taken by the ECtHR in regard to 
the right to life.35 Evidently, such an obligation (as envisaged by the HRC and 
ECtHR) remains relevant when considering a duty to provide humanitarian 
assistance. Indeed, it has been argued that this prohibition on the arbitrary deprivation 
of life as enshrined in the ICCPR must be seen as part of customary jus cogens, 
making the obligation that lies upon the state one of the highest within international 
law in general.36 The provision of humanitarian assistance therefore functions as a 
means to ensure the fulfilment of the right to life. States and acting sovereigns thus 
have a duty under the right to life to prevent the ‘arbitrary’ loss of life by way of 
ensuring the provision of emergency aid.  
Furthermore, the right to food must be considered. Article 11 of the ICESCR, and 
more particularly the General Comment on this by the CESCR, envisages an 
obligation for states to provide food as part of humanitarian assistance in the event 
of a humanitarian crisis; as part of the fulfilment of the right to food.37 Indeed, 
according to the CESCR a State would have to demonstrate that it has made every 
effort using the resources at its disposal, to in fact fulfil these minimum core 
obligations.38 As such, no retrogressive measures concerning core food provision 
may be taken, even in times of emergency, and Article 2 ICESCR provides that 
international cooperation and assistance should be sought in the fulfilment of the right 
to food, in the event a state’s own available resources should not suffice. Thus, a 
certain duty can be discerned for the affected state to seek international assistance in 
the fulfilment of its duties towards those under its jurisdiction based on Articles 11 
and 2 ICESCR. Indeed, a distinct obligation lies with the state to provide in the right 
to food, in times of an emergency. In practice this would mean that state parties to 
the ICESCR have an obligation to seek international assistance in the delivery of 
emergency supplies of food to their population facing a humanitarian crisis, should 
they not be capable of fulfilling the right to food satisfactorily themselves. The duty 
to provide food aid therefore contains an international aspect under the ICESCR that 
states must abide by. The various other existing legal provisions pertaining to the 
obligation of states to provide for food, amongst others Article 24(2)(c) CRC, Article 
12(2) CEDAW, Article 28 CRPD, Article 12 Additional Protocol to the ACHR in the 
Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and Article 15 Additional Protocol to 
the ACHPR on the Rights of Women in Africa, support the perspective of the 
                                                        
34 CCPR General Comment 6: ‘The right to life (art. 6)’ (30 April 1982) § 2 and CCPR General Comment 
14 ‘Nuclear weapons and the right to life (Art. 6)’ (9 November 1984) § 2. 
35 Budayeva And Others v Russia (App Nos 15339/02, 21166/02, 20058/02, 11673/02 and 15343/02) 
ECHR 20 March 2008, Final 29 September 2008, § 128-129.  
36 ‘Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights questions, including alternative approaches 
for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms’, Note by the 
Secretary-General UN Doc A/66/330 (30 August 2011) § 20.  
37 Section 5.4.4 and CESCR General Comment 12 (Article 11 ICESCR) UN Doc E/C.12/1999/5 ‘The 
right to adequate food’ (12 May 1999) § 28. 
38 Ibid § 17. 
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ICESCR. Furthermore, the latter two pertain to continents that are prone to natural 
disasters and conflicts, making their contribution of particular relevance to the 
provision of humanitarian assistance. 
The right to health, enshrined in Article 25 UDHR and specifically in Article 12 
ICESCR equally provides a (minimum core) obligation upon States Parties to ensure 
that persons within their jurisdiction have access to certain minimum essential levels 
of food, health facilities, basic shelter, water and sanitation. Non-compliance with 
this obligation according to the CESCR will result in a direct violation of Article 12 
ICESCR.39 In particular Article 12(2)(c) ICESCR, stating the duty of States Parties 
to take steps in ‘the prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, 
occupational and other diseases’, interpreted by the CESCR as to include the 
provision of humanitarian assistance in emergency situations, is of relevance with 
regard to the duty of the affected state to provide emergency relief.40 This provision 
in practice would oblige the affected state to actively set up emergency ‘camps’ 
where those affected by crisis may find refuge, which includes sanitation facilities, 
in order to prevent such health epidemics. Therefore, the provision of humanitarian 
assistance by the duty-bearer fulfils the obligation of states under Article 12(2)(c) 
ICESCR to provide in the right to health through an obligation of conduct. Other 
treaty provisions supporting the state's obligation to provide in the right to health, 
although not referring so explicitly to humanitarian assistance, are Article 5(e)(iv) 
ICERD, Article 24 CRC, Article 11 European Social Charter, Article 10 of the 
Additional Protocol to the ACHR in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, Article 16 ACHPR, Article 14 of the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child and Article 14 of the Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights of 
Women in Africa.41 In the above Articles, a consensus can be found concerning the 
obligation for states to prevent diseases and to prioritise vulnerable populations in 
the provision of medical aid.  
Lastly, the right to water is relevant to the provision of humanitarian assistance. 
Although international treaty law does not consider the right to water independently, 
separate from the right to health, several more specialised treaties do contain 
provisions pertaining to the right to water, such as Article 24(1)(c) CRC, Article 
14(2)(h) CEDAW,  Article 28 CRPD, Article 15(a) Additional Protocol to the 
ACHPR on the Rights of Women in Africa, Article 14(2)(c) African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child.42 From these provisions, an obligation can be 
distilled of a rather general nature, not focused on the provision of humanitarian 
assistance, resting upon states to provide access to safe drinking water. This 
obligation, however, is only found on the one hand in several specific treaties, 
connected to the rights of children, women or persons with disabilities, and on the 
other hand in regional conventions. As such, the right to water is not yet codified 
                                                        
39 CESCR General Comment 14 (11 August 2000) UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4 ‘The right to the highest 
attainable standard of health’, § 43 and Section 5.4.6. 
40 Ibid § 16.  
41 For a more detailed discussion of these articles, see Section 5.4.6. 






properly or uniformly at an international level, and the most far-reaching obligations 
lying upon states can be found on the African continent. It must be noted that the 
CESCR has interpreted a right to water to exist, as derived from Articles 11 and 12 
ICESCR, but such an interpretation on its own does not hold legal standing.43  Thus 
no practical duties can be discerned for sovereigns in the event of a humanitarian 
crisis under the ‘right to water’.  
The rights to life, food and health in international law provide for distinct and 
specific obligations resting upon states. Not only is the right to life arguably part of 
the jus cogens body of law,44 the rights to food and health also entail certain minimum 
core obligations for states to fulfil at all times. Moreover, Article 2 ICESCR 
addresses a duty of the affected state to search for international assistance and 
cooperation in the fulfilment of its obligations under the ICESCR and the rights to 
food and health enshrined therein. As such, the provision of humanitarian assistance 
in times of humanitarian crisis will be a vehicle or a means to fulfil a state's obligation 
under the right to life, food or health. Indeed, not providing emergency assistance 
may then be considered a violation of a state's duties under human rights law. Thus, 
the provision of humanitarian assistance in times of a humanitarian crisis is a 
translation, as made in the interpretative remarks of the HRC and CESCR, from the 
basic obligations resting upon states concerning the rights to life, food, health (and 
water). In practice, this amounts to precisely the provision of supplies as defined to 
be ‘humanitarian assistance’.45 
Besides the rights to life, food, health and water which have been discussed in 
relation to the provision of humanitarian assistance, other provisions also exist in 
current human rights law, calling upon states to protect persons in situations such as 
a humanitarian crisis. As such, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities declares: 
 
“States Parties shall take, in accordance with their obligations under international law, 
including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, all necessary 
measures to ensure the protection and safety of persons with disabilities in situations of 
risk, including situations of armed conflict, humanitarian emergencies and the occurrence 
of natural disasters”.46 
 
Thus, an obligation rests upon State Parties to the CRPD to provide for the fulfilment 
of human rights of such persons, in the event of a humanitarian crisis. Furthermore, 
the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, although a non-binding 
document, has emphasised the ‘importance of and the need for humanitarian 
                                                        
43 Ibid.  
44 Which norms amount to jus cogens continues to be a discussion under international law. See amongst 
others: Rafael Nieto Navia, ‘International Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) And International 
Humanitarian Law’ in LC Vohrah, F Pocar et al, (eds) Man’s Inhumanity to Man: Essays in Honour of 
Antonio Cassese (Kluwer Law International 2003); Alexander Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in 
International Law (Oxford University Press 2006); and Malcolm Shaw, International Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2008) 303, 720-721.  
45 Section 2.2.2 Defining Humanitarian Assistance. 
46 Article 11 CRPD.  
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assistance to victims of all natural and man-made disasters’ in the context of human 
rights.47   
Considering the above provisions in human rights law, specifically the provisions 
concerning the right to life, food and health as they relate to the delivery of 
emergency assistance in the event of a humanitarian crisis, the conclusions of Chapter 
5 must therefore be reiterated. The provision of humanitarian assistance by states, 
and by non-state actors upon which human rights obligations rest under international 
law, functions as a vehicle in the fulfilment of the obligations international human 
rights law places upon the affected state concerning the rights to life, food, health 
(and water). This indeed also aligns with the findings as mentioned above by the ICJ 
in both the Nicaragua-case and the ‘Application Of The International Convention On 
The Elimination Of All Forms Of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian 
Federation)’-case. Here, the Court observed that the provision of humanitarian 
assistance may indeed be a manner in which a state fulfils its obligations under human 
rights law.   
 
6.3.2 Rights of Persons to Receive Assistance under Human Rights Law 
  
The various human rights individuals may invoke to claim a right to the receipt of 
humanitarian assistance have been scrutinised above from the perspective of the 
affected state or non-state actor exercising control. Given the fact that no independent 
human right to receive humanitarian assistance currently exists in human rights law, 
individuals seeking to receive such assistance shall have to find recourse in the 
existing human rights to life, food, health (and water).48 Within the receipt of 
humanitarian assistance lies the fulfilment of the basic necessities required in the 
fulfilment of the rights to life, food and health.   
The right to life is distinctly formulated in Article 3 UDHR and Article 6 ICCPR, 
leaving no doubt as to the right of each individual to have his or her life protected.49 
Individuals may base themselves on Article 6 ICCPR, Article 2 ECHR, Article 4 
ACHR or Article 4 ACHPR preventing the arbitrary or intentional deprivation of the 
right to life, when claiming a right to receive emergency aid from their sovereign 
authorities. Furthermore, the child in international human rights law may also revert 
to Article 6 CRC, claiming an inherent right to life which can be read in conjuncture 
with Article 22 CRC relating to the protection of children through the provision of 
humanitarian assistance. These international human rights treaties do not specifically 
refer to the provision of humanitarian assistance as related to the right to life, nor do 
the interpretive remarks of states parties in reservations to these treaties either.50 As 
such, the State Parties have distinctly not chosen to limit the right to life in relation 
to the provision of humanitarian assistance, when they did have the opportunity to do 
so. This lack of restriction enables individuals to resort to invocation of this right in 
                                                        
47 ‘Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action’ UN Doc A/CONF.157/23, (12 July 1993) § 23.  
48 5.4 Humanitarian Assistance Within the Context of Existing Human Rights. 







the event of a humanitarian emergency, with a view to the assertion that the HRC has 
interpreted the right to life to include such emergency relief, and following the 
suggestions thereto also by the ICJ, that has addressed the role humanitarian 
assistance plays in the fulfilment of human rights. 
Subsequently, individuals may resort to the human right to (adequate) food in the 
event of a humanitarian emergency. As set out in Articles 25 UDHR and 11 ICESCR, 
each individual has a right to “adequate food” which according to the ICESCR 
includes the right to be free from hunger. As the CESCR has declared access to food 
to be of relevance to the fulfilment of the right to food,51 it unambiguously determines 
a link between the right to food and the receipt of humanitarian assistance. However, 
as has been established earlier, although Article 11 ICESCR is formulated as an 
inherent individual right, the emphasis of the provision lies with the obligation for 
State Parties to realise the right to adequate food, through its conduct.52 Article 
24(2)(c) CRC and Article 28 CRPD envisage a right to adequate food (through the 
right to health), whereas the CEDAW follows the formulation as found in the 
ICESCR and bases the right to adequate food in Article 12(2) CEDAW largely on 
the obligation of the State Party to provide it. Similarly at the regional level, Article 
12 of the Additional Protocol to the ACHR in the Area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights and Article 15 of the Additional Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights 
of Women in Africa formulate a right to food, and these Protocols also emphasise the 
role of the State Party in the obligation to fulfil the right to food. Whilst an 
individual’s right to food is thus codified broadly at the international level, the 
formulation of the right for the most part underlines the state’s obligations in the 
fulfilment of the right.53 From a practical perspective, it is therefore more difficult to 
claim such an obligation of conduct, as no specificities with regard to the receipt of 
food in times of emergency are formulated from the perspective of the individual. 
Rather, the individual shall have to assert that the state is not fulfilling its duty to 
provide an adequate amount of emergency relief in times of crisis.  
Equally the right to health, as codified in Article 25 UDHR and Article 12 
ICESCR, accentuates the obligation of states to ensure access to certain minimum 
essential levels of food, health facilities, basic shelter, water and sanitation. In fact, 
the receipt of humanitarian assistance may fulfil such an obligation according to 
Article 12(2)(c) ICESCR. Thus, reversely formulated, as states have a duty under this 
Article to take steps in ‘the prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, 
occupational and other diseases’, individuals would be entitled through their human 
right to health to receive humanitarian assistance in the assurance that they do not 
succumb to certain epidemic diseases during, or in the aftermath of, a humanitarian 
emergency.54 However, it is distinctly formulated within Article 12 ICESCR that 
State Parties to the ICESCR should ‘take steps’. Such a formulation does not appear 
to fall within the ‘minimum core obligations’ and it will be difficult for individuals 
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52 Section 5.4.3 and 5.4.4. 
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to truly enforce this ‘step’ in the right to health in the circumstance of a humanitarian 
crisis. Yet, it remains apparent that the provision of humanitarian assistance can be a 
vehicle in the fulfilment of the right to health as formulated in the ICESCR. Both the 
interpretive comments of the CESCR and the formulation of Article 12 ICESCR itself 
allow this. The right to health is furthermore equally recognised in Article 5(e)(iv) 
ICERD, Article 24 CRC, Article 11 European Social Charter, Article 10 of the 
Additional Protocol to the ACHR in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, Article 16 ACHPR, Article 14 of the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child and Article 14 of the Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights of 
Women in Africa. Problematic to the right to health however, as discussed in Chapter 
5, is that each treaty holds different formulations to this specific right, thereby making 
a consensus difficult to find.55 However, common ground can be found in the more 
narrow formulation concerning the prevention of diseases by states, which can be 
interpreted as part of the right to health for individuals. Such diseases, by their very 
nature, tend to spread more quickly in times of crisis and in circumstances of 
displacement of persons, leading to a distinct role of the affected state in the 
fulfilment of the right to health – through the prevention of diseases – in the 
circumstance of a humanitarian crisis. Individuals therefore have the right to request 
assistance in setting up proper health and sanitation facilities in the immediate 
aftermath of a disaster or when having fled their homes in times of conflict.  
Lastly, regarding the right to water, it has indeed already been discussed that such 
a ‘right’ does not currently exist as a codified individual provision within major 
international human rights treaty law. Yet, the more specialised conventions do 
encompass a right to water, such as Article 24(1)(c) CRC, Article 14(2)(h) CEDAW,  
Article 28 CRPD, Article 15(a) Additional Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights of 
Women in Africa, Article 14(2)(c) African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child. As is the case with the right to food and the right to health, these conventions 
mostly formulate these provisions as obligations of the State Parties.56 Furthermore, 
the incorporation is rather haphazard, as protection at the international level is 
somewhat limited to children and women, while at the regional level limited to the 
African and American continents. Indeed the CESCR has, through its interpretive 
remarks, attempted to ascertain that the right to water exists as derived from Articles 
11 and 12 ICESCR, but in and of itself, this does not create an actual right in 
international law.57 The further acceptance of such a right is currently in motion, 
through various initiatives in this regard within the resolutions of the UN General 
Assembly, leading to potential customary acceptance, although at this stage the law 
                                                        
55 Section 5.4.3.  
56 Section 5.4.4.  
57 CESCR General Comment 15 (20 January 2003) UN Doc E/C.12/2002/11 ‘The Right to water (arts. 
11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights’ § 3. Earlier references 
by the CESCR on the right to water in relation to Article 11 can be found in its General Comment 6 (8 
December 1995) UN Doc E/1996/22 ‘The economic, social and cultural rights of older persons’ § 5 and 
§ 32, as well as General Comment 4 (13 December 1991) UN Doc E/1992/23 ‘The right to adequate 
housing’ § 8(b). The CESCR has furthermore referenced to the right to water in relation to Article 12 






has not properly crystallised.58 Yet, for the provision of humanitarian assistance, as 
well as its protection through human rights law, such individual codification is 
however not necessary. Given the possibilities for persons to claim provision of 
assistance in the fulfilment of their rights to life, food and health, which may include 
the provision of water, such an individual right is not necessary.  
The existence of these rights creates a need and an obligation for their fulfilment. 
Humanitarian assistance can and must be seen as a vehicle through which these 
existing rights may be fulfilled. Such fulfilment must occur in respect of the 
principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality, amongst others incorporated 
through Article 5 ICERD. Indeed, the receipt of assistance may be claimed by 
persons in times of a humanitarian emergency, in order to meet the content of the 
provisions relating to the rights to life, food and health. Such a claim could also be 
considered the meeting of a basic norm within this context. Whereas an independent 
right to receive assistance is indeed currently absent from human rights law today, 
the provision of assistance must be considered part of the human rights regime in a 
larger perspective. Not receiving assistance (i.e. food, water, medicine and shelter) 
when in need during a humanitarian crisis, could result in the violation of the human 
rights to life, food and water. Humanitarian assistance as a concept therefore clearly 
fits within the human rights framework and discourse. Persons in need of food, water, 
medicine and other facilities related to their immediate survival have the opportunity, 
under the existing rights to life, food and health, to request the receipt of humanitarian 
assistance. Framing the provision of humanitarian assistance within this human rights 
regime is not only legally sound, it furthermore enables persons in need of emergency 
aid to actively pursue such claims.  
 
6.4 Duties and Rights under the UN Framework: the Security Council and 
General Assembly 
 
The UN framework also provides a general and comprehensive perspective on the 
duties that may rest on the affected state in the provision of humanitarian assistance. 
The UN framework is, as this research’s approach is doing, equally capable of 
approaching the provision of assistance from an overall perspective, addressing the 
provision of assistance at all times, as does human rights law. As such, the General 
Assembly is a representation of nearly all states in the world and therefore often 
reflects indications of opinio juris and state practice. Its scope furthermore is wide 
and covers all matters in international law. The Security Council on the other hand, 
whilst only encompassing a few member states, functions at the supranational level 
in international law, based upon the provisions in Article 25 of the UN Charter.59 
Given that it therefore has the power to adopt binding resolutions, its work influences 
the entire international legal world. Furthermore, whilst its scope of action may 
appear limited due to restrictions placed upon it in Article 39 UN Charter declaring 
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59 Article 25 UN Charter states: “The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the 
decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter”. 
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a need for a ‘threat to the peace’, such a limitation falls within the framework of this 
research. As argued in Section 3.3.3, the need for humanitarian assistance becomes 
immediate and relevant in the event of a ‘humanitarian crisis’. Such a crisis by 
definition encompasses a potential threat to the peace due to a variety of reasons, 
dependent on the specific circumstances. Non-international armed conflicts may 
incur spill-over effects into neighbouring countries, natural disasters may have cross-
border effects and induce a large influx of IDPs and refugees and a variety of other 
possibilities that may result in a threat to the peace.  
Thus, both Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, both for their own 
reasons, are relevant to analyse in relation to the rights and duties involved in the 
provision of assistance. Furthermore, several soft law instruments also adhere to such 
a comprehensive approach in the discussion of various duties related to the provision 
of emergency assistance. These soft law instruments, when in support of Security 
Council and General Assembly resolutions, are discussed therewith. They 
supplement the legal sources throughout this research as they often hold an 
overarching and encompassing approach in their consideration of rights and duties 
related to the receipt of humanitarian assistance, often taking the approach from the 
perspective of individuals entitled to receive aid. Considering the binding nature that 
Security Council resolutions can have regarding the member states of the UN, this 
category will be addressed first, followed by the General Assembly resolutions that 
in themselves do not have a binding force in international law.  
 
6.4.1 Duties of the Affected State under Security Council Resolutions 
 
The UN Security Council has expressed itself regarding the obligations of the 
affected state in the provision of humanitarian assistance on many occasions in recent 
years, but it got off to a slow start.60 Whereas the UN General Assembly first 
addressed the matter of humanitarian assistance and thus the various responsibilities 
decades ago,61 the Security Council has for a long time avoided this topic. The more 
encompassing approach was furthermore not embraced from the outset. Given the 
Charter-based determination and division of tasks between the two UN organs, the 
Security Council did not deal with the General Assembly's addressing of 
humanitarian assistance, considering the latter's focus on natural disasters. Indeed, 
when adopting resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter, these binding decisions 
affect the international legal realm and contribute to the further development of 
norms. A turning point came a few decades ago, when the Council embraced 
humanitarian assistance within its scope of work, and within the boundaries of a 
‘threat to the peace’ as codified in Article 39 UN Charter. The Council then 
commenced addressing the matter of humanitarian assistance thematically in 
independent resolutions, which will be concentrated on further in this Section. 
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However, the UN Security Council initially dealt with humanitarian assistance on a 
more ad hoc basis. The Council addressed humanitarian assistance increasingly in 
several of its resolutions pertaining to certain country situations that arose in the early 
1990s, most notably amongst others the prolonged conflicts in the Sudan, Somalia, 
the Former Yugoslavia and the situation in Iraq.62 To provide a more thorough view 
of the Security Council’s approach, these situations will be addressed and analysed, 
for the purpose of establishing the potential thread in the work of the Council.  
Several primary references to the provision of humanitarian assistance may be 
found in the Security Council resolutions concerning the situation in Iraq in the early 
1990s. However, in these resolutions the Council fails to address Iraq's own sovereign 
responsibility in adhering to this.63 Yet, considering the situation, the Security 
Council for the first time directly links the on-going repression of civilians to a threat 
to the international peace.64 Indeed, this approach where the responsibilities of the 
affected state are not addressed can also be seen in subsequent resolutions pertaining 
to Somalia that requested the international community to assist in the delivery of 
assistance.65 The Security Council foregoes Somalia's responsibilities in the 
provision of assistance, focusing on the facilitation of international assistance (to be 
addressed in the subsequent Chapter).66 Only in passing does the Council note that 
the Somali people have the ‘ultimate responsibility for national reconciliation and the 
reconstruction of their own country’.67 Similarly, and occurring roughly 
simultaneously, the Security Council focuses on the external provision of assistance 
in the conflict in the Former Yugoslavia,68 having received calls for assistance in the 
delivery of aid by amongst others the Bosnian President.69 At a later stage, still 
concerning the Former Yugoslavia, but related to the conflict in Kosovo, the Security 
Council does demand: 
 
                                                        
62 It remains beyond the scope of this research to provide in depth analyses of all country situations in 
which the UN Security Council addressed the matter of humanitarian assistance, and only several key 
examples will be used, to illustrate the legal relevance.  
63 UNSC Res 661 (6 August 1990) UN Doc S/RES/661 § 3(c) and 4; UNSC Res 687 (8 April 1991) UN 
Doc S/RES/687; UNSC Res 688 (5 April 1991) UN Doc S/RES/688 § 3, 5-6 and UNSC Res 706 (15 
August 1991) UN Doc S/RES/706 preamble §8 and §2.  
64 Ibid S/RES/688 § 1.  
65 See amongst others UNSC Res 794 (3 December 1992) UN Doc S/RES/794 preamble § 7. 
66 UNSC Res 733 (23 January 1992) UN Doc S/RES/733 § 2, 8-9; UNSC Res 746 (17 March 1992) UN 
Doc S/RES/746 § 3,5,8; UNSC Res 751 (24 April 1992) UN Doc S/RES/751 § 12 & 14; UNSC Res 767 
(27 July 1992) UN Doc S/RES/767 § 3-4, 6; UNSC Res 775 (28 August 1992) UN Doc S/RES/775 § 
7&9; UNSC Res 794 (3 December 1992) UN Doc S/RES/794 § 2-3.  
67 Ibid S/RES/794 preamble § 15. 
68 UNSC Res 752 (15 May 1992) UN Doc S/RES/752 § 7&8; UNSC Res 757 (30 May 1992) UN Doc 
S/RES/757 § 17; UNSC Res 770 (13 August 1992) UN Doc S/RES/770 § 2-3, 6; UNSC Res 776 (14 
September 1992) UN Doc S/RES/776; UNSC Res 781 (9 October 1992) UN Doc S/RES/781 preamble 
& § 1; UNSC Res 786 (10 November 1992) UN Doc S/RES/786; UNSC Res 787 (16 November 1992) 
UN Doc S/RES/787 § 17-18; UNSC Res 819 (16 April 1993) UN Doc S/RES/819 preamble § 8 and § 8; 
UNSC Res 824 (6 May 1993) UN Doc S/RES/824 preamble §4 & § 4(b), 7; UNSC Res 836 (4 June 
1993) UN Doc S/RES 836 preamble §15 & § 5.   
69 Ibid S/RES/752 preamble § 7. 
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“that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Albanian 
leadership take immediate steps to improve the humanitarian situation and to avert the 
impending humanitarian catastrophe”.70  
 
Thus, prior to addressing the thematic issue of the protection of civilians in armed 
conflict, the Security Council did not systematically address the potential 
responsibilities of the affected states in the provision of humanitarian assistance. It 
must however be noted that in these resolutions pertaining to specific country 
situations, the Security Council often responded to calls from the affected state to 
assist in the provision of international assistance, which indicates a willingness from 
the state-party to acknowledge a need for international support and in theory also 
implies an acknowledgment of that state that it cannot handle the situation 
independently. Such international assistance is then subsequently addressed by the 
Council. Indeed, where the situation in Kosovo was concerned, the Security Council 
called to parties, demanded even, that they improve the humanitarian situation, 
although the Council still fell short in addressing such matters as the ‘responsibility’ 
of the affected state.  
The country-specific circumstances opened the door to the more thematic 
deliberation of the topic within the work of the Council, and by 1999 the Security 
Council for the first time issued a thematic, non-country specific resolution. In this 
resolution concerning the protection of civilians in armed conflict the Council urged 
all parties involved to:  
 
”comply strictly with their obligations under international humanitarian, human rights and 
refugee law, in particular those contained in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and 
in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977, as well as with 
the decisions of the Security Council”.71 
 
Specifically regarding refugees and IDPs, the Security Council noted that the primary 
responsibility to protect these vulnerable groups lies with states, but fails to mention 
a primary responsibility in the protection of all civilians or the provision of 
humanitarian assistance.72 Despite this lacuna, the Security Council took an 
important step in the greater protection of civilians with this resolution, urging those 
involved in armed conflict to adhere to the relevant rules of international law, which 
include those concerning the provision of humanitarian assistance. The Council has 
on occasion elaborated such matters with a view to specific groups, by stressing 
                                                        
70 UNSC Res 1199 (23 September 1998) UN Doc S/RES/1199 § 2. 
71 UNSC Res 1265 (17 September 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1265 [Protection of Civilians in Armed 
Conflict] § 4. The thematic resolution followed a Secretary General Report on the matter: UN Doc 
S/1999/957 (8 September 1999). Since 1999, the Secretary General has systematically reported on the 
matter of the protection of civilians. See in this regard: UN Doc S/2001/331 (30 March 2001); UN Doc 
S/2002/1300 (26 November 2002); UN Doc S/2004/431 (28 May 2004); UN Doc S/2005/740 (28 
November 2005); UN Doc S/2007/643 (28 October 2007); UN Doc S/2009/277 (29 May 2009); UN Doc 
S/2010/579 (11 November 2010); and UN Doc S/2012/376 (22 May 2012).  






amongst others the importance of children’s access to basic services such as health 
care during ‘conflict and post-conflict periods’.73 
Following this thematic resolution, the Security Council has over the past years 
specifically addressed the matter of civilians in armed conflict more in depth. In 
subsequent resolutions, the Security Council reiterated its position concerning the 
adherence to the rule of law, but again did not declare a direct responsibility in the 
protection of persons or the provision of humanitarian assistance for the affected 
state.74 However, with time, the Security Council has altered its take on the provision 
of humanitarian assistance, to not only view this notion from an external position. 
Indeed the Council has begun to address it rather from the perspective that a primary 
responsibility lies with the affected state. As such, the Council declared in 2006 in 
the third thematic resolution on the protection of civilians in armed conflict that it: 
 
”Urges the international community to provide support and assistance to enable States to 
fulfil their responsibilities regarding the protection of refugees and other persons protected 
under international humanitarian law”.75 
 
Thus, whereas the Council urges the international community to take action, it does 
acknowledge that it is the primary responsibility of states to not only protect refugees 
and other protected persons in times of conflict, but to protect civilians in general.76 
With time, and with the simultaneous incorporation of the concept of the 
Responsibility to Protect within the UN framework as of 2005,77 the Security Council 
has also taken a stronger position in the declaration that the primary responsibility in 
the protection of civilians lies with the affected state. Such a protection concerns the 
basic needs of a population and must therefore include the provision of humanitarian 
assistance.  
Subsequently in 2009 in its fourth thematic resolution, the Security Council 
recalled this position.78 Intermittently, the Security Council also addressed matters 
concerning humanitarian assistance in other themed resolutions, where it reaffirmed 
the position taken in the resolutions concerning the protection of civilians in times of 
armed conflict.79 Equally, the Council continued to reaffirm its position in country 
                                                        
73 UNSC Res 1314 (11 August 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1314 § 14.  
74 See amongst others UNSC Res 1296 (19 April 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1296 Protection of Civilians in 
Armed Conflict preamble & § 19.   
75 UNSC Res 1674 (28 April 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1674 § 13.   
76 Ibid preamble stating: “that parties to armed conflict bear the primary responsibility to take all feasible 
steps to ensure the protection of affected civilians”.  
77 Section 4.2.3.1 UN Endorsement of the Responsibility to Protect. 
78 UNSC Res 1894 (11 November 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1894 preamble “Recognizing that States bear 
the primary responsibility to respect and ensure the human rights of their citizens, as well as all 
individuals within their territory as provided for by relevant international law, Reaffirming that parties to 
armed conflict bear the primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of 
civilians" and § 15: “Expresses its intention to: (a) Call on parties to armed conflict to comply with the 
obligations applicable to them under international humanitarian law to take all required steps to protect 
civilians (…)”.  
79 See amongst others UNSC Res 1325 (31 October 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1325 on Women and Peace 
and Security.  
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resolutions, calling upon governments to fulfil their ‘primary responsibility in the 
protection of civilians’.80 In fact, on occasion the Security Council also called upon 
‘all parties’ to a specific conflict to fulfil their responsibilities in such protection, such 
as concerning Somalia.81 In doing so, the Security Council reaffirms that it recognises 
a responsibility of armed groups to protect civilians and adhere to their 
responsibilities under international law when playing a role in an international or 
non-international armed conflict.  
Rather than being confined to armed conflict and humanitarian law, as was 
declared in the previously discussed thematic resolutions, the Security Council's 
perspective today regarding the provision of humanitarian assistance holds a 
somewhat broader perspective, through the incorporation of the notion of RtoP in the 
UN framework.82 Although the ‘protection of civilians’ as a thematic issue should 
arguably not be confused with the notion of RtoP,83 the two concepts share a common 
denominator in their ideology of protecting populations in need. Indeed, considering 
the ‘Arab Spring’ in 2011, the Security Council called upon the Libyan authorities in 
its resolution ‘Peace and security in Africa’ with a primary reference to RtoP in 
practice to ‘protect its population’.84  The Council reiterated that stance in its 
subsequent resolution declaring that such a duty to ‘protect and ensure’ that the 
primary needs of the population were met, was the responsibility of the state.85 As 
discussed more in depth in Chapter 4 above, the Security Council reaffirmed this 
position concerning the responsibility of the state in successive resolutions 
concerning Libya: 
 
“underscores the Libyan authorities’ responsibility for the protection of its population, 
including foreign nationals and African migrants”.86 
 
The Council has reiterated such wording as well concerning Cote d'Ivoire, Sudan, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Yemen; ‘stressing’, ‘reaffirming’, ‘recalling’ 
or ‘underscoring’ the responsibility of these states in the protection of their 
populations.87 In doing so regarding the Libyan situation, the Security Council 
                                                        
80 See amongst others UNSC Res 1430 (14 August 2002) UN Doc S/RES/1430 on the Situation between 
Eritrea and Ethiopia; UNSC Res 1861 (14 January 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1861 preamble on the situation 
in Chad and the Central African Republic; and UNSC Res 1906 (23 December 2009) UN Doc 
S/RES/1906 preamble on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
81 See for example UNSC Res 1863 (9 July 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1863 § 19. 
82 UNSC Res 1674 (28 April 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1674 § 13 and UNSC Res 1894 (11 November 2009) 
UN Doc S/RES/1894.  
83 ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict’ (22 May 2012) UN 
Doc S/2012/376 § 21 / p5-6. 
84 UNSC Res 1970 (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1970 ‘Peace and security in Africa’ preamble. 
85 UNSC Res 1973 (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1973 ‘The situation in Libya’ preamble § 3. For a 
more in depth discussion of these resolutions see Section 4.2.3.2.  
86 UNSC Res 2016 (27 October 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2016 ‘The situation in Libya’ § 3. See similarly 
UNSC Res 2040 (12 March 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2040 ‘The situation in Libya’ § 4. 
87 UNSC Res 1975 (30 March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1975 preamble; UNSC Res 1996 (8 July 2011) UN 
Doc S/RES/1996 § 3(b)(iv); UNSC Res 1991 (28 June 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1991 preamble; UNSC Res 






distinctly referred to the state's obligations under international law, including 
humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee law, as it had done in earlier 
resolutions pertaining to the protection of civilians in armed conflict.88 In both 
instances therefore the Council addressed the states’ obligations under international 
law. Such statements and declarations by the Security Council reaffirm the assertion 
that it is indeed the affected state that holds the primary responsibility as a sovereign 
to provide humanitarian assistance when (parts of) its population are in need of this 
due to a humanitarian crisis.  
While it is apparent that the embracement of the notion of RtoP has widened the 
scope of the Security Council's resolutions concerning the responsibility of states to 
protect their civilians and populations, the Security Council is somewhat ambiguous 
in its formulations. On the one hand, it calls upon states to protect ‘civilians in time 
of armed conflict’, referring to general international law while including particular 
obligations under humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee law. On the other 
hand, in situations falling short of a determination of an armed conflict it calls merely 
for the ‘protection of a population’ based on the states’ ‘responsibility’, without 
addressing the specific bodies of law upon which this responsibility is based.89 As 
such, the absence of the determination of an armed conflict alters the wording of the 
Security Council. The ‘responsibility’ called upon would then lie within general 
international law, but if interpreted narrowly within the UN's concept of 
Responsibility to Protect, would consequently only exist in relation to the four core 
crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. As 
argued previously by the UN Secretary General, this distinction between the 
‘protection of civilians in armed conflict’ and RtoP should be upheld, as the 
‘protection of civilians’ finds a greater legal basis than the political concept of RtoP.90 
Yet, a parallel discourse may be counterproductive, as the political concept of RtoP 
certainly adheres to the protection of civilians in a broader sense. And what of the 
situations such as Sudan, Yemen and Cote d’Ivoire, where the Security Council 
referred to the legal notion of ‘protecting civilians’ rather than the political concept 
of RtoP, while simultaneously also using terminology such as ‘protecting its 
population’?91 For instance concerning Syria, the Council: 
 
                                                        
88 UNSC Res 1973 (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1973 ‘The situation in Libya’ § 3; UNSC Res 2016 
(27 October 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2016; UNSC Res 2040 (12 March 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2040 § 3, 
as well as UNSC Res 1674 (28 April 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1674 § 5; UNSC Res 1296 (19 April 2000) 
UN Doc S/RES/1296 § 8.  
89 See all resolutions discussed in this Section – a.o. UNSC Res 1975 (30 March 2011) UN Doc 
S/RES/1975 ‘The situation in Côte d’Ivoire’; UNSC Res 1996 (8 July 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1996; UNSC 
Res 2014 (21 October 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2014; UNSC Res 2016 (27 October 2011) UN Doc 
S/RES/2016; UNSC Res 2040 (12 March 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2040.  
90 UN Doc S/2012/376 (n 83) §21. 
91 UNSC Res 1975 (30 March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1975 ‘The situation in Côte d’Ivoir’; UNSC Res 
1996 (8 July 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1996; UNSC Res 2014 (21 October 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2014; 
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“Also demands that all parties take all appropriate steps to protect civilians, including 
members of ethnic, religious and confessional communities, and stresses that, in this 
regard, the primary responsibility to protect its population lies with the Syrian 
authorities”.92 
 
Indeed, in practice, situations will arise in which one the four core crimes warranting 
action under the scope of RtoP is perhaps occurring, whilst the situation does not 
meet the threshold of an armed conflict. Consider in this regard in particular the 
concept of a crime against humanity, where no connection to an armed conflict is 
needed.93 While the primary responsibility of the Security Council is the maintenance 
of international peace and security, the Council will address matters that are often not 
defined as an ‘armed conflict’, but may in fact amount to a ‘humanitarian crisis’, once 
a ‘threat to the peace’ under Article 39 UN Charter is established.  
It appears that the Security Council is not adhering to a strict distinction between 
the two notions of ‘protection’, and opts for a rather broad approach to the protection 
of persons in need of assistance. Indeed, it is more all-encompassing, similar to the 
approach of this research, rather than the more abstract divisions. This path of the 
Security Council may provide a more practical approach to the circumstances it faces. 
In fact, the Security Council at times refers to ‘civilians’ and at times refers to 
‘populations’; a less legal term. However, despite the variety of formulations, the 
Council does not specifically assert what is needed in many circumstances, rather 
remaining more abstract.  
A common denominator in the resolutions of the Security Council relating to the 
provision of humanitarian assistance can be found in its referral to general 
international law, while including humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee 
law. Indeed, this approach also aligns with the UN's embracement of the notion of 
RtoP, and the more contemporary concept of state sovereignty as including a 
responsibility of the state to ensure the protection of those within its territory and 
control.94 Such an approach is for example also seen in the Council’s phrasing of the 
responsibilities of those involved in the conflict in Syria. Whilst the Council has been 
severely criticised for its indecisiveness and lack of action regarding Syria as 
compared to Libya, in 2014 it commenced to address in more detail the provision of 
humanitarian assistance in Syria, asserting that the ‘primary responsibility to protect 
its population lies with the Syrian authorities’.95 Subsequently in the summer of 2014 
the Council reiterated this position:  
 
“Reaffirming the primary responsibility of the Syrian authorities to protect the population 
in Syria and reiterating that parties to armed conflict bear the primary responsibility to take 
all feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians, and recalling in this regard its 
demand that all parties to armed conflict comply fully with the obligations applicable to 
                                                        
92 UNSC Res 2139 (22 February 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2139 § 9. 
93 See Section 8.6.2.2. 
94 See Sections 4.2.3.1 and 4.2.3.2. 






them under international law related to the protection of civilians in armed conflict, 
including journalists, media professionals and associated personnel”.96 
 
It can and must therefore be concluded that the Security Council envisages such a 
primary responsibility for states and parties exercising control under general 
international law, while referring to more specific fields of law also as sources of 
such responsibility, but not adhering to a strict distinction as proposed by the 
Secretary General and rather taking an all-encompassing view to states’ obligations 
in this regard. 
Indeed, this conclusion is also supported by several of the ‘Aide Memoires’ 
provided by the President of the Security Council; stating on behalf of the Council 
that the Council reaffirms that primary responsibility is borne by parties to an armed 
conflict to protect the ‘affected civilians’.97 In the most recent Aide Memoire 
pertaining to the theme of ‘protection of civilians’ the Council has in fact 
incorporated the scope and lingo of RtoP as it stated:  
 
“The Security Council recalls that States bear the primary responsibility to respect and 
ensure `the human rights of their citizens, as well as all individuals within their territory 
as provided for by relevant international law and reaffirms the responsibility of each 
individual State to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and 
crimes against humanity”.98 
 
Furthermore, the Aide Memoires have requested that the Security Council continues 
to stress the responsibility of parties to an armed conflict to ‘respect, protect and meet 
the basic needs of civilian populations within their effective control’.99 Clearly, 
meeting the ‘basic needs’ of a population involves the provision of food, water and 
emergency shelter, which can only lead to the conclusion that the Security Council 
perceives the primary responsibility in the provision of humanitarian assistance to lie 
with the sovereign state, or other parties involved in a particular conflict acting with 
a certain degree of control.  
                                                        
96 UNSC 2165 (14 July 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2165 preamble.  
97 For example ‘Aide Memoire Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict’ UN Doc S/PRST/2010/25 (22 
November 2010) preamble, and ‘Aide Memoire Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict’ UN Doc 
S/PRST/2014/3 (12 February 2014) 2. These Aide Memoire’s follow the previous one UN Doc 
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armed conflict.  
98 Ibid UN Doc S/PRST/2014/3, 2. 
99 ‘Aide Memoire Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict’ UN Doc S/PRST/2010/25 (22 November 
2010) 2; ‘Aide Memoire Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict’ UN Doc S/PRST/2014/3 (12 
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Armed Conflict’ UN Doc S/PRST/2013/2 (12 February 2013) 1 and 3. 
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Thus, as Presidential Statements are considered (non-binding) decisions of the 
Council under Article 27 of the UN Charter,100 the Security Council continues to 
restate its commitment to emphasising the primary responsibility of states regarding 
the protection of individuals within their jurisdiction, through a comprehensive 
approach, in support of its earlier resolutions in this regard. Indeed, the continued 
reiteration that the Security Council ‘recognises that States bear the primary 
responsibility to protect civilians’ as well as reaffirming that parties to an armed 
conflict bear the primary responsibility to take ‘all feasible steps to ensure the 
protection of civilians’ and urging that they meet civilians’ basic needs while at the 
same time reaffirming the ‘responsibility to protect populations’ in light of the World 
Summit Outcome Document, reaffirms the Security Council’s comprehensive 
approach to the provision of assistance, in search of broad protection for those in 
need. This protection appears to be sought both through the original thematic 
‘protection of civilians’ as well as through the more recent concept of RtoP. 
Furthermore, such a primary responsibility for states is asserted under international 
law, including humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee law, to protect their 
civilians and populations in circumstances of armed conflict and other situations that 
may provide a threat to the peace.  
A primary role can therefore be discerned for the sovereign or other party 
exercising control within the territory where the humanitarian crisis is taking place 
in the view of the Security Council in the provision of assistance in circumstances 
threatening the peace. Finally however, it must be noted that although the Security 
Council appears to be taking an all-encompassing approach to the discussion of the 
protection of persons, it does not address such protection in situations not amounting 
to some form of international threat to the peace. In this regard, the General 
Assembly's resolutions must be considered, to further develop a view of the current 
UN framework concerning the obligations of the affected state in the provision of 
humanitarian assistance. Nonetheless, the decisions of the Council do set forth an 
increasingly consistent line of reasoning regarding the responsibilities of the affected 
state, which can be considered to reinforce existing international norms.   
 
6.4.2 Rights of Persons to Receive Assistance under Security Council Resolutions 
 
Prior to discussing the approach of the General Assembly, the Security Council’s 
approach to the duty of the affected state to provide assistance must be set off against 
its approach to the potential right to receive such assistance. Whereas the Security 
Council considered the duties of the affected state rather thoroughly as discussed in 
the above Section, it’s take on the rights of individuals in the receipt of such 
assistance cannot be said to be anything more than meagre.  
The approach of the Security Council is quite clearly developed from the 
perspective of the obligation of the affected state and, as will be seen in the 
subsequent Chapter, also from the perspective of the potential right to the delivery of 
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assistance by third parties, which relates to a state’s potential duty to allow access 
therefore.101 In fact, in analysing the Security Council resolutions pertaining to 
humanitarian assistance and related topics such as the protection of civilians in armed 
conflict, it becomes apparent that the Security Council does not in so many words 
address the rights of individuals receiving assistance. The Council rather approaches 
the topic from the viewpoint of the responsibilities of the state. Although this 
approach from the perspective of state’s duties is somewhat disappointing given the 
opportunities the Council has to exercise influence on strengthening the ‘right to 
receive assistance’, it can to a certain degree be clarified and understood. Given the 
fact that the Security Council resolutions in fact bind states, it is logical that they are 
indeed therefore formulated in a manner to indeed address the responsibilities of 
states. Nonetheless, the opportunity remains for the Security Council to in fact also 
address the related right of individuals to receive aid as fulfilment of the states’ duties 
to provide such assistance.  
 
6.4.3 Duties of the Affected State under General Assembly Resolutions 
 
Whilst the General Assembly resolutions do not hold binding legal consequences for 
states, they do contribute to the determination of the position of state practice, given 
the large number of states represented within the body, in particular when such 
resolutions are adopted by consensus. Should a distinct thread or line in the work of 
the Assembly be discerned, this would then contribute to the argument of potential 
(developing) customary legal norms in this regard.  
The pivotal position of the General Assembly in the development of the role of 
the UN as an organisation in the provision of humanitarian assistance has been 
previously discussed in Section 2.2.1.1. This Section considers the position of the 
General Assembly concerning the affected state’s duties. From the 1960s onwards, 
the General Assembly has noted the relevance of the provision of humanitarian 
assistance.102 A clear stance regarding the affected state's responsibility remained 
lacking during the early decades, as the General Assembly focused on external offers 
regarding the provision of assistance from the international community.103 Yet, as 
early as 1981 the General Assembly noted the primacy of the role of the affected 
countries ‘in caring for the victims of natural disasters and other disaster situations’, 
while also stating that the primary responsibility for administration and relief 
operations, as well as the majority of the provision of actual material assistance lies 
                                                        
101 Section 7.4.2.  
102 The General Assembly also notes the importance of disaster preparedness, mitigation and prevention 
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research.  
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Chapter 7.  
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with these affected states.104 The General Assembly reaffirmed its stance in 
subsequent resolutions throughout the 1980s.105 Furthermore, gearing up towards its 
‘International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction’,106 the General Assembly 
noted in 1988 and in 1990 that ‘it is up to each state first and foremost to take care of 
the victims of natural disasters and other emergencies occurring on its territory’ and 
asserted the affected state’s primary role in this regard.107 The Assembly thus 
unequivocally asserts the responsibility of the affected state. Reiterating this position 
at an early stage during the ‘International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction’, 
the General Assembly determined in its well-known Resolution 46/182 that: 
 
“Each state has the responsibility first and foremost to take care of the victims of natural 
disasters and other emergencies occurring on its territory. Hence, the affected State has the 
primary role in the initiation, organization, coordination, and implementation of 
humanitarian assistance within its territory”.108 
 
Thus, almost a decade before the Security Council asserted a primary role for states 
in the ‘the protection of civilians in time of armed conflict’, the General Assembly 
claimed such a responsibility to lie with the affected state in times of ‘natural disaster 
and other emergencies’. As has already been argued, such an ‘other emergency’ may 
indeed include a wide variety of situations, originating from multiple origins.109 It is 
apparent that the wording of the General Assembly resolutions, although non-binding 
in character, is much clearer and more direct than the Security Council in the 
declaration that the provision of humanitarian assistance falls within the scope of 
responsibilities attributable to the affected state. Where the Security Council 
considers phrases such as the ‘protection of civilians’ and meeting their ‘basic needs’, 
the General Assembly is straightforward in the assessment of the need for 
humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of a natural disaster and that such a need 
should be met through the responsibilities of the affected state. Naturally, a state's 
responsibility for the occurrence of such a disaster is far more likely to be absent than 
is often the case in responsibility for instances of armed conflict, with which the 
Security Council is concerned. Such a determination by the General Assembly is 
therefore also more likely to be feasible in the political arena of the UN, with less 
political and legal consequences. Furthermore, although the General Assembly 
claims a responsibility for the affected state, it does not specify the exact legal basis 
for such a responsibility, nor do its resolutions have binding legal value.  
                                                        
104 UNGA Res 36/225 (17 December 1981) UN Doc A/RES/36/225 preamble and § 2.  
105 See amongst others UNGA Res 38/202 (20 December 1983) UN Doc A/RES/38/202 preamble and § 
4. See also UNGA Res 41/201 (8 December 1986) UN Doc A/RES/41/201 § 2.  
106 Section 2.2.1 Historical Development. 
107 UNGA Res 43/131 (8 December 1988) UN Doc A/RES/43/131 preamble & § 2; UNGA Res 45/100 
(14 December 1990) UN Doc A/RES/45/100 preamble and § 2. 
108 UNGA Res 46/182 (19 December 1991) UN Doc A/RES/46/182, General Assembly Resolution 
‘Strengthening the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations’, Annex 
Guiding Principles § 4.  






The abovementioned Resolution 46/182 is considered to be the cardinal resolution 
concerning the establishment of the UN framework on the provision and coordination 
of humanitarian assistance, and the Assembly has referred back to it consistently in 
subsequent resolutions, generally adopted without a vote, by consensus. In such 
subsequent resolutions, the Assembly reiterates the Guiding Principles annexed to 
Resolution 46/182, and stresses the need for humanitarian assistance to be provided 
according to these Principles.110 In doing so, the General Assembly has continued to 
repeat its original approach and wording, asserting the primary responsibility of the 
affected state. However, the Assembly has progressed and developed its perspective, 
as in subsequent years the Assembly has also addressed the responsibility of the 
affected state in circumstances other than related to natural disaster, noting:  
 
“the obligation of all States and parties to an armed conflict to protect civilians in armed 
conflicts in accordance with international humanitarian law, and invites States to promote 
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a culture of protection, taking into account the particular needs of women, children, older 
persons and persons with disabilities”.111 
 
Thus, aligning itself with the position of the Security Council, the General Assembly 
also affirms the duty of states and other parties to armed conflict to protect civilians, 
in particular the most vulnerable. This stance has then also been reiterated by the 
General Assembly in subsequent resolutions pertaining to the provision of 
humanitarian assistance.112 More recently, the General Assembly has begun to call 
upon states to ‘comply fully with their obligations under international humanitarian 
law’ regarding the respect for and protection of civilians within their jurisdiction.113 
When considering the General Assembly's perspective on the responsibility of 
states in the provision of humanitarian assistance, it becomes apparent that the 
original focus concerned a responsibility regarding the provision of humanitarian 
assistance in relation to natural disasters. Yet, in more recent years, the General 
Assembly has begun to complement the Security Council in both its topic and 
wording, as it has begun to include the responsibility of states to provide assistance 
in times of conflict, as well as mentioning the duties of states in the ‘protection of 
civilians’. Thus, although it may be too soon to state that the two central UN organs 
are perhaps aligning themselves towards one singular perspective, the General 
Assembly does indeed appear to be embracing the perspective taken by the Security 
Council with regard to a more all-encompassing and overarching approach 
concerning the responsibilities of the affected state, without so much distinction as 
to the specific circumstance leading up to the need for emergency aid.  
What remains however, is some lack in clarity with regard to the specific 
obligations that states may have within the ‘general responsibility’ to provide 
assistance. With the exception of the recent referrals to humanitarian law, the General 
Assembly does not declare whether these responsibilities that it recognises may be a 
duty to provide assistance under a particular body of law, thereby leaving no other 
source than general international law. Yet, the General Assembly does insist that such 
obligations exist in international law, and considers potential enforcement 
mechanisms should a state not provide for humanitarian assistance.114 Thus, while 
the UN body itself does not have the means to adopt legally binding resolutions, the 
resolutions in general are adopted by consensus and indicative of a particular trend 
within the body of UN member states. As such, it can be concluded that the UN 
General Assembly resolutions support the stance taken by the Security Council in the 
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sense that here too an assertion is made regarding an overall primary responsibility 
for the affected state to protect civilians within its jurisdiction under international 
law, through the provision of humanitarian assistance in the event of a broad range 
of emergencies. Unlike the Security Council, which includes non-state actors such as 
armed groups in its deliberations, the General Assembly however focuses on the 
responsibilities of the affected state.  
 
6.4.4 Rights of Persons to Receive Assistance under General Assembly Resolutions 
 
Similar to the Security Council, the General Assembly approaches the provision of 
humanitarian assistance from the perspective of the state, rather than from the 
perspective of the recipient of such assistance. Indeed, the UN's outlook focuses on 
the duties that may lie with the affected state (or third states in Chapter 7), rather than 
possible rights of the persons in need of assistance. At an early stage, the General 
Assembly merely formulated rather broadly that: 
 
“The provision of international relief to civilian populations is in conformity with the 
humanitarian principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and other international instruments in the field of human rights”.115 
 
As such, although noting the human rights context within which humanitarian 
assistance should take place, the General Assembly does not address specific rights-
holders. This formulation that the provision of humanitarian assistance is ‘in 
conformity with’ the UDHR and other human rights instruments however does align 
with the assessment in Chapter 5 that the provision of such aid is a vehicle in the 
fulfilment of existing human rights.116 
Also, the General Assembly has considered that the abandonment of victims of 
natural disasters ‘constitutes a threat to human life and an offence to human dignity’, 
although the Assembly has refrained from noting a specific obligation or duty resting 
upon a certain duty-bearer.117 Similarly avoiding a distinct responsible actor, the 
General Assembly has declared to be ‘deeply concerned with the victims’ of 
emergency situations and reaffirming the ‘cardinal importance of humanitarian 
assistance’ for such victims.118 The milestone Resolution 46/182 reiterates this 
perspective in its Guiding Principles.119 Indeed, subsequent resolutions do not evolve 
much, only on occasion adding words of sympathy and solidarity with those affected 
by disasters, but not framing such sentiments in legal rights: 
 
                                                        
115 UNGA Res 2675 (XXV) (9 December 1970) ‘Basic principles for the protection of civilian 
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“Expressing its solidarity with the people and countries that suffer as a result of natural 
disasters and expressing also the deepest sympathy to all victims of the natural disasters 
that have struck in various parts of the globe”.120 
 
The General Assembly herewith foregoes the opportunity to provide those finding 
themselves in humanitarian crises with stronger tools to assert themselves, as it 
avoids the formulation of both a potential right to receive aid, as well as a stronger 
embedding of humanitarian assistance within the current legal framework of (human) 
rights. Thus, it must be concluded that the General Assembly, although affirming 
strongly the responsibility of states to provide assistance, does not perceive this 
obligation to be translated into a right formulated for persons in need of assistance.  
 
6.5 Duties and Rights in Specific Circumstances under International Law 
 
Humanitarian assistance is not provided in a legal vacuum: it must be considered in 
the context of the realities on the ground. When facing a humanitarian crisis, the 
affected state cannot be expected to ensure that ‘life continues as normal’ prior to this 
crisis. Yet, humanitarian assistance in essence ensures that the basic necessities are 
provided to those in need. As such, given that the general international legal 
regulations have been discussed, the more specific regimes applicable in times of 
crisis need to be addressed. Therefore, this Section addresses the provision of 
humanitarian assistance from the various legally qualifiable circumstances of 
conflict, occupation and (natural) disaster. In these circumstances, specific corpora 
juris are applicable, jointly with the application of more general international law and 
human rights law and their provisions must therefore be addressed accordingly. 
Furthermore, refugee law is discussed as a separate body of law, as humanitarian 
assistance may be of relevance to circumstances in which a refugee population exists.   
The obligations of states must continuously be considered within the context of 
the relationship with state sovereignty. As discussed, the current concept of state 
sovereignty accepts both the right of the sovereign to be free from external 
interference; based on the principles of consent, non-interference and domestic 
jurisdiction, and the duty to provide for those within its jurisdiction. In this Chapter, 
the provision of assistance from external sources is not specifically addressed, as the 
focus lies on the duty of the affected state (or non-state actor) to provide humanitarian 
assistance from the perspective of its sovereign duties. As such, this Chapter looks 
into the specific circumstances in which the latter aspect of sovereignty plays a role.  
Relevant to the discussion of the current legal framework regarding the provision 
of humanitarian assistance, is the differentiation between the various circumstances 
in which assistance may be necessary. Only having clearly established which duties 
and rights exist in the various legal circumstances can a common denominator and 
shared common ground be sought and found. The determination of such a ‘minimum 
standard’ will allow for the better protection of all persons facing humanitarian 
crises, rather than accepting the fact that a person facing food shortages in Syria is 
                                                        






hypothetically not as well protected as someone needing food in the aftermath of the 
Sudanese drought. As such, the rights of persons to receive assistance from their 
sovereign in certain circumstances, namely armed conflict, occupation, natural 
disaster and other qualifiable circumstances are addressed according to the duties of 
these states.  
 
6.5.1 Duties of the Affected State and Non-State Actor in Times of Conflict 
 
Whilst the circumstance warranting the need for humanitarian assistance itself results 
in the application of a specific regime, within humanitarian law a differentiation must 
be made between international and non-international armed conflicts. Such a 
differentiation also exists pertaining to the provisions within humanitarian law, 
relating to the delivery of humanitarian assistance. States and non-state actors, as 
parties to a conflict, have obligations under international humanitarian law both in 
international armed conflicts and in non-international armed conflicts.121 These two 
factual circumstances result in the application of different legal provisions and the 
obligations resting upon the parties to a conflict are discussed accordingly.  
Particularly poignant to the circumstance of armed conflict is the fact that the 
provision of humanitarian assistance not only contributes food, water and medicine 
to those in need, but also substantially adds to the safety on the ground of persons 
caught up in a conflict. Through the provision of neutral, impartial and humanitarian 
assistance, these persons are often reassured in their protection from violence and in 
their security of person. Although humanitarian assistance itself does not indeed 
prescribe this in its most literal definition,122 the provision of such assistance and the 
presence of such neutral, impartial and humanitarian providers contributes greatly in 
this regard. Within the context of humanitarian law, the Geneva Conventions and 
their Protocols supply a variety of legal considerations in the provision of 
humanitarian assistance, assessed in the following Sections.  
 
6.5.1.1 Duties of the Affected State in Times of an International Armed Conflict 
  
For the regulation of the obligations resting upon parties to an international armed 
conflict, recourse must be had in first instance to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 
forming the basis of international humanitarian law today.123 The Geneva 
Conventions differentiate between various categories of persons and duties related 
thereto, and as the provision of humanitarian assistance concerns a civilian 
population, the relevant provisions must be determined.124 Many provisions concern 
relief schemes, but very few specifically address the duties of parties to an 
international armed conflict to provide humanitarian assistance themselves as the 
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‘affected state’ to a civilian population in need. This may well be explained by the 
time period in which the Geneva Conventions were drafted. As argued in the official 
Commentary, the Conventions uphold the principle to ‘not interfere in a State’s 
relations with its own nationals’ which was recognised in international law rather 
more unlimited at the time of drafting the Conventions in 1949 than it is today.125 
Thus, the four original Geneva Conventions of 1949 do not hold provisions 
specifically obliging a party to an international armed conflict to provide 
humanitarian assistance to (their own) civilian populations in need of such aid. 
Indeed, neither does their predecessor, the Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land; containing only brief provisions relating to relief for 
prisoners of war.126 In fact, when considering an international armed conflict, parties 
are in general considered to be inclined to provide for their own civilian populations 
facing conflict-related hardships. 
Yet, with the changing nature of the international legal domain, the 1977 
Additional Protocol I does address the responsibility of parties to an international 
armed conflict to provide for its own population, by declaring a prohibition of 
starvation in Article 54 AP I, which includes a prohibition of parties to destroy 
objects that are ‘indispensable to the survival of the civilian population’: 
 
“1. Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited. 2. It is prohibited to attack, 
destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian 
population, such as food-stuffs, agricultural areas for the production of food-stuffs, crops, 
livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works, for the specific 
purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the 
adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them 
to move away, or for any other motive […] 5. In recognition of the vital requirements of 
any Party to the conflict in the defence of its national territory against invasion, derogation 
from the prohibitions contained in paragraph 2 may be made by a Party to the conflict 
within such territory under its own control where required by imperative military 
necessity".127 
 
States and other parties to an international armed conflict are therefore obliged to 
refrain from those activities that are incompatible with the general principle of 
protecting the civilian population.128 As noted in Article 54 AP 1 and explained in 
the Commentary, certain acts (such as for example the creation of a blockade) are not 
necessarily prohibited, but rather the object and purpose of the act, i.e. military 
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necessity as opposed to deliberately cutting off the civilian population, must be taken 
into consideration.129 
As the concept of state sovereignty presupposes both a right of non-interference 
and a duty of the state to take care of its civilian population, it is arguable to suggest 
that specific provisions thereto may be redundant, but practice has taught otherwise. 
It remains however rather unfortunate that humanitarian law does not address the 
specific duty of the actual parties to an international armed conflict to actively 
provide assistance to their own civilian population. Other than the provision of 
Article 54 AP I, international humanitarian law does not assert such duties from the 
affected state or other parties to an international armed conflict. And indeed, it is 
quite clear that the duty to refrain from causing starvation as reflected in Article 54 
AP I is not as strong as a positive obligation to provide assistance would have been.  
However, international humanitarian law is not the only body of law applicable 
to states involved in an international armed conflict. Indeed, human rights law and 
more general principles of international law remain applicable also, and are 
particularly relevant in the absence of specific clauses in humanitarian law. As 
discussed, with regard to the lex specialis-doctrine and the provision of humanitarian 
assistance, the most specific and most protective clause in a given circumstance must 
be considered, to provide the utmost protection – on humanitarian grounds, in the 
spirit of the law – to persons needing assistance.130  
As such, seen within the context of international human rights law, the obligation 
under Article 54 AP I does align with the obligations of states and other actors 
concerning the right to life, food, health (and water) under international human rights 
law.131 Indeed, it has been argued with regard to the right to life, that the specific 
prohibition of starvation as enshrined in Article 54 AP I is a reflection of the influence 
of human rights law on humanitarian law, as prior to the implementation of amongst 
others this specific provision, the deprivation of the right to life would only be 
arbitrary if a person died in violation of the rules of war.132 Also, the CESCR has 
asserted that part of this obligation under Article 54 to protect objects that are 
indispensable for the survival of a civilian population includes: 
 
"drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works, protection of the natural 
environment against widespread, long-term and severe damage and ensuring that civilians, 
internees and prisoners have access to adequate water".133 
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Thus, the CESCR directly links its perspectives on the right to water to obligations 
under international humanitarian law.134 Similarly, the right to adequate food can be 
directly connected to these circumstances in humanitarian law, as the provision 
prohibiting starvation as a method of warfare can be considered a manner of 
protecting the right to food, although this right encompasses further positive 
obligations. In a similar manner, the Special Rapporteur on the right to health has 
asserted the duty of states to provide humanitarian assistance in conflict situations.135 
Equally, the Security Council has affirmed these duties as discussed above, although 
not going into great detail; stating the duties of all parties to fulfil their obligations 
under human rights law in times of conflict.136 With regard to the rights as enshrined 
in the ICESCR, a duty of the affected state to seek international cooperation and 
assistance to fulfil its obligations regarding the rights to food and health is included 
under Articles 11 and of the Covenant. In this manner, these provisions in human 
rights law reach a different and higher level of protection for persons caught in 
conflict than the prohibition to avoid starvation as enshrined in Article 54 AP I. In 
particular in international armed conflict, where states are parties to the conflict, there 
is little doubt as to whom the addressees of the duties are, and both human rights 
obligations and duties under humanitarian law are simultaneously applicable. As 
such, it has been argued that the provisions in the ICESCR indeed create a more 
substantive protection for the receipt of humanitarian assistance.137 
Thus, the prohibition of starvation as provided for in Article 54 AP I enshrines an 
obligation for parties to an international armed conflict to provide emergency 
assistance in the event of a threat of starvation. Furthermore, the duties under human 
rights law of states party to a conflict do not cease to exist, including the obligation 
to seek international assistance in the provision of the ‘minimum core obligations’. 
As such, not providing such assistance would not only violate Article 54 AP I itself, 
but also related human rights law provisions as the right to food, health and life. In 
fact, those latter provisions are more concrete with regard to the positive obligations 
of states party to an international armed conflict to provide humanitarian assistance.  
 
6.5.1.2 Duties of the Affected State and Non-State Actors in Times of a Non-
International Armed Conflict 
 
When considering humanitarian law pertaining to non-international armed conflicts, 
a differentiation must be made regarding the types of non-international armed 
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conflicts and the applicable law. As discussed in Section 3.2.1, a differentiation can 
be made between those non-international armed conflicts where Common Article 3 
is applicable, conflicts meeting the threshold of Article 1 AP II (and where parties to 
the conflict are also party to the Additional Protocol) and those circumstances that 
may arguably not meet the threshold of the applicability of humanitarian law but 
remain classified as ‘internal strife’ or a similar consideration.138 A topical situation 
to consider in that regard is the current situation in the Ukraine, where difficulties 
exist in the classification of the conflict.  
Commencing with the four Geneva Conventions, it becomes immediately 
apparent that these, similar to the case in an international armed conflict, do not 
contain a provision placing a duty upon states or other parties to the conflict to 
provide assistance to their population. In the circumstance of a non-international 
armed conflict, common Article 3 is applicable, and although Article 3 does not 
stipulate an obligation to provide assistance, it does consider that persons with no 
active role in the hostilities must be treated ‘humanely, without any adverse 
distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other 
similar criteria’. This principle as explained by the ICTY’s Trial Chamber in fact 
entails the obligation to not intentionally, through an act or omission cause ‘serious 
mental or physical suffering or injury or constitute […] a serious attack on human 
dignity’.139 Such assistance would ensure the humane treatment of those civilians 
finding themselves in a non-international armed conflict, and would furthermore 
have to be based upon the principle of non-discrimination. Indeed, although 
considered to reflect ‘elementary considerations of humanity’, the rules laid out in 
common Article 3 of the Conventions do not assist in the determination of the duties 
resting upon parties to a non-international armed conflict when it comes to the 
provision of humanitarian assistance.140 Thus, it may be argued that a duty exists for 
parties to provide a minimum of assistance based upon common Article 3.  
Similar to circumstances of international armed conflict, here too the Additional 
Protocol presents more considerations. With regard to the duties of the parties to a 
conflict, Article 1 AP II distinctly asserts that the Protocol’s applicability extends to 
those circumstances between a ‘State Party’ and non-state actors that can be classified 
as ‘dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups’ under responsible 
command.141 Article 14 of AP II relating to non-international armed conflicts is 
drafted in a very similar fashion to Article 54 of AP I, declaring:  
 
“Starvation of civilians as a method of combat is prohibited. It is therefore prohibited to 
attack, destroy, remove or render useless, for that purpose, objects indispensable to the 
survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production 
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of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation 
works”. 
 
The Article elaborates on common Article 3 of the four Conventions which merely 
refers to humane treatment and is thereby as a specific Article quite relevant for the 
protection of civilians caught in non-international armed conflicts, as AP II does not 
otherwise specifically protect civilian objects useful to the survival of civilians.142 
Article 14 must furthermore be read in conjunction with Article 18 AP II, which will 
be discussed further in Chapter 7, as it concerns the provision of relief through 
external sources. Together, these two provisions do not allow for parties to a non-
international armed conflict to use the argument of ‘military necessity’ as failure to 
provide for the civilian population, when such a civilian population is at risk of 
starvation.143 Indeed, whilst the argument that an airstrip or harbour is not 
immediately available due to operations being carried out may be a valid point, such 
an argument will not hold over a prolonged period of time. Furthermore, according 
to the official Commentary, an omission to provide for the civilian population, 
resulting in starvation, may also result in a violation of parties’ obligations under 
Article 14.144 Indeed, the Commentary distinctly argues that a party’s decision to 
deliberately not take ‘measures to supply the population with objects indispensable 
for its survival in a way would become a method of combat by default, and would be 
prohibited’ under Article 14 AP II.145 Whereas Article 54 of AP I arguably leaves 
some leeway to a State with regard to its right to destroy parts of its own territory to 
halt the progress of enemy troops, Article 14 of AP II obliges parties to respect such 
civilian objects that are indispensable to the survival of the population throughout the 
entire territory regardless of under whose control a certain part may be.146 As such, 
according to the Commentary, the scope of Article 14 AP II is far-reaching: obliging 
parties to the conflict to prevent the starvation of civilians through active measures, 
as omissions and ‘deliberate decisions’ to not supply indispensable relief provisions 
can both lead to violations of Article 14 AP II.  
Similar to the circumstance of international armed conflicts, human rights law 
continues to be applicable in situations of non-international armed conflict and to 
armed groups as parties involved in such conflicts, as also assessed by the Security 
Council.147 Indeed, as was established above, human rights obligations also rest upon 
non-state actors, which often play a large role in non-international armed conflicts.148 
As with an international armed conflict, the relevant provisions remain those related 
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to the right to life, food, health (and water). Such has also been reaffirmed for 
example by the CESCR, declaring in its General Comment pertaining to Article 11 
ICESCR that:  
 
“Violations of the right to food can occur through the direct action of States or other 
entities insufficiently regulated by States. These include: (…) prevention of access to 
humanitarian food aid in internal conflicts or other emergency situations".149 
 
Thus, the CESCR argues that parties to a non-international armed conflict are obliged 
to fulfil the right to food through the provision of humanitarian assistance. Indeed, 
the prevention of access to humanitarian assistance results in a direct violation of 
Article 11 ICESCR according to the CESCR.  The duties of the state and non-state 
actors in the realisation of the right to health have been asserted also by the Special 
Rapporteur on the right to health, arguing a ‘primary responsibility’ for such parties 
in times of conflict, which can be fulfilled through the provision of humanitarian aid 
and making ‘resources available’.150 As such, attacks on health care facilities could 
be considered a violation of the right to health, with a view to the obligation of 
conduct enshrined in the ICESCR to provide health care. Thus, although the 
obligations formulated in AP II are somewhat similar to those of AP I when 
considering the protection of persons in need of humanitarian assistance, the scope 
of AP II remains restricted to non-international armed conflicts involving armed 
groups that hold a certain degree of control and organisation. The provisions of 
Article 14 AP II require the prevention of starvation from parties involved in the 
conflict, which has been explained to include the prevention of deliberate obstruction 
of humanitarian aid. A positive obligation cannot therefore be construed within the 
Protocol. Thus, the content of the Protocol is not very far-reaching in the protection 
of persons. Furthermore, the scope of the Protocol results in many circumstances of 
non-international armed conflict remaining outside its protection. This situation 
results in uncertainty as to the obligations concerning the provision of humanitarian 
assistance to those in need that happen to be in circumstances falling short of a non-
international armed conflict falling within the scope of AP II. Yet, human rights law 
norms remain relevant and applicable. Indeed, as has been seen concerning 
international armed conflicts, the duties of the parties to a conflict are more protective 
under the rights to life, food and health. These rights envisage a positive obligation 
resting upon states, especially those of the ICESCR, to provide minimum levels of 
food and health care.  
 
6.5.2 Rights of Persons to Receive Assistance in times of Conflict 
 
Regarding the rights to receive humanitarian assistance in times of conflict, a similar 
approach as with the obligations to provide such assistance in times of conflict must 
be held. As such not only does a differentiation need to be made between the 
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circumstance of an international armed conflict and a non-international armed 
conflict, but also a consideration of the various applicable fields of law is relevant.  
 
6.5.2.1 Rights of Persons to Receive Assistance in Times of an International Armed 
Conflict 
 
When regarding the Geneva Conventions and AP I, neither contain specific 
formulations providing persons in need of humanitarian assistance with legal rights 
to claim such assistance from their sovereign under humanitarian law. This indeed 
once again reflects the timeframe of the Conventions, as can be seen for example 
through the incorporation of Articles 30 and 38 GC IV. Both Articles consider a right 
for ‘protected persons’ to apply for relief or allowing relief to be sent to them, rather 
than a right for civilians in general, and this right is furthermore not related to the 
affected state. Article 30 GC IV notes the opportunity for protected persons: 
 
“for making application to the Protecting Powers, the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, the National Red Cross (Red Crescent, Red Lion and Sun) Society of the country 
where they may be, as well as to any organization that might assist them”. 
 
As such, a right to claim assistance from the affected state is absent. Furthermore, 
Article 38 also does not reflect duties of the affected state to provide assistance to its 
own population, rather noting certain rights of protected persons such as to be:  
 
“[…] enabled to receive the individual or collective relief that may be sent to them. (2) 
They shall, if their state of health so requires, receive medical attention and hospital 
treatment to the same extent as the nationals of the State concerned. (3) They shall be 
allowed to practise their religion and to receive spiritual assistance from ministers of their 
faith. (4) If they reside in an area particularly exposed to the dangers of war, they shall be 
authorized to move from that area to the same extent as the nationals of the State 
concerned. (5) Children under fifteen years, pregnant women and mothers of children 
under seven years shall benefit by any preferential treatment to the same extent as the 
nationals of the State concerned”. 
 
Here too the official Commentary is unambiguous, clearly stating that the intention 
has been to restrict these possibilities to those persons in specific circumstances (such 
as detention) granting them the status of ‘protected persons’.151 Thus, civilians 
finding themselves in an international armed conflict do not have the possibility to 
resort to specific provisions in international humanitarian law granting them the right 
to receive humanitarian assistance from their sovereign state. However, arguably an 
implicit right to receive such assistance does exist, as can be read in other provisions. 
As such, certain provisions refer to a right of third parties to offer assistance or relief 
actions which ‘shall be undertaken’ (to be discussed further in Chapter 7) if and when 
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a civilian population ‘is in need’.152 Such formulations can be construed as an 
entitlement of the civilian population to be supplied with emergency aid in situations 
of need.153  
This changing approach seen in the formulation of the provisions of AP I towards 
a right to receive assistance, albeit not from the state sovereign, has been supported 
by the practice of the ICRC and its perspective as laid down in its ‘Customary IHL 
Study’.154 The ICRC itself has also repeatedly stated it recognises a right of a civilian 
population to receive humanitarian assistance in circumstances where it should be in 
need.155 Furthermore, such a right to seek and receive relief has been explicitly 
incorporated by several states in their military manuals, evidencing the belief that 
civilian populations should be entitled to demand assistance.156 Yet, as these states 
are few and far between, as well as the fact that the ICRC's perspective is not 
explicitly formulated in AP II, it remains difficult to assert an actual right of the 
civilian population to receive assistance from their state under existing humanitarian 
law.  
Alternatively, as seen in Section 6.3.2, such a right can be found in existing human 
rights law, more specifically the rights to life, food and health. These rights, 
considering their continued applicability in times of conflict, ensure at a more 
concrete level the receipt of assistance for persons in need of emergency aid. Indeed, 
in requesting assistance, persons in need of aid have more direct protection under 
human rights law, than through the inferred protection of international humanitarian 
law, when considering rights to receive assistance from the state sovereign.  
 
6.5.2.2 Rights of Persons to Receive Assistance in Times of a Non-International 
Armed Conflict 
 
Whilst civilians finding themselves in a non-international armed conflict are subject 
to a different legal regime, granting them other options, than those caught in an 
international armed conflict, it remains difficult to find clear-cut rights enshrined in 
humanitarian law for them also. As such, in circumstances falling within the scope 
of a non-international armed conflict as envisaged by AP II, civilians, similar to the 
lack of provisions in AP I, do not find distinct rights formulated within this Protocol. 
Articles 14 and 18 AP II do not provide for a right of civilians to demand assistance 
from the sovereign or other party involved in the conflict, nor do other provisions of 
the Protocol.  
                                                        
152 Article 70 AP I and to a lesser extent Articles 10 and 23 of GC IV.  
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Relief’, Annex VI to the resolutions of the 26th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent, Geneva, 1995 Prepared jointly by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies and the ICRC, Res II, § A(h). 
156 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study (n153) Rule 
55 for the Military manuals of Germany, the Netherlands, Nicaragua and Switzerland. 
 
 
The Duty of the Affected State to Provide, and the Right of Persons  
to Receive Humanitarian Assistance  
261 
Yet, the ICRC's perspective does not alter from its stance concerning international 
armed conflicts, and can remain true also for those civilians who are in need of 
assistance in times of a non-international armed conflict. As such, the ICRC argues 
a right to receive humanitarian assistance for all civilians finding themselves in a 
conflict situation.157 However, for the exercise of these rights of civilians in such 
conflicts, resort will mostly have to be had to other provisions in general international 
law and human rights law, which remain applicable at all times. Such resort also leads 
to a greater protection for those caught in conflicts falling outside the scope of AP II 
due to a lack of organisation or control of the armed group party to the conflict. Whilst 
in these circumstances it may be more difficult to claim responsibility of such groups 
in the provision of assistance, such responsibilities will nonetheless continue to 
remain for the state sovereign. As seen in Section 6.3.2, the rights to life, food and 
health provide for such protection at a more concrete level. In fact, given the lack of 
protection provided to civilians under humanitarian law in particular for non-
international armed conflicts falling outside the scope of AP I, the right to receive 
humanitarian assistance from the sovereign is more protectively and substantially 
enshrined in the rights to life, food and health under human rights law. As such, this 
law may well function as lex specialis, given its more specific and protective nature 
regarding the provision and receipt of humanitarian assistance. The provision of such 
assistance in fact, as concluded in Chapter 5, functions as the vehicle for the state’s 
fulfilment of those human rights.  
 
6.5.3 Duties of the Affected State (Occupying Power) in Times of Occupation 
 
It remains essential to note that, while a state of war no longer needs to be declared 
by parties for humanitarian law to be applicable, such a conflict must be factually 
determined and equally a situation of occupation must be determined to assess an 
authority as ‘occupying power’.158 Only if and when an occupation is determined, 
shall the law of occupation enter into force. As such, the law of occupation is only 
applicable in a circumstance where a sovereign state is involved as an actor, 
exercising a degree of control as discussed in Section 3.2.1. The possibility of 
application of the law of occupation to circumstances ‘other than a state of war or 
armed conflict between or among High Contracting parties’ has also been suggested 
by some,159 allowing for the application of the law to armed groups that may control 
territory without a sovereign's consent, but such a suggestion is not generally 
accepted.160  
Similar to the distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, the law of 
occupation applies independently of whether or not the occupation was established 
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lawfully, as long as its factual establishment can be determined.161 As such, the ICJ 
concluded in 2005 in the Armed Activities in the Democratic Republic of Congo case 
that: 
 
“Uganda was the occupying Power in Ituri at the relevant time. As such it was under an 
obligation, according to Article 43 of the Hague Regulations of 1907, to take all the 
measures in its power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety in 
the occupied area, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the 
DRC. This obligation comprised the duty to secure respect for the applicable rules of 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law, to protect the 
inhabitants of the occupied territory against acts of violence, and not to tolerate such 
violence by any third party. The Court, having concluded that Uganda was an occupying 
Power in Ituri at the relevant time, finds that Uganda’s responsibility is engaged both for 
any acts of its military that violated its international obligations and for any lack of 
vigilance in preventing violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by 
other actors present in the occupied territory, including rebel groups acting on their own 
account. The Court notes that Uganda at all times has responsibility for all actions and 
omissions of its own military forces in the territory of the DRC in breach of its obligations 
under the rules of international human rights law and international humanitarian law which 
are relevant and applicable in the specific situation”.162 
 
Thus, establishing who the occupying power is in a certain situation is the primary 
step to determining that the law of occupation is applicable, triggering (some of) the 
duties of the occupier to provide in humanitarian assistance for the civilian population 
should it be in need. Indeed this caveat of ‘need’ is of more relevance to the law of 
occupation, as opposed to the law of armed conflict, given that circumstances of 
conflict are more likely to result in situations of humanitarian crisis. Occupation on 
the other hand may not lead to the establishment of a humanitarian crisis, but rather 
on the contrary serve to prevent or solve such situations, such as for example the role 
of the United States and United Kingdom in Iraq following the armed conflict in 
2003.163 
Contrary to the law concerning armed conflict, the law of occupation historically 
contains many provisions prescribing an occupying power to provide in humanitarian 
assistance to an occupied population. Explanations for this difference with the law of 
armed conflict can particularly be found in the circumstances of World War II and 
the German occupation of large parts of Europe, leading up to the creation of the 
Geneva Conventions. Article 43 of the Regulations Concerning the Law and Customs 
of War on Land, as the predecessor to the Geneva Conventions dealing with 
occupation, does not distinctly mention such a duty of the occupier to provide, but 
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succinctly declares that such a power must ensure ‘public order and safety’.164 
However, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Protocols, following the events of 
World War II, clearly and more elaborately set forth the duties of the occupying 
power, starting with Article 55 GC IV which declares: 
 
“To the fullest extent of the means available to it, the Occupying Power has the duty of 
ensuring the food and medical supplies of the population; it should, in particular, bring in 
the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied 
territory are inadequate. The Occupying Power may not requisition foodstuffs, articles or 
medical supplies available in the occupied territory, except for use by the occupation forces 
and administration personnel, and then only if the requirements of the civilian population 
have been taken into account. […] The Protecting Power shall, at any time, be at liberty to 
verify the state of the food and medical supplies in occupied territories, except where 
temporary restrictions are made necessary by imperative military requirements”. 
 
Clearly this is a differentiation from the law applying to parties to an armed conflict 
in which no occupation exists, as the obligations in the Geneva Conventions and their 
Protocols do not contain such provisions for parties to a conflict in general. Indeed, 
the developments in the law of occupation cannot be viewed as separate from the 
Nazi-occupation of large parts of Europe, in the aftermath of which these provisions 
were developed. Article 55 GC IV thereby extends the duties of the occupier, as it 
now has to ‘ensure to the fullest extent of the means available’ that the population is 
provided with food and medical supplies. As such, Article 55 GC IV remains aware 
of the difficulties an occupier may face while doing so at the time of a conflict.165 
The occupying power may furthermore not be relieved from its duties in the event 
assistance is provided through other, external, sources (to be discussed further in 
Chapter 7), as Article 60 GC IV stipulates that the responsibility to provide relief 
remains with the occupying power.166  
In relation to the provision of relief and duty to ensure that an occupied population 
receives medical supplies, Article 56 GC IV obliges the occupier furthermore to 
ensure and maintain hospitals and public health, particularly taking measures 
concerning the prevention of epidemics.167 However, this responsibility does not rest 
solely with the occupying power, as Article 56 provides that such measures should 
be taken ‘with the co-operation of national and local authorities’.168 While the 
                                                        
164 Article 43 Regulations Concerning the Law and Customs of War on Land – annex to Convention 
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provisions relating to the duties of an occupier in GC IV already greatly surpass the 
duties resting upon parties to conflicts in general under the Geneva Conventions, 
Additional Protocol I has added to these duties as GC IV relates mostly to a 
responsibility of the occupying power to provide necessary food and medical 
supplies. Article 69 AP I supplements this obligation by stipulating that the occupier 
must, again ‘to the fullest extent of the means available to it’, also ensure clothing, 
shelter and other supplies that may be ‘essential to the survival of the civilian 
population’. AP I thereby creates a non-limitative list through which the occupier is 
obliged to supply those items that may be necessary specific to a certain situation.169 
However, the text of the Article does recognise that an occupying power may be 
limited (beyond its control) in its possibilities, as the Protocol stipulates that the 
occupier shall be limited by the ‘extent of the means available to it’.170 Such 
limitations indeed reflect the fact that a circumstance of occupation can immediately 
follow that of conflict, resulting in a situation in which the fulfilment of these duties 
are more difficult. Whereas certain duties apply immediately upon establishment of 
occupation, other duties, amongst which those stipulated in Articles 55, 56 and 59-
62 and related to the provision of assistance through relief such as food and medical 
supplies, may arise only at a later stage.171 Thus, interestingly the particular 
provisions under GC IV pertaining to the delivery of humanitarian assistance 
necessary at the time of a humanitarian crisis only arise upon the longer 
establishment of occupation, whereas such a crisis may then not, or no longer, exist.  
However, as established also with regard to times of armed conflict, the law of 
war, or in this case, the law of occupation is not necessarily the only body of law 
applicable. As seen above, it is accepted by the ICJ that human rights find continued 
application in times of occupation.172 Such application in relation to the duties of the 
‘affected state’ is distinct from its application in times of armed conflict, as in the 
latter case such application relates to the sovereign’s duties regarding its own citizens 
whilst in times of occupation such obligations would rest upon the occupying force 
regarding the occupied population. However, for all the obligations of the occupier 
to enter into force, including relevant human rights obligations, a level of ‘effective’ 
control or authority must be established.173 Therefore it is necessary to establish the 
exact level of ‘control’ of the occupying force in order for human rights law to be a 
source of obligations in the provision of humanitarian assistance for the occupier in 
a certain circumstance. As noted in more detail in Section 3.4.2.2 however, 
international law today does not definitively determine the level of ‘effective’ control 
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or authority needed for the extraterritorial application of human rights.174 Thus, this 
leaves the practical application of human rights obligations in times of occupation 
somewhat uncertain.  
Furthermore, the 'progressive development' aspect of the rights incorporated in 
the ICESCR, such as the right to food and health, as relevant to the provision of 
humanitarian assistance, may be problematic for an occupying force establishing new 
control over a certain territory and not necessarily intending to remain the occupying 
force for an extended period of time, and must therefore be taken into account.175 The 
‘minimum core obligations’ of the ICESCR resting upon states regarding the rights 
to food and health, which must be fulfilled, however do complement the duties of an 
occupier under the law of occupation, as this framework can be seen as ‘emergency 
law’.176 Indeed, these minimum core obligations must then be seen in the context of 
the establishment of control by the occupying power.  
Both for the applicability of human rights obligations and for the applicability of 
the specific provisions in the Geneva Convention relating to the provision of 
humanitarian assistance, a certain duration and degree of control are therefore 
necessary to incur responsibilities for the occupying power. Given the fact that 
humanitarian assistance is of relevance in the immediate existence of a humanitarian 
crisis such may well not be the case in the establishment of situations of occupation 
today, as compared to the origins of the elaborations in the Geneva Conventions 
following World War II. In that regard, it has also been noted by Higgins that whilst 
the protection of civilians is an ‘intransgressible obligation of humanitarian law’, 
such an obligation not only rests upon the occupier, but ‘equally for those seeking to 
liberate themselves from occupation’.177 Indeed, in such circumstances a 
humanitarian crisis may once again arise.  
 
6.5.4 Rights of Persons to Receive Assistance in Times of Occupation 
 
Similar to the provisions lacking in humanitarian law concerning an international and 
a non-international armed conflict, the law of occupation does not provide for a 
distinct right of individuals to claim humanitarian assistance from the occupier. 
Whereas Articles 59 and 60 GC IV and 69 AP I contain obligations for the occupying 
power to provide in relief, they do not equally entail a right for individuals during 
occupation that may be enforced towards the occupier. The obligations resting upon 
the occupier in fact cannot be ‘reversed’ into an enforceable right of individuals. 
Indeed, such a lack in distinct rights for individuals may follow from the related 
circumstance that a level of control needs to be established prior to which the duties 
relating to the provision of humanitarian assistance are applicable to the occupying 
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power. In fact, given the need for a certain amount of time to pass in this transitional 
stage, international humanitarian law in a larger sense may continue to be applicable 
with the therein-incorporated rights and duties relating to conflict.  
Thus, in situations of occupation, individuals wanting to request humanitarian 
assistance from the occupying power must resort to the above mentioned regulations 
as enshrined in human rights law, or more general international law regulations. With 
regard to such possibilities, it must equally be noted that the applicability of human 
rights law, although acknowledged, has not crystallised yet to the extent of 
unambiguously determining at what point during an occupation a level of control has 
been established granting individuals the right to request humanitarian assistance 
from the occupying force, based on human rights law.  
 
6.5.5 Duties of the Affected State in Times of (Natural) Disaster 
 
A third circumstance, following armed conflict and occupation, is that of a (natural) 
disaster. The legal regime applicable to disasters of both man-made and natural 
origins is not as specific as the legal regime applicable in times of conflict or 
occupation. Humanitarian law is not applicable, unless the disaster takes place on a 
territory where an armed conflict is also occurring simultaneously. The general 
principle of humanity however finds continued application. The ICJ stated as early 
as the 1949 Corfu Channel-case that indeed  
 
“certain general and well-recognized principles, namely: elementary considerations of 
humanity, even more exacting in peace than in war”178 
 
exist that are applicable to an even greater detail in times of peace. The principle of 
humanity has been discussed at length in Section 2.2.3.1. Of course in circumstances 
of disaster, general international law such as the law of state responsibility and more 
specifically human rights law are applicable, and in the above Section 6.3.3 in 
particular the role of the General Assembly in asserting the responsibilities of the 
affected state has become apparent. The UN body has been concerned with victims 
of natural disaster for decades, expressing amongst other concerns that: 
 
“the abandonment of the victims of natural disasters and similar emergency situations 
without humanitarian assistance constitutes a threat to human life and offence to human 
dignity”.179 
 
Given the fact that a particular regime for natural disaster law is absent, efforts have 
been made to assert the applicability of certain general aspects of international law 
in the circumstance of a natural or man-made disaster, and the ensuing need for 
humanitarian assistance when a humanitarian crisis unfolds. As such, the General 
Assembly has claimed that the primary responsibility in the provision of 
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humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of a disaster lies with the affected state, 
while simultaneously affirming the affected state's sovereignty.180 This perspective 
has indeed been reaffirmed by various other organs within the UN framework.181 
Furthermore, such organs have asserted the importance of states’ responsibilities 
under human rights law in the discourse on the provision of humanitarian assistance, 
as the provision thereof is a vehicle in, or recognition of, the fulfilment of several 
essential human rights.182 Whereas circumstances of disaster may frequently lead to 
the state asserting a ‘state of emergency’ which may result in the invocation of certain 
derogation clauses under international human rights treaties, this does not affect the 
duty of the affected state in its responsibilities to provide humanitarian assistance. 
Indeed, as discussed in Section 5.2.2, the relevant rights regarding the provision of 
humanitarian assistance, i.e. the rights to life, food and health, do not allow for 
derogation (from minimum core obligations) in times of emergency. As such, the 
duties of the affected state with regard to the provision of assistance under human 
rights law continue to be applicable in the aftermath of disasters, and as such Section 
6.4.1 has addressed these responsibilities in detail. This Section focuses on the more 
specific regulations geared towards natural or man-made disasters, besides existing 
obligations in human rights law.  
Currently, only a few international (regional) conventions exist concerning the 
facilitation of humanitarian assistance in the event of a natural disaster. Previously, 
failed attempts include the 1927 ‘Convention establishing an International Relief 
Union’; the first international convention on peacetime disaster relief, and the 1984 
‘Draft Convention on expediting the delivery of emergency assistance’.183 Although 
both initiatives were many years apart, the international community was still unable 
to positively create legal obligations for the provision of humanitarian assistance in 
the aftermath of a natural disaster through an international convention.184 The current 
binding legal regime as laid down in treaty law is therefore limited and regional. An 
example includes the ‘Inter-American Convention To Facilitate Disaster Assistance’ 
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of 1991.185 Although only very few states have ratified this regional treaty, similar to 
the stance of the General Assembly, the Convention places the responsibility of the 
coordination of humanitarian assistance upon the affected state.186 In 2005, the 
ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response settled with 
regard to the Asian region that ‘each affected Party shall have the primary 
responsibility to respond to disasters occurring within its territory’.187 The ASEAN 
Agreement bases this assertion on the concept of state sovereignty. More specifically 
geared towards nuclear accidents, the 1986 Convention on Assistance in the Case of 
a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency also places the primary responsibility 
for ‘the overall direction, control, co-ordination and supervision of the assistance’ 
with the affected state.188 
It becomes apparent that besides rather topic-specific regulations and small 
regional initiatives, international binding regulation concerning the responsibilities 
for the provision of humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of a disaster are lacking. 
Indeed, general international law and human rights law provide a solid basis, upon 
which responsibility can be asserted for the affected state to provide such assistance. 
Despite such existing obligations, certain specific soft law regulations as well as 
regulations currently under development, can be applied to the circumstance of a 
natural disaster, although they do not (currently) have legally binding force. Despite 
their non-binding nature, they are of practical value to the provision of assistance, as 
well as contributing to further development of the current legal framework.  
 
6.5.5.1 The Potential Application of the ILC Study: Protection of persons in the event 
of disaster 
 
In developing its study on the ‘Protection of persons in the event of disaster’, the ILC 
has formulated Draft Articles pertaining to the rights and obligations in the provision 
of assistance. Although these Articles do not currently have binding legal stature, and 
it remains uncertain whether they will obtain such standing, the ILC's work is 
relevant to the development of the law pertaining to humanitarian assistance and 
international law.189 Indeed, the Articles themselves are currently very much in the 
developmental stage, and it remains unclear precisely which form they will obtain if 
and when adopted. Draft Article 21 clearly defines the scope, stating that the Articles 
will not be applicable to circumstances in which international humanitarian law is 
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Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and 
Viet Nam. 
188 Article 3(a) of the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological 
Emergency (18 November 1986). To date the Convention has 112 state parties.  
189 See Section 2.2.2 on the work of the ILC.  
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applicable.190 The ILC Study thereby takes the approach that international 
humanitarian law as a body of law is the lex specialis in times of conflict, and a 
different regime applies entirely in times of disaster.191 Although this follows on from 
the approach taken by many of the UN organs in the provision of humanitarian 
assistance during the past decades, the opportunity was missed to approach disaster 
relief from a more all-encompassing perspective, including all applicable fields of 
law through one study, namely human rights law, humanitarian law and refugee law; 
an approach that has been adhered to increasingly in the past years.192 Indeed such a 
perspective is held by the ILC Special Rapporteur who has argued for a more 
simultaneous applicability and complementarity of the various fields of law relevant 
to disaster situations, including humanitarian law.193 It is therefore regrettable that 
the ILC as a whole in drafting these Articles is apparently creating another niche and 
separate body of law applicable to non-conflict disaster situations, as opposed to 
embracing a more all-encompassing view.  
Addressing more specifically the obligations set out in these Draft Articles, it 
becomes apparent that a primary responsibility is envisaged for the affected state. 
Draft Article 12 sets out that: 
  
“1. The affected State, by virtue of its sovereignty, has the duty to ensure the protection of 
persons and provision of disaster relief and assistance on its territory. 2. The affected State 
has the primary role in the direction, control, coordination and supervision of such relief 
and assistance”.194 
 
Thus, Draft Article 12 clearly expresses the primary duty of the affected state to 
provide assistance to the population affected by disaster. The term ‘protection’ 
reflects the overall theme of study of the ILC.195 The notion of ‘protection of persons’ 
is therefore of a broader view than the more narrow ‘protection of civilians’ as a 
concept within international humanitarian law and as also used by the Security 
Council, although discussion on this topic also exists.196 The Special Rapporteur has 
elaborated that the Draft Articles intend to respect state sovereignty within their 
                                                        
190 ILC ‘Protection of persons in the event of disasters’ Draft Articles UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.831 (15 May 
2014) Draft Article 21. In subsequent reports, states have addressed the option that the Articles apply in 
situations where existing international law provisions do not: ‘Fourth report on the protection of persons 
in the event of disasters’ by Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, Special Rapporteur (11 May 2011) UN Doc 
A/CN.4/643 § 10.  
191 ‘Preliminary report on the protection of persons in the event of disasters’ (5 May 2008) International 
Law Commission, UN Doc A/CN.4/598 § 49. 
192 See Section 3.4 on the relationship between human rights and humanitarian law.   
193 ILC ‘Preliminary report on the protection of persons in the event of disasters’ UN Doc A/CN.4/598 
(n 191) § 51. 
194 ILC ‘Protection of persons in the event of disasters’ Draft Articles UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.831 (n 190).  
195 ‘Third report on the protection of persons in the event of disasters’, ILC Special Rapporteur Eduardo 
Valencia-Ospina, UN Doc A/CN.4/629 (31 March 2010) § 97.  
196 Amra Lee, ‘The Case for Strengthening Protection Frameworks in ‘Other Situations of Violence’ 
(2014) The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance <http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/2091> accessed 1 






framework.197 Interestingly, Draft Article 13 includes another duty of the affected 
state, namely a duty to seek assistance should the disaster not be manageable through 
its own resources: 
  
“To the extent that a disaster exceeds its national response capacity, the affected State has 
the duty to seek assistance from among other States, the United Nations, other competent 
intergovernmental organizations and relevant non-governmental organizations, as 
appropriate”.198 
 
The Draft Articles therefore see an active duty from the perspective of the affected 
state to not only provide humanitarian assistance individually but to also take up the 
responsibility to seek such assistance from other states. This duty aligns with the 
obligations reflected in the ICESCR. When indeed reasoned from a human rights 
perspective, such a duty would in fact be arguable in line with the obligations resting 
upon a state under Article 2 ICESCR, in combination with the relevant rights to food, 
health (and water).199 Indeed, the ILC Special Rapporteur has also followed this 
reasoning, elaborating that while this duty to seek assistance by no means diminishes 
the obligations of the affected state to provide assistance itself, this notion of 'internal 
sovereignty' also encompasses a duty to seek assistance from other, external, sources 
in a state’s fulfilment of its human rights obligations.200 Given the fact that the Draft 
Articles are currently in a state of development, it remains to be seen what the final 
outcome shall become, and what their influence may be on the law pertaining to the 
provision of humanitarian assistance in times of natural disaster. Furthermore, given 
the fact that the Draft Articles distinctly do not incorporate circumstances in which 
humanitarian law is applicable, it is at least commendable that they follow the line of 
existing human rights law. With a view to the continuous protection of persons in 
need of assistance, the creation of another separate body of law, applicable in specific 
circumstances, may only add to the fragmentation of the law, as opposed to assisting 
in the creation of greater protection.  
 
6.5.5.2 The Potential Application of the IDRL Guidelines and Model Act 
 
As a second initiative, the ‘Guidelines for the domestic facilitation and regulation of 
international disaster relief and initial recovery assistance’ (IDRL Guidelines), may 
be considered. The IDRL Guidelines were developed by the International Federation 
of the Red Cross and were unanimously adopted by all state parties to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions in 2007.201 The IDRL Guidelines aim to aid governments in 
preparedness at a domestic level with regard to overcoming legal obstacles in the 
                                                        
197 UN Doc A/CN.4/629 (n 195) § 67 and further.  
198 ILC ‘Protection of persons in the event of disasters’ Draft Articles UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.831 (n 190). 
199 Sections 5.2.2.1 and 5.4 and further.  
200 UN Doc A/CN.4/643 (n 190) § 32-40.  
201 ICRC Resolution 30IC/07/R4 ‘Guidelines for the domestic facilitation and regulation of international 
disaster relief and initial recovery assistance’, 30th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent (30 November 2007). 
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provision of assistance in the aftermath of disaster, but are distinctly not binding in 
their nature. More relevantly, nor are they intended to be binding as they merely 
provide suggestions to adopt, and in this way distinctly differ from for example the 
General Assembly resolutions which are also non-binding in nature but hold a 
different standing as they are more reflective of state practice and contribute to 
customary developments.202 The IDRL Guidelines follow the IDRL Programme 
which was developed in 2001 (as of 2012 called the 'Disaster Law Programme') 
following a resolution for this purpose by the Red Cross and Red Crescent Council 
of Delegates, and aimed at a: 
 
“compilation and publication of existing international laws and regulations, and the 
evaluation of their actual effectiveness in humanitarian operations”.203 
 
Therefore initially appearing to have a more international legal approach, the 
Guidelines themselves however operate as more domestic tools for states. In their 
creation and methodology, the IFRC did build on domestic examples as well as 
various existing (soft) law tools.204 As the Guidelines aim to be a practical tool for 
governments in their national responses, they will not be discussed in depth as part 
of the international legal framework concerning humanitarian assistance.205 Indeed, 
following their adoption in 2007, only 12 states have reported to have ‘drawn 
language or inspiration’ from the Guidelines in their domestic legislation.206 Even if 
the intention of the Guidelines therefore had been more legislative they cannot be 
considered reflective of state practice. For the purpose of this Chapter it is however 
relevant to note that these IDRL Guidelines also identify the affected state as the 
primary responsible actor in the provision of assistance in the event of a disaster.207  
However, the more recently developed ‘Model Act for the Facilitation and 
Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance’, as 
supplement to the IDRL Guidelines, does indeed attempt to provide more legal 
regulation, although also operating at a domestic level. This ‘Model Act’; which is a 
model and example for domestic lawmakers, was adopted in March 2013 as an 
initiative of the IFRC ‘intended to assist states to strengthen their legal preparedness 
                                                        
202 IFRC ‘Guidelines for the domestic facilitation and regulation of international disaster relief and initial 
recovery assistance’ (IDRL Guidelines) (30 November 2007), adopted at the 30th International 
Conference of the Movement, § 1: “These Guidelines are non-binding. While it is hoped that States will 
make use of them to strengthen their laws, policies and/or procedures related to international disaster 
response, as appropriate, the Guidelines do not have a direct effect on any existing rights or obligations 
under domestic law”.  
203 Council of Delegates of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, (Geneva, 
Switzerland 11 - 14 November 2001) ‘Resolution 5: International Disaster Response Law' §1.  
204 ‘International Disaster Response Laws (IDRL) Project Report 2002-2003’, 28th International 
Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (2-6 December 2003), IFRC and Red Crescent Societies 
Doc 03/IC/11. 
205 IFRC IDRL Guidelines (2007) (n 202) § 3.  
206 <http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/idrl/idrl-guidelines/new-legislation-adopted-on-idrl/> accessed 
8 February 2015.  






for international disaster cooperation’ in a manner that would be ‘appropriate to their 
national circumstances’.208 Similar to the IDRL Guidelines, the Model Act suggests 
in its Article 2 that the affected state bears primary responsibility for the provision of 
humanitarian assistance.209 Given the novel status of this Model Act, it has yet to be 
embraced by states and subsequently incorporated into their domestic regulatory 
framework.  
Thus, contrary to the circumstance of conflict and occupation, one particular legal 
regime pertaining to humanitarian assistance in times of (natural) disaster is missing. 
As such, no concrete, specific legal provisions relate to the obligations resting upon 
the affected state to provide in assistance for the population within its territory or 
control, following such a disaster. However, general international law and most 
notably human rights law provide the continuous legal basis for such obligations and 
assertions in times of disaster. Such more general provisions are occasionally 
supplemented with regional conventions such as on the South American continent 
and the ASEAN Management Agreement. Although the developments of the ILC 
and IFRC recognise the responsibility of the affected state, in a similar matter to 
existing international law, it remains to be seen what their contributions to the 
existing legal framework will be. On the one hand, the IDRL Guidelines and Model 
Act operate more at the domestic level, while the ILC initiatives into the protection 
of persons in the event of a disaster have yet to concretely materialise with more 
binding status. The latter also problematically limits itself to circumstances distinctly 
outside the realm of the applicability of international humanitarian law.  
 
6.5.6 Rights of Persons to Receive Assistance in Times of (Natural) Disaster 
  
As a result of the above lacking framework on the specific obligations for the affected 
state in times of disaster, similarly no particular framework is in place concerning the 
rights of persons to request such (international) assistance from their sovereign.210 
General human rights law of course continues to find applicability and individuals 
shall therefore be able to have recourse to such provisions in the aftermath of disaster. 
The UN IASC has also asserted this perspective, developing ‘Operational Guidelines 
on Human Rights and Natural Disaster’ through which victims of natural disaster 
‘should enjoy the same rights and freedoms under human rights law as others in their 
country’.211 Important as such Guidelines may be for those involved in the practice 
of humanitarian assistance, from a legal perspective additional specific guarantees in 
the form of specific rights to request humanitarian aid are absent for victims of natural 
                                                        
208 <http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/idrl/model-act-on-idrl/> accessed 19 October 2014.  
209 Article 2(a) of the Model Act. 
210 The Directory of National emergency Response offices, Disaster Emergency Plans and Legislation, 
and Regional and Sub-Regional Agreements for Disaster Assistance, UNDRO 1992 however states to 
have documentation on legislation for 64 countries; that apparently entail a right to receive assistance.  
211 ‘Operational Guidelines on Human Rights and Natural Disasters’ by the Representative on human 
rights of internally displaced persons UN Doc A/HRC/4/38/Add.1 (26 January 2006) General Principle 
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disasters in these Guidelines. However, the work of the ILC in developing its Draft 
Articles on the Protection of persons in the event of disasters may bring renewed 
possibilities to the victims of natural disasters that find themselves in need of 
humanitarian assistance, strengthening their position. Formulating specific legal 
rights enhances the position of those finding themselves in the aftermath of disaster, 
to claim aid from those exercising sovereign duties.  
 
6.5.6.1 The Potential Application of the ILC Study: Protection of persons in the event 
of disaster 
 
The ILC study, which is currently still in progress, has to date foregone the 
opportunity to create a Draft Article tailored specifically to the needs of those 
requesting assistance in the aftermath of a disaster.212 Until now, the ILC study has 
merely incorporated a Draft Article 6 stating that ‘persons affected by disasters are 
entitled to respect for their human rights’.213 As the focus lies on the protection of 
those in the aftermath of a disaster, it appears that the ILC, like many other initiatives 
and legal provisions, has taken the approach of the obligation of the state, rather than 
the right of the individual to request specific assistance from its sovereign. In doing 
so, the ILC has opted to focus in its study on those obligations that may rest upon 
states or rights that may exist for other providers of assistance, rather than attempting 
to formulate a right to receive assistance for victims of (natural) disasters. Indeed, the 
ILC study does not break new ground, or depart from the existing degree of 
protection envisaged under general human rights law. Whilst it is commendable to 
ensure the protection that may be derived from existing human rights provisions; and 
these existing human rights do ensure a sufficient level of protection for those in a 
humanitarian crisis without warranting the development of an individual human 
right, it remains somewhat disappointing that the ILC study has not asserted a more 
specific formulation. Indeed, as the Draft Articles appear to attempt to develop a new 
legal framework specifically tailored for circumstances of disaster, one would expect 
a more elaborate development of rights of persons finding themselves in such crises. 
From the perspective of this research however, which takes a more encompassing 
view of the legal framework of humanitarian assistance, the reliance of the ILC study 
on the existing legal body of human rights law in fact confirms the assertion made in 
this research that such a framework adequately represents the rights of persons in 
need of emergency aid.  
 
6.5.6.2 The Potential Application of the IDRL Guidelines and Model Act 
 
An entirely different stance has been taken by the IFRC/ICRC, in relation to the 
IDRL Guidelines. Indeed, while the IDRL Guidelines do not hold binding legal status 
nor formulate a specific right to receive assistance, the ICRC in 2007 recognised that 
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the Movement considers persons to have a fundamental right ‘both to offer and 
receive humanitarian assistance’, whilst adopting these Guidelines.214 Moreover, this 
stance was a reaffirmation of the ‘Principles and Rules of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent in Disaster Relief’.215 Clearly such expressions are not legally binding, but 
may be seen as the perspective of the ICRC/IFRC on the manner in which 
humanitarian assistance and its legal framework should be approached. 
Subsequently, although the ‘Model Act for the Facilitation and Regulation of 
International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance’ was created to 
supplement the IDRL Guidelines, it too does not formulate a right of persons to 
receive assistance. Therefore, whilst such a perspective may be the stance of the 
ICRC/IFRC as an organisation, it is not reflected in their legislative attempts for the 
domestic regulation of disaster response.  
In times of conflict and occupation many of the legal provisions concern the duties 
of the state as opposed to the rights of the individuals, resulting in the absence of an 
individual's right to claim assistance from the sovereign. In times of natural disaster, 
the end result is indeed similar, whereas the result is reached through a general lack 
of an existing legal framework, and a lack of implementation of the perspective into 
the existing initiatives.  
 
6.5.7 Duties of the Affected State under Refugee Law  
 
Although being a ‘refugee’ or an ‘Internally Displaced Person’ is not a situational 
circumstance as for example conflict and natural disaster, being defined as a ‘refugee’ 
or as an ‘IDP’ does warrant the applicability of a specific set of rules, as in certain 
instances those persons in need of humanitarian assistance may be categorised as 
refugees or IDPs, independently from other groups of civilians facing for example a 
conflict or disaster.216 
The application of refugee law and obligations in this regard concerning the 
provision of humanitarian assistance is dependent on the qualification of a person as 
‘refugee’ under the 1951 Refugee Convention.217 As noted above in Section 2.3.1, 
the provision of humanitarian assistance is aimed at all those in need of emergency 
aid in the aftermath of a crisis, while refugees mark a distinct category of such 
persons, and their legal qualification often occurs during a timeframe that may exceed 
the situation of a ‘humanitarian crisis’ in which humanitarian assistance is necessary. 
Furthermore, for the purposes of the provision of humanitarian assistance upon which 
this research is focused, the determination of a ‘refugee-status’ involves a cross-
border movement to the extent that a person no longer is able to turn to the 
government of its original nationality for assistance.218 Refugee law therefore has a 
                                                        
214 ICRC Resolution 30IC/07/R4 (n 201).  
215 ‘Principles and Rules of the Red Cross and Red Crescent in Disaster Relief’ as amended by the 26th 
International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, 1995.  
216 Section 2.3.1 Recipients of Humanitarian Assistance. 
217 See Section 2.3.1 on the definition of a refugee, as according to the 1951 Refugee Convention.  
218 Article 1 Refugee Convention.  
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specific focus on ‘protection’ which is distinct from emergency assistance with which 
the legal framework of humanitarian assistance is concerned. With regard to the 
framework of humanitarian assistance, such simultaneous occurrence will most 
likely be at the time of a non-international armed conflict where civilians are fleeing 
the country, or a (natural) disaster with cross-border effects. As such, refugees form 
a distinct category of persons in the discussion of obligations under international law 
resting upon states in the provision of humanitarian assistance. Determining that a 
person is a ‘refugee’ almost unequivocally results in the conclusion that the state of 
origin is (sometimes wilfully) not fulfilling certain duties in accordance with 
international law.219 Thus, when discussing the obligations pertaining to the 
provision of assistance, in refugee law such obligations automatically pertain to third 
states, as these states become the ‘affected’ state: namely the state with a received 
refugee population. As such, Article 23 of the 1951 Refugee Convention declares 
that: 
 
“The Contracting States shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory the same 
treatment with respect to public relief and assistance as is accorded to their nationals”. 
   
Although the provision itself does not specify what is meant with ‘public relief’, 
according to its Commentary it was meant to be interpreted widely and includes 
hospital treatment and emergency relief.220 Consequently, the state receiving 
refugees shall be under the obligation to provide refugees with the same assistance 
as they are obliged to provide their own nationals.221 In the event of a humanitarian 
crisis that results in the creation of a refugee population, the ‘affected’ state shall 
therefore be obliged to apply those rules of humanitarian law and human rights law 
that may be relevant in the specific circumstance, acting towards the refugees with 
the same responsibilities it would towards its own civilians. Both the UN Security 
Council and the General Assembly have indeed also taken the stance that the civilian 
population, as recipient of humanitarian assistance, includes refugees and IDPs.222 
                                                        
219 It remains beyond the scope of this research to address the full range of refugee law in depth. This 
research will concern itself strictly with those provisions of refugee law that are relevant to the legal 
regime concerning the provision of humanitarian assistance.   
220 Paul Weis, The Refugee Convention 1951: The Travaux Preparatoires Analysed With A Commentary 
(UNHCR 1995) 125.  
221 It must be noted that several states have placed reservations to Article 23 of the Convention, mainly 
concerning the fact that this Article shall be interpreted as a recommendation rather than as legally 
binding. States that have placed reservations are: Austria, Canada, Egypt, Estonia, Iran, Malta, Monaco, 
Timor Leste, Zimbabwe: Convention Relating To The Status Of Refugees Geneva, 28 July 1951, Entry 
into Force: 22 April 1954, Signatories: 19. Parties: 144, UNTS, vol. 189, p. 137.   
222 See in this regard amongst others: UNSC Res 1265 (17 September 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1265 § 7; 
UNGA Res 52/167 (18 February 1998) UN Doc A/RES/52/167 ‘Safety and security of humanitarian 
personnel’ §3; UNGA Res 53/87 (27 January 1999) UN Doc A/RES/53/87 ‘ Safety and security of 
humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel’ § 11; UNGA Res 60/124 (8 March 
2006) UN Doc A/RES/60/124 ‘Strengthening the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of 
the United Nations’ § 2; UNGA res 61/133 (1 March 2007) UN Doc A/RES/61/133 ‘Safety and security 
of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel’ § 4; UNGA Res 62/94 (25 January 






The UN accordingly acknowledges the need that may incur in certain instances to 
provide humanitarian assistance to refugees and IDPs. However, as refugees are 
considered civilians, and as the ‘affected’ state is a third state that has an obligation 
to provide equal assistance to lawful refugees as to its own nationals, the duties 
resting upon a state to provide humanitarian assistance must therefore be sought 
within general international law, human rights law and, on occasion, humanitarian 
law. Refugee law itself does not offer much support aside from the abovementioned 
Article 23 of the Refugee Convention with regard to specific obligations resting upon 
states in the provision of humanitarian assistance. As such, an in-depth look into this 
body of law is not necessary for the purpose of this research into the legal framework 
on the provision of humanitarian assistance. Recourse must be had to those 
provisions the third (recipient) state is obliged to fulfil at all times concerning its own 
civilian population, which would in essence result in the application of general 
principles of international law and human rights law.   
 
6.5.8 Rights of Persons to Receive Assistance under Refugee Law  
 
As the 1951 Refugee Convention is almost silent in its consideration of humanitarian 
assistance, only briefly referring to the duties of states to treat refugees as nationals 
in their provision of ‘public relief’ in Article 23, the Convention also does not 
specifically address a right of refugees to receive or claim humanitarian assistance 
from the ‘affected’ state. This affected state continues to be the ‘third’ state to which 
they have travelled. The Refugee Convention merely provides in Article 5 that:  
  
“Nothing in this Convention shall be deemed to impair any rights and benefits granted by 
a Contracting State to refugees apart from this Convention”.  
 
Thus, the Convention declares that refugees remain entitled to all those rights which 
the State Parties bestow upon them. This must be read in light of the rights and duties 
existing in international law with regards to human rights, as discussed in the above 
Section 6.3.2. Two provisions in particular are relevant to the discussion of the human 
rights of refugees to receive assistance, as the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child stipulate in Article 
22 and Article 23 respectively that a refugee child is entitled to receive humanitarian 
assistance within the context of the enjoyment of the rights of the Conventions.223 
Thus, when it comes to the right to receive humanitarian assistance, recourse must 
be had to other substantial bodies of law, as refugee law in itself does not make 
provisions in this. Refugees are of course free to claim such assistance from their 
original authorities based upon existing human rights law. Refugee children, 
                                                        
of the United Nations’ § 24; UNGA Res 63/139 (5 March 2009) UN Doc A/RES/63/139 ‘Strengthening 
of the coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief assistance of the United Nations, including special 
economic assistance: strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the 
United Nations’ § 25.  
223 See Section 5.4 and further on the full discussion of these rights.  
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particularly within the African continent, have extra means at their disposal through 
the particular clauses in the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. More relevantly, once refugees are 
lawfully within the jurisdiction of another state, they may claim assistance based on 
human rights provisions that are applicable to them within the jurisdiction of this 
third state. These provisions are applicable to such refugees through the very scope 
of human rights law itself, as discussed above in Chapter 4.   
 
6.5.9 Duties of the Affected State under the (Potential) IDP Framework 
  
Like refugees, internally displaced persons are a category of persons recognised in 
the receipt of humanitarian assistance by the UN.224 Furthermore, like refugees, they 
are indeed civilians although they are distinctly categorised in international law.225 
However, unlike the case for refugees, no international binding legal framework 
exists with regard to the duties resting upon states concerning the treatment of IDPs.  
Regionally in Africa, however, the Kampala Convention for the ‘Protection And 
Assistance Of Internally Displaced Persons In Africa’ declares far-reaching 
obligations resting upon states regarding the provision of humanitarian assistance to 
IDPs. Article 3 pertaining to ‘general obligations’ stipulates in particular relating to 
the provision of assistance that:   
  
“1. States Parties undertake to respect and ensure respect for the present Convention. In 
particular, States Parties shall: (…) j. Ensure assistance to internally displaced persons by 
meeting their basic needs as well as allowing and facilitating rapid and unimpeded access 
by humanitarian organizations and personnel; k. Promote self-reliance and sustainable 
livelihoods amongst internally displaced persons, provided that such measures shall not be 
used as a basis for neglecting the protection of and assistance to internally displaced 
persons, without prejudice to other means of assistance; (…)”. 
 
Clearly, the African Union has wished to place a distinct obligation upon the State 
Parties to the Kampala Convention to provide assistance to IDPs by meeting their 
                                                        
224 UNSC Res 1265 (17 September 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1265 § 7; UNGA Res 52/167 (18 February 
1998) UN Doc A/RES/52/167 ‘Safety and security of humanitarian personnel’ § 3; UNGA Res 53/87 
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United Nations’ § 25. 
225 See Section 2.3.1 on their inclusion as recipients of humanitarian assistance. See furthermore ‘Report 
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resolution 1997/39’, Addendum ‘Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement’ (Guiding Principles on 
IDPs) (11 February 1998) UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 preamble § 2 and the African Union Kampala 






basic needs and respecting their rights, as stated in particular in Article 3(1)(j). The 
Kampala Convention takes the obligations of States Parties one step further than the 
general obligations of international law, stating in Article 4 that such States Parties 
have an obligation to prevent conditions that may lead to arbitrary displacement and, 
‘where necessary, provide immediate protection and assistance to internally 
displaced persons’. Following this obligation, Article 5 asserts that States Parties 
shall have the primary obligation and responsibility in the provision of humanitarian 
assistance to all IDPs within their territory or jurisdiction, specifying a duty to ‘take 
necessary steps to effectively organize, relief action that is humanitarian, and 
impartial in character’. Article 5 explicates that such a duty exists regardless of the 
origin of the disaster which causes displacement; be it manmade or natural, whilst at 
the same time recognising respect for the existing principles of sovereignty and 
territorial integrity under international law.226 Article 9 of the Kampala Convention 
reiterates this obligation to protect the rights of IDPs regardless of the cause of the 
displacement, and sets forth that states, in doing so, must refrain amongst others from 
‘genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other violations of international 
humanitarian law’ as well as from starvation, which has already been discussed more 
in detail above, in Section 6.5.1.227 More specifically concerning humanitarian 
assistance, Article 9 also sets forth that during internal displacement:  
  
“2. States Parties shall: (…) b. Provide internally displaced persons to the fullest extent 
practicable and with the least possible delay, with adequate humanitarian assistance, which 
shall include food, water, shelter, medical care and other health services, sanitation, 
education, and any other necessary social services, and where appropriate, extend such 
assistance to local and host communities; c. Provide special protection for and assistance 
to internally displaced persons with special needs, including separated and unaccompanied 
children, female heads of households, expectant mothers, mothers with young children, 
the elderly, and persons with disabilities or with communicable diseases; (…) g. Respect 
and maintain the civilian and humanitarian character of the places where internally 
displaced persons are sheltered and safeguard such locations against infiltration by armed 
groups or elements and disarm and separate such groups or elements from internally 
displaced persons”. 
 
As such, the Kampala Convention has created specific provisions for the various 
timeframes that may be of relevance, namely assistance in the protection from 
displacement, assistance during displacement, as well as in the aftermath thereof. 
Tailoring to many possible situations and with many specific provisions, the 
Kampala Convention has also asserted particularly in relation to armed groups 
participating in conflict that obligations pertaining to the provision of humanitarian 
assistance rest upon them also and not merely upon the State Parties to the 
Convention. As such, Article 7 states that: 
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“5. Members of armed groups shall be prohibited from: (…) b. Hampering the provision 
of protection and assistance to internally displaced persons under any circumstances; c. 
Denying internally displaced persons the right to live in satisfactory conditions of dignity, 
security, sanitation, food, water, health and shelter; and separating members of the same 
family; (…) g. Impeding humanitarian assistance and passage of all relief consignments, 
equipment and personnel to internally displaced persons h. Attacking or otherwise harming 
humanitarian personnel and resources or other materials deployed for the assistance or 
benefit of internally displaced persons and shall not destroy, confiscate or divert such 
materials; and i. Violating the civilian and humanitarian character of the places where 
internally displaced persons are sheltered and shall not infiltrate such violations”.  
     
Although this provision does not contain a positive obligation towards armed groups 
to provide humanitarian assistance, the Kampala Convention does envisage a 
prohibition for armed groups to interfere with the provision of such assistance. The 
inclusion of this provision adds to the protection of IDPs on the African continent, 
where complex emergencies often occur, and natural disasters take place in regions 
afflicted by (often non-international) armed conflict. Given the gaps in protection 
offered by humanitarian law in times of non-international armed conflict, the 
enhanced protection provided by the efforts of the Kampala Convention add to the 
legal framework for IDPs. Clearly, it must be noted that the Kampala Convention is 
limited as the treaty's scope concerns the African continent, and has only recently 
entered into force.228  
It is therefore relevant to note furthermore that, in circumstances of non-
international armed conflict, Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Convention holds 
in Article 17 that displacement of civilians, aside from two exceptional 
circumstances, is prohibited and that should displacements indeed have to be carried 
out, all possible measures must be taken to ensure that the IDPs are ‘received under 
satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition’. This 
provision also includes the conditions during displacement itself and not only upon 
the arrival of IDPs in a new area, and it follows Article 49 of GC IV, as the original 
1949 Conventions are silent on the matter of internal displacement and treatment of 
such IDPs.229 Thus, in circumstances of non-international armed conflict as covered 
by the level of control indicated in AP II, a minimum level of protection for IDPs 
exists, as states have a duty to ensure that no displacement occurs, and in the 
exceptional circumstance that such displacement does occur, assistance must be 
provided to the IDPs.  
At a more general level, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 
developed within and largely embraced by the UN framework, are the current 
existing soft law framework with regard to the rights and duties concerning IDPs.230 
Although non-binding in nature, they will be discussed in this Section pertaining to 
                                                        
228 Currently 22 states are party to the Convention.  
229 Sandoz, Swinarski & Zimmermann Commentary to the Additional Protocols (n 128) Protocol II 
Article 17, 1472 . 







the legal framework as they have been widely embraced by actors in the field.231 
Similar to the Kampala Convention, the Guiding Principles distinguish between 
provisions concerning protection from displacement, during displacement and 
thereafter. Specifically concerning the obligation resting upon states in the provision 
of humanitarian assistance during the prevention of displacement, Guiding Principle 
3 stipulates that ‘national authorities have the primary duty and responsibility’ in this 
regard.232 Similar to the provision of Article 17 AP II, Guiding Principle 7 declares 
that should displacement be inevitable, ‘satisfactory conditions of safety, nutrition, 
health and hygiene’ must be met.233 In the event displacement has occurred, the 
Guiding Principles prohibit, as do the Geneva and Kampala Conventions, ‘starvation 
as a method of combat’.234 In fact, according to Guiding Principle 18(2) authorities 
shall have the obligation to at least provide IDPs with access to: 
 
“(a) Essential food and potable water; (b) Basic shelter and housing; (c) Appropriate 
clothing; and (d) Essential medical services and sanitation”. 
 
The subsequent Principle explicates what such essential medical services entail, with 
a specific view to the prevention of contagious diseases.235 From the above it follows 
that the Guiding Principles have attempted to be as explicit and detailed as possible 
in their assertion of the duties of states. As such, reiterating Principle 3 (that dealt 
more particularly with the prevention of displacement), Guiding Principle 25 declares 
unambiguously that the ‘primary duty and responsibility for providing humanitarian 
                                                        
231 Ibid and more specifically also ‘Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis 
M. Deng, submitted pursuant to Commission resolution 1997/39’, Addendum ‘Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement’ (Guiding Principles on IDPs) (11 February 1998) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, Principle 3. The Guiding Principles are supported by the United Nations offices 
UNHCR and OHCHR, and furthermore the UN General Assembly declared in § 7 of UNGA Res 58/177 
(12 March 2004) UN Doc A/RES/58/177 ‘Protection of and assistance to internally displaced persons’ 
that it: “Expresses its appreciation of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement as an important 
tool for dealing with situations of internal displacement, welcomes the fact that an increasing number of 
States, United Nations agencies and regional and non-governmental organizations are applying them as 
a standard, and encourages all relevant actors to make use of the Guiding Principles when dealing with 
situations of internal displacement”. See also former UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of 
Internally Displaced Persons Walter Kälin has furthermore declared in his final ‘Report of the 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced persons’, UN Doc 
A/HRC/13/21 (5 January 2010) § 10. Furthermore the General Assembly has continued to embrace the 
Guiding Principles, amongst others in UNGA Res 60/1 (24 October 2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1 ‘World 
Summit Outcome Document’ § 132 where the General Assembly recognises the Principles as an 
“important international framework for the protection of internally displaced persons”, a phrasing that is 
echoed by UNGA Res 60/124 (8 March 2006) UN Doc. A/RES/60/124 § 6; UNGA Res 60/168 (7 March 
2006) A/RES/60/168 ‘Protection of and assistance to internally displaced persons’ § 8; and UNGA Res 
62/153 (6 March 2008) UN Doc. A/RES/62/153, ‘Protection of and assistance to internally displaced 
persons’ § 10; as well as UN HRC Res 6/32 (14 December 2007) A/HRC/6/32 § 5. 
232 Guiding Principle 3(1). 
233 Guiding Principle 7(2). 
234 Guiding Principle 10(b).  
235 Principle 19(3). 
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assistance’ to IDPs lies with national authorities.236 The creation of the Guiding 
Principles was primarily to ‘fill the gap’ in protection for IDPs under existing human 
rights, refugee and humanitarian law, as many provisions were not tailored to the 
specific needs of such IDPs.237 Prior to their development, Francis Deng addressed a 
problem that unfortunately still exists today, as the Principles are non-binding: 
 
“Clear gaps in international protection arise in certain areas where no explicit norms exist 
to address identifiable needs of the internally displaced (…) A norm may exist in human 
rights law but be lacking in humanitarian law, or vice versa (…) The second category of 
insufficient coverage results where a general norm exists but a corollary, more specific 
right has not been articulated that would ensure implementation of the general norm in 
areas of particular need to internally displaced persons (…) While it may be possible to 
infer specific legal rights from general norms, the protection of the internally displaced 
would be strengthened by spelling out the particular corollary of the norm relevant to their 
needs. There are also inherent shortcomings in the law”.238   
 
Although these Guiding Principles have been embraced by the UN General Assembly 
and other organs, they are indeed non-binding and as such do not add to the existing 
legal framework on the protection of persons in need of humanitarian assistance.239 
Indeed as addressed by Deng himself, the Guidelines build forth on existing law to 
provide ‘gap-filling’ for the grey areas in the law concerning IDPs. In their support 
several organs of the UN themselves have also in recent years called upon the primary 
responsibility of states to provide in assistance towards IDPs.240 Not only have UN 
organs supported the embracement of the Guiding Principles, their content too has 
been specifically supported, as several organs have expressed that IDPs at least 
should enjoy (amongst others) access to essential food and water, shelter and medical 
                                                        
236 Guiding Principle 25(1). Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Principle 25 shall be dealt with more in depth in 
Chapter 7.  
237 ‘Further Promotion And Encouragement Of Human Rights And Fundamental Freedoms, Including 
The Question Of The Programme And Methods Of Work Of The Commission Human Rights, Mass 
Exoduses And Displaced Persons Internally displaced persons’ Report of the Representative of the 
Secretary General UN Doc E/CN.4/1997/43 (4 February 1997) § 2-5.  
238 Ibid § 3-5. 
239 See (n 230 and 231). 
240 See amongst others regarding the General Assembly's support of this position: UNGA Res 49/169 (23 
December 1994) UN Doc A/RES/49/169 § 11; UNGA Res 58/177 (12 March 2004) UN Doc 
A/RES/58/177 preamble; See also the Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis 
Deng, UN Doc E/CN.4/1994/44 (n 74) § 21; ‘Further Promotion And Encouragement Of Human Rights 
And Fundamental Freedoms, Including The Question Of The Programme And Methods Of Work Of The 
Commission Human Rights, Mass Exoduses And Displaced Persons Internally displaced persons’, 
Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General (22 February 1996) UN Doc E/CN.4/1996/52 § 
71; Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced 
persons UN Doc A/HRC/4/38/Add.2 (18 October 2006) § 5; ‘Specific Groups And Individuals: Mass 
Exoduses And Displaced Persons’ Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General UN Doc 
E/CN.4/2002/95/Add.3 (10 December 2001) § 13; and more recently ILC ‘Preliminary report on the 
protection of persons in the event of disasters’ UN Doc. A/CN.4/598 (n 191) § 45; as well as UN Doc 






services.241 Such assertions are most relevant, as they can be construed as potential 
indications of opinio juris with regard to legal developments. In fact, with the 
changing nature of humanitarian crises, focusing more on natural disasters and non-
international armed conflicts, the need for clear regulations regarding IDPs is 
increasing. Such a need is also of a more general level, rather than focusing perhaps 
more specifically on the receipt of humanitarian aid. Indeed, where persons are 
displaced as the result of a natural disaster or potential (non-) international armed 
conflict, the more general applicable law in such circumstances remains appropriate 
and valid, such as human rights law and humanitarian law.242 When considering 
however the binding and specific legal framework placing obligations upon states to 
provide humanitarian assistance to IDPs, it must be concluded that such a framework 
only exists regionally for states that fall within the scope of the Kampala Convention, 
and rather limited for those circumstances regulated by AP II of the Geneva 
Conventions, as Article 17 AP II does not allow for much (explicit) protection. In a 
more general sense therefore, circumstances in which IDP populations arise, such as 
non-international armed conflicts falling outside the scope of AP II, or outside of the 
African continent, recourse must be had to the more general protection of the existing 
human rights to life, food and health, similar to other civilians.  
 
6.5.10 Rights of Persons to Receive Assistance under the (Potential) IDP Framework 
 
Similar to refugees, several specific legally binding provisions detail the rights of 
IDPs to request humanitarian assistance. In particular, within a human rights context, 
the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child stipulates in Article 23 
that the rights applicable to the refugee child are equally applicable to the IDP child, 
entitling it to receive humanitarian assistance within the context of the enjoyment of 
the rights of that Charter.243 Also within the African continent, but more elaborately 
and unambiguously, the Kampala Convention declares in Article 5(9): 
  
“States Parties shall respect the right of internally displaced persons to peacefully request 
or seek protection and assistance, in accordance with relevant national and international 
laws, a right for which they shall not be persecuted, prosecuted or punished”. 
                                                        
241 Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced 
persons, ‘Addendum Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons’ UN Doc 
A/HRC/13/21/Add.4 (9 February 2010) § 65. See also HRC Res 6/32 (14 December 2007) UN Doc 
A/RES/6/32 § 3 in which the Human Rights Council expresses concern for IDPs not having access to 
such materials; Commission on Human Rights resolution 2002/56l (25 April 2002) § 10; Report of the 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced persons (23 
December 2005) UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/71/Add.1 § 10. 
242 This perspective has amongst others also been supported by the ILA in its ILA Declaration of 
International Law Principles on Internally Displaced Persons (29 July 2000) Article 2. See the 
Commentary to the Declaration for a further discussion on the ILA's perspective that the state is the 
primary responsible for the provision of assistance to IDPs (Article 10). As this declaration is also non-
binding, this research will not discuss it within this section on the legal framework. 
243 See supra Section 4.3.I.A Humanitarian Assistance as a Potential Human Right in International Treaty 
Law on the full discussion of this right.  
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Thus, the Kampala Convention very clearly addresses the distinct right to request aid, 
pertaining to IDPs. Also, the Kampala Convention acknowledges in Article 9(2)(k) 
that IDPs must be consulted, and more particularly, that they are allowed to 
participate in the process of receiving assistance. 
Furthermore, it has been asserted that IDPs have a right to request assistance based 
on the existing human rights framework, similar to other civilians in general.244 The 
close relationship and complementarity between IDPs’ need for humanitarian 
assistance and the protection offered by general human rights law has indeed 
frequently been addressed, and an independently existing right to request assistance 
for IDPs has been asserted by the UN Special Rapporteur.245 This perspective is also 
voiced in the Guiding Principles on IDPs, as Principle 3(2) states that IDPs not only 
have a right to request assistance, but that they also have the right to receive such 
assistance. The Guiding Principles therefore hold a dual right for IDPs in relation to 
their authorities, similar to the Kampala Convention. In circumstances of 
displacement, Guiding Principle 18 is more elaborate and explicates that:  
  
“1. All internally displaced persons have the right to an adequate standard of living. 2. At 
the minimum, regardless of the circumstances, and without discrimination, competent 
authorities shall provide internally displaced persons with and ensure safe access to: (a) 
Essential food and potable water; (b) Basic shelter and housing; (c) Appropriate clothing; 
and (d) Essential medical services and sanitation. 3. Special efforts should be made to 
ensure the full participation of women in the planning and distribution of these basic 
supplies”. 
 
Thus, the Guiding Principles envisage a right for IDPs to receive and request 
humanitarian assistance in the fullest possible manner. This viewpoint is echoed by 
the ILA's Declaration of International Law Principles on Internally Displaced 
Persons, creating a strong perspective in soft law with regard to the rights of IDPs in 
relation to humanitarian assistance.246 Existing binding legal provisions however 
remain those provisions in general international law and human rights law. 
Specifically within human rights law, next to the existing rights to life, food and 
health, tailored provisions exist such as Article 23 African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child and particularly supplemented by the Kampala Convention.  
 
                                                        
244 Section 5.4 Humanitarian Assistance Within the Context of Existing Human Rights. 
245 See in this regard amongst others Commission on Human Rights resolution 2003/52 (24 April 2003) 
preamble § 9; Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis Deng, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/1994/44 (n 74) § 20; ‘Further Promotion And Encouragement Of Human Rights And 
Fundamental Freedoms, Including The Question Of The Programme And Methods Of Work Of The 
Commission Alternative Approaches And Ways And Means Within The United Nations System For 
Improving The Effective Enjoyment Of Human Rights And Fundamental Freedoms’ Note by the 
Secretary-General UN Doc E/CN.4/1993/35 (21 January 1993) § 59. For the perspective of the Special 
Rapporteur: UN Doc A/HRC/4/38/Add.2 (n 240) § 5. 
246 Article 3(2) Declaration of International Law Principles on Internally Displaced Persons, which 






6.6 Ascertaining the Existing Legal Framework in a Humanitarian Crisis  
 
From the above overview of the applicable legal framework, it must be distinctly 
ascertained in which circumstances the provision of humanitarian assistance is 
developed most fully, and which circumstance may be lacking proper legal 
provisions. The relationship of various corpora juris is furthermore relevant, to 
determine the exact level of protection for persons needing emergency aid in a 
humanitarian crisis, depending on the specific kind of crisis at hand.  
 The perspective is taken in this research that persons in need of assistance 
should be able to receive such assistance, regardless of the origin of the humanitarian 
crisis. The determination of such a crisis in itself warrants the provision of assistance. 
Yet, various legal regimes are currently applicable in different circumstances, 
providing for different levels of protection. It has therefore been established that the 
lex specialis principle entails that the more detailed provision (as opposed to a whole 
body of law) is considered the applicable law, while the lex generalis remains present 
in the background.247 With a more harmonious approach, focus would lay on gap-
filling methods and the application of specific provisions, rather than entire bodies 
of law having prevalence over another body of law.248 This approach would enhance 
the level of protection at all times, as provisions can be utilised from various bodies 
of law, to ensure a greater level of protection for the provision of assistance.    
Only upon analysing the interaction of the various applicable rights and duties 
that have been ascertained above, can it be ascertained precisely which duties the 
affected state has, and which rights persons in need can claim, in circumstances 
amounting to a humanitarian crisis. When ascertaining the applicable law, it is 
relevant to take all provisions of the above corpora juris into account. 
  
6.6.1 The Applicable Lex Specialis in Armed Conflict 
 
In times of armed conflict, multiple fields of law are of relevance in the determination 
of the current legal framework pertaining to the provision of humanitarian assistance. 
Indeed, armed conflict in particular is a circumstance in which the circumstantial 
field of humanitarian law and the topical fields of refugee law and IDP law are 
applicable next to the generally applicable bodies of law such as human rights law 
and the duties under state sovereignty or those derived from the UN Security Council 
resolutions ascertaining a general primary duty for affected states to provide in 
humanitarian assistance. 
With regard to the relation between human rights law and humanitarian law, a 
conflict does not necessarily exist concerning the provisions pertaining to the 
delivery of emergency aid. Indeed, whilst the provisions in the Additional Protocols 
are quite specific, they are duties to refrain from certain actions, and do not conflict 
with the duties under human rights law, in particular the rights to food and health, 
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that incorporate obligations of conduct, where the affected state is responsible for 
meeting the minimum core obligations. Both fields of law are specific, and tailored 
to the topic of humanitarian assistance. Both fields of law address distinct duties in 
circumstances of armed conflict that are not necessarily in conflict, in particular given 
the fact that humanitarian law differentiates between the type of armed conflict and 
thus does not have a broad scope of protection for those persons in need of assistance, 
to receive such aid from the affected state.  
Sections 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 have addressed that humanitarian law recognises 
obligations resting upon parties to a conflict to prevent certain circumstances. 
Besides the existing duty of ‘humane treatment’ in Common Article 3, Article 54 AP 
I stipulates an obligation resting upon parties to an international armed conflict to 
prevent the destruction of objects that are indispensable to the civilian population, 
whereas Article 14 AP II states a duty for parties to a non-international armed conflict 
to prevent starvation of civilians: both duties are obligations of result. However, 
human rights law also provides for various positive obligations of states: obligations 
of conduct. These duties exist regardless of the typology of the conflict, and include 
the duty to provide adequate food for the civilian population, which the CESCR has 
interpretatively ascertained to entail the freedom from hunger, as part of the 
minimum core obligations under Article 11 ICESCR. The right to health, in particular 
Article 12(2)(c) ICESCR with regard to the prevention of diseases provides for a 
right of the population in times of conflict to request assistance from the affected 
state. Such assistance is then related to the prevention epidemics, common to 
emergency situations. Furthermore, the right to life in armed conflict continues to 
encompass the right to not be ‘arbitrarily deprived’ of one’s life.  
Should an armed conflict be international and include the development of a 
refugee population, the refugee child shall also be protected through Article 22 of the 
CRC. Furthermore, if such conflicts occur within the African continent, Article 23 of 
the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child holds specific provisions 
in this regard. Moreover, in the case of a non-international armed conflict, the 
protection is increased on the African continent through the provisions of the 
Kampala Convention. Articles 3(1)(j), 4, 5, 7(5)(b) and (c), 9(1), 9(2)(b) and (c), and 
9(2)(k) place detailed obligations upon State Parties with regard to the provision of 
humanitarian assistance.  
Thus, the above shows that international humanitarian law is not in itself by 
definition the lex specialis with regard to the provision of humanitarian assistance in 
times of conflict. Rather, various corpora juris contain specific provisions pertaining 
(mostly) to the obligations resting upon the affected state in the provision of 
assistance; a positive obligation that is distinctly absent in humanitarian law. All such 
obligations must be read together, facilitating a harmonious approach through which 
the affected population shall be able to receive the greatest protection in international 
law, and the best legal protection for the provision of assistance. Indeed, it will be 
necessary to apply the various obligations side-by-side, as their simultaneous 






both human rights law and humanitarian law to enhance the protection of persons, 
and as such both bodies work towards the same goal.  
 
6.6.2 The Applicable Lex Specialis in Occupation 
 
A similar converging approach must be had to the law applicable in times of 
occupation that amounts to a humanitarian crisis. As is the case in times of armed 
conflict, the constant factor of state sovereignty and the UN framework provide for a 
primary responsibility that lies with the occupier in the provision of assistance, 
should it be needed in times of occupation.  
As seen in Sections 6.5.3 and 6.5.4, the Fourth Geneva Convention stipulates in 
Articles 55, 56 and 60 that the occupier has a duty to provide food and medical 
supplies to its available means, whereas Article 69 AP I elaborates on this to include 
shelter and other supplies that may be essential to the survival of the occupied 
population. Although the provisions of GC IV and AP I are rather detailed, they do 
include the phrasing ‘to the fullest extent of the means available’, which provides the 
occupier with the possibility to claim it is not in a position to grant the population 
such materials. Furthermore, it must be noted that these provisions only become 
relevant upon the passing of a certain amount of time and establishment of a certain 
amount of control by the occupying force, when often a humanitarian crisis may not 
(or no longer) exist.  
The level of control of the occupier is furthermore relevant to the application of 
human rights law. Whereas the continued application of such law is accepted in times 
of conflict, its continued application in times of occupation is subject to the 
discussion of the level of ‘effective’ control or authority, in extraterritorial 
situations.249 Whilst the relevant provisions of human rights law include the 
obligation of states to respect the right to life of civilians, provide adequate food, and 
safeguard health (in particular with regard to the prevention of epidemics and 
diseases), their continued application is not crystal clear. Should a crisis exist, most 
logically the rather detailed provisions of the Geneva Conventions would be resorted 
to.  
As the provisions in times of occupation allow for a rather far-reaching level of 
obligations upon states, it has been argued that such duties resemble the duties upon 
states in peacetime situations to quite a large extent.250 Indeed, in contrast to a 
situation of conflict, occupation may be prolonged over time, and the urgency to 
supply goods may subside or may indeed already have subsided when occupation is 
established. As such, it would then need to be re-evaluated whether or not a 
humanitarian crisis exists, to re-evaluate the application of legal provisions 
                                                        
249 Sections 3.4.2 Applicability of Human Rights in Armed Conflict and Occupation and 3.4.2.2 The 
Potential Extraterritorial Scope of Application of Human Rights Treaties. 
250 Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation (n 161) 87; Flavia Zorzi Giustiniani, ‘The Works of 
the International Law Commission on ‘Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters. A Critical 
Appraisal’ in A de Guttry, M Gestri, G Venturini (eds), International Disaster Response Law (TMC 
Asser Press / Springer 2012) 65-84.  
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concerning humanitarian assistance. Today, the need for humanitarian assistance is 
more often found in other circumstances, such as (natural) disasters.  
  
6.6.3 The Applicable Lex Specialis in Times of (Natural) Disaster 
  
As has been addressed in Sections 6.5.5 and 6.5.6, a particular encompassing and 
tailored legal framework is absent in times of disaster not resulting from armed 
conflict. State sovereignty and the duties expressed through organs in the UN 
framework such as the General Assembly, however, continue to note the general legal 
responsibility of the affected state to provide in the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance to an affected group of persons in the aftermath of such disasters.  
Furthermore, human rights law is applicable as only lex specialis to provide 
persons in need of assistance with actual legal rights to claim the receipt such aid 
from the affected state. Human rights law does so through provisions pertaining to 
the right to life, food, health (and water). Thus, as in times of conflict, states are 
obliged to not arbitrarily deprive persons of their life, and fulfil the positive 
obligations relating to the right to adequate food and health as stipulated in Articles 
11 and 12 of the ICESCR as well as in all other specialised treaties discussed above. 
Furthermore, the topical bodies of refugee and IDP law can be applied. Should 
children become refugees, Article 22 of the CRC will provide State Parties with 
specific obligations in light of other obligations they may have under the Convention. 
The African continent in particular – prone to natural disasters – has developed far-
reaching human rights protection for IDPs, as  Articles 3(1)(j), 4, 5, 7(5)(b) and (c), 
9(1), 9(2)(b) and (c), and 9(2)(k) oblige the affected state to provide in humanitarian 
assistance for IDPs. Also, Article 23 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare 
of the Child holds specific provisions to this end that are comparable to Article 22 
CRC. As seen in the above settings also, the African continent regionally holds the 
most specific obligations for affected states and specific rights for those in need of 
humanitarian assistance. This region is furthermore prone to ‘complex emergencies’ 
in which a natural disaster may occur in times of armed conflict.  
Indeed as addressed in Section 6.6.1, in essence the provisions of the various fields 
of law that can be applicable in disaster do not conflict with each other. As such, no 
discussion arises on the applicability of fields of law, and the applicable fields 
complement each other. 
 
6.6.4 Determining the Problems and Gaps in the Provision of Humanitarian 
Assistance  
 
In addressing the rights of the affected population to request assistance from its 
sovereign or other authority exercising sovereign control, such as certain armed 
groups in times of conflict, and addressing the duties of the authorities to provide in 
this regard, this Chapter has also uncovered the problems and gaps in the current 
legal framework. Indeed, whereas greatly detailed provisions exist for example with 






within the scope of the Kampala Convention, some areas are still very much lacking 
specific legal protection by the affected state for persons in a humanitarian crisis.  
In particular, several situations spring to mind. For example, one might consider 
situations of non-international armed conflict, outside the realm of the Kampala 
Convention on the African continent, where one does not look specifically to the IDP 
population. Both natural disasters and non-international armed conflicts are the types 
of humanitarian crises most commonly found today. In cases of non-international 
armed conflict, the civilian population is protected under humanitarian law solely 
through Additional Protocol II’s stipulation that states are obliged to prevent 
starvation. Such protection is however solely granted to those civilians finding 
themselves within the scope of AP II’s threshold of ‘control’ needed for a non-state 
party, and furthermore is confined to those states that are party to the Protocol in the 
first place. Yet, what protection is offered in situations in which a state is not party 
to the Additional Protocol, or such a threshold is not met?  
For all other protection, such civilians must resort to human rights law and the 
provisions therein that are not necessarily drafted for tailoring to circumstances of 
conflict. This is equally the law which is applicable in times of natural disaster, as no 
other detailed provisions exist for the receipt of assistance. Although human rights 
law offers great protection through the rights to life, food and health, the provisions 
are not as detailed concerning the delivery of emergency assistance specifically. 
Despite their lack of detail, the provisions of the ICESCR, in particular due to the 
notion of ‘minimum core obligations’ do cast a ‘wide net’ of protection through their 
continued applicability and are by some considered to provide greater protection than 
international humanitarian law.251 Indeed, human rights law contains positive 
obligations for the affected state that are lacking in humanitarian law. Whilst it is 
therefore positive that human rights law provides this protection, it remains 
regrettable that such duties for the sovereign actor are absent under humanitarian law. 
Such gaps in the law are particularly poignant in the recent rise in non-international 
armed conflicts, where populations in need are caught in conflict between state armed 
forces and non-state actors or armed groups.  
Furthermore, complex emergencies are relevant in the determination of gaps in 
the law, such as those emergencies where a natural disaster takes place in a conflict 
area. Whilst human rights law remains applicable, consideration must be given to 
areas where the national authorities may claim not to have sovereignty or control 
within their state territory due to an on-going conflict. It might be unclear who the 
sovereign is in a certain area, and therefore upon whom the obligation lies to provide 
assistance should a sudden natural disaster take place that overwhelms the local 
authority. The state sovereign may then be unwilling or unable to provide the 
assistance it is required to provide under existing human rights obligations.  
Indeed, the above Chapter has shown that within the current framework, not only 
do gaps exist, but furthermore a lack of harmony exists between various corpora 
juris. The implementation of the more detailed provisions tailored specifically to the 
                                                        
251 Barber, ‘Facilitating humanitarian assistance in international humanitarian and human rights law’, (n 
137) 395.  
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delivery of assistance has been dispersed: indeed the African continent has the 
greatest level of protection, in particular for IDPs.252 Yet even for IDPs not finding 
themselves within the protection of the new Kampala Convention, a lack of 
protection from humanitarian law and even human rights law can be argued, as such 
persons often find themselves displaced due to both natural disasters and non-
international armed conflict.253 To ensure the equal protection of all persons, not 
merely children on the African continent that happen to fall within the particular 
scope of the Kampala Convention, the possibilities of ensuring the external provision 
of assistance and potential state duties to allow access from abroad must be 
considered. Enhancing harmonisation of the protection of persons in need will allow 
for more certainty of that protection, regardless of the particular circumstance in 
which the humanitarian crisis is taking place.  
 
6.7 Conclusion  
 
The above Chapter has established the current existing legal framework with regard 
to the specific obligations resting upon affected states and the specific rights for the 
affected persons to claim such assistance from their national authorities or sovereign. 
As has become apparent, no ‘single’ overall duty or right can be discerned. Clarity in 
the law does not exist concerning the provision of humanitarian assistance. Such lack 
of clarity is not necessarily only the result of gaps, as it is moreover the result of ‘grey 
areas’ in the law and in some circumstances even the result of overlap between 
multiple human rights as well as humanitarian law provisions. Human rights law 
acknowledges the right to life, food, health (and water), with the simultaneous 
acknowledgement of obligations resting upon state parties to human rights treaties to 
positively provide in the protection of such rights. Several distinct human rights 
treaties furthermore cater to the rights of children and IDPs within the scope of the 
Kampala Convention.  
At a general level, the Security Council and General Assembly have asserted the 
primary responsibility of the affected state in the provision of humanitarian 
assistance, both in times of conflict and in times of (natural) disaster. Such assertions 
made by both the Security Council and General Assembly however lack detailed 
obligations or rights that are specifically tailored to the situation of a humanitarian 
crisis, as the respective resolutions often refer to the affected state’s obligations under 
‘international law’, ‘human rights law’ or ‘humanitarian law’.254 Thus, whilst these 
resolutions assert general obligations upon states or provide rights for individuals to 
assistance, they lack specific clarity within their texts. Such grey areas or gaps 
enhance the difficulties persons may experience in their attempt to receive assistance 
when in a humanitarian crisis. These assertions must therefore be explicated by 
                                                        
252 ICRC Resolution 30IC/07/R4 (n 201) § preambule. See also ‘Fragmentation Of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising From The Diversification And Expansion Of International Law’, Report of the Study 
Group of the International Law Commission (13 April 2006) UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682. 
253 UN Doc E/CN.4/1993/35 (n 245) § 61 & 74.  






human rights law and humanitarian law. Indeed, international humanitarian law 
contains a variety of very precise and detailed provisions, but lacks the incorporation 
of more general duties for the affected state and completely foregoes a right of 
individuals to request assistance from their sovereign or other authorities exercising 
control. Indeed, no specific duty to provide emergency assistance exists for the 
affected state.  
Such a general obligation is also missing from human rights law, as this body of 
law was originally of course not specifically designed to protect persons solely in a 
humanitarian crisis, but more generally at all times. From this general purpose 
however of the rights to life, food and health, the duty of the affected state to ensure 
these rights also in times of crisis for persons finding themselves in a humanitarian 
emergency can be derived. This particular protection is essential, as human rights 
law finds continued applicability in particular circumstances where protection 
through other bodies of law is lacking, such as (natural) disasters and non-
international armed conflicts.  
Furthermore, the African continent has recently expanded its legal framework 
through the Kampala Convention, allowing for a surge in protection of IDPs in this 
area of the world. Such enhanced protection must of course be applauded, but it also 
painfully lays bare the lack of protection for IDPs in other regions of the world. Given 
the influx of IDPs over the past decades,255 due to the surge in natural disasters and 
non-international armed conflicts, this relative lack of protection of IDPs (compared 
to IDPs happening to fall within the scope of the Kampala Convention) exemplifies 
the need for a more comprehensive, all-encompassing approach to the legal 
framework protecting those in a humanitarian crisis, rather than haphazard 
incorporation or geographical protection.  
Another related, and problematic, aspect of the legal framework concerning 
humanitarian assistance is the fact that the existing detailed provisions are often 
confined to very specific circumstances, such as IDPs in Africa, or refugee children. 
Thus, the legal protection provided to persons in need of assistance becomes rather 
‘sectoral’, with different legal obligations resting upon various states and different 
rights existing for persons depending on the particular category of crisis one finds 
oneself in, or the particular location on the globe. Such haphazard and disparate 
protection is rather problematic, as it results in unequal protection under the law for 
persons in need of humanitarian assistance, as well as unequal obligations for 
affected states, depending on their particular region. A person in need of food, water 
and shelter due to the existence of a humanitarian emergency should have to be able 
to request and receive such bare necessities and retain human dignity, regardless of 
country of origin, typology of crisis or age. For this precise purpose, this research 
takes an overall and encompassing view of the protection of persons in need of 
humanitarian assistance.  
                                                        
255 For some statistics in this regard: <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c23.html> accessed 20 
October 2014, where UNHCR states that in 2012 nearly 29 million IDPs existed worldwide, compared 
to 17 million in 1997.  
 
 
The Duty of the Affected State to Provide, and the Right of Persons  
to Receive Humanitarian Assistance  
291 
Many soft law documents have sought to solve such problematic situations by 
developing guidelines and principles with regard to the provision of humanitarian 
assistance which are applicable to all circumstances. As such, the 1991 Guidelines 
for Humanitarian Assistance, the 1993 San Remo Principles, the Mohonk Criteria 
and the well-known Bruges Resolution of 2003 proffer suggestions. These soft law 
instruments invariably recognise the primary duty of the affected state to provide aid, 
regardless of the nature or origin of the crisis, and the Mohonk Criteria and Bruges 
Resolution even explicitly recognise such a duty for other authorities exercising a 
certain amount of control.256 Moreover, and quite distinct from the existing law, these 
instruments almost all acknowledge a right of persons affected by a humanitarian 
crisis to request and receive assistance from their national authorities or sovereign.257 
Clearly, such instruments express a development initiative in the international legal 
framework regarding humanitarian assistance, as they can be considered to contribute 
to expressions of opinio juris.258 However, such an all-encompassing approach to the 
provision of humanitarian assistance is currently lacking in existing law; in particular 
the recognition of a ‘right to request’ assistance.  
In essence, such an individual right is however not necessary for the protection of 
persons through human rights law, as argued in Chapter 5, given the sufficient level 
of protection offered by the existing human rights to life, food and health. Whereas 
the development of more tailored provisions might theoretically enhance protection, 
such development is of greater necessity from the perspective of the duties of the 
affected state; in particular in circumstances of loss of control of the affected state 
over areas of its territory, such as in times of non-international armed conflict and 
complex emergencies. 
From the above discussion of the existing legal framework, as well as from the 
efforts of soft law instruments, a conclusion can be drawn. The international legal 
framework regarding the provision of humanitarian assistance, although hesitant to 
affirmatively acknowledge a right of individuals to claim assistance and receive such 
assistance from their sovereign, does view a primary positive, but general, obligation 
to rest upon the affected state in the provision of humanitarian assistance. Such a duty 
is furthermore made more concrete through the duties derived from the human rights 
to life, food and health as well as by the notion of sovereignty as ‘responsibility’. 
Consequently, if an affected state or acting sovereign does not provide in such a duty, 
the legal framework regarding humanitarian assistance must enlarge its scope, and 
look to encompass potential rights of third parties, such as states and international 
organisations, in the provision of assistance to persons in need. The subsequent 
                                                        
256 See in this regard the 1991 Guidelines for Humanitarian Assistance Guideline 6 (6); ‘Guiding 
Principles on the Right to Humanitarian Assistance’ (April 1993) The International Institute of 
Humanitarian Law in San Remo, Principle 4; ‘The Mohonk Criteria for Humanitarian Assistance in 
Complex Emergencies’, (1995) reprinted in 17 Human Rights Quarterly 1, Principle II; Resolution 
‘Humanitarian Assistance’ (2 September 2003) Institute of International Law, Sixteenth Commission, 
Bruges Session, Principle III. 
257 Ibid ‘Guiding Principles on the Right to Humanitarian Assistance’ Principles 1 and 2; ibid ‘The 
Mohonk Criteria’; and ibid the Bruges Resolution § II.2. 






Chapter shall therefore address a potential external right to provide assistance, as well 
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 Primary duty of 
affected state to 
provide assistance 
based on concept of 
sovereignty within this 
research (as 
responsibility) 
 Right to request 
assistance from 
affected state based 
on a reciprocal 
relationship between 




 2(1) UN Charter; UNGA Res 
38/202 (20 December 1983) 
UN Doc A/RES/38/202 § 4, 
UNGA Res 43/131 (8 
December 1988) UN Doc 
A/RES/43/131 § 2, and 
UNGA Res 45/100 (14 
December 1990) UN Doc 
A/RES/45/100 § 2, UNGA 
Res 46/182 (19 December 
1991) UN Doc 







 Primary responsibility 
to protect vulnerable 
groups lies with states  
  UNSC Res 1265 (17 
September 1999) UN Doc 
S/RES/1265 preamble 
 Call to states to 
comply strictly with 
their obligations under 
international 
humanitarian, human 
rights and refugee law 
  UNSC Res 1265 (17 
September 1999) UN Doc 
S/RES/1265 § 4; UNSC Res 
1296 (19 April 2000) UN 
Doc S/RES/1296 preamble 
and § 19 
 Primary responsibility 
of states to protect 
civilians (in general)  
  UNSC Res 1674 (28 April 
2006) UN Doc S/RES/1674 
§ 13; UNSC Res 1894 (11 
November 2009) UN Doc 
S/RES/1894 preamble and § 
15. See also amongst others: 
UNSC Res 1325 (31 October 
2000) UN Doc S/RES/1325; 
UNSC Res 1430 (14 August 
2002) UN Doc S/RES/1430; 
UNSC Res 1906 (23 
December 2009) UN Doc 
S/RES/1906; and UNSC Res 
1861 (14 January 2009) UN 
Doc S/RES/1861 
 'Responsibility to 
Protect' population; 
incorporation of RtoP 
  UNSC Res 1970 (26 
February 2011) UN Doc 
S/RES/1970 preamble and 
UNSC Res 1973 (17 March 
2011) UN Doc S/RES/1973 
preamble and § 3; UNSC Res 
1975 (30 March 2011) UN 
Doc S/RES/1975 ‘The 
situation in Côte d’Ivoir’ 
preamble; UNSC Res 1996 
(8 July 2011) UN Doc 
S/RES/1996 § 3(b)(iv); 
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2011) UN Doc S/RES/2014 
§ preamble; UNSC Res 2016 
(27 October 2011) UN Doc 
S/RES/2016 § 3; UNSC Res 
2040 (12 March 2012) UN 
Doc S/RES/2040 § 4; UNSC 
Res 2139 (22 February 2014) 
UN Doc S/RES/2139 § 9; 
UNSC 2165 (14 July 2014) 
UN Doc S/RES/2165 
preamble 
 Primary responsibility 
under general 
international law to 
'take all feasible steps 
to ensure the 
protection of affected 
civilians' as well as 
responsibility of 
parties to an armed 
conflict to 'respect, 
protect and meet the 
basic needs of civilian 
populations within 
their effective control' 
  ‘Aide Memoire Protection of 
Civilians in Armed Conflict’ 
UN Doc S/PRST/2010/25 
(22 November 2010) 
preamble; ‘Aide Memoire 
Protection of Civilians in 
Armed Conflict’ UN Doc 
S/PRST/2013/2 (12 
February 2013)  1 and 3; 
‘Aide Memoire Protection of 
Civilians in Armed Conflict’ 
UN Doc S/PRST/2014/3 (12 
February 2014) 2; UNSC 








 Primacy of the role of 
the affected countries 
'in caring for the 
victims of natural 
disasters and other 
disaster situations' 
  UNGA Res 36/225 (17 
December 1981) UN Doc 
A/RES/36/225 preamble and 
§ 2; UNGA Res 38/202 (20 
December 1983) UN Doc 
A/RES/38/202 preamble & § 
4; UNGA Res 41/201 (8 
December 1986) UN Doc 
A/RES/41/201 § 2 
 Primary role and 
responsibility of 
affected state to take 
care of the victims of 
natural disasters and 
other emergencies 
occurring on its 
territory 
  UNGA Res 46/182 (19 
December 1991) UN Doc 
A/RES/46/182 Annex § 4; 
UNGA Res 47/168 (22 
December 1992) UN Doc 
A/RES/47/168; UNGA Res 
48/57 (14 December 1993) 
UN Doc A/RES/48/57; 
UNGA Res 48/188 (9 March 
1994) UN Doc 
A/RES/48/188; UNGA Res 
49/139 (20 December 1994) 
UN Doc A/RES/49/139; 
UNGA Res 51/194 (10 
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February 1997) UN Doc 
A/RES/51/194; UNGA Res 
52/167 (18 February 1998) 
UN Doc A/RES/52/167; 
UNGA Res 52/168 (18 
February 1998) UN Doc 
A/RES/52/168; UNGA Res 
53/87 (27 January 1999) UN 
Doc A/RES/53/87; UNGA 
Res 53/88 (29 January 1999) 
UN Doc A/RES/53/88; 
UNGA Res 54/95 (28 
January 2000) UN Doc 
A/RES/54/95; UNGA Res 
54/192 (21 February 2000) 
UN Doc A/RES/54/192; 
UNGA Res 54/233 (25 
February 2000) UN Doc 
A/RES/54/233; UNGA Res 
55/163 (7 February 2001) 
UN Doc A/RES/55/163; 
UNGA Res 55/164 (7 
February 2001) UN Doc 
A/RES/55/164; UNGA Res 
55/175 (7 March 2001) UN 
Doc A/RES/55/175; UNGA 
Res 56/99 (31 January 2002) 
UN Doc A/RES/56/99; 
UNGA Res 56/103 (5 
February 2002) UN Doc 
A/RES/56/103; UNGA Res 
56/107 (7 February 2002) 
UN Doc A/RES/56/107; 
UNGA Res 56/217 (19 
February 2002) UN Doc 
A/RES/56/217;  UNGA Res 
57/150 (27 February 2003) 
UN Doc A/RES/57/150; 
UNGA Res 57/152 (3 March 
2003) UN Doc 
A/RES/57/152; UNGA Res 
57/153 (3 March 2003) UN 
Doc A/RES/57/153; UNGA 
Res 58/25 (29 January 2004) 
UN Doc A/RES/58/25; 
UNGA Res 58/114 (5 
February 2004) UN Doc 
A/RES/58/114;  UNGA Res 
59/141 (25 February 2005) 
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Source  
UNGA Res 59/212 (3 March 
2005) UN Doc 
A/RES/59/212; UNGA Res 
60/124 (8 March 2006) UN 
Doc A/RES/60/124; UNGA 
Res 60/125 (15 March 2006) 
UN Doc A/RES/60/125; 
UNGA Res 60/123 (24 
March 2006) UN Doc 
A/RES/60/123; UNGA Res 
61/131 (22 February 2007) 
UN Doc A/RES/61/131; 
UNGA Res 61/133 (1 March 
2007) UN Doc 
A/RES/61/133; UNGA Res 
61/134 (1 March 2007) UN 
Doc A/RES/61/134; UNGA 
Res 62/92 (1 February 2008) 
UN Doc A/RES/62/92; 
UNGA Res 62/94 (25 
January 2008) UN Doc 
A/RES/62/94; UNGA Res 
62/95 (29 January 2008) UN 
Doc A/RES/62/95; UNGA 
Res 63/138 (5 March 2009) 
UN Doc A/RES/63/138; 
UNGA Res 63/139 (5 March 
2009) UN Doc 
A/RES/63/139; UNGA Res 
63/141 (10 March 2009) UN 
Doc A/RES/63/141; UNGA 
Res 64/76 (2 February 2010) 
UN Doc A/RES/64/76; 
UNGA Res 64/77 (8 
February 2010) UN Doc 
A/RES/64/77; A UNGA Res 
64/251 (30 April 2010) UN 
Doc A/RES/64/251; UNGA 
Res 65/132 (1 March 2011) 
UN Doc A/RES/65/132; 
UNGA Res 65/133 (3 March 
2011) UN Doc 
A/RES/65/133; UNGA Res 
65/264 (21 June 2011) UN 
Doc A/RES/65/264; UNGA 
Res 65/307 (25 August 2011) 
UN Doc A/RES/65/307; 
UNGA Res 66/117 (1 March 
2012) UN Doc 
A/RES/66/117; UNGA Res 
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66/119 (7 March 2012) UN 
Doc A/RES/66/119; UNGA 
Res 66/227 (15 March 2012) 
UN Doc A/RES/66/227; 
UNGA Res 67/85 (21 March 
2013) UN Doc 
A/RES/67/85; UNGA Res 
67/87 (26 March 2013) UN 
Doc A/RES/67/87; UNGA 
Res 67/231 (9 April 2013) 
UN Doc A/RES/67/231; 
UNGA Res 68/101 (18 
February 2014) UN Doc 
A/RES/68/101; UNGA Res 
68/102 (12 February 2014) 
UN Doc A/RES/68/102; 
UNGA Res 68/103 (19 
February 2014) UN Doc 
A/RES/68/103 
 Obligation of all States 
and parties to an armed 
conflict to protect 
civilians in armed 
conflicts 
  UNGA Res 58/114 (5 
February 2004) UN Doc 
A/RES/58/114 § 12; UNGA 
Res 59/141 (25 February 
2005) UN Doc 
A/RES/59/141 § 15; UNGA 
Res 60/124 (8 March 2006) 
UN Doc A/RES/60/124 § 3; 
UNGA Res 62/94 (25 
January 2008) UN Doc 
A/RES/62/94 §19; UNGA 
Res 63/139 (5 March 2009) 
UN Doc A/RES/63/139 §21; 
UNGA Res 64/76 (2 
February 2010) UN Doc 
A/RES/64/76 §22; UNGA 
Res 65/133 (3 March 2011) 
UN Doc A/RES/65/133 § 23; 
UNGA Res 66/119 (7 March 
2012) UN Doc 
A/RES/66/119 § 29; UNGA 
Res 67/87 (26 March 2013) 
UN Doc A/RES/67/87 § 33; 
UNGA Res 68/102 (12 




 Obligation on UN 
Member States to 
ensure universal 











respect for human 
rights 
 Duty to not arbitrarily 
deprive persons of 
their life 
 Right to life  Article 3 UDHR, 6 ICCPR, 
Article 2 ECHR, Article 4 
ACHR, Article 4 ACHPR; 
Article 6 & 22 CRC 
 Obligation for states to 
provide food (as part 
of humanitarian 
assistance in the event 
of a humanitarian 
crisis) 
 Right to adequate  
food 
 Article 11 ICESCR (and 
Article 2 ICESCR); Article 
24(2)(c) CRC, Article 12(2) 
CEDAW, Article 28 CRPD, 
Article 12 of the Additional 
Protocol to the ACHR in the 
Area of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights and 
Article 15 of the Additional 
Protocol to the ACHPR on 
the Rights of Women in 
Africa, Article 25 UDHR.  
 Obligation upon states 
parties to ensure that 
persons have access to 
certain minimum 
essential levels of 
food, health facilities, 
basic shelter, water 
and sanitation (more 
narrowly: prevention 
of diseases) 
 Right to health  25 UDHR and Article 12 
ICESCR (and Article 2 
ICESCR) [in particular: 
12(2)(c) ICESCR]; Article 
5(e)(iv) ICERD, Article 24 
CRC, Article 11 European 
Social Charter, Article 10 of 
the Additional Protocol to 
the ACHR in the area of 
Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Article 16 
ACHPR, Article 14 of the 
African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the 
Child and Article 14 of the 
Protocol to the ACHPR on 
the Rights of Women in 
Africa 
 General obligation 
resting upon states to 
provide access to safe 
drinking water (this 
obligation is only 
found in several 
specific treaties and in 
regional conventions) 
 Right to water 
 
 Article 24(1)(c) CRC, 
Article 14(2)(h) CEDAW,  
Article 28 CRPD, Article 
15(a) Additional Protocol 
to the ACHPR on the 
Rights of Women in Africa, 
Article 14(2)(c) African 
Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child 
 Obligation on State 
Parties to provide for 
the fulfilment of 
human rights of 
  Article 11 CRPD  
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disabilities, in the 










 Prohibition of parties 
to destroy objects that 
are 'indispensable to 





International Armed Conflict 
 Article 54 AP I 
 
  (Right of a civilian 




it should be in need) 












 Common Article 3 GC 
 
 Prohibition of 
starvation of civilians 
'as a method of 
combat' 





 Occupier must ensure 
'public order and 
safety' 
  Article 43 Regulations 
Concerning the Law and 
Customs of War on Land – 
annex to Convention 
Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land 
 Duties of occupier to 
'ensure to the fullest 
extent of the means 
available' that the 
population is provided 
with food and medical 
supplies 
  Article 55 GC IV 
 Responsibility to 
provide relief remains 
with the occupying 
power 
  Article 60 GC IV 
 Obligation to ensure 
and maintain hospitals 
and public health, 
particularly taking 
measures concerning 
the prevention of 
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Population 
Source  
epidemics ('with the 
co-operation of 
national and local 
authorities') 
 Occupier must 'to the 
fullest extent of the 
means available to it', 
also ensure clothing, 
shelter and other 
supplies that may be 
'essential to the 
survival of the civilian 
population' 








 Duty of affected state 
to ensure the 
protection of persons 
and provision of 
disaster relief and 
assistance on its 
territory. The affected 
State has the primary 
role in the direction, 
control, coordination 
and supervision of 
such relief and 
assistance 
  Inter-American Convention 
To Facilitate Disaster 
Assistance 
 Article 3 (a) Convention on 
Assistance in the Case of a 
Nuclear Accident or 
Radiological Emergency 
 Draft Article 12 ILC 
 Duty to seek 
assistance should the 
disaster not be 
manageable through 
States own resources 
  Draft Article 13 ILC  
 (Affected state as 
primary responsible 
actor in the provision 
of assistance in the 
event of a disaster) 




 (Right of persons 
'both to offer and 
receive humanitarian 
assistance') 
 (ICRC Conference 2007, 





 Obligation of State 
Parties to provide 
same treatment with 
respect to public relief 
and assistance as is 




 Article 23 Refugee 
Convention 
 
  Refugee child is 
entitled to receive 
 Article 22 CRC and  Article 
23 African Charter on the 
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assistance within the 
context of the 
enjoyment of the 
rights of the 
Conventions 

















 Obligation for State 
Parties to provide 
assistance to IDPs by 
meeting their basic 
needs and respecting 
their rights 
  Article 3(1)(j) Kampala 
Convention 
 Obligation to prevent 
conditions that may 





assistance to internally 
displaced persons' 
  Article 4 Kampala 
Convention 
 Primary obligation 
and responsibility in 
the provision of 
humanitarian 
assistance to all IDPs 
within their territory or 
jurisdiction, 
specifying a duty to 
'take necessary steps to 
effectively organize, 
relief action that is 
humanitarian, and 
impartial in character' 
 Right of IDPs to 
peacefully request 
or seek protection 
and assistance 
 
 Article 5 Kampala 
Convention 
 
 Article 5(9) Kampala 
Convention 
 
 Obligation to protect 
the rights of IDPs 
regardless of the cause 
of the displacement, 
and to refrain amongst 
others from 'genocide, 
crimes against 
humanity, war crimes 
and other violations of 
international 
humanitarian law' as 





 Article 9(1) Kampala 
Convention 
 
 Duty to provide IDPs 
to the fullest extent 
practicable and with 
 IDPs allowed to 
participate in the 
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Source  
the least possible 
delay, with adequate 
humanitarian 
assistance, which shall 
include food, water, 
shelter, medical care 
and other health 
services, sanitation, 
education, and any 
other necessary social 
services 
process of receiving 
assistance 
 
 Article 9(2)(k) Kampala 
Convention 
 Prohibition for armed 
groups of hampering 
the provision of 
protection and 
assistance to IDPs 
under any 
circumstances and 
denying IDPs the right 
to live in satisfactory 
conditions of dignity, 
security, sanitation, 
food, water, health and 
shelter 
  Article 7(5)(b) and (c) 
Kampala Convention 
 Obligation in 
situations of 
displacement to ensure 
that all possible 
measures must be 
taken to ensure that the 
IDPs are 'received 
under satisfactory 
conditions of shelter, 
hygiene, health, safety 
and nutrition' 
  Article 17 AP II 




the context of the 
enjoyment of the 
rights of the 
Convention 
 
 Article 23 African Charter on 
the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child 
  IDPs have a right to 
request assistance, 
the right to receive 
such assistance and 
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right to an adequate 



















THIRD PARTIES AND THE PROVISION OF 
ASSISTANCE: THE RIGHT TO OFFER 
ASSISTANCE AND THE RELATED (POTENTIAL) 




















The previous Chapter has established that the affected state is the primary responsible 
actor for the provision of assistance in the event of crises on its territory or under its 
control with a corresponding right of persons in such a crisis to request assistance 
from their sovereign, commonly based on human rights law. In certain instances, the 
local authorities may be overwhelmed by the nature of the crisis and may be unable 
to provide in assistance. In other circumstances, the local authorities may even be 
unwilling to provide assistance, or may have lost the exercise of control over parts of 
their territory. Examples include the collapse of state authorities which may result in 
so-called ‘failed states’. This circumstance, and the others mentioned above where a 
lack of will or control prevents the provision of assistance by the affected state, 
warrant further examination of the legal framework pertaining to humanitarian 
assistance from an external perspective. In such circumstances, regardless of whether 
these may factually be conflict or disaster, the right to offer and provide humanitarian 
assistance through external sources such as third states or international organisations 
                                                        
1<https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/16%20July%202014%20Syria%20SC%20resolution_j
oint%20statement.pdf> accessed  21 October 2014: joint statement on Security Council Resolution 2165 
on humanitarian access in Syria by OCHA, UNICEF and WFP.  
In the summer of 2014, OCHA, UNICEF and the World Food Programme 
declared in a joint statement regarding the humanitarian crisis in Syria:   
 
“Hungry, homeless children don’t know or care whether they are in a government-
controlled area or an opposition-controlled area. They just want a safe place to live. 
Inside Syria, nearly 11 million people need immediate humanitarian aid. We must do 
everything we can to help them, bringing aid by the most direct routes, whether they 
are across borders or across conflict-lines”. 
 
But what precisely are the rights of third parties to access a territory, from an 
international legal perspective? What duties does the affected state or acting 
sovereign have to allow such access? In this Chapter these questions are 








needs to be addressed. Such ‘external’ provision of assistance is subsidiary to the 
primary right and duty of the affected state.2  
The external provision of humanitarian assistance is guided by two legally distinct 
aspects; namely (1) the right to offer provision of assistance and (2) a related right to 
access, or, alternatively formulated, a potential duty to allow such access by the 
affected state. As such, there is a tiered approach to the provision of assistance from 
external sources. In addressing the current legal framework concerning the provision 
of humanitarian assistance by or through external sources, this Chapter thus also 
addresses the directly related potential right to access the affected territory for such 
assistance or the duty to allow this access. These external aspects in the provision of 
humanitarian aid are a vast part of the existing legal framework and will also map 
out existing gaps in the provision of assistance.  
Indeed, given the nature of the provision of humanitarian assistance; namely its 
taking place in a crisis, external assistance is often needed. This Chapter specifically 
addresses the provision of assistance from the perspective of third parties. Should 
however the affected state not allow for the provision of assistance, the result may be 
the denial of humanitarian assistance, which will be further explored in Chapter 8. 
Chapter 8 addresses the consequences of the denial of humanitarian aid, and the 
consequences if a state or other duty-bearer does not comply with its existing duties 
under international law. Part III of this research thus addresses the current legal 
framework on the provision of humanitarian assistance from an external perspective, 
looking firstly into the legal possibilities for third parties to provide access, and 
secondly, in the subsequent Chapter, into enforcement methods should such access 
and assistance be denied.  
In many instances, international organisations themselves have provided for a 
form of self-regulation and protection in their provision of assistance, through 
treaties, or soft-law documents. As such, whilst this aspect of regulation remains 
outside the realm of this research, it is relevant to note amongst others the Convention 
on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel.3 In fact, these regulations 
need only come into place upon the establishment of what precisely the rights (and 
duties) are of third parties in the provision of humanitarian assistance. It is precisely 
this that is addressed in the current Chapter. As has been the case in previous 
Chapters, the approach of this research to the legal framework and the rights and 
duties encompassed therein is overarching. As such, the lex lata in general fields of 
international law shall be addressed first, after which the more specific bodies of law 
will be concentrated on. A tiered approach is taken; in each field of law firstly 
addressing the right to offer the provision of assistance, and secondly addressing the 
related right to access. This access is distinctly entangled with the affected state 
sovereign’s (or other authority’s) rights to determine the allowance of such access. 
Such rights and duties reflect two sides of the same coin, in this aspect of the legal 
                                                        
2 Carlo Focarelli, ‘Duty to Protect in Cases of Natural Disasters’, (2010) Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
International Law § 4.  
3 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, New York, 9 December 1994, 
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framework. As will be apparent, the political will of the respective actors plays a 
large role in this area of the legal framework, and Chapter 8 therefore addresses the 
consequences of the denial of assistance, should the affected sovereign not allow the 
external provision of aid, in the circumstances that this Chapter assesses as rightful.  
 
7.2 The Provision of Humanitarian Assistance by Third Parties under General 
International Law 
 
The previous Chapter addressed the rights and duties of clear-cut actors: the affected 
state or authority, and the persons in need of receiving aid. The potential external 
right to provide aid however extends to a large variety of actors.4 As such, 
international organisations and third states in some circumstances may have the right 
to offer and deliver humanitarian assistance, provided that such assistance is procured 
according to the principles of neutrality, humanity and impartiality.5 These potential 
legal rights will be explored according to various fields of law below, commencing 
with the general fields of law relating to state sovereignty. Simultaneously, the 
corresponding duties of the affected state and potential other actors shall be 
addressed.  
 
7.2.1 State Sovereignty and the Right to Offer Assistance 
  
The notion of state sovereignty continues to be one of the cornerstones upon which 
the international legal domain is built. Thus, when exploring the potential right of 
third parties to offer and provide humanitarian assistance, such a discussion cannot 
forego the concept of sovereignty. Chapter 4 has addressed the various principles 
which have played a large role in this discussion, amongst which the principle of non-
intervention, of consent and of domestic jurisdiction. The 1984 Draft Convention on 
expediting the delivery of emergency assistance remained unclear regarding the 
notion of sovereignty and the amount of emphasis the concept should receive in 
relation to the provision of humanitarian assistance. As such, Article 3(a) of the Draft 
Convention stated that the assistance as provided under the Draft Convention had to 
be in accordance with the principle of respect for the ‘sovereignty of the receiving 
state and non-interference in its internal affairs’. Although the Draft Convention 
never materialised as international law, the ICRC has criticised the document for 
giving too much leeway to sovereignty.6 The question of whether a potential right to 
offer and provide humanitarian assistance may not be consistent with the concept of 
sovereignty is not new. The ICJ determined only a few years after the failed Draft 
Convention that:  
 
                                                        
4 Section 2.3.2 Providers of Humanitarian Assistance.  
5 Section 2.2.3 The Principles for the Delivery of Assistance. 
6 Law and legal issues in international disaster response: a desk study (International Federation of Red 






“There can be no doubt that the provision of strictly humanitarian aid to persons or forces 
in another country, whatever their political affiliations or objectives, cannot be regarded 
as unlawful intervention, or as in any other way contrary to international law (…) In the 
view of the Court, if the provision of “humanitarian assistance” is to escape condemnation 
as an intervention in the internal affairs of Nicaragua, not only must it be limited to the 
purposes hallowed in the practice of the Red Cross, namely “to prevent and alleviate 
human suffering”, and “to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human 
being”; it must also, and above all, be given without discrimination to al1 in need in 
Nicaragua, not merely to the contras and their dependents.”7 
 
As argued in Chapter 4, in this determination by the ICJ, the Court declares that not 
only the offer of assistance is considered lawful, but that such provision can also not 
be considered to infringe upon the principle of non-intervention.8 The Court thus 
emphatically excludes the sec provision of assistance from an infringement on state 
sovereignty.  
Today, sovereignty however indeed remains a factor in the provision of 
humanitarian assistance. The foremost explication of this is the fact that as the 
primary responsibility in the provision of humanitarian assistance lies with the 
affected state, the (un)willingness of the affected state is expressed through its 
exercise of sovereign rights to withhold the provision of assistance by external 
sources. However, the inclusion of sovereign responsibilities also in itself reflects the 
fact that sovereignty has changed over time. Such change is also effectuated by the 
fact that failing to oblige with certain duties under international law may lead to a 
responsibility for the international community to provide assistance, as just 
mentioned. Indeed, it was already asserted in the early 1990s by the UN General 
Assembly that the protection of human rights is a matter that concerns the 
international community as a whole.9 As the previous Chapters have addressed, the 
provision of humanitarian assistance is a vehicle in the fulfilment of the human rights 
to life, food, health (and water). As such, it may be argued that the international 
community is invested also from a human rights perspective in the provision of 
humanitarian assistance, should a state not uphold its sovereign duties in the 
provision of humanitarian assistance.10 On what grounds and with which legal basis 
the international community shall be able to offer and provide such assistance will 
be discussed in subsequent Sections through the discussion of various bodies of law.  
The international community is often also concerned with the provision of 
humanitarian assistance in circumstances where a sovereign is lacking. Situations 
                                                        
7 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 
Merits, Judgment 27 June 1986 I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14 § 242-243. 
8 Section 4.2.1 Historical Context and Relevant Principles in relation to Humanitarian Assistance.  
9 UNGA Res 48/141 (20 December 1993) UN Doc A/RES/48/141 § 3(a): “the promotion and protection 
of all human rights is a legitimate concern of the international community”.  
10 ‘Further Promotion And Encouragement Of Human Rights And Fundamental Freedoms, Including 
The Question Of The Programme And Methods Of Work Of The Commission Alternative Approaches 
And Ways And Means Within The United Nations System For Improving The Effective Enjoyment Of 
Human Rights And Fundamental Freedoms’ Note by the Secretary-General UN Doc E/CN.4/1993/35 
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such as failing states and multiple actors claiming sovereignty over a territory 
influence the potential role of state sovereignty. The factual circumstance of a failing 
state often coincides with the existence of a severe humanitarian crisis and a need for 
assistance. Although arguably the provision of humanitarian assistance in the event 
of a state failure is purely symptomatic, such provision will be necessary 
nonetheless.11 It is undeniable that state sovereignty as a concept remains a crucial 
factor in the provision of humanitarian assistance by external sources, but although 
state sovereignty as a concept is a constant, the factual circumstances in which 
provision is necessary may vary, including conflict and disaster. Indeed Ryngaert 
also argues that given the diversity of situations in which the provision of assistance 
is necessary, the uniting factor is ‘emphasis on state consent’ as an exercise of 
sovereignty.12 Consent as an aspect of the ‘principle of consent’ that is relevant to 
state sovereignty indeed most distinctly factors in the circumstance of a potential 
right to access.  
 
7.2.2 State Sovereignty and the Right to Access 
 
As recalled above, the ICJ asserted in the Nicaragua-case that the sec offer and 
provision of assistance could not be considered an impediment to the notion of 
sovereignty. An omission in the ICJ’s analysis however remains the fact that the 
Court neglects to address how such assistance should reach the affected territory, and 
thereby avoids addressing the issue of access by means of force or an ‘intervention’ 
for humanitarian purposes. Clearly, the principles of consent and non-intervention 
stand in the way of unlimited and continuous access by third parties to a territory.13 
But, such principles do not always prevent such access to a territory per se for the 
delivery of assistance. Vukas concurs, arguing that the offer of assistance cannot be 
construed as an unlawful interference with a state's domestic affairs.14 The 
developments surrounding these principles and the notion of sovereignty over the 
past decades, including the concept of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and the UNs 
approach in this regard, result in an approach to sovereignty that may allow for access 
to a territory by third parties under certain circumstances and for specific purposes.15 
Indeed with the development of this concept, the international community may 
indeed also have responsibilities in the provision of aid to a certain territory. In fact, 
                                                        
11 The Netherlands Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV), Report ‘Failing States. A Global 
Responsibility’ No. 35 (May 2004) 51. 
12 Cedric Ryngaert, ‘Humanitarian Assistance and the Conundrum of Consent: A Legal Perspective’, 
(2013) 5 Amsterdam Law Forum 2, 5. 
13 Focarelli, ‘Duty to Protect in Cases of Natural Disasters’ (n 2) § 15. See in this regard also UNGA Res 
2131 (XX) (21 December 1965), UNGA Res 2625 (XXV) (24 October 1970) ‘Declaration on Principles 
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations’, Annex; and UNGA Res 36/103 (9 December 1981) UN Doc 
A/RES/36/103 discussed in Section 4.2.1.   
14 Budislav Vukas, ‘Humanitarian Assistance in Cases of Emergency’, (2007) Max Planck Encyclopedia 
of Public International Law § 22.  






this was already assessed by the ICJ in its Nicaragua judgment, while the Court did 
not address how the provision of such assistance should be provided to the affected 
territory. Within the RtoP doctrine, the notion of ‘access’ for humanitarian purposes 
is furthermore only addressed in the context of state sovereignty as access ‘by force’. 
Such a means of gaining access, although on occasion necessary, does not fall within 
the scope of a potential ‘right to access’ for third parties in the provision of assistance 
itself. Access as discussed within this Chapter maintains the principles of humanity, 
neutrality and impartiality, in order to fit within the notion of humanitarian assistance. 
Access by means of force shall be discussed subsequently in Chapter 8 as a means of 
enforcing the provision of humanitarian assistance. A clear differentiation must 
therefore be made between access granted by the affected sovereign directly to those 
providers of aid themselves, and the (forceful) gaining of access by those creating 
the necessary conditions to allow the provision of emergency assistance in the 
absence of consent.  
In subsequent Sections, the potential right to access is linked to the primary 
responsibility of the affected state to provide assistance. Only if and when the 
affected state does not fulfil its duties, does the international community act. 
Therefore, as Chapter 6 has established a primary role of the affected state, this role 
must be taken into consideration when contemplating the right to access. Through 
the determination in the following Sections regarding the rights and duties of third 
parties under the relevant corpora juris, it will become apparent in which instances 
the affected state must consent, and in which instances such consent may be withheld. 
The premise remains that the provision of humanitarian assistance occurs in a 
situation of a ‘humanitarian crisis’.16 
 
7.3 The Provision of Humanitarian Assistance by Third Parties Under Human 
Rights Law 
 
The relationship between human rights law and humanitarian assistance has been 
addressed to a large extent in Chapter 5. It has been concluded that currently no 
independent human right to receive humanitarian assistance exists, whilst the 
provision of such assistance functions as a vehicle in the fulfilment of the existing 
human rights to life, food, health (and water). As such, Chapter 6 has assessed the 
value of this; discussing the rights of persons in need to receive assistance and the 
duty of the affected state to provide in this regard. Such duties have also been 
addressed from the perspective of various non-state actors fulfilling the role of 
‘affected sovereign authority’.  
This Section thus subsequently addresses the rights of third parties to provide 
humanitarian assistance under existing human rights law, followed by an assessment 
of a potential right to gain access to the affected territory. As this Section pertains to 
lex lata, solely the potential currently existing right to provide assistance by third 
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parties under the right to life, food, health (and water) will be evaluated, rather than 
focusing on the progressive development of the law. 
 
7.3.1 Human Rights Law and the Right to Offer Assistance 
 
In the relationship between human rights law and humanitarian assistance, a focus is 
placed on the rights to life, food, health (and water). The previous Chapter concerning 
the right to life has shown that the current legal framework places emphasis on the 
duties of the affected state in securing that a person is not arbitrarily deprived of his 
or her life, and furthermore that the HRC and ECtHR envisage a certain positive 
obligation in the prevention of epidemics and similar circumstances.17 Whereas the 
right to life entails certain positive obligations for states towards persons within their 
jurisdiction, most often this right is regarded as a right to ‘not interfere, and thereby 
does not hold many links for the international community to read a ‘right or duty to 
provide’ humanitarian assistance into the provisions of the various international 
treaties.18 As such, it must be concluded that the current international human rights 
legal framework cannot be said to entail an external duty to provide humanitarian 
assistance in the fulfilment of the human right to life.  
The right to food, health (and water), hold many positive obligations to fulfil, 
which could be attributed to the international community as a whole. Unequivocally, 
the fulfilment of human rights in general must be seen in light of the joint 
responsibility states have under Article 56 of the UN Charter. Indeed, the CESCR 
has argued with regard to Article 2 ICESCR concerning the ‘progressive realization’ 
of the rights in the Convention that:  
  
“the phrase ‘to the maximum of its available resources’ was intended by the drafters of the 
Covenant to refer to both the resources existing within a State and those available from the 
international community through international cooperation and assistance. [...] The 
Committee wishes to emphasize that in accordance with Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter 
of the United Nations, with well-established principles of international law, and with the 
provisions of the Covenant itself, international cooperation for development and thus for 
the realization of economic, social and cultural rights is an obligation of all States. It is 
particularly incumbent upon those States which are in a position to assist others in this 
regard”.19 
 
Thus, the CESCR envisages not only a duty of the affected state to exceed its national 
borders in search of international assistance, but also envisages a distinct duty upon 
those states within the international community that are in a position, to indeed assist 
                                                        
17 Section 6.3.1 Duties of the Affected State and Non-State Actor under Human Rights Law. 
18 Section 5.4.2 Humanitarian Assistance and the Right to Life. 







when such help is needed.20 This viewpoint of the Committee aligns with the 
provisions of Article 2 ICESCR, in which a state party undertakes to:  
 
“take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation […] to the 
maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means”.21  
 
Whilst this provision allows for the assertion of a duty resting upon the affected state 
to seek international assistance, the formulation is arguably open to a wider 
interpretation for the international community, yet shying away from a hard 
‘obligation’. In fact, during the travaux préparatoires, most states argued that such 
international assistance cannot be seen as a duty under Article 2(1), not accepting 
wording such as ‘to guarantee’.22 Proposals which were also considered unacceptable 
for the participating states as part of Article 2 were ‘to ensure’ and ‘to pledge 
themselves’.23 International cooperation under the ICESCR is therefore not 
necessarily meant as an international legal obligation, although the CESCR would 
argue otherwise.  
The CESCR envisages this combined duty of the affected state and the 
international community not just in general, but also in particular concerning the right 
to food. As such, the treaty body has considered Article 11 ICESCR to contain a duty 
for State Parties to ‘take steps’ in the provision of assistance when necessary in other 
countries, in order to ensure the fulfilment of the right to food.24 Furthermore, the 
Protocol to the ACHR stresses an obligation resting upon states parties to take 
measures in cooperating to ensure food security and ‘promote greater international 
cooperation’ to this end.25 Although clearly the Protocol does not encompass 
worldwide coverage, it does cover a continent which is particularly prone to food 
emergencies resulting from natural disasters (such as cyclones) and therefore holds 
significant practical relevance.  
Also from a soft law perspective support can be found for international 
cooperation, although clearly falling short of a binding obligation. As such, the UN 
Human Rights Council has also stressed the need and importance of international 
assistance in relation to the right to food and has argued that the international 
community ‘should provide’ such assistance when needed.26 While the Human 
                                                        
20 For a further discussion on Article 2(1) see Section 5.4.4 Humanitarian Assistance and the Right to 
Food. 
21 Article 2(1) ICESCR. 
22 Philip Alston & Gerard Quinn, ‘The Nature and Scope of State Parties’ Obligations under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 1, 
165.  
23 Ibid.  
24 CESCR General Comment 12 (Article 11 ICESCR) UN Doc E/C.12/1999/5 ‘The right to adequate 
food’ (12 May 1999) § 36 and § 38. 
25 Article 12 Additional Protocol ACHR. 
26 See amongst others UNHRC Res 7/14 (27 March 2008) § 14 and § 22; UNHRC Res S-7/1 7th Special 
Session ‘The negative impact of the worsening of the world food crisis on the realization of the right to 
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Rights Council's resolutions are not of a binding character, the distinct political nature 
of the body must also be taken into account, compared to the General Assembly as a 
representation of all UN member states proper. Support for international cooperation 
can also be found in the Voluntary Guidelines of the FAO, adopted in 2004.27 Olivier 
de Schutter, UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, has argued that 
problematic in the establishment of an international duty to provide food is the fact 
that none of the above treaties, their organs or the UN in general have established 
‘precise levels at which States should provide aid’.28 Indeed, while the push towards 
acknowledgment of such an international duty to cooperate in the provision of food 
aid appears to exist amongst others in the work of the CESCR, the actual content of 
the duty may currently be in need of clarification. Emerging opinio juris is therefore 
at most to be established with regard to the potential duty of third parties, which of 
course does not prevent the existence of the right of third parties to offer assistance, 
as can clearly be read in Article 2(1) and 11 ICESCR.  
 In relation to the human right to health, recourse must equally be had to the 
provisions of the ICESCR. As in the case of the right to food, Article 2 ICESCR calls 
upon the international community to provide assistance in the fulfilment of the right 
to health, should a state not be in the capacity to fulfil its own obligations in this 
regard. The CESCR has interpreted this as an obligation of states to provide 
international cooperation and assistance to the affected state in its fulfilment of the 
core obligations of the convention.29 The minimum core obligations of the right to 
health, as assessed in Chapter 5, indeed align for a large part with the basic content 
of humanitarian assistance and its provision - internationally - will thus aid in the 
fulfilment of the right to health.30 In fact the CESCR itself acknowledges that in 
situations where humanitarian assistance is needed, the realisation of the right to 
health may be dependent on international cooperation, as it calls in particular on the 
importance of involvement of UN organs and the WHO.31 As such, the CESCR has 
argued, also concerning third states that: 
 
“States parties have a joint and individual responsibility, in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations and relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly 
and of the World Health Assembly, to cooperate in providing disaster relief and 
humanitarian assistance in times of emergency, including assistance to refugees and 
                                                        
16 & 26; UNHRC Res 13/4 The right to food (14 April 2010) §11, 13, 20 and § 28; UNHRC Res 12/10 
(12 October 2010) § 5; UNHRC Res 16/27 (13 April 2011) § 11, 13, 20 and § 28. 
27 FAO ‘Voluntary Guidelines to support the progressive realization of the right to adequate food in the 
context of national food security’ (Adopted by the 127th Session of the FAO Council November 2004) 
§ 15 and 16.  
28 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food ‘Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights, 
Civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development’ (11 February 
2009) UN Doc A/HRC/10/5 § 8. De Schutter refers in this regard to the potential of the Food Aid 
Convention, which establishes clear volumes and guidelines.  
29 CESCR General Comment 14 (11 August 2000) UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4 ‘The right to the highest 
attainable standard of health’, § 45.  
30 See in particular Section 5.4.6 Humanitarian Assistance and The Right to Health. 






internally displaced persons […] Priority in the provision of international medical aid, 
distribution and management of resources, such as safe and potable water, food and 
medical supplies, and financial aid should be given to the most vulnerable or marginalized 
groups of the population. Moreover, given that some diseases are easily transmissible 
beyond the frontiers of a State, the international community has a collective responsibility 
to address this problem”.32  
 
While the CESCR has read such international obligations into the text of Article 12 
ICESCR, Chapter 5 has discussed that the right to health is a somewhat more diverse 
right, due to the various alternative provisions in the international human rights treaty 
framework.33 The other existing treaties, or their interpretative bodies, in this instance 
do not argue an international duty to provide external assistance in the fulfilment of 
the right to health. The UN Special Rapporteur on the right to health has equally not 
assessed such a duty, simply stating that the legal framework ‘recognizes that 
international and non-governmental organizations have particular importance in 
relation to disaster relief and humanitarian assistance’.34 Thus, similarly to the right 
to food, it must be concluded that indeed whilst no legal duty exists, a right to offer 
assistance can be found in international law with regard to the right to health. 
Lastly, concerning the right to water, such an international legally binding 
obligation is even more difficult to ascertain. Given the current incomplete status of 
the right to water under international law, ascertaining a duty or right to 
internationally provide assistance in the fulfilment of the right to water is challenging. 
The CESCR has derived a right to water from the right of persons to an adequate 
standard of living and to the highest attainable standard of health as encompassed in 
Articles 11 and 12 of the ICESCR respectively.35 Given the commitment to cooperate 
internationally as enshrined in Article 2 ICESCR, arguably an international right may 
be found to offer assistance in the provision of the right to water in the aftermath of 
disasters also, as the CESCR asserts.36 Yet, due to the haphazard international 
incorporation of the right to water in and of itself, through its absence as an individual 
right in the major existing international treaties today despite current UN 
commitment, establishing an external duty or right to provide water in the fulfilment 
of the (developing) human right to water is currently not possible. The interpretative 
comments of the CESCR are to date the only indication that such an external duty 
may exist in international law and therefore fall short of creating such an obligation 
or right.  
Furthermore, within the UN context, the Special Rapporteur on IDPs has asserted 
that a growing acceptance exists that an obligation to ‘invite, accept and facilitate’ 
the provision of aid is a part of the obligation to ‘respect, protect and fulfil’ human 
                                                        
32 Ibid § 40. 
33 Section 5.4.6 Humanitarian Assistance and The Right to Health.  
34 ‘Right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’ 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health UN Doc A/68/297 (9 August 2013) § 60. 
35 Section 5.4.8 Humanitarian Assistance and The Right to Water. 
36 CESCR General Comment 15 (20 January 2003) UN Doc E/C.12/2002/11 ‘The Right to water (arts. 
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rights in general, particularly in the event an affected state is unwilling or unable to 
provide in such assistance.37 Yet this assertion is not backed up with legal sources, 
and whilst admirable, does not in itself add to the above conclusions that indeed a 
right to offer assistance exists. 
Thus, when determining whether an external duty to provide humanitarian 
assistance under human rights law exists, not much affirmative evidence can be found 
in existing international law. The most outspoken provisions may be seen within the 
context of the right to food, and somewhat within the right to health, based on the 
interpretative remarks of the CESCR. The nature of the right to life does perhaps not 
allow for such international duties to be read into the existing provisions, and the 
right to water would be in need of more development, prior to ascertaining whether 
an external duty may be related to this. However, current international human rights 
law allows for a right to offer the provision of assistance, in line with Article 2(1) 
ICESCR. Establishing a potential right to access a territory under human rights law 
should the affected state not be able to fulfil its obligations shall prove to be 
challenging, in particular considering the notion of state consent, in the absence of 
an international legal duty under human rights law to provide assistance. In this 
regard, third states or other third parties will in certain instances be left to attempt to 
hold a state responsible under international law for certain breaches of its duties, 
rather than being able to act upon their own duties under human rights law to provide 
assistance.38  
 
7.3.2 Human Rights Law and the Right to Access 
 
A distinction must be made between this Section examining the right to gain access 
under human rights law for the purpose of providing aid, and other enforcement 
mechanisms – such as access – should flagrant violations of human rights take place 
that will be discussed in Chapter 8. As seen in the above Section, current existing 
international human rights law does not contain many provisions solidly providing 
for an external duty to provide assistance codified in human rights law. The related 
'right to access' for third parties to provide such assistance is then certainly even more 
difficult to ascertain. 
When considering the right to life, the previous Section has already shown that 
the current legal framework pertaining to this particular human right in relation to the 
provision of humanitarian assistance focuses on the duties which relate to the affected 
state, as duty-bearer. Thus, an external right of third parties to access a territory for 
the provision of humanitarian assistance can currently not be found in the existing 
international law relating to the human right to life. The right to food however, as 
seen above, entails a wider scope of potential duty-bearers, as the provision in the 
ICESCR envisages distinctly that some form of international cooperation takes place 
in the fulfilment of this right. However, Article 11 (1) ICESCR also notes: 
  
                                                        
37 Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on IDPs UN Doc A/65/282 (11 August 2010) § 77.  






“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate 
standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and 
housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will 
take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the 
essential importance of international co-operation based on free consent”. 
 
The text of the Article is unambiguous and calls for ‘consent’ on the part of the 
involved parties. As explained by the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, the 
consent of the affected state is necessary, while the Rapporteur argues that in the 
event a state’s unwillingness to consent to aid results in the violation of the right to 
food, the international community might resort to the ‘responsibility to protect’.39 
Thus, while the above Section saw the most far-going provisions within the right to 
food, current international human rights law does not allow for an external right to 
access a territory in the fulfilment of a person's right to food without the consent of 
the affected state. Unlike in the case with the right to food, when considering the 
right to health in Article 12, the ICESCR does not specify a particular form of 
international cooperation or an affiliated need for consent of the affected state. 
Although the right to health has been incorporated in numerous international treaty 
bodies, a related right of third parties to gain access to a territory in order to provide 
assistance in the event of a crisis, to ensure the fulfilment of the right to health has 
not been codified. Similarly, as the right to water has not been laid down definitively 
in international law, with haphazard incorporation at the regional level and often in 
relation to the right to health, it is therefore even more difficult to ascertain a potential 
right to access.  
Indeed, the ‘right to access’ from a human rights perspective is more logically 
formulated as a duty to allow access by the affected state: the primary duty-bearer of 
obligations of conduct in relation to the provision of assistance. This perspective has 
in fact been taken by the ICJ. In the 2008 case concerning the Application of the 
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(Georgia v. Russian Federation) the ICJ had occasion to express itself on 
humanitarian access through a human rights context. The Court determined that:  
 
 “both parties shall facilitate, and refrain from placing any impediments to, humanitarian 
assistance in support of the rights to which the local population are entitled under the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination”.40 
 
Thus, the Court determined that Georgia and Russia both had an obligation to allow 
access for the provision of humanitarian assistance, on the basis of their obligations 
                                                        
39 ‘The right to food’, Report of the Special Rapporteur, Note by the Secretary General UN Doc A/63/278 
(21 October 2008) § 12 and Chapter 8 on the matter of access by force. This perspective on access for 
the provision of aid in the fulfilment of the right to food has been reiterated not long ago also by the UN 
Human Rights Council, in Res S-7/1 (n 26). 
40 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(Georgia v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order of 15 October 2008, I.C.J. Reports 2008, 
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under human rights law, as opposed to international humanitarian law.41 As seen in 
Section 5.3, the ICERD determines in Article 5 that states parties must undertake to 
‘prohibit and to eliminate’ all forms of racial discrimination, and relevant to the 
provision of humanitarian assistance, particularly in the enjoyment of (amongst 
others) the right to security of person and the ‘protection against bodily harm’, as 
well as economic, social and cultural rights; including the right to health. A distinct 
connection is therefore made by the Court between allowing access for humanitarian 
assistance and the fulfilment of human rights duties. As following logically from the 
above, the ICJ indeed places this duty upon the state, as duty-bearer, rather than 
formulating it as a right from the viewpoint of third parties wishing to provide 
assistance.  
In this manner, the fulfilment of the rights to life, food and health would not only 
be the provision of assistance by the affected state, as discussed in Chapter 6, but 
would also entail the allowance of access for third parties to provide assistance. From 
the perspective of the affected state then, withholding consent would amount to a 
violation of the duties of that state under human rights law. Indeed, such an 
assessment aligns with the perspective of the Security Council also, as will be 
addressed in Section 7.4.2, assessing that access granted by the affected state amounts 
in certain cases to the fulfilment of its duties under international law, including 
human rights law. As argued by Rygnaert, human rights law has not only ‘penetrated 
the legal regimes governing humanitarian assistance’ but has also ‘eroded, or at least 
conditioned, the state consent requirement’.42 It remains to be noted in this regard 
that in essence, human rights are considered primarily within the context of the state 
as duty-bearer, and the individuals within their jurisdiction as rights holders. Thus, 
not much hard law is to be found concerning a potential right to access by third parties 
in order to provide humanitarian assistance from outside the affected territory.43 
Nonetheless, from the perspective of the ICJ and as confirmed by the CESCR 
following the provision of Article 2 ICESCR, duties may exist under human rights 
law for the affected state to allow access.  
Although this Section pertains to lex lata, several expressions on the matter of 
access were given by international organs that contribute to the expression of opinio 
juris on the matter. As such, from a human rights perspective, the European 
Community asserted in 1996 that:  
 
“[…] people in distress, victims of natural disasters, wars and outbreaks of fighting, or 
other comparable exceptional circumstances have a right to international humanitarian 
assistance where their own authorities prove unable to provide effective relief”.44 
 
                                                        
41 Whilst the outcome of the ICJ ruling was torn (8 against 7), it appears that this finding was not a reason, 
as none of the dissenting or separate opinions address this assessment.  
42 Ryngaert, ‘Humanitarian Assistance and the Conundrum of Consent: A Legal Perspective’ (n 12), 8. 
43 Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng (5 December 1995) UN 
Doc E.CN.4/1996/52/Add.2 § 391.  







Such a formulation suggests the right of third parties to then assist in the fulfilment 
of this right of such individuals, given the distinct mention of the inability of the 
affected state. The subsequent EU 2008 Joint Statement on the subject matter has 
however not reiterated this rather forward position, merely stating that the EU’s 
humanitarian aid amongst other matters aims ‘at facilitating or obtaining access to 
people in need’.45 Furthermore, the UN Human Rights Council and its predecessor, 
the Commission on Human Rights have similar to the Security Council and General 
Assembly on multiple occasions expressed concern for the denial of humanitarian 
access and called upon the facilitation of ‘safe and unhindered access’ to a territory.46 
Such indications by EU and UN organs provide some indication of opinio juris, or at 
least states’ willingness to consider the necessity of access for the provision of 
humanitarian assistance from a human rights perspective, but at this point currently 
cannot amount to an existing right in international human rights law to access for 
third parties in the provision of emergency aid. The perspective taken by the ICJ, as 
well as amongst others the Security Council to be discussed subsequently, indeed 
aligns with the approach that human rights law views the affected state as the original 
primary duty-bearer in the fulfilment of rights, and therefore in relation to 
humanitarian assistance considers a duty to allow access, rather than a right to obtain 
access.  
An interesting aspect in this discourse, however, is the determining factor of when 
the duty-bearing affected state is violating its duties by not allowing access. In 
essence, such a violation would occur at the moment that indeed the affected state is 
not fulfilling its own duties in the provision of humanitarian assistance, as required 
under the rights to life, food and health. Given its role as duty-bearer, this duty would 
then oblige the affected state to seek international assistance in the fulfilment of these 
rights, by allowing access to third parties for the provision of humanitarian assistance.  
 
7.4 The Provision of Humanitarian Assistance by Third Parties Under the UN 
Framework: the Security Council and General Assembly 
 
Both the Security Council and the General Assembly have on numerous occasions 
expressed themselves concerning the potential external provision of humanitarian 
assistance, occurring both by third states and by international organisations. Such a 
perspective falls in line with Article 1(3) of the UN Charter stating that one of the 
purposes of the UN is to ‘achieve international cooperation in promoting and 
                                                        
45 ‘Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States 
meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission’ (European 
Consensus on Humanitarian Aid)  (30 January 2008) EU Doc 2008/C/25/01 § 8.  
46 See amongst others Commission on Human Rights Res 2000/53, (25 April 2000) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/RES/2000/53 § 11; Commission on Human Rights Res 2000/55 (25 April 2000) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/RES/2000/55 § 7; Commission on Human Rights Res 2001/54 (24 April 2001) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/RES/2001/54 § 12; Commission on Human Rights Res 2003/52 (24 April 2003) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/RES/2003/52 preamble §5; Commission on Human Rights Res 2004/55 (20 April 2004) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/RES/2004/55  § 10; HRC Res 14/6 (23 June 2010) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/14/6 §5; and HRC Res 




Third Parties and the Provision of Assistance: The Right to Offer Assistance and the 
Related (Potential) Right to Access 
321 
encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all’. When 
regarding the resolutions adopted by both the General Assembly and the Security 
Council, it remains relevant therefore to keep this purpose of the organisation in 
mind, when it calls upon its Member States to act in the provision of humanitarian 
assistance.  
A distinct differentiation can be made in the legal value of the resolutions of both 
organs as explained in Chapter 6.47 Although the General Assembly may have a wider 
scope, the Security Council can take binding decisions under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, warranting its discussion prior to that of the General Assembly. Indeed, these 
binding resolutions form a source of law; warranting even more so their assessment 
as part of the current legal framework on the provision of humanitarian assistance, 
whereas the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly merely contribute in 
interpretative value and in the contribution to the formation of opinio juris on a given 
topic. Furthermore, as will be addressed below, the various resolutions themselves 
can hold different value in the discussion of the legal framework.  
 
7.4.1 Security Council Resolutions and the Right to Offer Assistance 
 
The UN Security Council has concerned itself not only with the duties of the affected 
state in the provision of humanitarian assistance, but through its resolutions also with 
the position of the international community in the provision of such assistance. 
Although it appears in recent resolutions as though the Security Council glosses over 
the specificities related to the sec provision of assistance from external sources and 
the particular rights of parties to indeed provide assistance, focusing mainly on access 
of such parties (see following  Section), this has not always been the case. Indeed, 
the Security Council has independently and specifically addressed the role of third 
states and international organisations in the provision of assistance. Whereas the 
previous Chapter has shown that the Security Council did not commence addressing 
the responsibilities of the affected state until the Council’s in-depth deliberation of 
the situation in Iraq in the 1990s (a decade which has shown a proliferation of 
resolutions in general), it has occasionally expressed its gratitude or called upon third 
parties and international organisations to contribute to the provision of assistance at 
an earlier time.48 As such, as early as 1982, the Security Council addressed all UN 
member states and the agencies of the UN itself stating in relation to the situation in 
Lebanon that it:  
 
“Appeals to Member States to continue to provide the most extensive humanitarian aid 
possible (…) Stresses the particular humanitarian responsibilities of the United Nations 
and its agencies (…) towards civilian populations”.49  
                                                        
47 Section 6.4 Duties and Rights under the UN Framework: the Security Council and General Assembly. 
48 It remains beyond the scope of this research to provide in depth analyses of all country situations in 
which the UN Security Council addressed the matter of humanitarian assistance, and only several key 
examples will be used, to illustrate the legal relevance. 







In doing so, the Security Council addressed the ‘humanitarian responsibilities’ of the 
UN and its agencies, distinctly stating that the organisation has a responsibility in the 
provision of humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, an ‘appeal’ is made to the 
international community of states to also provide in such assistance, which although 
falling short of a responsibility, does portray the intention of the Council to involve 
third states in the provision of aid.  
This choice of wording of the Council, next to choices such as adopting a 
resolution under Chapter VII, implies a level of commitment for the international 
community. The latter is an often-cited indication of the level of involvement and 
binding nature of the decision-making of the Council. As is known, interpretative 
methods related to wording are often applied to treaty interpretation rather than the 
interpretation of Council resolutions.50 Yet, ‘appealing’ expresses a different 
sentiment than ‘calling’, which in turn is different from ‘urging’ or ‘stressing’, all 
commonly utilised by the Council. The Security Council in essence is a political 
body, but its resolutions potentially have legal effects especially when adopted with 
binding force.51 As such, its choices in wording are open to a variety of 
interpretations. As remarked by the ICJ in its 1971 Namibia Advisory Opinion, 
 
“The language of a resolution of the Security Council should be carefully analysed before 
a conclusion can be made as to its binding effect. In view of the nature of the powers under 
Article 25, the question whether they have been in fact exercised is to be determined in 
each case, having regard to the terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the discussion 
leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in general, all circumstances that might 
assist in determining the legal consequences of the resolution of the Security Council”.52 
 
The ICJ viewed such tests as relevant to interpretation methods. Indeed, a transition 
in argumentation over the past years has been to view the Security Council as a body 
that has legally binding effects through decision-making, or to actively assert it as a 
legislative organ, given the influx of thematic resolutions.53 In this Section, the 
Council’s resolutions relevant to the legal framework on the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance will be assessed, rather than discussing the status of the organ per se. In 
this assessment, both wording and potential binding nature of adoption will be 
addressed and interpreted. As will be seen below, many of the Security Council’s 
resolutions addressing the rights of the international community take place within the 
context of country-specific resolutions. As such, their potential legislative value must 
be considered within that specific context.  
                                                        
50 Michael C Wood, ‘The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions’, (1998) Max Planck Yearbook 
of United Nations Law 74.  
51 Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘The Impact of Peremptory Norms’, (2005) 16 European Journal of 
International Law, 61. 
52 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1971) 
p. 16, § 114.  
53 Wood, ‘The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions’ (n 50) 77-78; S Talmon, ‘The Security 
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Where the Security Council in 1982 did not adopt this resolution regarding 
Lebanon under Chapter VII, in 1990 it did choose to adopt such a binding resolution 
concerning the situation in Iraq. Acting with binding force under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, the Security Council declared in Resolution 661 of 1990 a duty for states 
to ‘not make available’ any funds, including by their nationals to the government of 
Iraq save for the provision of strictly humanitarian aid.54 In subsequent resolutions 
the Council reiterated this stance, adding hereto that although no trade with the 
Government of Iraq is permitted, this ban shall not apply ‘to foodstuffs’.55 These 
resolutions, instated prior to the UN ‘Oil for Food Programme’, provide insight into 
the Security Council’s viewpoint that regardless of the other prohibitions it may place 
upon states, the offering and provision of humanitarian aid by third parties continues 
to be a global responsibility.56 Pursuant to the well-known Resolution 661, a special 
committee was established (only to be terminated in 2003) amongst others to oversee 
the vast amount of sanctions, the ‘Oil for Food Programme’ and to determine the 
needs concerning the provision of humanitarian assistance. Immediately following 
Resolution 661, in its well-known Resolution 688 the Council used the phrasing it 
had done earlier regarding Lebanon in 1982 and stated that it: 
 
“appeals to all Member States and to all humanitarian organizations to contribute to these 
humanitarian relief efforts”.57 
 
Falling short of an obligation, the Security Council does, however, envision a large 
role for third states and international organisations in the provision of assistance. 
Only a year later in similar spirit concerning the situation in Somalia, the Council 
called upon the Secretary General to see to the increase of the provision of aid by the 
UN, its specialised agencies and other international organisations and states, as well 
as calling upon all states and organisations to contribute to the delivery of 
international aid.58 The Council followed up on this stance in a subsequent resolution, 
as it ‘welcomes’ and ‘encourages’ the continuous efforts of the various organisations 
involved in the provision of assistance.59 Thus, not only does the Council see a role 
for organisations next to a role for third states, this role is in fact proactively engaged 
                                                        
54 UNSC Res 661 (6 August 1990) UN Doc S/RES/661 § 3(c) and 4. A similar approach and call to 
Member States was held by the Council concerning Yugoslavia (also acting under Chapter VII) in UNSC 
Res 757 (30 May 1992) UN Doc S/RES/757 § 5. 
55 UNSC Res 687 (8 April 1991) UN Doc S/RES/687 § 20; UNSC Res 706 (15 August 1991) UN Doc 
S/RES/706 § 1(c).  
56 The larger concept of the ‘Oil for Food Programme’ which was instated by the UN following the 
reports on the humanitarian situation in Iraq in the early 1990s, will not be discussed within this research. 
For the Security Council’s basis for this programme, see amongst others UNSC Res 661 (6 August 1990) 
UN Doc S/RES/661; UNSC Res 687 (8 April 1991) UN Doc S/RES/687; UNSC Res 688 (5 April 1991) 
UN Doc S/RES/688; UNSC Res 706 (15 August 1991) UN Doc S/RES/706; UNSC Res 712 (19 
September 1991) UN Doc S/RES/712 and in particular  UNSC Res 986 (14 April 1995) UN Doc 
S/RES/986. For the report suggesting the need for immediate humanitarian relief, see UN Doc  S/22366 
(20 March 1991) § 37. 
57 UNSC Res 688 (5 April 1991) UN Doc S/RES/688 § 6.  
58 UNSC Res 733 (23 January 1992) UN Doc S/RES/733 § 2 & 9. 






by the Council itself. In 1993, regarding the situation in Liberia, the Council goes a 
step further and: 
 
“[…] commends the efforts of the Member States, the United Nations system and 
humanitarian organizations in providing humanitarian assistance to the victims of the 
conflict in Liberia, and in this regard reaffirms its support for increased humanitarian 
assistance”.60 
 
In this situation, not only are appeals made to states and organisations, they are 
furthermore commended for providing assistance and receive the full support of the 
Council.61 Acting under Chapter VII, the Security Council has also in relation to the 
situation in Kosovo called upon ‘Member States and others concerned to provide 
adequate resources for humanitarian assistance in the region and to respond promptly 
and generously’, thereby showing the Council’s willingness to turn to the 
international community in a more binding manner.62 In more recent years, such as 
regarding the situation in Iraq in 2003, the Security Council has called upon the 
international community to:  
 
“[…] provide immediate humanitarian assistance to the people of Iraq, both inside and 
outside Iraq in consultation with relevant States, and in particular to respond immediately 
to any future humanitarian appeal of the United Nations, and supports the activities of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross and of other international humanitarian 
organizations”.63 
 
In the above it appears that a road is taken in which the Council appeals with more 
urgency to the UN member states, whilst acting under Chapter VII. Again, the 
Council has reiterated its support for the provision of assistance by humanitarian 
organisations, expressing its perspective that such provision forms a part of the larger 
framework of provision of emergency aid. Whilst Chapter VII resolutions are case-
specific, and general assumptions should not be derived too quickly, case-specific 
conclusions can be drawn. As such, in this particular instance, whilst a general duty 
cannot be concluded, this particular Resolution was also taken under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter, thereby placing a binding ‘call’ upon states to assist in the provision 
of aid in Iraq. Specifically tailored towards the international community however, 
this formulation does not allow for the assertion or interpretation of a right to receive 
aid for the affected persons.  
The Security Council has continued to refer to the possible rights and duties of 
third states and international organisations in country-specific resolutions, rather than 
addressing these matters in thematic resolutions such as the previously discussed (in 
Chapter 6) resolutions concerning the ‘Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict’. In 
                                                        
60 UNSC Res 813 (26 March 1993) UN Doc S/RES/813 § 14. [Italics EEK] 
61 The Council continues to reiterate such positions over the next years, such as for example concerning 
assistance to Burundi in UNSC Res 1286 (19 January 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1286 § 13. 
62 UNSC Res 1199 (23 September 1998) UN Doc S/RES/1199 § 12.  
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this sense, it remains difficult to establish a more general thread in the Council’s 
work.  
With regard to country situations, for instance concerning the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, the Security Council has continued along its previously set 
out lines and in 2009 called upon member states to ‘continue to provide medical, 
humanitarian and other assistance to victims’ of the conflict in the DRC.64 Continuing 
its concern for the Congo, the Council ‘urged’ the UN and other relevant actors to 
address the challenges of humanitarian assistance, but has not used the stronger 
language it engaged with regard to Iraq.65 Furthermore, more recently with regard to 
the situation in Yemen, the Security Council equally merely ‘encouraged’ the whole 
of the international community to provide humanitarian aid to the country.66 A 
comparable approach can be found in the Council’s address of the situation in 
Libya.67 Even more restrained was the Council’s approach to the situation in Syria in 
its Resolutions 2042 and 2043 of 2012 where the Council did not call upon the 
international community to act; merely acknowledging their presence in the 
provision of humanitarian assistance through a call to the parties in Syria to: 
 
“cooperate fully with the United Nations and relevant humanitarian organizations to 
facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance”.68  
 
In Resolution 2043, the Council then also reaffirms the need for external 
humanitarian assistance: 
 
“Expressing its appreciation of the significant efforts that have been made by the States 
bordering Syria to assist Syrians who have fled across Syria’s borders as a consequence of 
the violence, and requesting UNHCR to provide assistance as requested by member states 
receiving these displaced persons (…) Expressing also its appreciation of the humanitarian 
assistance that has been provided to Syria by other States”.69 
  
As can be seen, this Resolution addresses the needs of those receiving humanitarian 
aid after having fled Syria, rather than focusing on the need to provide aid inside the 
conflict area itself. This perspective however is also indicative of the approach by the 
Council, as discussed at the beginning of this Section, namely to forego the rights of 
states to offer assistance and focus on the actual access of a territory. Given the 
Security Council’s primary dealing with situations threatening the international 
peace, such a focus has its merits.70 Naturally, as the Security Council is a UN organ 
                                                        
64 UNSC Res 1906 (23 December 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1906 preamble. Earlier views are expressed 
amongst others concerning the situation in Lebanon: UNSC  Res 1701 (11 August 2006) UN Doc 
S/Res/1701 § 6.  
65 UNSC Res 1991 (28 June 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1991 preamble. 
66 UNSC Res 2014 (21 October 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2014 § 10.  
67 UNSC Res 1970 (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1970 Peace and Security in Africa § 26.  
68 UNSC Res 2042 (14 April 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2042 ‘The situation in the Middle East’ § 10 and 
similarly UNSC Res 2043 (21 April 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2043 § 11.  
69 Ibid UN Doc S/RES/2043 preamble.  






comprised of Member States, the wording of the Council is dependent on the political 
situation it is seized of. It remains however relevant to note that the specific language 
choices of the Council over the past decades; ‘urging’ and ‘calling’ its member states, 
indicate the presupposition of a right to offer assistance. Indeed, such expressions of 
the Council indicate the presupposition of a responsibility of the international 
community – be it through the various international (humanitarian) organisations or 
through the involvement of third states – to provide humanitarian assistance in 
situations amounting to a humanitarian crisis. Indeed, such situations must be within 
the realm of the work of the Security Council in order for the Council to be seized of 
the matter, and therefore must meet the threshold of an established threat to the 
international peace. 
 
7.4.2 Security Council Resolutions and the Right to Access 
 
As the above Section has shown, the Council plays a distinct role in ascertaining 
whether or not the international community may be called upon to provide assistance 
in the event of a crisis that amounts to a threat to the peace. Yet the Security Council, 
in its role as primary organ concerned with the maintenance of peace and security, 
has also often called upon states to comply with their obligations under international 
law in the provision of humanitarian assistance.71 Thus, it is relevant to ascertain 
whether the Council addresses in a consistent manner in what way and on which 
grounds the international community might have a right to access a territory as aid 
provider and for the provision of humanitarian assistance (to be distinctly 
differentiated from access by force), should the affected state not comply with its 
own responsibilities under international law and sufficiently provide assistance itself. 
As many of the Security Council's resolutions are taken under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter and therefore are of a binding character pursuant to Article 25 UN Charter, 
it is of crucial importance to also note the practice of the Security Council in this 
particular regard. It is unfortunately not always clear which resolutions are taken with 
such a binding intention, and specific attention must therefore also be given to the 
exact language and vocabulary in the phrasing of the resolutions, as also addressed 
in the above.72 Dinstein rightfully notes the Security Council’s trajectory in this 
regard, often commencing with a non-binding call upon parties and States to allow 
for free passage of goods and assistance and only subsequently providing for binding 
measures.73 Whereas the previous Section saw Security Council resolutions 
addressing the international community and their possibilities to provide assistance, 
this current Section discusses the Council’s perspective on the duties of the affected 
state or sovereign actor in relation to third parties, as the Council calls upon the 
facilitation of access.  
                                                        
71 6.4.1 Duties of the Affected State and Non-State Actor under Security Council Resolutions.  
72 Section 7.4.1 Security Council Resolutions and the Right to Offer Assistance; also Yoram Dinstein, 
‘The Right to Humanitarian Assistance’ (2000) LIII Naval War College Review 4, 87. 
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In 1982, regarding the situation in Lebanon discussed above, the Council called 
upon all parties to the conflict to facilitate ‘the dispatch and distribution of aid’ 
provided by relief organisations.74 Indeed, the call to states to allow free passage of 
humanitarian aid in ‘situations’ it is ‘seized’ with can be seen as a continuous thread 
throughout the practice of the Security Council in subsequent years with regard to 
the external provision of assistance by third parties. As such, the wording of the 
Council has in this particular aspect of its resolutions been especially static over the 
course of multiple decades. In subsequent country situations with which the Council 
has been seized, the Council has built on this phrasing, such as the situation in Iraq 
in 1991 where the Council has for the first time insisted that Iraq:  
 
“allow immediate access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need 
of assistance in all parts of Iraq and make available all necessary facilities for their 
operations”.75 
 
In this well-known resolution, the Security Council does not explicitly act under 
Chapter VII, and refers to Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, pertaining to non-
intervention in the domestic affairs of a state.76 However, through its wording, the 
Council binds Iraq to an obligation to allow for the international community to 
provide humanitarian assistance. Interestingly in this Resolution for the first time the 
Security Council also links the assessed human rights violations to the existing threat 
to international peace and security.77  
In many of the subsequent resolutions following equally as many ‘country 
situations’ the Security Council continues to reiterate the wording that it calls upon 
or urges parties involved to allow immediate access for the external provision of 
assistance as it: 
 
“Calls on all parties to cooperate with the Secretary-General to this end and to facilitate 
the delivery by the United Nations, its specialized agencies and other humanitarian 
organizations of humanitarian assistance to all those in need of it […] Urges all parties to 
take all the necessary measures to ensure the safety of personnel sent to provide 
humanitarian assistance, to assist them in their tasks and to ensure full respect for the rules 
and principles of international law regarding the protection of civilian populations”.78  
 
As discussed in the above Section, such wording is stronger than an ‘appeal’ and 
expresses a higher level of urgency adhered to by the Council. The facilitation of 
                                                        
74 UNSC Res 513 (19 June 1982) UN Doc S/RES/513 ‘Lebanon’ § 1.  
75 UNSC Res 688 (5 April 1991) UN Doc S/RES/688 § 3.  
76 Christine Grey, ‘The use of force and the international legal order’ in Malcolm Evans (ed) International 
Law (Oxford University Press 2010) 621.  
77 UNSC Res 688 (5 April 1991) UN Doc S/RES/688 § 1-2. See also Nico J Schrijver, ‘Sovereignty 
versus Human Rights? A Tale of UN Security Council Resolution 688 (1991) on the Protection of the 
Kurdish People’, in: M Castermans, F van Hoof and J Smith (eds), The Role of the Nation-State in the 
21st Century: Human Rights, International Organizations and Foreign Policy. Essays in Honour of Peter 
Baehr (Brill Nijhoff 1998). 






‘unhindered delivery’ and ‘safe access’ specifications of the Security Council can 
also be found in many resolutions during the 1990s such as those pertaining amongst 
others to the extended conflicts in Somalia, the Former Yugoslavia, Liberia, the DRC, 
Burundi and Afghanistan; in which the Security Council in some instances ‘demands’ 
these actions from parties.79 Indeed, intermittently the Security Council has in these 
same conflicts acted under Chapter VII, while calling upon parties to facilitate the 
provision of assistance and allow safe and unhindered passage, such as in the Former 
Yugoslavia where it: 
 
“Demands that all parties and others concerned create immediately the necessary 
conditions for unimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies to Sarajevo and other 
destinations in Bosnia and Herzegovina […]”.80 
 
As such, the language in this approach is increasingly forceful and the Council opts 
to act under Chapter VII. Demanding compliance from parties to a conflict, whilst 
operating under the binding cloak of Chapter VII places a duty under international 
law upon the addressees of this resolution. On the other hand, it also allows for a 
larger scope of action for the international community in providing humanitarian 
assistance, given the request for compliance by the Council.  
Subsequent resolutions in which the Council acts under Chapter VII equally show 
a continued request of the affected state to facilitate and ensure safe and unhindered 
passage of assistance, as well as to ensure the safety of humanitarian personnel.81 In 
some instances, specific mention is made of access for the ‘International Committee 
of the Red Cross and other relevant humanitarian agencies’.82 The Council assesses 
such facilitation of humanitarian assistance and safety of its providers to be part of 
                                                        
79 See amongst others resolutions regarding Somalia: UNSC Res 746 (17 March 1992) UN Doc 
S/RES/746 § 3 and 8; UNSC Res 751 (24 April 1992) UN Doc S/RES/751 § 14; UNSC Res 767 (27 July 
1992) UN Doc S/RES/767 § 3; UNSC Res 775 (28 August 1992) UN Doc S/RES/775 § 7; UNSC Res 
794 (3 December 1992) UN Doc S/RES/794 § 2-3. See also resolutions concerning the Former 
Yugoslavia such as: UNSC Res 752 (15 May 1992) UN Doc S/RES/752 § 8; UNSC Res 758 (8 June 
1992) UN Doc S/RES/758 § 8; UNSC Res 787 (16 November 1992) UN Doc S/RES/787 § 18; See also 
resolutions such as pertaining to Liberia: UNSC Res 813 (26 March 1993) UN Doc S/RES/813 § 15; 
UNSC Res 1059 (31 May 1996) UN Doc S/RES/1059 § 7; UNSC Res 1071 (30 August 1996) UN Doc 
S/RES/1071 § 10; UNSC Res 1083 (27 November 1996) UN Doc S/RES/1083 § 8. See furthermore 
resolutions relating to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, such as UNSC Res 1258 (6 August 1999) 
UN Doc S/RES/1258 § 11. Concerning the situation in Burundi: UNSC Res 1286 (19 January 2000) UN 
Doc S/RES/1286 § 9 and 10; and Afghanistan: UNSC Res 1378 (14 November 2001) UN Doc 
S/RES/1378 § 2.  
80 UNSC Res 757 (30 May 1992) UN Doc S/RES/757 § 17.  
81 Relating to the Former Yugoslavia: UNSC Res 770 (13 August 1992) UN Doc S/RES/770 § 2-3 and 
6; UNSC Res 819 (16 April 1993) UN Doc S/RES/819 § 8 and 10; UNSC Res 824 (6 May 1993) UN 
Doc S/RES/824 § 4(b); UNSC Res 1004 (12 July 1995) UN Doc S/RES/1004 § 5; UNSC Res 1199 (23 
September 1998) UN Doc S/RES/1199 § 4(c) and 10; as well as resolutions relating to Sierra Leone: 
UNSC Res 1132 (8 October 1997) UN Doc S/RES/1132 § 2; and UNSC Res 1270 (22 October 1999) 
UN Doc S/RES/1270 § 13. See furthermore concerning East Timor UNSC Res 1264 (15 September 
1999) UN Doc S/RES/1264 § 2; UNSC Res 1272 (25 October 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1272 § 10-11. 
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the ‘fulfillment’ of a state’s responsibilities.83 Furthermore, the Security Council 
asserts that ‘impediments’ to such delivery constitute violations of international 
humanitarian law.84 Whilst the resolutions of the Council are strictly only binding 
regarding the specific situation they are concerned with, the continued reiteration and 
repetition of a particular stance is indicative of this body’s approach to the provision 
of humanitarian aid by third parties within the international legal framework 
pertaining to this.  
This perspective of the Security Council regarding access for third parties has 
progressed over the past decades as the Security Council has shown a continuing 
stronger stance, appealing to states or parties to a conflict and demanding their 
allowing unhindered passage of humanitarian assistance under binding resolutions of 
Chapter VII. Indeed, the thematic resolutions of the Council concerning the 
‘Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict’ with which the Council commenced in 
1999 reflect this perspective, as the Council:  
 
“Underlines the importance of safe and unhindered access of humanitarian personnel to 
civilians in armed conflict, including refugees and internally displaced persons, and the 
protection of humanitarian assistance to them […] urges all parties to armed conflicts to 
respect fully the status of United Nations and associated personnel and, in this regard, 
condemns attacks and the use of force against United Nations and associated personnel, as 
well as personnel of international humanitarian organizations […] Expresses its 
willingness to respond to situations of armed conflict where civilians are being targeted or 
humanitarian assistance to civilians is being deliberately obstructed, including through the 
consideration of appropriate measures at the Council’s disposal in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations”.85 
 
The Security Council has proceeded with this stance in its subsequent thematic 
resolutions, reiterating the importance of access for personnel to deliver assistance, 
and urging parties to respect such personnel.86 Such thematic resolutions, although 
                                                        
83 UNSC Res 1319 (8 September 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1319 concerning East Timor § 1.  
84 See amongst others UNSC Res 771 (13 August 1992) S/RES/771 preamble; UNSC Res 787 (16 
November 1992) UN Doc S/RES/787 § 7; UNSC Res 819 (16 April 1993) UN Doc S/RES/819 § 8; 
UNSC Res 824 (6 May 1993) UN Doc S/RES/824 preamble. For a discussion of the various rights and 
duties under humanitarian law: Sections 7.5.1 and 7.5.2. 
85 UNSC Res 1265 (17 September 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1265 preamble and § 7, 9 and 10.  
86 UNSC Res 1296 (19 April 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1296 § 8 and 12; UNSC Res 1674 (28 April 2006) 
UN Doc S/RES/1674 § 22 where the Council asserts such is reflected in humanitarian law: “Urges all 
those concerned as set forth in international humanitarian law, including the Geneva Conventions and 
the Hague Regulations, to allow full unimpeded access by humanitarian personnel to civilians in need of 
assistance in situations of armed conflict, and to make available, as far as possible, all necessary facilities 
for their operations, and to promote the safety, security and freedom of movement of humanitarian 
personnel and United Nations and its associated personnel and their assets”; UNSC Res 1894 (11 
November 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1894 § 14, 15(a) and 16(b). The Council has also addressed the matter 
in other thematic resolutions, such as pertaining to ‘Children and Armed Conflict’ UNSC Res 1314 (11 
August 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1314 §7; and UNSC Res 1379 (20 November 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1379 






not binding in nature, speak more towards a ‘legislative’ approach of the Council, as 
it attempts to regulate a topic, rather than a country situation.87 
Whilst addressing the issue of access to humanitarian assistance in thematic 
resolutions, the Council has not ceased to also attend to the matter in country-specific 
situations. It must be noted that the Council’s resolutions over the past decade have 
commenced to contain stronger wording compared to the 1990s, as the Council 
‘expresses its condemnation’ of violence against humanitarian personnel and calls 
upon states to adhere to their ‘obligations to comply with international law related 
to’ such personnel, while simultaneously calling for ‘unimpeded access’.88 
Furthermore, the Council has continued to address and ‘demand’ the need for (rapid 
and unimpeded) humanitarian access through resolutions taken both under Chapter 
VII and without the enforcement options of this Chapter in the UN Charter.89 Such 
calls by the Council express the perspective that indeed the affected state should be 
‘condemned’ in the event it does not allow access for the provision of assistance or 
does not protect the safety of humanitarian personnel. A condemnation thus implies 
a violation of a duty of the affected state to allow such access. The calls furthermore 
operate with the possibility of future enforcement action through Chapter VII, should 
the affected state not allow access for international humanitarian assistance.  
As has been seen in the previous Chapter, following its embracement within the 
UN framework, the notion of the Responsibility to Protect enters the Council’s 
resolutions pertaining to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, in particular in 
                                                        
87 This research will not address the legality of legislature by the Security Council as it falls outside the 
scope of the research. Merely those resolutions relevant to the legal framework on humanitarian 
assistance will be addressed. See for a more in depth analysis of the Security Council as a potential 
legislator and legal problems related thereto amongst others V Popovski and T Fraser (eds), The Security 
Council as Global Legislator (Routledge Global Institutions Series 2014). See also for an earlier 
perspective Talmon, ‘The Security Council as World Legislature’ (n 52) 175-193. 
88 See for examples amongst others UNSC Res 1502 (26 August 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1502 ‘Protection 
of Personnel in Conflict zones’ § 1, 3 -5 and thematic resolutions such as pertaining to Children and 
Armed Conflict UNSC Res 1882 (4 August 2009) UN Doc S/RES1882 § 1. The Council has done so 
also in country specific resolutions such as amongst others pertaining to the Sudan UNSC Res 1769 (31 
July 2007 ) UN Doc S/RES/1769 preamble; the DRC: UNSC Res 1794 (21 December 2007) UN Doc 
S/RES/1794 § 17; UNSC Res 1991 (28 June 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1991 preamble; as well as in 
Afghanistan UNSC Res 1868 (23 March 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1868 preamble. Furthermore, (although 
not requesting ‘access’): UNSC Res 1860 (8 January 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1860 § 2; and the situation 
in Georgia, UNSC Res 1866 (13 February 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1866 § 4.  
89 See for resolutions taken under Chapter VII for example those concerning Liberia UNSC Res 1509 (19 
September 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1509 § 8; concerning the Sudan UNSC Res 1769 (31 July 2007 ) UN 
Doc S/RES/1769 § 19; the DRC: UNSC Res 1794 (21 December 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1794 § 17, UNSC 
Res 1906 (23 December 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1906 preamble; and Somalia: UNSC Res 1744 (21 
February 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1744 § 11, UNSC Res 1772 (20 August 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1772 § 
20, UNSC Res 1801 (20 February 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1801 § 14, UNSC Res 1814 (15 May 2008) UN 
Doc S/RES/1814 § 12 and UNSC Res 1872 (26 May 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1872 § 4. For resolutions 
with similar wording but in absence of Chapter VII support: regarding Lebanon UNSC  Res 1701 (11 
August 2006) UN Doc S/Res/1701 § 6; regarding Iraq UNSC Res 1770 (10 August 2007) UN Doc 
S/RES/1770 preamble; concerning Afghanistan UNSC Res 1806 (20 March 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1806 
preamble. Such wording is also reiterated by the Council in thematic resolutions, amongst others 
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relation to the affected state’s responsibilities in the provision of assistance.90 Indeed, 
Barber has argued that the notion of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’, its premise that 
sovereignty implies responsibility, and its embracement by the UN, has certainly 
strengthened the argument that customary international law imposes an obligation 
upon states to not only facilitate humanitarian assistance, but perhaps even go so far 
as to consent to its delivery.91 A customary norm deduced at an abstract, non-case 
specific level, which requires consent and derives from the Security Council’s work 
as Barber argues, is today however a bit of a stretch. Whether or not customary 
international law imposes such an obligation to consent has not been addressed by 
the Council in its most recent, relevant resolutions. While the Security Council has 
addressed RtoP in connection to the responsibilities of the affected state, it has not 
done so in addressing the potential right to access of third parties which might be 
based on a responsibility to provide assistance. Furthermore, the Council has not 
actively taken the stance that a failure of the affected state to provide assistance (and 
thereby fulfil its sovereign duties) automatically translates into a potential right to 
provide assistance externally, including a related right to obtain access to a territory 
therefore. Indeed, even after the embracement of RtoP as a doctrine, the Security 
Council is seen to reiterate the (on occasion strong) language it has in fact used over 
the past decades. As such concerning Libya, the Council, acting under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter declares it (is): 
 
“Expressing its determination to ensure the protection of civilians and civilian populated 
areas and the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance and the safety of 
humanitarian personnel, […] 3. Demands that the Libyan authorities comply with their 
obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, human 
rights and refugee law and take all measures to protect civilians and meet their basic needs, 
and to ensure the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance.92 
 
The Council has repeated this stance in similar wording through subsequent 
resolutions pertaining to situations like those concerning Côte d’Ivoire, the Republic 
of South Sudan, the DRC and Somalia (all acting under Chapter VII), as well as 
Yemen, Syria and Afghanistan, on occasion adding the phrase ‘in accordance with 
the guiding principles of humanitarian assistance’.93 An example of this latter 
phrasing can be seen in relation to the situation in Somalia where the Council:  
                                                        
90 Section 6.4.1. 
91 Rebecca Barber, ‘Facilitating humanitarian assistance in international humanitarian and human rights 
law’, (2009) 91 International Review of the Red Cross 874, 397. 
92 UNSC Res 1973 (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1973 ‘The situation in Libya’ preamble and § 3. In 
the primary resolution UNSC Res 1970 (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1970, also acting under 
Chapter VII, the Security Council did not use such strong language, as in § 2 it: “Urges the Libyan 
authorities to: (c) Ensure the safe passage of humanitarian and medical supplies, and humanitarian 
agencies and workers, into the country”.  
93 Acting under Chapter VII: UNSC Res 1975 (30 March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1975 ‘The situation in 
Côte d’Ivoir’ preamble and § 10; UNSC Res 1996 (8 July 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1996 § 8; UNSC Res 
2046 (2 May 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2046 § 4; UNSC Res 2076 (20 November 2012) UN Doc 







“Demands that all parties ensure full, safe and unhindered access for the timely delivery 
of humanitarian aid to persons in need of assistance across Somalia, in accordance with 
humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality, humanity and independence, underlines 
its concern at the humanitarian situation in Somalia, urges all parties and armed groups to 
take appropriate steps to ensure the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and 
supplies […]”.94 
 
Although it sometimes remains unclear exactly which principles the Council refers 
to, when merely referencing ‘UN principles’ or ‘humanitarian principles’, it may be 
assumed that the principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality (and 
independence) are meant as it refers to them by name in later resolutions.95 On other 
occasions, the Council has continued to add to this phrasing by ‘strongly 
condemning’ the obstruction of humanitarian aid.96  
From this above analysis, an approach by the Security Council can be discerned 
regarding the body’s willingness to address matters concerning humanitarian access. 
Quite unfalteringly the Council ‘calls’, ‘urges’ or ‘demands’ for parties to ‘facilitate’, 
‘allow’ or ‘ensure’ ‘safe’, ‘unhindered’, ‘timely’ and ‘unimpeded’ access for both 
humanitarian assistance and personnel. Furthermore, parties are called upon to 
comply with their obligations under international (humanitarian) law related to the 
provision of assistance and the protection of humanitarian personal, as well as to act 
in accordance with ‘the guiding principles of humanitarian assistance’. Particularly 
relevant is also the fact that the Security Council adheres to similar wording, 
regardless of whether the situation with which it is seized is an international armed 
conflict, a non-international armed conflict or any other form of situation, as long as 
it may be considered ‘a threat to the peace’. The Council continuously does so, both 
under Chapter VII and without such binding force. The latter is relevant to the 
enforcement mechanisms it might envisage, which of course relates to the political 
nature of the organ that must always be taken into consideration. Thus, it appears 
possible to conclude from the Council’s approach that it does not differentiate 
according to the circumstances, as long as the threshold of a ‘threat to the peace’ is 
met. As such, the Council, similar to this research, adheres to a more all-
encompassing approach in dealing with humanitarian crises.  
Of course, not all Security Council resolutions attract equal attention or are 
equally forceful. The political composition of the Council influences the viability of 
its actions as was distinctly visible in the aftermath of the Cold War, when resolutions 
surged and alternatively in Syria where the Council was paralyzed. The situation in 
                                                        
under Chapter VII: UNSC Res 2014 (21 October 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2014 § 10; UNSC Res 2042 (14 
April 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2042 § 10 and also concerning Syria UNSC Res 2043 (21 April 2012) UN 
Doc S/RES/2043 § 11; and UNSC Res 2096 (19 March 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2096 § 29; UNSC Res 
2113 (30  July 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2113 preamble § 14. 
94 UNSC Res 2060 (25 July 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2060 § 6. 
95 See in this regard also UNSC Res 2096 (19 March 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2096 preamble, as well as 
UNSC Res 2127 (5 December 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2127 § 52. 
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Syria has resulted in the Security Council’s refraining from Chapter VII action, which 
has attracted a lot of negative attention. An impasse was broken when the Council 
adopted Resolution 2118 (although not related to the provision of humanitarian 
assistance) and progress was made, despite the Resolution not being adopted under 
Chapter VII.97 Subsequently, the road was paved for Security Council action 
concerning the provision of humanitarian assistance in February 2014, after nearly 2 
years of crisis. The Council, although still not acting under Chapter VII, ‘demanded’ 
that all parties allow ‘rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access’ to all those in 
need of assistance.98 Most recently in the summer of 2014 (and renewed in December 
2014), the Council has, whilst reminding Syria that UN member states are obliged 
under Article 25 of the UN Charter to ‘accept and carry out the Council’s decisions’ 
taken a very novel approach.99 The Security Council has, whilst steering clear of 
Chapter VII action, circumvented the consent of the Syrian authorities and authorised 
so-called ‘cross-conflict’ delivery of humanitarian aid:  
 
“Decides that the United Nations humanitarian agencies and their implementing partners 
are authorized to use routes across conflict lines and the border crossings of Bab al-Salam, 
Bab al-Hawa, Al Yarubiyah and Al-Ramtha, in addition to those already in use, in order 
to ensure that humanitarian assistance, including medical and surgical supplies, reaches 
people in need throughout Syria through the most direct routes, with notification to the 
Syrian authorities, and to this end stresses the need for all border crossings to be used 
efficiently for United Nations humanitarian operations; […] Also decides that all Syrian 
parties to the conflict shall enable the immediate and unhindered delivery of humanitarian 
assistance directly to people throughout Syria, by the United Nations humanitarian 
agencies and their implementing partners, on the basis of United Nations assessments of 
need and devoid of any political prejudices and aims, including by immediately removing 
all impediments to the provision of humanitarian assistance”.100 
 
Although the Council has always continued to reaffirm the affected states’ 
sovereignty in each of its resolutions dealing with humanitarian matters, through 
binding resolutions and wording, in this Resolution the Council appears to assert that 
consent is possibly not always a prerequisite in the provision of humanitarian 
assistance.101 This potential acknowledgment must be differentiated from the forceful 
access as discussed in Chapter 8, where force is used to pave the way for the provision 
of assistance. It is therefore novel that the Security Council directly addresses access 
for the provision of assistance itself without referring to the role of the Syrian 
                                                        
97 UNSC Res 2118 (27 September 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2118 more specifically on the prohibition of 
the use of chemical weapons.  
98 UNSC Res 2139 (22 February 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2139 § 5-7. See subsequently the renewal in 
UNSC 2191 (17 December 2014) S/RES/2191 § 2.  
99 UNSC 2165 (14 July 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2165 preamble. 
100 Ibid § 2 and 6. 
101 The phrasing used often by the Security Council in the preambles to its resolutions is: “Reaffirming 
respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of…” or “Reaffirming its strong commitment to the 
sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of…”. See also Barber, ‘Facilitating 






authorities. Such a novel phrasing appears to search for an intermediate approach to 
the provision of assistance, as it circumvents Syrian sovereignty, but does not 
reference the use of force.  
Perhaps the decades of Security Council action – and thereby joint international 
condemnation – suggest the formation of a customary principle which allows access 
to humanitarian organisations and third states in the provision of humanitarian 
assistance as argued by Barber? Such adoption and acceptance by states of these 
resolutions also puts forth arguments that opinio juris or state practice (by way of the 
Member States of the Security Council) may exist on this matter.102 Yet subsequent 
state practice in accordance with such a norm continues to remain problematic, as a 
common practice with regard to ‘consent’ to access (as required for customary law 
to exist) cannot be distinguished at this time, with but two resolutions from the 
Council, both relating to the same country-situation. At this point, it therefore 
remains to be seen which path is chosen by the Council in subsequent resolutions and 
circumstances. Suggestions as to the direction of the Council have often been made, 
such as underlining the importance of access, calling for strict compliance with the 
law and condemnation of failure to provide access.103 
As has been noted in the above Section 7.4.1, the Security Council often 
presupposes a right of the international community to provide assistance, whereas 
this Section has discussed the potential duty of the affected state to facilitate and 
allow access to the international community in the provision of aid. Certainly, the 
reverse of such a duty of the affected state can and must be seen as a right to provide 
humanitarian assistance. The existence of an actual right to access a territory for the 
provision of aid potentially derived from the practice of the Security Council remains 
somewhat ambiguous.  
It is suggested here that such a right may be concluded in the event the Council 
adopts a resolution under Chapter VII, while using particularly stringent wording 
such as ‘demanding’ the affected state to ‘ensure’ the safe and unimpeded passage of 
humanitarian assistance and its personnel. Such a conclusion would, however, remain 
case- or country-specific as this would not occur in thematic resolutions. Indeed, in 
such specific instances the Council foregoes the stadium in which the international 
community is called to offer such aid to a state, and presupposes the existence of 
willingness in this regard. However, this phrasing of the Security Council in itself 
does not imply a right to intervene. A right or duty for third states to intervene 
forcefully only exists if the Security Council explicitly calls thereto.104 In one of its 
‘quasi-judicial’ Presidential Statements105 the Security Council has however 
                                                        
102 Ibid Barber,  390.  
103 ‘Security Council, Internal Displacement And Protection: Recommendations For Strengthening 
Action Through Resolutions’, Brookings Institute (September 2011) 21.  
104 With regard to the use of force in general: Articles 2(4) and 39 UN Charter. See in particular in relation 
to the provision of humanitarian assistance: UN Doc E.CN.4/1996/52/Add.2 (n 43) § 389 and Chapter 8 
for a discussion on enforcement through the use of force.  
105 S Talmon, ‘The Statements of the President of the Security Council’, (2003) 2 Chinese Journal of 




Third Parties and the Provision of Assistance: The Right to Offer Assistance and the 
Related (Potential) Right to Access 
335 
recognised the need for humanitarian access as a prerequisite for the effective 
provision of assistance: 
 
“The Security Council reiterates that safe, and unhindered access by United Nations 
humanitarian agencies and national and international organisations to people in need, in 
accordance with the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and 
independence, and the Guiding Principles of Humanitarian Assistance, is a prerequisite for 
the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance”.106 
 
This position is held similarly by the Secretary-General, and can only be reiterated 
here.107 Access to a territory is a vital component in the provision of assistance.  
 
7.4.3 General Assembly Resolutions and the Right to Offer Assistance 
 
As seen in the previous Chapter, the General Assembly has noted the importance of 
the provision of humanitarian assistance from early in the 1960s, and has addressed 
the international community’s role in this assistance from the start. To provide a full 
overview of the current developments regarding the role of third states and the 
international community in general, the views of the General Assembly must be 
juxtaposed with those of the Security Council. Indeed, the General Assembly cannot 
adopt binding resolutions, nor can these resolutions be considered an independent 
source of law. As such, these resolutions are of lesser immediate importance in the 
legal framework. However, the General Assembly’s approach to the external 
provision of humanitarian assistance may well support the perspective of the Security 
Council and as such add to existing opinio juris or state practice. Given the large 
number of states partaking in the General Assembly as compared to the Security 
Council, its resolutions are in fact often regarded in this way.  
In some of its most early resolutions the General Assembly presupposes offers of 
assistance from its Member States in the case of a crisis.108 In other instances, the 
General Assembly has ‘appealed’ to states to offer such assistance.109 In particular, 
such calls were issued in circumstances of natural disaster, but on occasion also in 
                                                        
106 ‘Aide Memoire Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict’ UN Doc S/PRST/2013/2 (12 February 
2013) 4. 
107 ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict’ (22 May 2012) UN 
Doc S/2012/376 § 57. See equally the earlier Secretary General Reports on the Protection of Civilians in 
Armed Conflict: UN Doc S/2009/277 (29 May 2009) § 58 and UN Doc S/2010/579 (11 November 2010) 
§ 43.  
108 UNGA Res 2034 (XX) ‘Assistance in cases of natural disaster’ (7 December 1965) § 2. 
109 UNGA Res 2435 (XXIII) (19 December 1968) § 5; UNGA Res 2717 (XXV) ‘Assistance in cases of 
natural disaster’ (15 December 1970) § 1; UNGA Res 2816 (XXVI) ‘Assistance in cases of natural 
disaster and other disaster situations’ (14 December 1971) § 9 (a) and (b); UNGA Res 3244 XXIX (29 
November 1974) § 2-3; UNGA Res 34/127 (14 December 1979) UN Doc A/RES/34/127 ‘Assistance to 
the Comoros’ § 4; UNGA Res 36/225 (17 December 1981) UN Doc A/RES/36/225 § 12 and 19; UNGA 
Res 49/139 (20 December 1994) UN Doc A/RES/49/139 § 13. See also the range of General Assembly 







circumstances of ‘war’.110 Furthermore, the General Assembly has expressed its 
awareness of the need to strengthen the collective efforts of the international 
community in the provision of assistance.111 The General Assembly has indeed 
asserted that the provision of assistance to those states that have suffered the results 
of a disaster is an ‘expression of the principle of international solidarity’ as enshrined 
in the UN Charter.112 This notion can also be traced in the views behind the UN 
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and 
of course international humanitarian law, although the latter also focuses more on the 
principle of humanity.113 
In addition, not only the UN Member States but indeed also the UN as an 
organisation itself is counted on in the provision of assistance, as the General 
Assembly discusses the Relief Coordinator’s possibilities to ‘instantly’ provide 
emergency assistance.114 On the other hand, the General Assembly has also addressed 
the ‘recipient Government’ in suggesting practical manners through which it may 
facilitate international emergency aid.115 In a general appeal, the international 
community and the affected state are both called upon by the UN General Assembly 
to continue to provide information regarding the provision and receipt of assistance 
as the organ:  
 
“Calls upon Governments and international organizations to co-operate with the United 
Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator by furnishing his Office, as expeditiously as possible, 
with detailed information on their current and intended relief contributions, in cash and in 
kind, in order to render more effective the provision of assistance to the victims of 
disasters. Further calls upon recipient Governments to co-operate with the United Nations 
Disaster Relief Co-ordinator by informing his Office of the relief contributions offered and 
received”.116  
 
Thus, the General Assembly has from a very early stage assumed a need for the 
international community to assist in the provision of humanitarian assistance (in 
circumstances of a natural disaster) and has furthermore envisaged an acceptance 
thereof by the affected state. Indeed, an active role remains for the affected state, as 
in subsequent resolutions such as pertaining to the situation in Chad, the Assembly 
                                                        
110 See in this regard amongst others UNGA Res 35/92 B (5 December 1980) UN Doc A/RES/35/92 B 
‘Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Chad’.  
111 UNGA Res 2816 (XXVI) ‘Assistance in cases of natural disaster and other disaster situations’ (14 
December 1971) preamble.  
112 UNGA Res 3244 XXIX (29 November 1974) ‘Assistance to Bangladesh’ preamble.  
113 UNGA Res 2625 (XXV) (24 October 1970) ‘Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations’.  
114 UNGA Res 3440 XXX (9 December 1975) Assistance in cases of natural disaster and other disaster 
situations’  § 1(a); UNGA Res 36/225 (17 December 1981) UN Doc A/RES/36/225 § 8.  
115 UNGA Res 2816 (XXVI) ‘Assistance in cases of natural disaster and other disaster situations’ (14 
December 1971) § 8.  
116 UNGA Res 33/22 (29 November 1978) UN Doc A/RES/33/22 ‘Office of the United Nations Disaster 
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has called upon the international community to provide assistance to the government 
of Chad, to enable Chad to assist the affected persons.117  
In line with this approach, the General Assembly (as does the Security Council) 
continues to reaffirm the sovereignty of the affected state.118 Furthermore, as the 
thematic resolutions regarding ‘Strengthening the capacity of the United Nations 
system to respond to natural disasters and other disaster situations’ progressed, the 
General Assembly has also reiterated on several occasions that the international 
provision of assistance shall take place upon the ‘request’ of the affected state.119 Yet, 
the General Assembly has equally stressed the important contribution made through 
the external provision of assistance to the survival of persons in emergency 
situations.120 As such, in its well-known Resolution 46/182, the General Assembly 
stressed the need to strengthen and effectuate the ‘collective efforts of the 
international community’ in the provision of humanitarian assistance.121 
Furthermore, the General Assembly asserted in this cardinal resolution that the 
provision of external assistance is of ‘great importance’ as a disaster may overwhelm 
national capacity.122 However, whilst negotiating this Resolution, a number of states 
reiterated the need to respect the principle of sovereignty, arguing that the provision 
of humanitarian assistance was dependent on the approval of the affected state.123 
While reiterating the call to the international community to assist in the provision of 
humanitarian assistance, the General Assembly proceeded – as did the Security 
Council – and called for ‘timely and speedy’ provision in subsequent resolutions.124 
In subsequent resolutions, the General Assembly has continued to stress the 
importance of the provision of assistance by the international community; not only 
calling upon UN Member States, but also the organs of the UN itself as well as 
humanitarian organisations.125 In this sense, its approach is similar to that of the 
                                                        
117 UNGA Res 35/92 B (5 December 1980) UN Doc A/RES/35/92 B ‘Emergency Humanitarian 
Assistance to Chad’ § 2.   
118 See in this regard amongst others UNGA Res 36/225 (17 December 1981) UN Doc A/RES/36/225 § 
2 and UNGA Res 43/131 (8 December 1988) UN Doc A/RES/43/131 ‘Humanitarian Assistance to 
victims of natural disasters and similar emergency situations’ § 2; UNGA Res 46/182 (19 December 
1991) UN Doc A/RES/46/182 ‘Strengthening the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of 
the United Nations’ Annex § 3.  
119 UNGA Res 36/225 (17 December 1981) UN Doc A/RES/36/225 § 8 and 9.  
120 UNGA Res 43/131 (8 December 1988) UN Doc A/RES/43/131 § 1 and 3; UNGA Res 45/100 (14 
December 1990) UN Doc A/RES/45/100 ‘Humanitarian Assistance to victims of natural disasters and 
similar emergency situations’, § 1 and 3.  
121 UNGA Res 46/182 (19 December 1991) UN Doc A/RES/46/182 preamble. See also subsequently UN 
Res 47/168 (22 December 1992) UN Doc A/RES/47/168; UNGA Res 48/57 (14 December 1993) UN 
Doc A/RES/48/57 preamble.  
122 Ibid UNGA Res 46/182 Annex § 5.  
123 ILC ‘Protection of persons in the event of disasters’ Memorandum by the Secretariat, UN Doc 
A/CN.4/590 (11 December 2007) footnote 75. Amongst others Brazil, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, France, Iran, 
Mexico, Japan, Pakistan, Tunisia, the Sudan, China, Ghana, Cuba, Iraq, Switzerland and India held 
various takes on this position, with regard to the development of resolutions UNGA Res 43/131 (8 
December 1988) UN Doc A/RES/43/131 and UNGA Res 46/182 (19 December 1991) UN Doc 
A/RES/46/182.  
124 UNGA Res 49/169 (23 December 1994) UN Doc A/RES/49/169 § 11.  






Security Council, which also views a role for both states and international 
organisations. 
A culmination of the viewpoint of the General Assembly, namely that the 
provision of humanitarian assistance is a shared international responsibility, can be 
found in its Millennium Declaration where the General Assembly asserts that:  
 
“we have a collective responsibility to uphold the principles of human dignity, equality 
and equity at the global level. […] We will spare no effort to ensure that children and all 
civilian populations that suffer disproportionately the consequences of natural disasters, 
genocide, armed conflicts and other humanitarian emergencies are given every assistance 
and protection so that they can resume normal life as soon as possible. We resolve 
therefore: To expand and strengthen the protection of civilians in complex emergencies, 
in conformity with international humanitarian law. To strengthen international 
cooperation, including burden sharing in, and the coordination of humanitarian assistance 
to, countries hosting refugees and to help all refugees and displaced persons to return 
voluntarily to their homes, in safety and dignity and to be smoothly reintegrated into their 
societies”.126  
 
Indeed, the principle of human dignity itself warrants the provision of humanitarian 
assistance, and the General Assembly makes a clear statement acknowledging the 
importance of enhancing the protection of those who are in need of humanitarian 
assistance. As argued by Vukas, the General Assembly's stance to uphold the 
principle of human dignity is an answer to some states’ reluctance to ‘admit the 
vulnerability of their societies in the face of a disaster and their inability to cope with 
the effects thereof’.127 In later resolutions, the General Assembly has reiterated its 
stance that the international community (in particular the UN system) bears the task 
of strengthening and improving the humanitarian response in the aftermath of 
emergencies.128 The General Assembly indeed continues to ‘encourage efforts’ of 
cooperation and coordination amongst international humanitarian organisations, 
third countries and the affected state to enhance more effective delivery of 
assistance.129 The General Assembly does so not only in its thematic resolutions, but 
                                                        
126 UNGA Res 55/2 (18 September 2000) UN Doc A/RES/55/2 ‘United Nations Millennium Declaration’ 
§ 2 and 26.  
127 Vukas, ‘Humanitarian Assistance in Cases of Emergency’ (n 14) § 21. Vukas herein also refers to 
UNGA Res 43/131 (8 December 1988) UN Doc A/RES/43/131 § 8.  
128 UNGA Res 60/124 (8 March 2006) UN Doc A/RES/60/124 ‘Strengthening the coordination of 
humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations’ § 11; and subsequent thematic resolutions 
such as amongst others UNGA Res 63/139 (5 March 2009) UN Doc A/RES/63/139 ‘Strengthening of 
the coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief assistance of the United Nations, including special 
economic assistance: strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the 
United Nations’ § 3; UNGA Res 64/76 (2 February 2010) UN Doc A/RES/64/76 preamble. 
129 UNGA Res 63/139 (5 March 2009) UN Doc A/RES/63/139 ‘Strengthening of the coordination of 
humanitarian and disaster relief assistance of the United Nations, including special economic assistance: 
strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations’ § 11; 
UNGA Res 63/141 (10 March 2009) UN Doc A/RES/63/141 preamble and § 6, 10-11; UNGA Res 64/76 
(2 February 2010) UN Doc A/RES/64/76 § 3 and 8. See in this regard also UNGA Res 64/251 (30 April 
2010) UN Doc A/RES/64/251 §13; UNGA Res 65/133 (3 March 2011) UN Doc A/RES/65/133 
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also in more specific circumstances, expressing its appreciation of those states that 
have aided, amongst others El Salvador in the aftermath of hurricane Ida and Haiti 
following the earthquake.130  
Yet, although the General Assembly acknowledges that assistance by external 
providers is ‘essential’  and ‘necessary’, the UN body does not go beyond 
‘welcoming’ effective cooperation amongst states and organisations, nor does the 
General Assembly use stronger wording than ‘urging’ its Member States to assist, or 
‘stressing’ a continued need for enhanced cooperation.131 While ‘urging’ Member 
States may come across as an urgent appeal, the General Assembly falls short from 
actually declaring an international legal responsibility or duty in the provision of 
assistance. Whereas both the Security Council and General Assembly stress the 
importance of adhering to international law, from the above it becomes apparent that 
the General Assembly emphasises somewhat more the moral duty lying with the 
international community, such as through recalling the principles of solidarity and 
seen in the above discussed Millennium Declaration. This approach can similarly be 
found in the 2008 EU Consensus with regard to the stance of the EU.132 However, as 
the General Assembly places a fair amount of emphasis on the need for the affected 
state to allow access to external providers of humanitarian assistance, perhaps this 
shared international responsibility to provide aid is somewhat presupposed, as the 
Assembly focuses on the difficulties with entry into the affected territory upon an 
offer of assistance.  
 
7.4.4 General Assembly Resolutions and the Right to Access 
 
Following a discussion of the Security Council’s approach to the potential right to 
access a territory for the provision of humanitarian assistance, the General 
Assembly’s perspective must be addressed also. Whereas the General Assembly’s 
initial approach was to address the external provision of humanitarian assistance 
through the assumption that such provision would be instigated at the request of the 
affected state, this changed over time.133 The General Assembly has in fact stated that 
it:  
 
“Invites all States in need of such assistance to facilitate the work of these organizations 
in implementing humanitarian assistance, in particular the supply of food, medicines and 
health care, for which access to victims is essential; Appeals, therefore, to all States to give 
                                                        
130 UNGA Res 64/74 (7 December 2009) UN Doc A/RES/64/74 ‘Humanitarian assistance, emergency 
relief and rehabilitation for El Salvador as a result of the devastating effects of Hurricane Ida’ § 2-3; 
UNGA Res 64/250 (30 April 2010) UN Doc A/RES/64/250 § 3-5. 
131 See for example UNGA Res 65/264 (21 June 2011) UN Doc A/RES/65/264 preamble and § 8, 12-13. 
See also UNGA Res 66/119 (7 March 2012) UN Doc A/RES/66/119 preamble, § 4 and 10. 
132 ‘Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States 
meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission’ (European 
Consensus on Humanitarian Aid)  (30 January 2008) EU Doc 2008/C/25/01, § 1. 






their support to these organizations working to provide humanitarian assistance, where 
needed, to the victims of natural disasters and similar emergency situations”.134  
 
This statement, stressing the need for cooperation of the affected state implies the 
realisation of the General Assembly that indeed the affected state itself is not always 
willing to welcome international organisations into the territory for the provision of 
assistance. Moreover, the General Assembly simultaneously calls upon states in the 
vicinity to facilitate the transit of such emergency aid.135 Thus, the General Assembly 
asserts the essential character of humanitarian access, which the organ has continued 
to do in subsequent resolutions and more particularly in its well-known Resolution 
46/182 of 1991.136 In fact, the General Assembly adopts some of the language as seen 
in the Security Council resolutions, and calls upon ‘parties to conflicts’ to: 
 
“take all possible necessary measures to ensure impartial, safe and timely humanitarian 
access to persons in need of protection and assistance”.137 
 
In doing so, the Assembly does not only acknowledge the role of non-state actors, 
but also addresses circumstances of conflict: this is somewhat unfamiliar territory to 
it. Yet, the General Assembly appears conflicted, as it subsequently falls back on its 
earlier position and asserts that:  
 
“humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of the affected country and 
in principle on the basis of an appeal of the affected country”.138 
 
Indeed, the General Assembly thus unequivocally argues that a right to access does 
not exist, but that access for third parties for the provision of humanitarian assistance 
is dependent on the will of the affected state. In the very same Resolution however 
the General Assembly reiterates the importance of access to provide assistance, and 
calls upon the international community for such provision.139  
Nevertheless, despite this occasional diverging in the organ’s approach to the 
provision of assistance from external sources, the General Assembly simultaneously 
adopted several resolutions in which it once again appears to follow the line set out 
by the Security Council (sometimes even referring to such resolutions),140 as it calls 
                                                        
134 UNGA Res 43/131 (8 December 1988) UN Doc A/RES/43/131 § 4 and 5.   
135 Ibid § 6; see for a reiteration UNGA Res 45/100 (14 December 1990) UN Doc A/RES/45/100 § 7.  
136 Ibid UNGA Res 45/100 § 4 and 5; UNGA Res 46/182 (19 December 1991) UN Doc A/RES/46/182 
Annex § 6-7. Subsequently, see also UNGA Res 49/174 (24 February 1995) UN Doc A/RES/49/174 
preamble.  
137 UNGA Res 49/169 (23 December 1994) UN Doc A/RES/49/169 § 12.  
138 UNGA Res 51/194 (10 February 1997) UN Doc A/RES/51/194 ‘Strengthening of the coordination of 
emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations’ preamble, and UNGA Res 57/150 (27 
February 2003) UN Doc A/RES/57/150 preamble. 
139 Ibid A/RES/51/194 preamble and § 10.  
140 See for example UNGA Res 54/192 (21 February 2000) UN Doc A/RES/54/192 preamble, UNGA 
Res 55/175 (7 March 2001) UN Doc A/RES/55/175 preamble and UNGA Res 56/217 (19 February 2002) 
UN Doc A/RES/56/217 preamble, where the General Assembly refers to the thematic resolutions of the 
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to ‘parties in complex humanitarian emergencies’ to act in conformity with 
international law and to: 
 
“[…] ensure the safe and unhindered access of humanitarian personnel in order to allow 
them to perform efficiently their task of assisting the affected civilian population, 
including refugees and internally displaced persons”.141 
 
Indeed, ensuing resolutions of the General Assembly at the beginning of the 21st 
century reiterate such wording, including the ‘delivery of supplies and equipment’, 
while also calling upon states to ensure ‘the safety and security of humanitarian 
personnel’.142 Such resolutions also portray a willingness of the General Assembly 
to address not only situations of natural disaster, but to also address more complex 
and conflict-related circumstances. The General Assembly has continued to reaffirm 
the stance it has taken, amongst others in its well-known 2005 World Summit 
Outcome Document.143 On other occasions, the General Assembly calls upon states 
to ‘facilitate the efforts’ of third parties in the provision of relief.144 Again following 
the Security Council choice in language, the General Assembly has also in more 
recent years urged states in the ‘proximity to humanitarian emergencies’ to facilitate 
the transit of emergency aid.145 In an even more converging manner, in 2013 the 
General Assembly: 
                                                        
141 UNGA Res 52/167 (18 February 1998) UN Doc A/RES/52/167 ‘Safety and security of humanitarian 
personnel’ § 3.  
142 UNGA Res 53/87 (27 January 1999) UN Doc A/RES/53/87 ‘ Safety and security of humanitarian 
personnel and protection of United Nations personnel’ § 11 and see also § 3; UNGA Res 54/192 (21 
February 2000) UN Doc A/RES/54/192 § 2-3; UNGA Res 55/175 (7 March 2001) UN Doc 
A/RES/55/175 § 3-4; UNGA Res 56/217 (19 February 2002) UN Doc A/RES/56/217 § 3, 4 and 12; 
UNGA Res 58/114 (5 February 2004) UN Doc A/RES/58/114 § 8 and 10; UNGA Res 59/141 (25 
February 2005) UN Doc A/RES/59/141 § 18; UNGA Res 60/124 (8 March 2006) UN Doc A/RES/60/124 
§ 2; UNGA Res 60/123 (24 March 2006) UN Doc A/RES/60/123 § 3-4; UNGA Res 61/133 (1 March 
2007) UN Doc A/RES/61/133 ‘Safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United 
Nations personnel’ § 3 and 4; UNGA Res 61/134 (1 March 2007) UN Doc A/RES/61/134 § 20; UNGA 
Res 62/94 (25 January 2008) UN Doc A/RES/62/94 ‘Strengthening of the coordination of emergency 
humanitarian assistance of the United Nations’ § 24; UNGA Res 62/95 (29 January 2008) UN Doc 
A/RES/62/95 § 3-4; UNGA Res 63/138 (5 March 2009) UN Doc A/RES/63/138 § 3 and 4; UNGA Res 
64/76 (2 February 2010) UN Doc A/RES/64/76 §26; UNGA Res 64/77 (8 February 2010) UN Doc 
A/RES/64/77 § 4; UNGA Res 65/132 (1 March 2011) UN Doc A/RES/65/132 §4; UNGA Res 65/133 (3 
March 2011) UN Doc A/RES/65/133 § 27; UNGA Res 66/117 (1 March 2012) UN Doc A/RES/66/117 
§ 4; UNGA Res 66/119 (7 March 2012) UN Doc A/RES/66/119 § 33; UNGA Res 66/120 (7 March 2012) 
UN Doc A/RES/66/120 ‘Strengthening humanitarian assistance, emergency relief and rehabilitation in 
response to the severe drought in the Horn of Africa region’ § 12; UNGA Res 67/85 (21 March 2013) 
UN Doc A/RES/67/85 § 4; UNGA Res 67/87 (26 March 2013) UN Doc A/RES/67/87 § 37.  
143 UNGA Res 60/1 (24 October 2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1 ‘World Summit Outcome Document’ § 169.  
144 UNGA Res 56/164 (19 December 2001) UN Doc A/RES/56/164 ‘Protection of and assistance to 
internally displaced persons’ § 10. See also UNGA Res 60/168 (16 December 2005) UN Doc 
A/RES/60/168 ‘Protection of and assistance to internally displaced persons’ § 12.   
145 UNGA Res 59/141 (25 February 2005) UN Doc A/RES/59/141 preamble; UNGA Res 64/251 (30 
April 2010) UN Doc A/RES/64/251 § 14. See also UNGA Res 65/264 (21 June 2011) UN Doc 
A/RES/65/264 § 14; UNGA Res 66/227 (15 March 2012) UN Doc A/RES/66/227 §16; and UNGA Res 







“Calls upon all States and parties in complex humanitarian emergencies, in particular in 
armed conflict and in post-conflict situations, in countries in which humanitarian personnel 
are operating, in conformity with the relevant provisions of international law and national 
laws, to cooperate fully with the United Nations and other humanitarian agencies and 
organizations and to ensure the safe and unhindered access of humanitarian personnel, as 
well as the delivery of supplies and equipment, in order to allow such personnel to 
efficiently perform their task of assisting affected civilian populations, including refugees 
and internally displaced persons”.146 
 
In this approach, the General Assembly focuses on the obligations of parties to 
humanitarian crises under international law in ensuring access to providers of aid, a 
line of reasoning which it has continued subsequently.147  
From the above analysis and comparison with the approach taken by the Security 
Council follows that the General Assembly to a certain extent appears to also take 
the line set out by the Security Council with regard to the potential ‘right to access’ 
for third parties in the event of a humanitarian crisis. Such an impression appears 
from the statements of the General Assembly in adopting the language of the Security 
Council that preceded it in the vocabulary of certain resolutions. A common 
perspective, through common language, appears at the least to be that both organs 
call upon the affected parties to abide by their duties under international law to allow 
access in times of a crisis, although the General Assembly resolutions fall short of 
actually identifying these obligations in greater detail. As argued by Quenivet, the 
Security Council resolutions indeed prove to be a more ‘sound basis’ to argue that 
persons may have a right to humanitarian assistance, and that such assistance indeed 
must be provided.148 In fact, the ICRC argues also in its ‘Customary International 
Humanitarian Law Study’ that both the General Assembly and the Security Council 
have on occasion ‘underlined the obligation’ to allow civilians access to emergency 
aid.149 While such wording is in reality not strictly purported by the two UN organs, 
both do assert a need for the affected state to allow access to the affected territory. 
Such urgent and pressing calls to the affected state may however not be directly 
translated to a ‘right’ of third parties to gain access to the affected territory. Barber 
has argued that the combined stance of the General Assembly and Security Council 
                                                        
146 UNGA Res 67/87 (26 March 2013) UN Doc A/RES/67/87 § 37.  
147 See amongst others UNGA Res 68/102 (12 February 2014) UN Doc A/RES/68/102 § 37 and 41; 
UNGA Res 68/101 (18 February 2014) UN Doc A/RES/68/101 § 2-4 and 13-14 in which the General 
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allow for the assertion that opinio juris exists regarding a specific customary norm, 
namely a duty of states to allow access for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, 
should the denial thereof lead to starvation.150 The exact threshold of consent and 
denial, leading to forcible enforcement mechanisms in international law, will be 
further addressed in Chapter 8.  
 
7.5 The Provision of Humanitarian Assistance by Third Parties Under Specific 
Circumstances in International Law 
 
In the above Sections, the more general international legal framework pertaining to 
the right to provide humanitarian assistance from an external perspective has been 
discussed, and the related potential right to access. Following this discussion, the 
more specific regimes need to be assessed. This Section therefore addresses the legal 
framework pertaining to conflict, occupation and (natural) disaster, in relation to the 
legal possibilities of third parties to provide assistance in an affected territory. The 
legal framework pertaining to refugees and IDPs shall also be considered, as a 
sectoral aspect rather than a circumstantial perspective.  
In practice, gaining access to a territory for the provision of humanitarian 
assistance also entails safety for such provision. Again, this is to be differentiated 
from the use of force to create an environment in which assistance can be provided; 
as this form of safety caters specifically to the duties of the affected authority and 
others to ensure the safety of humanitarian aid providers. In this regard, with a view 
to such safety, for example the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and 
Associated Personnel states:  
  
“1. United Nations and associated personnel, their equipment and premises shall not be 
made the object of attack or of any action that prevents them from discharging their 
mandate. 2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure the safety and 
security of United Nations and associated personnel. In particular, States Parties shall take 
all appropriate steps to protect United Nations and associated personnel who are deployed 
in their territory from the crimes set out in article 9. 3. States Parties shall cooperate with 
the United Nations and other States Parties, as appropriate, in the implementation of this 
Convention, particularly in any case where the host State is unable itself to take the 
required measures”.151  
 
States are indeed therefore called upon to act according to the realities on the ground. 
Access to a territory must naturally include the safety to provide assistance, otherwise 
such access remains a theoretical perspective rather than a practical reality. Such 
duties are also reflected in the enforcement mechanisms of international criminal law, 
discussed in Section 8.6.2. 
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7.5.1 The Right to Provide Assistance in Times of Conflict 
 
Given the nature of a situation of conflict, the discussion on this shall take place prior 
to a circumstance of occupation, which, when occurring, often follows an armed 
conflict. As the legal regimes in an international armed conflict and a non-
international armed conflict vary, the potential duty of third parties to provide 
humanitarian assistance is discussed accordingly. While non-international armed 
conflicts are increasingly common in this era, the legal framework regarding an 
international armed conflict is taken as a starting point, therefore reflecting the 
development in the law pertaining to the provision of assistance and access.  
 
7.5.1.1 The Right to Provide Assistance in Times of International Armed Conflict 
 
To determine whether a possible external right or duty to provide humanitarian 
assistance in an international armed conflict exists, the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
and their Additional Protocols must be considered primarily. Article 10 GC IV 
provides explicitly:  
 
“The provisions of the present Convention constitute no obstacle to the humanitarian 
activities which the International Committee of the Red Cross or any other impartial 
humanitarian organization may, subject to the consent of the Parties to the conflict 
concerned, undertake for the protection of civilian persons and for their relief”.152 
 
Thus, Article 10 GC IV does not prescribe a duty, rather formulating the possibilities 
of international humanitarian organisations as a ‘right to offer’ assistance.153 
Reflective of the time of drafting of the Conventions is that such organisations are 
distinctly mentioned, whilst third states are not. Whereas Pictet describes the Article 
as ‘an invitation to all men of good will’ to continue the work of the late Henri 
Dunant, whose drafting was not in any way disputed, it is indeed not seen as more 
than that: an invitation, certainly not placing a legal obligation upon third parties in 
the provision of assistance.154 
The ensuing Additional Protocols of 1977 formulate more elaborately the 
possibilities that lie with third parties to provide a civilian population with 
humanitarian assistance as Article 70(1) AP I stipulates: 
 
“If the civilian population of any territory under the control of a Party to the conflict, other 
than occupied territory, is not adequately provided with the supplies mentioned in Article 
69, relief actions which are humanitarian and impartial in character and conducted without 
                                                        
152 Although not relating to humanitarian assistance, several other provisions in the Fourth Geneva 
Convention also consider the delivery of food, such as Article 89 with regard to the rations internees 
should receive, Article 91 concerning the medical attention due to internees and Articles 108-11 
concerning the relief shipments internees might receive.  
153 See Section 7.5.2.1 on the aspect that a state’s consent is needed.  
154 Jean Pictet, Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 Volumes I-IV (International 
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any adverse distinction shall be undertaken, subject to the agreement of the Parties 
concerned in such relief actions. Offers of such relief shall not be regarded as interference 
in the armed conflict or as unfriendly acts. In the distribution of relief consignments, 
priority shall be given to those persons, such as children, expectant mothers, maternity 
cases and nursing mothers, who, under the Fourth Convention or under this Protocol, are 
to be accorded privileged treatment or special protection […]”. 
 
Although the provision stipulates firmly that such assistance ‘shall’ be undertaken, 
rather than ‘may’ be undertaken, it is unclear who the addressee of this obligation is, 
and the Commentary does not provide an answer. The level of ‘adequacy’ is also not 
elaborated upon, and raises the dilemma that it remains unclear as to whom shall 
determine whether or not the territory is ‘adequately’ supplied (see Section 8.3 in this 
regard). As seen above in Chapter 2, the intensity of the situation must amount to a 
humanitarian crisis in order to warrant the delivery of humanitarian assistance, yet 
Article 70 AP I does not prescribe the determination of this to a certain actor. 
Moreover, Article 70(1) AP I importantly reiterates that the relief actions are ‘subject 
to the agreement of the Parties concerned’, which according to the Commentary 
includes the recipient state, and the state(s) from whose territory the relief is sent.155 
Thus, a requirement to consent is not strictly formulated.156 However, this 
‘agreement’, pertaining to the degree to which the affected state may be obliged to 
allow humanitarian assistance into its territory was added to the Article to protect the 
affected state’s sovereignty.157 Yet it was also acknowledged during the negotiations 
by states, while recalling the importance of state sovereignty, that there was no 
‘absolute and unlimited freedom’ in the denial of an agreement to provide relief 
schemes, as this provision must also be read in conjuncture with the duty for affected 
parties in Article 54 AP I concerning the prohibition of starvation of civilians.158 
Indeed, the boundary lies precisely there: the sovereign right to determine the 
allowance of access by way of consent is curtailed by the sovereign duties to not 
starve persons within its jurisdiction, as determined in humanitarian law, or to violate 
their rights to life, food and health, as determined in human rights law.159  
Thus, although the addressee of the obligation to provide assistance according to 
Article 70(1) AP I may be unclear, it is apparent that this provision may in fact come 
from external parties, as the second sentence elaborates that such offers of relief may 
not be considered as hostile acts. From the last sentence of Article 70(1) AP I, calling 
for a distribution of relief according to necessity, once again the obligatory character 
of the provision is apparent, through the wording ‘shall’. Therefore, taking into 
consideration the lack of clarity in the formulation of some aspects of Article 70(1), 
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Committee of the Red Cross 1987) Protocol I Article 70, 819.  
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158 Ibid 819-820. See also Sections 8.3 and further regarding Article 54 AP I and the prohibition of 
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the Article does in fact call upon the obligatory provision of assistance, which it 
considers to include assistance from external sources. This approach taken by the 
Additional Protocol furthermore aligns with the obligations under human rights law 
of the affected state or party involved in the conflict that requires an appeal for 
external assistance, in particular through Article 2 ICESCR. 
A discussion however remains as to the level of the obligation of the affected state 
to accept a bona fide offer, the determination of the adequacy by which the civilian 
population is supplied and the discrepancy states have in the exercise of their 
sovereignty as they might decide not to consent to the provision of assistance. As 
such, Dinstein has argued that the widest interpretation of Article 70(1) AP I may 
only be read as the impediment of a refusal by the affected state to an agreement of 
external relief for arbitrary reasons.160 On the other hand, Plattner has argued that an 
offer meeting the terms of Article 70 AP I, even upon an arbitrary refusal, does not 
divest from its neutral character and may still be considered within the range of 
humanitarian assistance as meant by the Additional Protocol, whereas Spieker has 
argued that if the civilian population is at risk, consent may not be withheld.161 Thus, 
as the provisions of Article 70 AP I are dissected and opinions differ, this Article too 
must be considered to contain rather a ‘right to offer’ for third parties than a duty to 
provide. According to Spieker, although the Protocol does not particularly specify 
this, such a right to offer exists not only for third states but in particular also for relief 
organisations.162 Such an assessment indeed follows Article 10 GC IV and 
international practice. This right to offer and the related consent of the affected state 
must then be considered in light of the potential ‘right to access’ a territory by third 
parties as shall be addressed in the Section 7.5.2.1. 
 
7.5.1.2 The Right to Provide Assistance in Times of Non-International Armed 
Conflict 
 
When considering the provision of aid by third parties in a non-international armed 
conflict, the Geneva Conventions and Protocols have to be considered, similar to the 
circumstance of an international armed conflict. The well-known common Article 3, 
also on occasion called a ‘miniature convention’ regulating non-international armed 
conflicts, is distinct in its statement as to the role of potential humanitarian 
organisations, declaring: 
 
“An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict”. 
 
                                                        
160 Dinstein, ‘The Right to Humanitarian Assistance’ (n 72) 85.  
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The provision that international organisations may offer humanitarian assistance is a 
distinct indication that the drafters envisioned a supplementary role for any outside 
party, with a responsibility lying first and foremost on the parties to the conflict.163 
This indeed aligns with the assessment in Chapter 6 that the primary responsibility 
in the provision of assistance lies with the affected state and other parties to the 
conflict exercising a level of authority. No duty for third parties to provide assistance 
as such exists, under Article 3 and Pictet argues that parties to the conflict may 
decline such an offer ‘if they can do without it’.164 Again, as seen in previous 
instances, a difficulty lies in the determination of this capacity to fulfill the obligation 
to provide assistance. It remains unclear from the wording of the Convention who 
shall determine whether or not the civilian population is adequately supplied.  
Following the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1977 Additional Protocol II has 
supplemented Common Article 3, similar to Additional Protocol I supplementing 
Article 10 GC IV. Article 18 AP II declares: 
 
“1. Relief societies located in the territory of the High Contracting Party, such as Red Cross 
(Red Crescent, Red Lion and Sun) organizations, may offer their services for the 
performance of their traditional functions in relation to the victims of the armed conflict. 
The civilian population may, even on its own initiative, offer to collect and care for the 
wounded, sick and shipwrecked. 2. If the civilian population is suffering undue hardship 
owing to a lack of the supplies essential for its survival, such as foodstuffs and medical 
supplies, relief actions for the civilian population which are of an exclusively humanitarian 
and impartial nature and which are conducted without any adverse distinction shall be 
undertaken subject to the consent of the High Contracting Party concerned”.165 
 
Here, AP II provides that during a non-international armed conflict as within the 
scope of the Protocol (requiring the existence of a non-state actors exercising a degree 
of control), local relief societies ‘may’ offer assistance, differing from the provision 
of assistance in the event of an international armed conflict. The external assistance 
by third parties in times of non-international armed conflicts is considered 
complementary to the national provision, should the affected authorities be unable to 
meet the needs of the civilian population.166 As such, Article 18 AP II must be read 
in conjuncture with Article 14 AP II concerning the prohibition of starvation as a 
method of warfare: in order for the affected authorities to respect the obligations 
under Article 14 AP II, the provision of emergency assistance as formulated under 
Article 18(2) AP II should be authorised.167 Only in the situation that civilians are 
experiencing ‘undue hardship’, does such a right to offer become an obligation 
through the wording of ‘shall’, as seen in the second paragraph of the Article. Yet, as 
was seen above in the discussion of Article 70 AP I, again in this instance such an 
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obligation does not have a clear addressee, nor can consent of the affected state be 
bypassed. As such, the formulation remains problematic.  
The formulation of this Article portrays the struggle experienced with regard to 
balancing the drafting states’ concerns for their national sovereignty with the needs 
of a suffering population.168 While the wording ‘shall’ implies an obligation that 
might be construed as a limitation of the notion of state sovereignty, consent of the 
affected state continues to be required according to AP II. Yet, as is often the case in 
circumstances of non-international armed conflict, armed groups or non-state actors 
operate from certain areas of the territory where the affected state experiences a loss 
of control. According to the Commentary, in the event it is unclear who the 
authorities are, consent must be presupposed so as to prevent the prolongation of 
suffering from the affected population.169 Although the Commentary is widely 
recognised, such an assertion; declaring the presupposition of consent in the event 
clarity does not exist concerning the authorities in a territory, cannot be said to be 
commonly supported in practice. Dungel has argued that the text of Article 18 AP II 
in addressing only the affected state has an inherent inequality, which may be 
explained by the fact that historically obtaining approval from another belligerent 
party exercising control would be the recognition of this as a government.170 Yet, as 
Dungel asserted, as this party indeed exercises de facto control, it would be arguable 
to consider such a party also a ‘concerned party’ in the sense of Article 18(2) AP II, 
leading to the requirement of its approval, rather than the approval of the affected 
state, depending on where specifically the assistance is required.171 Ryngaert has 
concurred from a practical perspective, but notes that the necessity of the legal 
requirement of consent by a non-state actor remains unclear, given the silence of the 
Geneva Conventions and Protocols on this specific matter, whilst the Protocol does 
impose other obligations on such actors.172  
Ryngaert furthermore notes that as armed groups increasingly aspire to 
sovereignty in conflicts with existing authorities, they may be ‘bound by exactly the 
same norms as the state’ with regard to the legal framework of humanitarian 
assistance, which simultaneously implies that such an armed group may not withhold 
consent arbitrarily, in violation of Article 18 AP II.173 As is the case in the analysis 
of the various potential duties or rights to provide assistance in times of an 
international armed conflict, equal discussion exists with regard to non- international 
armed conflicts. Whereas Dinstein argues that a decline of an offer of assistance is 
permissible and that states shall always find plausible arguments to that end, Plattner 
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poses that an offer which meets the terms of Article 18 APII cannot be considered an 
unlawful interference and may not be arbitrarily refused.174 Again, semantics remain 
relevant, as the ‘arbitrariness’ of the refusal lies in the eye of the beholder. The ILC, 
in its study on the ‘Protection of persons in the event of disasters’, has argued that 
such a determination must be made on a ‘case-by-case basis’, without elaborating as 
to who should be the determinant in such circumstances.175  
Despite the relevance of Article 18 AP II, many of the contemporary non-
international conflicts are not governed by the provisions of this particular Protocol, 
either due to a lack of control of the armed groups, thereby not meeting the threshold 
of the Protocol, or because the affected stated has not acceded to it. In such 
circumstances, resort must be had to the general provisions of Common Article 3 of 
the Conventions, which does not allow for a ‘right to access’ or even a duty to allow 
such access. In fact, in these circumstances, relying on the duties of the affected state 
and non-state actor based on human rights law will provide more protection for 
persons in need of humanitarian assistance. The rights to life, food and health all 
warrant the provision of humanitarian assistance by the affected authorities, should a 
humanitarian crisis take place, as such provision fulfils these human rights as 
enshrined in the ICCPR, ICESCR and various specific and regional treaties. 
Therefore, under human rights law, in times of non-international armed conflict – not 
meeting the threshold of AP II – the affected state and armed groups would still be 
held to the duty to seek international assistance in the provision of humanitarian 
assistance. In non-international armed conflicts that do fall within the scope of AP II, 
human rights law of course also continues to apply.  
Should such offers of assistance be made, consent continues to be a crucial part 
of the actual facilitation of assistance. The matter of consent is crucial to the 
discussion of a potential ‘right to access’ as needed by third parties in order to 
factually provide the emergency assistance and shall therefore be further developed 
in the following Section, whereas the denial of humanitarian assistance (through the 
denial of consent) leading to a violation of a duty of the affected state shall be 
subsequently addressed in Section 8.3.  
 
7.5.2 The Potential Right to Access in Times of Conflict 
 
As seen in the previous Sections, the legal rights and duties involved in the provision 
of assistance are in practice very closely related to the discussion on the potential 
right to access. Alternatively formulated, the potential duty to allow access facilitates 
the external provision of assistance. Although the law pertaining to the potential right 
to access in times of armed conflict must also be discussed according to the type of 
conflict at hand, an overarching dilemma exists, as the issue of consent exists in 
circumstances of international armed conflict and non-international armed conflict, 
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as well as for example in times of (natural) disaster. In the following Sections, an 
assessment is made of whether indeed the obligation resting upon the affected state 
and other involved parties – at times – can be considered to have evolved into a right 
of third parties to gain access for the provision of assistance. Again, it must be 
reiterated that this form of access must be distinguished from access through the use 
of force, as the provision of humanitarian assistance, in order to be precisely that, 
must abide by the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality.  
 
7.5.2.1 The Potential Right to Access in Times of International Armed Conflict 
 
The main provision of the 1949 Geneva Conventions with regard to the provision of 
humanitarian assistance, Article 10 GC IV, provides that the offer of assistance – and 
its provision – is subject to the consent of the affected state. Pictet argues in the 
Commentary that although parties to the conflict cannot be obliged to ‘tolerate’ the 
activities of a third organisation or party in its territory and that the states involved in 
the conflict do not need to provide reasons for the refusal, they may be subjected to 
some judgment in this regard: 
 
“The decision is entirely theirs, but since they are pledged to apply the Convention, they 
alone must bear the responsibility if they refuse help in carrying out their engagements”.176 
 
Although therefore no ‘right to access’ can be read into Article 10 GC IV, Pictet 
suggests an accountability for states that might refuse an offer from third parties to 
assist in the provision of humanitarian assistance. This responsibility is extended by 
Pictet to include others that might bear responsibilities, such as those parties involved 
in controlling a blockade, or facilitating the transit of emergency aid.177 
Subsequently, Article 23 GC IV declares: 
 
“Each High Contracting Party shall allow the free passage of all consignments of medical 
and hospital stores and objects necessary for religious worship intended only for civilians 
of another High Contracting Party, even if the latter is its adversary. It shall likewise permit 
the free passage of all consignments of essential foodstuffs, clothing and tonics intended 
for children under fifteen, expectant mothers and maternity cases. The obligation of a High 
Contracting Party to allow the free passage of the consignments indicated in the preceding 
paragraph is subject to the condition that this Party is satisfied that there are no serious 
reasons for fearing: (a) that the consignments may be diverted from their destination, (b) 
that the control may not be effective, or (c) that a definite advantage may accrue to the 
military efforts or economy of the enemy through the substitution of the above-mentioned 
consignments for goods which would otherwise be provided or produced by the enemy or 
through the release of such material, services or facilities as would otherwise be required 
for the production of such goods. The Power which allows the passage of the consignments 
indicated in the first paragraph of this Article may make permission conditional on the 
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distribution to the persons benefited thereby being made under the local supervision of the 
Protecting Powers”. 
 
Thus, Article 23 GC IV imposes an obligation upon states that they ‘shall’ allow the 
provision of humanitarian assistance, adding to this that such an obligation may only 
be set aside if ‘serious reasons’ as stated above can be argued. Only upon the 
inclusion of these ‘safeguards’ were many states willing to agree to the mandatory 
character of Article 23.178 Furthermore, Article 23 stipulated that the relief 
consignments ‘shall’ be forwarded as speedily as possible, thus placing another 
obligation upon state parties to not obstruct the distribution of aid. In addition to 
Article 23, which is specifically tailored to humanitarian assistance for the civilian 
population, Article 38 of the Fourth Geneva Convention stipulates that protected 
persons ‘shall’ be allowed to receive relief that is sent to them. It is therefore a distinct 
pattern of provisions that show the principle of thought behind the drafting of the 
Convention and the wishes of the drafters, namely that those in need should be able 
to receive such assistance, implying both a related right to access of third parties and 
an obligation of the affected state to allow for such access, subject to certain ‘control 
rights’.  
Such perspectives are also translated into the Additional Protocol, where Article 
70 addresses the provision of humanitarian assistance and, as seen above, the right to 
offer such assistance. Although attempts were made at a more far-reaching provision 
during the drafting process; which did not include any restrictions on the obligations 
of the affected state, the eventually accepted Article 70 AP I follows the general lines 
of Article 23 GC IV.179 Concerning the potential right to access, Article 70(2)-(5) AP 
I declares in line with Article 23 GC IV: 
 
“2. The Parties to the conflict and each High Contracting Party shall allow and facilitate 
rapid and unimpeded passage of all relief consignments, equipment and personnel 
provided in accordance with this Section, even if such assistance is destined for the civilian 
population of the adverse Party. 3. The Parties to the conflict and each High Contracting 
Party which allow the passage of relief consignments, equipment and personnel in 
accordance with paragraph 2: (a) shall have the right to prescribe the technical 
arrangements, including search, under which such passage is permitted;  (b) may make 
such permission conditional on the distribution of this assistance being made under the 
local supervision of a Protecting Power; (c) shall, in no way whatsoever, divert relief 
consignments from the purpose for which they are intended nor delay their forwarding, 
except in cases of urgent necessity in the interest of the civilian population concerned. 4. 
The Parties to the conflict shall protect relief consignments and facilitate their rapid 
distribution. 5. The Parties to the conflict and each High Contracting Party concerned shall 
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encourage and facilitate effective international co-ordination of the relief actions referred 
to in paragraph 1”. 
 
Thus, in first instance only fractional differences exist between the Fourth 
Convention and the Additional Protocol when considering a potential right to access 
a territory by third parties in times of international armed conflict. As such, much of 
the phrasing of Article 70 AP I regarding the content of the rights and duties 
formulated remains mainly identical, to Article 23 GC IV and including a duty to 
allow transit of assistance for third states. Yet, several additions and changes have 
been made, amongst which most notably a broadening of the content of the assistance 
which shall be allowed. Amongst other matters, the prohibition of delaying 
humanitarian assistance by the affected state is a new addition in Article 70(3)(c) AP 
I. As such, the obligation to allow the unimpeded passage of assistance is balanced 
through several ‘control rights’ of the affected state: to control the emergency aid, to 
check supplies and cargo or to delay the provision for reasons of necessity. Many 
examples exist in which a state uses (or abuses) its power to control the delivery of 
assistance, such as taking excessive time to search convoys, closing airports, 
requiring visas or the payment of taxes and even confiscating the aid for other 
purposes.180 As the Commentary notes, since the affected parties are ‘obliged to 
permit and to facilitate’ the passage of relief, they have the right to ‘require certain 
guarantees’.181 However, Article 70 AP I is less lenient towards the affected state. In 
fact, the somewhat subjective phrase in Article 23 GC IV allowing it to avert the 
assistance if it has certain ‘fears’, is simply omitted in Article 70 AP I.182 Thus, the 
‘control rights’ are restricted, but do remain part of Article 70 AP I, clearly giving 
reference to the affected states’ sovereignty. Article 70(5) AP I also adds to the 
existing language, stipulating that international relief shall be encouraged and 
facilitated, although it is not an international legal obligation as of yet.183 Indeed, in 
circumstances in which Additional Protocol I is applicable, Article 70 AP I should 
be considered to replace the provisions of Article 23 GC IV, given its more recent, 
detailed nature.184 With a view to these control rights, the UN Secretary General has 
recently called upon Member States to facilitate the practicalities of matters such as 
visas, checkpoints and to ensure aid providers’ safety from attacks.185  
It has also been argued that the discretion of the affected state is limited not only 
by the provisions in international humanitarian law as referred to in Article 70 AP I, 
but also by the provisions of existing human rights law and as such, a states’ refusal 
to allow humanitarian assistance must also be in line with the provisions on the right 
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to life and the right to food, health (and water).186 Indeed, human rights law remains 
applicable in times of conflict, and thus the duties of states to seek international 
cooperation (or in the very least, not obstruct international offers) under human rights 
law, remain relevant.187 Helpful and contributory to the legal discourse are also 
statements by international organisations (as seen above through the work of the UN 
Security Council and General Assembly) that portray a perspective on state practice 
with regard to the need to abide by existing rules of international humanitarian law 
and allow access to a territory for the provision of assistance.188 As such, in particular 
the Security Council has at times asserted a duty of the affected state to allow 
unimpeded access to humanitarian aid providers.  
Related to the potential right to access is Article 71(2) AP I, calling upon parties 
to provide for safety of humanitarian personnel.189 Indeed, this wording has also been 
seen previously in the discussion of the many Security Council resolutions, and with 
regard to the UN Convention for the safety of its personnel. Although such a 
provision does not in itself call for a ‘right to access’, the safety of such personnel is 
naturally a prerequisite in the delivery of assistance. The ICRC has argued similarly 
in its Customary IHL Study, whilst simultaneously arguing the customary 
international legal status of the obligation to ensure freedom of movement for 
humanitarian personnel as a ‘corollary’ to a right to access.190 Quite understandably, 
given its particular position, the ICRC as an organisation has for many years asserted 
such a right to access. However, as seen above, the ‘right to access’ cannot currently 
be positively stipulated to exist, despite some trends towards its gradual recognition. 
As argued by Spieker, this customary right has not been fully established, as both 
opinio juris and state practice have not properly crystallised regarding the 
abandoning of ‘the precondition of consent’ concerning a potential arbitrary 
refusal.191 The Customary IHL Study has also noted that the broadening of the 
content of emergency relief within Additional Protocol I (from the original more 
restricted Article 23 GC IV) has been accepted as customary law.192 Indeed, the ICRC 
notes in its Study that state practice (including through national legislation of many 
states) indicates an obligation of the affected state to not deliberately impede the 
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delivery of humanitarian assistance to civilians under its control.193 The legality of 
the offer of assistance is thus not affected, should the provision of humanitarian 
assistance meet the criteria as mentioned, even if a state refuses to allow assistance 
and thereby violates its responsibilities by arbitrarily denying access.194 The 
provision and offer, however, must at all times abide by the requirements of Article 
23 GC IV and 70 AP I regarding the manner in which the assistance should be 
provided, regardless of whether or not the affected state is consenting and abiding by 
its obligations under international humanitarian law.195  
 
7.5.2.2 The Potential Right to Access in Times of Non-International Armed Conflict 
 
The Geneva Conventions do not stipulate precisely whether a right to access exists 
for third parties in a non-international armed conflict, as common Article 3 is the 
only source upon which regulations can be sought and it remains silent on the matter, 
merely stating that assistance ‘may’ be offered. Thus, for those non-international 
armed conflicts not reaching the threshold of control required for the application of 
AP II, as well as those in which the affected state is not a Party to the Protocol, 
international humanitarian law does not distinctly supply a right to access the affected 
territory for the purpose of providing assistance. Furthermore, Additional Protocol II 
itself does not contain a particular provision concerning the access to a territory from 
abroad, other than the previously discussed provision in Article 18(2) AP II that relief 
actions ‘shall be undertaken’ in the event a population is not properly supplied with 
emergency aid.196 However, the Commentary to the 1977 Additional Protocol II does 
consider regarding Article 18 that: 
 
“Once relief actions are accepted in principle, the authorities are under an obligation to co-
operate, in particular by facilitating the rapid transit of relief consignments and by ensuring 
the safety of convoys”.197 
 
Indeed, as argued also by the ICRC in its Customary International Humanitarian Law 
Study, access is a ‘conditio sine qua non’ for the provision of relief, which in itself is 
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required through the provision ‘shall be undertaken’ in Article 18 AP II.198 Such a 
necessity is according to the Study also incorporated in the national legislation of 
several states.199 However, it remains to be noted that Article 18 AP II itself does not 
provide for such a right to access, as it was removed in the final acceptance of the 
Article, after having been part of earlier draft versions.200 Such a removal of course 
is a deliberate act of the drafting State Parties, and at the very least suggests their 
restraint in the acceptance of such a right. The ICRC has also argued in its Customary 
IHL Study that the obligation to ensure freedom of movement for humanitarian 
personnel, consequential to its assertion of the obligation to allow access to civilians, 
holds customary international legal status also concerning non-international armed 
conflicts.201 Yet, as the underlying obligation is absent from AP II, considering the 
fact that Article 18 does not specifically mention such an obligation, as well as the 
fact that such a provision is not codified for non-international armed conflicts falling 
short of the threshold of AP II, it appears somewhat premature to argue a customary 
legal norm derived from an obligation which has not been codified, nor 
unequivocally accepted in state practice.202  
Yet, an evolution in the law has taken place since the codification of the Protocols 
in 1977, and the development of the Customary IHL Study in 2005. As reflected in 
this research, the steady increase of non-international armed conflicts adds to the 
development of the law. As such, attacks on humanitarian convoys or personnel in a 
non-international armed conflict have been incorporated as a war crime in the ICC 
Statute.203 It has been put forward that this incorporation contributes to the position 
that the provision of humanitarian assistance within such a conflict is indeed 
evidential of the continuous further incorporation of such a potential right to access, 
as it embraces the reality of such provision on the ground.204  
Furthermore, specific to the character of a non-international armed conflict is the 
matter of the duty-bearer of the obligation to allow humanitarian assistance into a 
certain territory, touched upon in the above Section. Whereas consent is a crucial 
element to the discussion on access to a territory in a variety of circumstances, in a 
non-international armed conflict, similar to circumstances of failed states, the legal 
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sovereign may not be exercising factual control. Problematic in this respect is the 
difficulty in establishing contact with such entities, as contact is often considered to 
reflect a manner of recognition which states may wish to avoid. As discussed above, 
Dungel and Ryngaert argue the need to perhaps consider the non-state actor the 
‘concerned party’ in the sense of Article 18 AP II, although Ryngaert views this as 
merely a practical obligation.205 Consent may in reality be necessary not only of the 
state, but also of the non-state actor holding control over certain areas or territory. 
Although Article 18(2) AP II only addresses the consent of the concerned ‘High 
Contracting Party’, in reality a non-state actor exercising a certain level of de facto 
control would also be a ‘concerned party’ within the meaning of Article 18(2).206 
Schwendimann concurs with Ryngaert, arguing that the consent from such a group 
does not necessarily imply legal recognition.207 This approach of non-recognition has 
also been taken by the states parties to the Kampala Convention, that in a novel 
manner has incorporated duties of armed groups, declaring that members of such 
groups are prohibited from impeding humanitarian assistance, attacking 
humanitarian personnel and violating humanitarian spaces in general.208 In another 
attempt to fill the void regarding conflicts that may fall short of such legal 
qualification, the Turku / Åbo Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards has 
claimed that the necessary facilities to provide assistance ‘shall be granted’.209 
From the above, a close connection can be distinguished between the right to offer 
assistance, and the need for access. Such access in times of a non-international armed 
conflict, however, cannot be legally constructed as a right under international 
humanitarian law, due to the limitations that are incorporated in both Common 
Article 3 GC and Article 18 AP II. As analysed by Spieker, indeed the discussion 
regarding a potential legal obligation to offer and provide humanitarian assistance is 
divided due to the ‘precondition of consent’ of the states and parties concerned, which 
holds true for both international and non-international armed conflicts.210 Within 
international humanitarian law, the duty to allow consent balances on the threshold 
of the affected state’s (or acting sovereign’s) duty to avoid starvation of the civilian 
population. Indeed, consent may not be withheld should it lead to a denial of 
humanitarian assistance that amounts to a violation of international law. Such a 
violation, also in times of conflict, may perhaps be reached at an earlier stage from a 
human rights law perspective. Within human rights law, the threshold does not lie 
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with potential starvation, as the rights to life, food and health require the affected 
state, as a duty-bearer, to take positive action in the fulfilment of these rights towards 
those within its jurisdiction, as opposed to ‘avoiding starvation’, as the most meagre 
requirement of humanitarian law proscribes. A more in-depth analysis of the 
threshold of consent, denial of humanitarian assistance and violations of the law is 
provided in Section 8.3.  
 
7.5.3 The Right to Provide Assistance and the Law of Occupation 
 
On occasion, armed conflicts lead to situations of occupation that amount to 
circumstances of crisis. Should the occupying force in such circumstances not 
provide assistance, third parties also have possibilities, similar to circumstances of 
armed conflict, to do so. Within the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the duties of the 
occupier have been quite extensively addressed as seen above in Chapter 6. Turning 
to the Geneva Conventions, Article 59 GC IV is considered the primary source for 
the rights and duties of third parties, stipulating in paragraph (1) and (2):  
 
“If the whole or part of the population of an occupied territory is inadequately supplied, 
the Occupying Power shall agree to relief schemes on behalf of the said population, and 
shall facilitate them by all the means at its disposal. Such schemes, which may be 
undertaken either by States or by impartial humanitarian organizations such as the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, shall consist, in particular, of the provision of 
consignments of foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing”. 
 
Thus, relief schemes ‘shall’ be agreed upon by the occupying power, which speaks 
of an obligation for the affected occupier rather than an obligation for third parties. 
As argued by the Commentary, such a duty resting upon the occupier is 
‘unconditional’.211 Pictet does subsequently acknowledge that an occupying force 
may be ‘justified’ in refusing such assistance which might not be urgently needed for 
the survival of a population, which is why the final sentence ‘foodstuffs, medical 
supplies and clothing’ is added in the wording of Article 59(2).212 Such materials 
must be allowed, as they contribute to the survival of civilians. Indeed, Article 59 GC 
IV may be construed as an inversed right to provide assistance for third parties, but 
the Article itself is silent on this matter. The Commentary elaborates that the third 
parties – including states – must remain impartial in their provision of assistance.213 
Indeed it is only through impartial provision of relief that such relief can still be 
qualified as humanitarian assistance, and thereby continue to place the obligation 
upon the occupying power to agree to its provision.  
Related to Article 59 GC IV, Article 55 GC IV provides the Protecting Power the 
right to check the state of provision of assistance by the occupier. A protecting power; 
a third state that takes care of the interests of the occupied state with the consent of 
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the occupier, has however remained a more theoretical concept in the Conventions, 
due to the issues relating to its appointment.214 Indeed, the concept of a ‘protecting 
power’ is somewhat out-dated in current international law and is no longer seen much 
in practice.215 For purposes of completeness, the concept will be briefly addressed. 
Pictet argues that the protecting power is not limited to such ‘supervision’ but may 
rather be extended to include lending their good offices for the provision of 
assistance.216 Although the occupying power has the possibility to restrict the 
protecting power hereto in case of military necessity, such restrictions are only 
allowed temporarily. Also related to the role of the protecting power, Article 61 (1) 
and (2) GC IV provides that the protecting power shall have the duty to supervise the 
distribution of such assistance (or delegate such a duty to another neutral third party), 
whereas the occupier must facilitate the rapid distribution of relief: 
 
“The distribution of the relief consignments referred to in the foregoing Articles shall be 
carried out with the cooperation and under the supervision of the Protecting Power. This 
duty may also be delegated, by agreement between the Occupying Power and the 
Protecting Power, to a neutral Power, to the International Committee of the Red Cross or 
to any other impartial humanitarian body. Such consignments shall be exempt in occupied 
territory from all charges, taxes or customs duties unless these are necessary in the interests 
of the economy of the territory. The Occupying Power shall facilitate the rapid distribution 
of these consignments”. 
 
The protecting power, as a third party, therefore has an obligation to cooperate in the 
distribution of the relief, although the Convention does not elaborate on the manner 
in which such cooperation or distribution should take place. Furthermore, although 
the protecting power may delegate its duties to another neutral party, it may only do 
so in an agreement with the occupying power. Thus, some form of insurance is given 
that the cooperation between the new parties will indeed take place.217 The manner 
in which the law is formulated relies heavily on the instatement of such a protecting 
power, whereas in practice this concept has not functioned over the past decades.  
In circumstances of armed conflict, the Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions provided for much needed enhancement of the rights and duties 
involved in the external provision of humanitarian assistance, but this is not the case 
concerning occupied territory. Article 69 (2) AP I very summarily declares that those 
external actions for the provision of humanitarian assistance in occupied territories 
are governed by the existing Articles of GC IV and Article 71 of AP I.218 For the 
potential obligation to provide assistance by third parties therefore, the Additional 
Protocol does not offer an extra source. Such an approach by the Protocols can indeed 
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be explained by the timeframe of their development, and the period of decolonisation. 
Over time, circumstances of occupation have decreased, leading to even fewer 
circumstances of occupation that amount to a humanitarian crisis.  
Thus, with regard to the right to provide assistance, recourse must be had to the 
1949 Conventions as the Additional Protocols do not provide for new obligations or 
rights specific to circumstances of occupation. The provisions of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention are quite explicit concerning the provision of aid by third parties, but 
solely place an obligation upon the protecting powers that might be in place. As is 
apparent from state practice, such protecting powers are no longer common, and as a 
result, also in times of occupation, the most common form of external provision of 
assistance is that by third states or other third parties such as humanitarian 
organisations. Whereas their possibilities to provide assistance are indeed 
incorporated in Article 59 GC IV, these parties do not have a duty as such to provide 
assistance to an occupied population in the event of a humanitarian crisis, but have a 
right to offer to do so, as may be derived from the wording of Article 59 GC IV.  
 
7.5.4 The Potential Right to Access and the Law of Occupation  
 
As seen in the previous Section, Article 59 GC IV is considered the cardinal provision 
pertaining to the external provision of humanitarian assistance in times of occupation. 
Other than in times of armed conflict, the occupying force is obliged to accept such 
assistance with, according to the Commentary, virtually no restrictions.219 
Subsequently, when a potential right to access is considered, Article 59 GC IV 
equally provides in its final paragraphs that:  
 
“All Contracting Parties shall permit the free passage of these consignments and shall 
guarantee their protection. A Power granting free passage to consignments on their way to 
territory occupied by an adverse Party to the conflict shall, however, have the right to 
search the consignments, to regulate their passage according to prescribed times and 
routes, and to be reasonably satisfied through the Protecting Power that these 
consignments are to be used for the relief of the needy population and are not to be used 
for the benefit of the Occupying Power”.  
 
Pictet has argued in his Commentary that these final passages of Article 59 GC IV, 
articulating the principle of free passage of goods and their protection, are the 
‘keystone of the whole system’ as they contain the obligation for the occupying 
power to allow the provision of assistance to the population through any barrier the 
occupier may have set up.220 The level of consent needed in circumstances such as 
an international or non-international armed conflict leading to certain control rights, 
does not translate to circumstances of occupation in the Fourth Convention. The 
occupying power cannot impose restrictions such as the ‘control rights’ that exist for 
the affected parties in times of conflict, as the ‘control rights’ of the occupier are 
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confined to searching the convoys to determine whether the materials are in fact 
meant for a needy population, and to regulate their passage accordingly. Yet, the 
occupier may indeed of course determine for each individual passage of goods and 
personnel whether the convoy meets such criteria and regulate their passage 
accordingly.221 
Access to a territory is, as always, fundamental to the provision of assistance. It 
is relevant to note in this regard also Article 61(2) GC IV, determining that no 
charges, taxes or customs may be imposed, to enable the rapid distribution of relief, 
upon the determination of the occupier that a convoy meets the set criteria. It is the 
occupier’s obligation through its actions to ensure this rapid distribution by 
facilitating this. The final paragraph of Article 61 GC IV determines:   
  
“All Contracting Parties shall endeavour to permit the transit and transport, free of charge, 
of such relief consignments on their way to occupied territories”. 
 
Thus, an obligation lies upon all parties to the Convention to allow relief 
consignments designated for occupied territory through their own territory. Although 
this is certainly not a ‘right to access’ the occupied territory, the combination of what 
is prescribed in Article 59 and 61 amounts to a right of third parties to transfer 
humanitarian assistance through third territory into the occupied territory for the 
provision of assistance. Furthermore, also adding to the discussed ‘right to access’ an 
occupied territory for the provision of assistance, Article 63 GC IV obliges the 
occupying power to allow the existing Red Cross Societies and other similar 
humanitarian organisations in a territory to continue with their activities, with the 
exception of urgent security-related reasons of the occupier. Such temporary reasons 
may be the legitimate concerns and interests of the occupier, who might be threatened 
by imminent danger.222 The caveat with regard to the framework of humanitarian 
assistance under the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention however remains 
that such duties only arise upon the establishment of a certain degree of control, and 
the passing of time, upon which a humanitarian crisis is often not occurring.223 
The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Convention, which have proven helpful 
in the determination of more explicit rights and duties in the potential access to a 
territory in times of armed conflict, do not however expound upon the existing rights 
and duties enshrined in the Fourth Geneva Convention concerning occupied territory, 
except for stating the fact that such provision is also governed by Article 71 AP I. As 
discussed in the above Section pertaining to the right to access and armed conflicts, 
Article 71 AP I calls upon affected parties to ensure the safety of humanitarian 
personnel. Although the Article is relevant to the provision of assistance and 
obtaining access to this end, it does not in itself entail a more elaborate right or duty 
for third parties in times of occupation than enshrined in the Fourth Geneva 
Convention. In fact, concerning the participation of relief personnel, Article 71 AP I 
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calls upon the ‘approval of the Party in whose territory they will carry out their 
duties’, which makes the application of the Article to occupied territory somewhat 
problematic. A lack of clarity exists regarding the addressee of the duty, in times of 
occupation. Thus, applying this Article mutatis mutandis to occupied territory, one 
must conclude that the approval of the occupying power must be sought.224 As such, 
where the Fourth Geneva Convention does not expressly stipulate the right of consent 
for the occupying force, this is now indeed included through the provisions of Article 
71 AP I.  
As discussed in Section 3.4.2.2, the extraterritorial application of human rights 
law including the level of ‘effective’ control or authority needed for its application 
continues to be a matter of debate and the matter has not crystallised in international 
law today. Human rights law may be relevant regarding the creation of potential 
duties to seek international assistance in fulfilling duties regarding the rights to life, 
food and health for the affected state, in this circumstance the occupying power. 
Whilst indeed human rights do not cease to exist in times of conflict or occupation, 
their continued application in occupied territory, in particular relating to the rights to 
food and health, is more difficult to establish given the positive duties of conduct 
these place upon the affected state.225 The ICJ and ECtHR have for example not 
positively affirmed such extraterritorial obligations for states with regard to 
economic, social and cultural rights, whilst the provision of humanitarian assistance 
can be seen as a vehicle in the fulfilment of the rights to life, food and health by a 
state as duty-bearer.  
In the particular case of occupation, the level of control and duration of occupation 
determine the application of both the provisions in the Geneva Conventions and 
Protocols, and the potential application of human rights provisions such as Article 11 
and 12 ICESCR. Yet, in the longer establishment of occupation, in theory the 
immediate humanitarian crisis would also subside, no longer warranting the 
application of human rights law for the provision of emergency aid. Indeed it must 
be concluded that even upon the recognition that human rights find extraterritorial 
application in times of occupation, a case-by-case determination of the degree of 
‘effective control’ or authority is needed to assess their factual application. However, 
the need for their specific application may not be as high as in times of conflict or 
natural disaster, given the more elaborate provisions of Article 59 GC IV. Indeed, the 
nature of the circumstance of occupation, also warranting the application of Article 
59 GC IV, suggests that the immediate humanitarian crisis has passed. 
 
7.5.5 The Right to Provide Assistance in Times of (Natural) Disaster 
 
As seen in Chapter 6, the provision of humanitarian assistance in times of natural 
disaster is not guided by a particular legal framework as is the case in times of armed 
conflict. Certainly, general international law and human rights law find continued 
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applicability, and the General Assembly has increasingly concerned itself with the 
provision of assistance to disaster victims in the aftermath of such natural disasters. 
Yet, creating a binding legal framework has proven difficult on numerous occasions, 
such as in 1927 with the quite extensive, but failed ‘Convention establishing an 
International Relief Union’, and subsequently in 1984 with the ‘Draft Convention on 
expediting the delivery of emergency assistance’. To date, only a few legally binding 
(regional) treaties are in place specifically concerning the rights and duties in the 
provision of humanitarian assistance in the situation of a natural disaster, such as the 
‘Inter-American Convention To Facilitate Disaster Assistance’ of 1991, which 
unfortunately could still benefit from the accession of more parties.  
This regional treaty interestingly presupposes an offer of assistance by third states 
without specifically addressing this right.226 Furthermore, humanitarian 
organisations may, if the affected state consents to this, resort mutatis mutandis to 
the Convention also.227 However, no specific duty to provide humanitarian assistance 
is incorporated, and the Convention presupposes the right of the affected state to 
‘accept’ the offer, thereby suggesting that a refusal thereof is also a possibility.228 In 
short, the Convention places the power of decision resolutely in the hands of the 
affected state. Another regional initiative is the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster 
Management and Emergency Response of 2005, which codifies a duty in Article 4(c) 
for states party to the agreement to ‘promptly respond’ to a request for assistance by 
a state affected by disaster, while the ‘control’ and supervision of coordination and 
direction remains firmly within the sovereign rights of the affected state as 
elaborately established in Articles 11 and 12 of the Agreement. Furthermore, 
according to Article 8 of the Agreement, states have an obligation to coordinate the 
provision of joint emergency response operations amongst themselves.  
With a view to specific types of disasters, the Convention on Assistance in the 
Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency also sees a responsibility for 
all parties to it, declaring that they ‘shall cooperate between themselves’ to ‘facilitate 
prompt assistance’.229 With such a perspective, the Convention foregoes a ‘right to 
offer’ assistance, and rather codifies a duty to assist in the specific circumstance of 
nuclear accidents or radiological emergencies. Yet, such a duty is not unlimited, as 
Article 2(3) of the Convention provides that the state which is requested by the 
affected state to assist shall indeed notify this state ‘whether it is in a position to 
render the assistance requested, and the scope and terms of the assistance that might 
be rendered’. More specifically geared towards food assistance is the recent ‘UN 
Food Assistance Convention’ which entered into force in January 2013 and proclaims 
that certain ‘eligible countries’ are entitled to receive assistance from donors.230 
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Signatories to the Convention, amongst which the EU, must provide a minimum of 
food assistance annually, although no specificities are provided as to the manner in 
which such assistance should be legally framed within the discussion of a potential 
legal duty to provide assistance in a specific circumstance.231 The legal duty which 
exists in this particular Convention relates to a quantity or value of aid which must 
be provided annually, as opposed to the circumstance – such as a humanitarian crisis 
– which triggers the delivery of aid.  
Thus, as the Food Aid Convention does not tailor to the specific legal aspects of 
provision and access for emergency assistance, nor do several of the other 
international or regional initiatives related to international cooperation in relation to 
disaster response, only a small regional and topical component is binding upon 
states.232 Focarelli has argued along these lines that legal regulation in times of 
disaster of assistance towards affected persons is ‘desperately needed’.233 Even from 
the perspective of humanitarian law, support for duties in the provision of 
humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of disaster is found, as the Commentary to 
Article 14 AP II declares that starvation of the civilian population ‘is nowadays no 
longer an acceptable phenomenon, irrespective of how it arises (natural disaster 
or induced by man)’ and that such circumstances have ‘prompted the international 
community to organize relief actions’.234 Such perspectives may be particularly 
relevant to complex emergencies, where disasters occur in times of conflict. 
However, human rights law of course remains applicable in disaster situations 
amounting to a humanitarian crisis. From the perspective of the provision of 
assistance by third parties, the above Section 7.3.1 has shown that although the 
primary duty-bearer in the fulfilment of human rights is the affected state, 
international cooperation is envisaged under Article 2 ICESCR. A right to offer 
assistance therefore can also flow from such provisions. Soft law initiatives, such as 
the ‘Operational Guidelines on Human Rights and Natural Disasters’ similarly 
adhere to this.235 
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Next to existing human rights law and these few binding regional and topical 
treaties, developments exist in particular relation to the legal regulation of 
humanitarian assistance in disaster circumstances in a somewhat more global 
manner. These include both the IDRL regulations as proposed by the IFRC and the 
ILC study on ‘Protection of persons in the event of disasters’ that may provide new 
perspectives through its Draft Articles. Whilst both initiatives are not lex lata, nor do 
they necessarily aspire to be, as the IDRL Guidelines in particular offer a more 
practical and domestic approach, these new perspectives may eventually form part of 
the customary law development. Indeed, from such efforts it becomes evident that 
the international community as a whole is concerned with strengthening international 
cooperation in the aftermath of disasters, warranting their discussion in this 
Section.236 
 
7.5.5.1 The Potential Application of the ILC Study: Protection of persons in the event 
of disaster 
 
Over the past years the ILC has considered through its Draft Articles the possibility 
of external parties providing assistance in the event of a natural disaster, while their 
development into codified international law currently remains uncertain. Draft 
Articles 8 and 9 of the ILC’s study stipulate a duty for states to cooperate amongst 
themselves as well as with humanitarian organisations.237 Furthermore, a right to 
offer assistance is explicitly provided in Draft Article 16: 
 
“In responding to disasters, States, the United Nations, and other competent 
intergovernmental organizations have the right to offer assistance to the affected State. 
Relevant non-governmental organizations may also offer assistance to the affected 
State”.238 
 
Draft Article 16 thus unambiguously provides for a broad spectrum of third parties 
to offer their services in the event of a disaster. The Special Rapporteur has argued 
in favour of such a holistic approach, as he views the protection of persons in the 
event of a disaster in essence a matter which concerns the international community 
as a whole.239 Yet, a duty for the affected state to accept such an offer is clearly 
missing from the text; a deliberate decision of the ILC to allow the affected state the 
freedom of choice through the necessity of its consent.240 Following suit, Draft 
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Article 15 determines that, as is also the case in circumstances of conflict, the affected 
state may exercise certain ‘control rights’:  
 
“The affected State may place conditions on the provision of external assistance. Such 
conditions shall be in accordance with the present draft articles, applicable rules of 
international law, and the national law of the affected State. Conditions shall take into 
account the identified needs of the persons affected by disasters and the quality of the 
assistance. When formulating conditions, the affected State shall indicate the scope and 
type of assistance sought”.241 
 
Unlike in the case with the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and their 
Additional Protocols, the ILC’s Draft Articles do not specify which particular rights 
rest upon the affected state, thereby creating uncertainty for the providing party as to 
what its rights are in offering assistance.242 From the Special Rapporteur’s discussion 
of the right of the affected state to place conditions upon the provision of assistance, 
it can be inferred that states may demand that the assistance provided is in accordance 
with the national law of the affected state (which may be waived), the affected state 
should indicate its needs and it may make certain demands regarding the quality of 
the assistance, but cannot make requests that would deter from the core principles of 
the provision of assistance.243 Thus, the ILC Draft Articles currently appear to hold 
on to the established notion of humanitarian assistance, whilst providing the affected 
state with ample opportunity to ‘mould’ the offered assistance into what it needs in a 
particular circumstance. The duty to cooperate as envisaged by the ILC in its Study 
however follows the line of existing human rights law, providing for somewhat 
stronger clauses than for example humanitarian law. However, the notion of state 
consent is translated from humanitarian law into these Draft Articles.  
 
7.5.5.2 The Potential Application of the IDRL Guidelines and Model Act 
 
As established in Section 6.5.5.2, the IDRL Guidelines are non-binding in their nature 
and intent, as determined by their method of creation and their role in the IFRC’s 
Disaster Law Programme.244 Thus, their more practical approach with a domestic 
perspective foregoes an opportunity to codify in a universal manner the potential 
legal rights and duties for third states in the provision of humanitarian assistance. 
Yet, within the context of this research it is relevant to address the possibilities of 
external parties to provide assistance under the Guidelines. Guideline 3.2 determines 
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that the affected state has a duty to ‘seek international and/or regional assistance’, 
and Guideline 10.1 determines more explicitly:  
 
“Disaster relief or initial recovery assistance should be initiated only with the consent of 
the affected State and, in principle, on the basis of an appeal. The affected State should 
decide in a timely manner whether or not to request disaster relief or initial recovery 
assistance and communicate its decision promptly […]”. 
  
As can be seen, the Guidelines are restrained in their approach, declaring that 
humanitarian assistance should only be ‘initiated’ upon the consent of the affected 
state and on the basis of an ‘appeal’, thereby falling short of positively declaring a 
right to offer assistance for third parties. Furthermore, the IFRC Guidelines, as does 
the ILC in its Study, provide the affected state with ‘control rights’ based on their 
state sovereignty. As such, the affected state shall have the right to: 
 
“coordinate, regulate and monitor disaster relief and recovery assistance provided by 
assisting actors on their territory, consistent with international law”.245  
 
Following that approach, the external providers of assistance have the obligation to 
abide by the national laws of the affected state and coordinate with the local 
authorities.246 Given their practical rather than legal applicability, the IDRL 
Guidelines remain of limited value in their contribution to this analysis of the legal 
framework pertaining to natural disaster relief.247 It must be noted however that the 
UN General Assembly has embraced the Guidelines in its work, thereby adding to 
the potential formation of some consensus on customary principles concerning 
disaster relief.248 
The Guidelines are very restrained and the recently developed ‘Model Act for the 
Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery 
Assistance’ follows this approach.249 The Model Act, which has yet to be 
incorporated by states into their domestic disaster response framework, suggests in 
Article 7(a) and (e) that offers of assistance may be made, but are subject to the 
acceptance thereof by the affected state. Thus, the Model Act does not venture out 
into unchartered territory, and merely echoes the IDRL Guidelines in a more legal 
formulation.  
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7.5.6 The Potential Right to Access in Times of (Natural) Disaster 
 
The UN Secretary General has argued that whilst security reasons might put some 
restrictions on humanitarian access, ‘it remains that humanitarian considerations 
should always be given the necessary priority’.250 The Secretary General suggests 
creating ‘relief corridors’ in specific circumstances, to provide access to victims of 
natural disasters, but reflects that such corridors, functioning as ‘life lines’ should be 
instated in coordination with the affected state, in respect of state sovereignty.251 
These arguments, made in 1990, still hold true today, although developments in the 
law have taken place, not in the least concerning the notion of state sovereignty.252 
As noted in the previous Section, currently a specific legal framework pertaining 
to the provision of humanitarian assistance in times of natural disaster is absent, save 
for the regional provisions of the ‘Inter-American Convention To Facilitate Disaster 
Assistance’ of 1991 and the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and 
Emergency Response.253 Although according to the Inter-American Convention the 
assisting states merely have the right to offer assistance and the affected state has a 
choice to accept such an offer, once accepted, the Convention determines in Article 
V that access and freedom of movement in the territory, both for humanitarian 
personnel and convoys, is exempt from all kinds of payments and shall be facilitated 
fully by the affected state. As seen in times of conflict and occupation, the 
Convention envisages for the affected state to have certain ‘control rights’ which 
include determination of certain routes and acceptance of which personnel enters the 
territory.254 Although of only regional consequence, this Convention thus 
differentiates from humanitarian law, and does not envisage such specific control 
rights. Similar to the Inter-American Convention, according to the ASEAN 2005 
Agreement’s Article 3(1) and Article 11(2) the affected state will maintain the right 
to determine whether or not it consents to the assistance as offered by other state 
parties. Yet, once a state consents to the provision of assistance, it must according to 
Article 14 of the Agreement ‘exempt’ the assisting state from all charges of taxes and 
facilitate access for both the humanitarian personnel and convoys. Such duties 
equally rest upon third states, as they must allow and facilitate transit through their 
territory.255 Indeed, the ASEAN Agreement provides for many regulations, yet does 
not assert a right to access a territory in any form. Furthermore, due to its origins, its 
scope is limited to the practice of the provision of humanitarian assistance amongst 
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251 Ibid.  
252 Section 4.2.3.3 Towards a new Definition of Sovereignty. 
253 ‘Inter-American Convention To Facilitate Disaster Assistance’ (7 June 7 1991, entry into force 16 
October 1996). Currently 6 states are party to the treaty. Although the Convention is primarily addressed 
to states, humanitarian organisations may also have recourse to it; and ASEAN Agreement on Disaster 
Management and Emergency Response 2005.    
254 Article VI Inter-American Convention To Facilitate Disaster Assistance.  






South-East Asian states. Limiting control rights of the affected state to the bare 
necessities remains essential, as the UN Secretary General argued in 1990: ‘delayed 
relief is virtually no relief’.256 
From the above, it becomes apparent that the two regional binding legal sources 
do not provide for a right to access, but rather attempt to regulate the manner in which 
such access is given, upon consent of the affected state. Similarly, the Convention on 
Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency does not 
codify a right to access for third parties, as assistance is based quite firmly on the 
request of the affected state. Furthermore, the coordination of the assistance provided 
remains in the hands of the affected state, thereby granting it a form of ‘control’ over 
the external assistance, similar to circumstances of conflict, regulated by 
humanitarian law.257 Thus, with no framework specifically in place providing legal 
solutions, once again resort is had to the framework of human rights law. Whereas 
this framework also does not formulate a positive right to access for third parties, 
Section 7.3.2 has addressed that it does in fact, supported by the ICJ and Security 
Council, at times envisage a duty of the affected state to allow access to third parties, 
as part of its fulfilment of the rights to life, food and health. Human rights law 
therefore serves as a solid basis, in the absence of more all-encompassing binding 
provisions specifically tailored to disaster relief.  
With a view to the progressive development of the law, the ILC’s Draft Articles 
on the ‘Protection of persons in the event of disasters’ and the IDRL Guidelines and 
Model Act must be addressed to assess potential developments in these initiatives. 
Although this Chapter addresses the current framework and lex lata, such 
developments are indicative of potential developing opinio juris and thereby relevant 
to the potential right to access in times of natural disaster.   
 
7.5.6.1 The Potential Application of the ILC Study: Protection of persons in the event 
of disaster 
  
The ILC Study has formulated several Draft Articles distinctly positing a right to 
offer assistance by external parties in the event of a disaster, as well as a duty of states 
to cooperate amongst themselves and with international organisations. However, as 
seen in the other circumstances of conflict and occupation, discussed above, often 
the affected state is granted the opportunity to determine whether or not access to a 
territory shall be allowed. Indeed, in a similar manner Draft Article 14 denies third 
parties a ‘right’ to access as it formulates: 
 
“1. The provision of external assistance requires the consent of the affected State. 2. 
Consent to external assistance shall not be withheld arbitrarily. 3. When an offer of 
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assistance is extended in accordance with the present draft articles, the affected State shall, 
whenever possible, make its decision regarding the offer known”.258 
 
In this provision, as also formulated in international humanitarian law, arbitrariness 
in a refusal of access shall not be permitted. However, explication of the notion of 
‘arbitrariness’ is not provided for in the text of the Draft Article. The Special 
Rapporteur in his analysis refers to both humanitarian and human rights law and, 
despite arguing that such determinations must take place on a ‘case-by-case basis’ 
also proffers some suggestions, such as a lack of a ‘clear need’ for assistance, or not 
meeting the requirements (such as certain principles for the provision of assistance) 
and furthermore declares that the affected state must provide reasons for its refusal.259 
The notion continues to be subject of debate in the Commission, also with regard to 
potential political motivations states might have in the refusal of aid from certain 
other states.260 With this formulation, however, the ILC has unequivocally chosen to 
forego the opportunity to search for new boundaries in this particular aspect of the 
provision of assistance. Such a perspective appears to be the logical consequence of 
the ILC’s preliminary discussion of the potential ‘right to assistance’ or ‘right to 
provide assistance’, where many members of the Committee proved quite hesitant in 
their acknowledgment of the existence of such rights.261 The ILC Draft Articles in 
their position thus uphold a quite conservative notion of state sovereignty, as the 
Special Rapporteur argues that although sovereignty does include responsibilities, 
the affected state may adopt those measures ‘it sees fit’ in the protection of persons.262  
On the other hand, Draft Article 17 does explicate in detail in its text the duties of 
the affected state should it consent to access: 
 
“1. The affected State shall take the necessary measures, within its national law, to 
facilitate the prompt and effective provision of external assistance regarding, in particular: 
(a) civilian and military relief personnel, in fields such as privileges and immunities, visa 
and entry requirements, work permits, and freedom of movement; and (b) goods and 
equipment, in fields such as customs requirements and tariffs, taxation, transport, and 
                                                        
258 ILC ‘Protection of persons in the event of disasters’ Draft Articles UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.831 (15 May 
2014). 
259 UN Doc A/CN.4/643 (n 175) § 72-74.  
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disposal thereof. 2. The affected State shall ensure that its relevant legislation and 
regulations are readily accessible, to facilitate compliance with national law”.263 
 
If the affected state consents to allow access for third parties providing assistance, it 
must then also facilitate the effective provision of the assistance by taking measures 
concerning both the personnel providing the assistance as the factual convoys. Herein 
again a restriction on control rights is seen, compared to the similar provisions in 
humanitarian law. The experiences from humanitarian practice, where preventing 
delays in assistance are often crucial to the survival of those in need, have aided the 
developments in the law from the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 
Protocols, to these more recent initiatives by the ILC.  
 
7.5.6.2 The Potential Application of the IDRL Guidelines and Model Act 
  
As seen above, the IDRL Guidelines follow the line of existing legal provisions with 
regard to the potential right to access of third parties. As such, the Guidelines do not 
determine that external parties providing assistance have a right to access. Indeed, 
the right to offer is not even mentioned, as the Guidelines focus on the alternative: a 
right of the affected state to determine access through ‘consent’.264 Yet, once consent 
has been provided by the affected states, the IDRL Guidelines envisage the actors 
involved in the provision of assistance to have certain rights, which must conversely 
be provided by the affected state as it has the obligation to: 
 
“Facilitate freedom of access to and freedom of movement in and from the disaster affected 
area, bearing in mind the safety of disaster relief and initial recovery personnel”.265 
 
Equally, although the Guidelines do not separately discuss the notion of ‘transit 
states’, such states have certain duties, which also apply to the affected state and 
include the duty to waive or promptly issue visas and exempt assistance from customs 
or other requirements and restrictions that may delay or impede its provision.266 The 
Guidelines indeed are quite detailed, and Guidelines 16 and 17 also set forth specific 
regulations pertaining to the duties of the affected state to grant telecommunication 
licenses, access for vehicles and other administrative measures that may speed up 
and enable the process of the provision of humanitarian assistance in Guidelines 18 
and 19. Lastly, although somewhat more common in circumstances of conflict and 
occupation, the Guidelines also call upon the affected state to take measures in the 
protection of those actors that they have consented to access their territory: 
 
“Affected States should take appropriate measures to address the safety and security of 
disaster relief and initial recovery personnel of assisting States and eligible assisting 
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265 Ibid Guideline 16.1.d.  
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humanitarian organizations and of the premises, facilities, means of transport, equipment 
and goods used in connection with their disaster relief or initial recovery assistance. 
Assisting States and assisting humanitarian organizations should also take appropriate 
steps in their own planning and operations to mitigate security risks”.267 
 
Although indeed the affected state ‘should take appropriate measures’ according to 
Guideline 22, this is not a binding obligation as seen under international humanitarian 
law or the discussed Security Council appeals.  
The Model Act, developed by the IFRC following the Guidelines largely focuses 
on the practical aspects of access, once consent has been provided. Indeed, like the 
Guidelines themselves, the Model Act presupposes the acceptance of assistance by 
the affected state, prior to such actual provision while no direct right to access exists 
in its provisions.268 With regard to the practicalities of the provision of assistance by 
third parties, the Model Act elaborates on the needs regarding aspects such as visas, 
customs and transportation.269 
The non-binding nature of the Guidelines has been addressed, but it remains 
unfortunate that such Guidelines have not attempted to approach the topic of 
humanitarian access from a more forward, developing perspective, perhaps to incite 
positive law-making on the topic by states through the development of an 
international treaty. However, such an approach by the IDRL Guidelines and also by 
the aforementioned ILC Study aligns with states’ perspectives and literature 
pertaining to the potential development of a legal framework for the provision of 
humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of a natural disaster. These perspectives 
commonly assert that a ‘right to offer’ does not equal a ‘right to access’.270 Indeed, 
the willingness of third parties to provide assistance does not result in (a right to) 
access to a territory, nor does it in and of itself indicate the existence of a (human) 
right for persons to receive humanitarian assistance when in need, as customary law 
is not created through state practice alone.271 Yet what can be seen from these 
Guidelines is a willingness to move away from the exercise of too much ‘control’ by 
the affected state, once it has consented to the provision of assistance by third parties, 
as was also done by the ILC in its Draft Articles. Thus, a somewhat contradictory 
development appears to be taking place, where on the one hand states are hesitant to 
relinquish their sovereignty by forfeiting their sovereign right to consent, and on the 
other hand a recognition exists that placing too many obstacles upon approval of 
consent continues to delay and obstruct the factual delivery of assistance.  
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7.5.7 The Right to Provide Assistance under Refugee Law 
 
Chapter 6 has provided the context that although the qualification of ‘refugee’ or 
‘IDP’ is not a circumstance such as the above discussed circumstances of conflict, 
occupation or natural disaster, such qualifications do warrant a separate discussion, 
as a specific (legal) framework is applicable to refugees and IDPs.272 The specific 
framework created for the particular protection of refugees and IDPs must be 
analysed in order to establish the potential obligation to provide assistance to such 
persons as in circumstances of humanitarian crisis, persons often become refugees 
and IDPs.  
Refugee law becomes applicable in the circumstance that persons are defined as 
‘refugees’ under the 1951 Refugee Convention.273 Upon such establishment, the 
Convention itself finds applicability. With regard to the potential duty to provide 
assistance for third states or other actors such as organisations, the Refugee 
Convention is silent. Such silence logically follows from the fact that refugee law is 
applicable with regard to a cross-border situation whereby the ‘affected state’ is the 
state receiving the refugees. Thus, the Refugee Convention places certain obligations 
upon the third state that is the recipient of the refugees, rather than on the state where 
the refugees originated from.274  
However, the entirety of the Refugee Convention is based upon equal treatment, 
and Article 23 of the Convention determines that refugees are entitled to ‘public 
relief’ in the same manner as the nationals of said state.275 By analogy, this would 
mean that in the event a refugee population is present in a given state and third parties 
are wishing to provide assistance, such assistance must be given to both the nationals 
of the state and the refugee population that is present. However, such an obligation 
is placed by the Refugee Convention upon the affected state that has received the 
refugees. This provision of humanitarian assistance in an equal manner also aligns 
with the findings of the ICJ in the 2008 case concerning the Application of the 
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(Georgia v. Russian Federation).276 
 
7.5.8 The Potential Right to Access under Refugee Law 
  
Given the limited provisions in the Refugee Convention pertaining to a potential 
obligation to provide aid for third parties or even a right to do so, a potential right to 
access derived from this is even more difficult to ascertain. In short, the Refugee 
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Convention does not contain provisions from which a potential right to access a 
territory may be derived. This falls in line with the fact as discussed above that 
refugee law becomes applicable in situations where persons have moved across 
borders and ‘access’ would then occur in the third state. It stands to reason therefore 
that a potential right to access should have been applied to those circumstances in 
which the persons in need have not yet crossed the border from their country of origin 
where the crisis took place. On occasion, in complex situations where natural 
disasters and conflict coincide, or an unclear situation that enables the addressing of 
refugees and IDPs together, the General Assembly has called upon states to provide 
assistance to refugees.277 Such calls by the General Assembly, although helpful in 
ascertaining the stance of states in certain specific situations, can however not be 
considered to indicate an existing international legal principle, nor the (imminent) 
development of customary international law in this regard, as they are few and far 
between, as well as focusing on country-specific situations. Recourse must therefore 
be had to other sources of international law, such as general international law, human 
rights law, and depending on the circumstances, also humanitarian law. 
 
7.5.9 The Right to Provide Assistance under the (Potential) IDP Framework 
 
As established, although refugees and IDPs are not a ‘situation’ like conflict or 
disaster, the qualification of a person as ‘refugee’ or ‘IDP’ does trigger the 
application of a specific set of rules, as in the abovementioned circumstances.  
The only binding source of international law tailored to the provision of 
humanitarian assistance to IDPs is the recent Kampala Convention, applicable 
regionally in Africa. The Kampala Convention sets out from the perspective of the 
affected state, as it is the prerogative of this state to seek cooperation from the 
international community, according to Articles 4(3) and 5(2). Yet more forcefully, 
and in line with human rights law, Article 5(6) declares a duty for the affected state 
to reach out to external parties: 
 
“States Parties shall provide sufficient protection and assistance to internally displaced 
persons, and where available resources are inadequate to enable them to do so, they shall 
cooperate in seeking the assistance of international organizations and humanitarian 
agencies, civil society organizations and other relevant actors. Such organizations may 
offer their services to all those in need”. 
 
Thus, organisations may offer services, but third states are not mentioned here, save 
perhaps as ‘other relevant actors’. In fact, the affected state has a duty to seek out 
humanitarian organisations, rather than also resorting to assistance from 
neighbouring states for example. This duty to seek international assistance appears 
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similar to Article 2 ICESCR, calling upon international cooperation when internal 
resources are lacking.  
From a soft law perspective, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 
offer options with regard to the provision of humanitarian assistance to IDPs by third 
parties.278 As such, Guiding Principle 25(2) declares that: 
 
“International humanitarian organizations and other appropriate actors have the right to 
offer their services in support of the internally displaced. Such an offer shall not be 
regarded as an unfriendly act or an interference in a State's internal affairs and shall be 
considered in good faith. Consent thereto shall not be arbitrarily withheld, particularly 
when authorities concerned are unable or unwilling to provide the required humanitarian 
assistance”. 
 
No obligation to provide assistance is therefore asserted: the Guiding Principles align 
with existing international law. The existing law indeed often considers a right to 
offer assistance whilst considering the sovereign rights of the affected state, a notion 
also expressed in UN context.279 The more problematic notion of ‘arbitrariness’ is 
once again raised, without further indication as to which instances might amount to 
such arbitrariness. ‘Arbitrary’ refusal of assistance remains a rather vague notion, as 
it is unclear at which point a refusal is in fact ‘arbitrary’, especially when no 
specifications are provided in law as to the grounds of a potential refusal.  
The work of the International Law Association (ILA) is often also considered 
indicative of opinio juris, like the Guiding Principles, despite its composition not 
being that of states. This status is based on the legal scholarship involved in its 
research, and regarding the topic at hand the ILA’s Committee on Internally 
Displaced Persons has argued that an ‘offer’ to provide assistance cannot be 
construed as a breach of the affected state’s sovereignty, as humanitarian assistance 
to IDPs in itself is ‘justified under Articles 1(3), 13(1)(b), 55(c) and 56 of the Charter 
of the United Nations’.280 This statement furthermore follows the ICJ Nicaragua-
judgment, where the Court assessed that strictly humanitarian aid could not be 
construed as ‘an intervention in the internal affairs’ of an affected state.281 
Indeed, from the above it is apparent that next to the duties flowing from human 
rights law as discussed in Section 7.3.1, the Kampala Convention provides the only 
binding source for external parties wishing to provide humanitarian assistance to 
IDPs, as they ‘may offer’ their assistance. The Guiding Principles remain soft law, 
and their embracement by many actors has unfortunately not resulted in widespread 
state practice of their content in the field, as has been addressed on numerous 
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occasions by the UN Special Rapporteur on IDPs, the Secretary General’s Special 
Representative and the former Commission on Human Rights.282 The General 
Assembly has also expressed its particular concern regarding the need for external 
provision of assistance to IDPs.283 Indeed, IDPs are a category of persons increasing 
in number, as humanitarian crises today increasingly occur within the territory of one 
state; through non-international armed conflicts and (natural) disasters, whereas 
tailored legal protection remains absent.  
 
7.5.10 The Potential Right to Access under the (Potential) IDP Framework 
 
As noted in the previous Section, the existing legal framework concerning IDPs is 
somewhat limited, as most of the regulations are contained in soft law instruments. 
Yet, the regional Kampala Convention of 2009 has addressed the matter of a potential 
right to access, stating in Article 3(1)(j) that:  
 
“States Parties undertake to respect and ensure respect for the present Convention. In 
particular, States Parties shall: […] ensure assistance to internally displaced persons by 
meeting their basic needs as well as allowing and facilitating rapid and unimpeded access 
by humanitarian organizations and personnel”. 
 
The Kampala Convention therefore asserts a duty of the affected state to facilitate the 
‘rapid and unimpeded access’ of organizations for the provision of assistance, yet the 
Convention itself does not refer to a ‘right to access’. The obligation is formulated 
from the perspective of the affected state. The previous Section has shown that no 
duty to provide assistance exists for third parties, as the affected states are responsible 
for seeking out assistance. The connected right to obtain access to a territory therefore 
becomes difficult to establish. Furthermore, the Kampala Convention declares that 
the principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity must be upheld.284 This 
provision is related to Article 5(7) of the Convention which stipulates in more detail 
the obligation of the affected state to allow access to those organisations they have 
sought out to assist in the provision of humanitarian assistance:  
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“States Parties shall take necessary steps to effectively organize, relief action that is 
humanitarian, and impartial in character, and guarantee security. States Parties shall allow 
rapid and unimpeded passage of all relief consignments, equipment and personnel to 
internally displaced persons. States Parties shall also enable and facilitate the role of local 
and international organizations and humanitarian agencies, civil society organizations and 
other relevant actors, to provide protection and assistance to internally displaced persons. 
States Parties shall have the right to prescribe the technical arrangements under which such 
passage is permitted”. 
 
From the above, it may be derived that the Kampala Convention does foresee a large 
role for international humanitarian organisations, but states remain firmly in control 
of the initial access to a territory. Control rights thus remain a theme throughout the 
legal framework pertaining to the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Subsequent 
access however must then be swiftly provided for by states parties. Also, considering 
times of conflict, the Kampala Convention prescribes similar obligations for armed 
groups in Article 7(5)(b) and (g): 
 
“Members of armed groups shall be prohibited from: (b) [...] Hampering the provision of 
protection and assistance to internally dis- placed persons under any circumstances; (g) 
[...] Impeding humanitarian assistance and passage of all relief consignments, equipment 
and personnel to internally displaced persons”.  
 
Both in times of conflict and in other times, states parties and armed groups are 
obliged to refrain from attacking or ‘otherwise harming’ the humanitarian personnel 
present in the territory for the purpose of providing assistance.285 The Kampala 
Convention is indeed novel in its recognition of the prohibition for armed groups and 
in doing so adheres to the changes in crises over the past decades.286 Albeit only of a 
regional scope, the Convention thereby does address a threatened group of persons; 
IDPs, and provides legal duties both in times of conflict and disaster, clearly 
addressing both the state sovereign and armed groups. However, it does not really 
break new ground with regard to the potential right to access for international parties 
(in the Convention: organizations) that might wish to provide assistance.287 Yet all in 
all, IDPs on the African continent, which is in fact prone to humanitarian crises, have 
enhanced and tailored protection under the Kampala Convention. This protection, 
given its formulation from the perspective of the affected state (and armed group) is 
very similar to the protection afforded by existing human rights law, although of 
course more elaborate and specific, as the entire convention is tailored towards the 
protection of IDPs in times of humanitarian crises.  
International humanitarian law of course also considers the needs of IDPs in times 
of conflict besides the Kampala Convention and human rights law. In particular in 
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today’s many non-international armed conflicts, the needs of IDPs are manifest. As 
discussed in Chapter 6, Article 17 of AP II of the Geneva Conventions provides that 
persons may not be displaced, and that a responsibility lies with the affected state and 
parties to provide assistance.288 The ICRC however adds rather progressively to this 
in its Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law that, given the difficulties 
many governments face in reaching IDPs for the provision of assistance, such a 
responsibility also entails the duty to ‘permit the free passage of humanitarian 
assistance’ to IDPs.289 In this regard the Customary IHL Study refers to UN Security 
Council resolutions, and the non-binding Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement as its legal sources for this assertion.  
Indeed, as discussed above in Section 7.4.2, the Security Council resolutions often 
assert (either under Chapter VII or without such authorisation) an obligation (by 
‘requesting’ or ‘urging’) for states in specific situations to allow or facilitate the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance. Whether the practice of the Security Council in 
this regard amounts to a general norm of customary international law in the absence 
of other sources declaring the same, is however not as easily ascertained as the ICRC 
Customary Study would like to do.290 Arguing an obligation as being part of 
customary international law due to the Security Council’s position in this regard 
appears somewhat flimsy at best. Indeed, the stance of the Council contributes to, 
and is indicative of, both state practice and opinio juris, but in and of itself cannot be 
considered to affirmatively reach such a status. This is particularly the case as the 
Council has mostly asserted such a position in country-specific resolutions rather 
than thematic resolutions. The ICRC Customary IHL Study proceeds to argue that 
the Security Council practice also indicates that in the event the displacement of 
persons was not lawful, the provision of assistance by the international community 
shall remain lawful.291 Whilst such an argument may be reasonable, this cannot 
however be deduced from these Security Council resolutions pertaining to the 
potential obligation of states (or in some instances other parties to a conflict) to 
provide access to actors providing assistance. Indeed, an illegality of the provision of 
assistance in itself would not logically flow from an illegal displacement of persons. 
More often than not, the actual need for provision of assistance – in a humanitarian 
crisis – follows an unlawful displacement of persons, or persons displaced due to 
circumstances such as natural disasters. As such for example, the Geneva 
Conventions’ Protocols also indicate that offers of assistance shall not be viewed as 
unlawful interference in a state or an unfriendly act in that regard, echoed by the ICJ 
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in its 1986 Nicaragua judgment.292 This perspective is also reflected in the Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement and supported in literature regarding 
circumstances of natural disaster.293 
These Guiding Principles, although non-binding in their nature provide additional 
guidance to actors in the field.294 Whereas the previous Section discussed the right to 
offer assistance as laid down in the Guiding Principles, these Principles also express 
that although the affected state has the right to ‘consent’ to the offer of assistance and 
may therefore determine which assistance enters into the territory, once such consent 
is provided: 
 
“All authorities concerned shall grant and facilitate the free passage of humanitarian 
assistance and grant persons engaged in the provision of such assistance rapid and 
unimpeded access to the internally displaced”.295 
 
Thus, the Guiding Principles follow the reasoning which by now has indeed become 
indicative of the current international legal perspective: although the affected state 
has the right to determine who enters a certain territory, it must indeed facilitate the 
rapid and free passage of personnel and convoys for the provision of assistance. The 
Guiding Principles proceed to express that such personnel and convoys must be 
respected and protected and may therefore not be attacked.296 Furthermore, Principle 
24(2) declares that the affected state may not divert emergency aid to IDPs, ‘in 
particular for political or military reasons’.  
Although the Guiding Principles are embraced by many relevant actors in the 
field, amongst which many UN organs, the current lack of binding legal obligations 
resting upon states in the allowance of access for the provision of humanitarian 
assistance remains problematic. The ILA has in this regard asserted that an obligation 
rests upon the ‘international community to provide humanitarian assistance to IDPs 
under the Charter of the United Nations’.297 Such an assertion could indeed find a 
basis in Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter, especially in consideration of Article 
2 ICESCR. Yet, state practice continues to be lacking, as stressed by the UN 
Secretary General’s Special Representative on IDPs in his work in this regard.298 
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295 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement’ (11 February 1998) UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (n 
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Within the UN framework, although not addressing the matter as an outright 
obligation, the General Assembly has further on more than one occasion addressed 
the need for improved access to IDPs, as has the ILC’s Special Rapporteur on the 
study into the protection of persons in the event of disasters.299 Such calls for more 
state practice to allow access for humanitarian purposes have also previously been 
made by the former Human Rights Commission.300 Although contributing to the 
general opinio juris on the matter, a distinct right to access cannot be distinguished. 
Indeed, the fact that such right is lacking, can be related to the general lack of a 
binding international legal framework tailored to IDPs, with the exception of those 
falling within the scope of the Kampala Convention. Outside of the African continent, 
IDPs must continue to resort to other existing legal frameworks, in particular that of 
human rights law.  
 
7.6 Ascertaining the Legal Framework in a Humanitarian Crisis 
 
The above Sections have established the current legal framework for third parties 
such as states or international organisations to provide humanitarian assistance and 
gain access, according to particular fields of law. However, from a more practical 
perspective, an assessment must take place in which factual circumstances the 
provision of humanitarian assistance by parties outside the affected state are most 
fully developed.  
In determining the applicable law in a given instance therefore, it may be relevant 
to take into account multiple bodies of law that might be applicable simultaneously 
and may provide different levels of protection dependent on the particular 
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circumstances. In this research into the legal framework in times of humanitarian 
crises, the perspective is held that the provision of humanitarian assistance warrants 
an all-encompassing approach. This perspective is based on the position that persons 
in need of humanitarian aid should be able to receive this aid regardless of the 
particular circumstance (conflict, occupation or (natural) disaster) that was the origin 
of their need for assistance. It is in fact the perspective of this research that the 
determination of a humanitarian crisis itself warrants the provision of emergency aid. 
A humanitarian crisis is then the determining factor, as opposed to the underlining 
circumstance, leading to a more equal protection of persons by law. The more 
harmonious approach taken in this research with regard to the lex specialis principle 
also allows for a focus to lay on gap-filling methods in the applicable corpora juris, 
as well as the prevalence of specific provisions of a certain body of law as opposed 
to an entire body of law prevailing over another.301 Thus, the lex specialis is the more 
detailed provision, whilst the lex generalis remains present as a body of law in the 
background for application if necessary. In this manner, persons in need of 
humanitarian assistance can rely on the most protective clause at any given time, 
resulting in the greatest protection in times of a humanitarian crisis.  
In determining the applicable law in a situation of crisis, one can safely establish 
that general international law remains applicable. Therefore, the obligations or rights 
which may be derived from the concept of state sovereignty do not alter in times of 
crisis, but are a constant in international law, as the notion of state sovereignty itself 
is a continuous factor.302 Human rights law also retains its applicability throughout 
circumstances of crisis. Furthermore, the UN the Security Council resolutions are 
relevant, but confine themselves to circumstances that meet the threshold of a threat 
to the peace. In a similar fashion international humanitarian law is applicable solely 
in times of (non-) international armed conflict or occupation, with its particular 
specificities for each of these (and more) detailed circumstances.303 It remains 
relevant therefore to ascertain all the provisions of these bodies of law in the 
establishment of the exact rights and obligations in the external provision of 
humanitarian assistance in times of conflict, occupation and natural disaster. Through 
such an establishment, the most protective clauses will become apparent, as will the 
gaps in protection by the law.  
 
7.6.1 The Applicable Lex Specialis in Armed Conflict 
 
From the above it has become apparent that in times of armed conflict, the general 
fields of law remain applicable. Thus, the rights and duties derived from state 
sovereignty continue to exist, but unfortunately do not provide clear-cut rights or 
duties for third parties in the provision of assistance. In fact, state sovereignty does 
not provide indications of potential rights to provide assistance, nor a right to access 
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for the provision of such assistance. Within the UN framework however, the Security 
Council has over the past decades progressively taken a stronger stance pertaining to 
situations that amount to ‘threats to the peace’, culminating in the Council’s 
requirement under Chapter VII of states to assist in the provision of assistance to 
persons in need in Iraq in 2003.304 It must be reiterated that these calls are not to be 
construed as calls for access by means of force. For now, this call appears to be one 
of the most forward of the Security Council resolutions to date: a culmination of the 
‘urges’ and ‘requests’ it has made in prior years. Following the situation in Iraq, the 
Council has not reiterated such language, and ‘encouraged’ the international 
community to act. However, with a rather novel approach, the Security Council has 
called upon third parties to provide assistance in Syria without referencing the 
consent of the Syrian authorities. Therefore, at this moment it remains to be seen in 
what way the Council will proceed with future country-situations. Given the political 
nature of the body, it must be noted that although the Council has found grounds to 
oblige states to provide humanitarian assistance in the past, such an obligation does 
not exist in each circumstance for which the Council passes a resolution concerning 
the provision of assistance. Therefore, as a minimum common standard or threshold 
in the Council’s approach cannot be deduced, it is not possible to determine 
indisputably that the Council perceives an obligation to provide assistance for third 
parties. Following on from this, a potential right to access is difficult to ascertain. 
Yet, conversely, the Council has repeatedly issued resolutions (including resolutions 
under Chapter VII) calling and urging the affected state to facilitate and allow 
immediate ‘unhindered delivery’ of assistance and ‘safe access’. In such country-
specific situations therefore, it can be concluded that the Council presupposes a 
willingness of the international community to offer aid and asserts a case-specific 
right in this regard, when adopting such resolutions under Chapter VII and using the 
well-known stringent wording such as ‘demanding’ the ‘ensuring’ of unimpeded safe 
access of assistance and personnel.305  
A similar approach can be seen in the resolutions of the General Assembly, as it 
indeed views a need for international assistance, but falls short of declaring an 
existing duty under international law to provide such assistance.306 Indeed, the 
General Assembly often surpasses this phase and focuses on the need to allow access 
but does not particularly address the needs of a conflict situation, although it does 
address more complex situations than natural disasters alone. From the wording of 
the General Assembly’s resolutions it can be deduced that this principal organ 
follows a similar approach to the Security Council and often also similar vocabulary, 
reiterating the importance of access in the provision of assistance, but through its 
emphasis on the consent of the affected state, the General Assembly falls short of 
declaring such a right to access to exist, and as such, the Security Council’s 
resolutions may be a more sound basis for such a claim, in a specific instance of 
armed conflict.  
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Looking then to international humanitarian law’s application to international 
armed conflicts, Article 10 GC IV formulates a ‘right to offer’ for international 
humanitarian organisations, complemented by Article 70(1) AP I that declares 
assistance ‘shall’ be provided, in the event the population is inadequately supplied. 
Such wording notes the obligatory character that AP II ascribes to the provision of 
assistance, which includes the external provision of such aid. However, control rights 
continue to exist for the affected state, and uncertainty exists as to the determination 
of when an affected territory is ‘inadequately supplied’. In situations of non-
international armed conflicts, Common Article 3 merely provides that international 
organisations have a subsidiary role as they ‘may’ offer assistance, thus providing 
very little solid protection for those persons affected by crises in times of non-
international armed conflicts falling outside the scope of AP II and those in which 
the affected state is not party to the Protocol. Article 18 AP II adds that in the event 
the local population is suffering ‘undue hardship’, humanitarian assistance ‘shall’ be 
provided. It remains somewhat unclear however who the addressee of this obligation 
is; either the affected state or the non-state actor exercising control over a particular 
territory within the state. Whilst according to Article 18 AP II consent of the affected 
state remains necessary, it does provide a minimum degree of protection as it must 
be read conjointly with Article 14 AP II concerning the prohibition of starvation as a 
method of warfare.  
As discussed, human rights law contains many specific provisions for the affected 
state, but this is not the case concerning the provision of assistance by third parties. 
This circumstance flows from the concept of the law itself, viewing the affected state 
as primary duty-bearer. From existing human rights law, no duty or potential right to 
provide assistance is found in relation to the human right to life, food, health (and 
water). Equally, the potential right to access cannot be discerned in such a way in 
current existing human rights law. Despite tentative remarks from EU and UN 
organs, most states and other international actors remain hesitant in acknowledging 
a right to access based upon human rights law, as in general the state (or actor 
claiming sovereignty over a territory) is considered the duty-bearer in this field of 
law. 
If then the right to provide assistance (and related right to access) is not viewed 
from the perspective of the third party, but from the duty of the affected state, 
possibilities arise. Indeed, the ICJ did determine in the case concerning the 
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation) that both parties had an obligation 
under the ICERD to allow access for humanitarian aid. Thus, the Court determined 
such an obligation to exist in times of armed conflict under human rights law, rather 
than under humanitarian law. Furthermore, such a duty aligns with the structure of 
the ICESCR as codified in Article 2 ICESCR (as intended in Article 56 UN Charter). 
Yet such a duty is not definitively asserted within the Convention, and remains the 
interpretation of the CESCR in particular relating to the right to food in Article 11. 
Indeed, the Additional Protocol to the ACHR also recognises such obligations resting 
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therefore arguably be emerging but, importantly, an existing duty to allow access and 
request assistance can be discerned for the affected state (or acting authority) under 
current human rights law. This duty flows from its obligations to fulfil the rights to 
life, food and health as sovereign, for which the provision of humanitarian assistance 
functions as a vehicle.  
It has been concluded that the Kampala Convention also determines that the 
affected state (in Africa) has the obligation under Article 5(6) to seek the assistance 
of third parties in the provision of assistance to IDPs, rather than acknowledging an 
obligation to provide for third parties. The Convention furthermore asserts under 
Article 3(1)(j) that the affected state has a duty to facilitate access, which is 
elaborated in Article 5(7), although no direct right to access is mentioned. 
Specifically geared towards armed groups, the Kampala Convention considers in 
Article 7(5)(b) and (g) that armed groups are to refrain from attacking or harming 
humanitarian personnel. Whereas the Kampala Convention follows the approach 
taken by humanitarian law in the need for consent from the affected sovereign, it does 
limit the control rights seen in humanitarian law by asserting a need for facilitation 
of access.  
From the above discussion it is apparent that not only international humanitarian 
law contains certain detailed provisions pertaining to the potential duty to provide or 
right to access a territory in order to ensure the provision of humanitarian assistance 
in times of conflict and therefore this body of law as a whole cannot be considered a 
lex specialis. Indeed, the Kampala Convention, Article 2 ICESCR and the Security 
Council resolutions, when adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and geared 
towards a country-specific situation also declare obligations under international law. 
Rather than focusing on the duties of third parties, these treaties focus on the duties 
of the affected authorities in allowing access to those third parties that have proven 
willing to provide assistance. These obligations must be read jointly with a 
harmonious approach, in order to establish the greatest protection of persons in the 
provision of assistance. In practice, at times more security can therefore be found in 
the provisions outside humanitarian law.  
 
7.6.2 The Applicable Lex Specialis in Occupation 
 
Similar to armed conflict, general international law and its considerations concerning 
state sovereignty remain applicable in circumstances of occupation, yet they do not 
contain specific rights or duties pertaining to the provision of aid from external 
sources. Furthermore as is the case in armed conflict, the Security Council resolutions 
provide a guideline to possibly consider the provision of assistance by the 
international community as an obligation, depending on the wording of these 
resolutions and whether or not such a call for assistance is made under Chapter VII. 
The General Assembly follows suit, but does not particularly focus on circumstances 
of occupation, thereby not providing guidelines in this regard.  
Specific to circumstances of occupation, whereas human rights law maintains its 






difficult to establish extraterritorially in times of occupation and continues to be a 
debated topic within international law.307 Such difficulties arise particularly 
concerning the obligations of conduct as enshrined in the ICESCR. As seen above in 
the previous Section, international human rights law does not acknowledge a 
potential right to access a territory based on the existing framework relating to the 
right to life, food, health or water, which would then be equally lacking for an 
occupied territory. However Article 2 ICESCR and Article 55 and 56 UN Charter do 
call upon the international community to cooperate in the fulfilment of human rights. 
Thus, with regard to circumstances of occupation, a case-specific determination of 
the level of control is necessary to determine whether or not certain rights can be 
applied extraterritorially to the occupying force, or whether their fulfilment lies with 
a different authority.  
From a regional perspective, the Kampala Convention may be of relevance. 
Whilst applying this Convention mutatis mutandis to a situation of occupation may 
appear reasonable given the potential for IDPs in such circumstances, the Convention 
itself does not mention such possibilities, therefore not providing that the affected 
state should automatically be assumed to be the occupying power. However, from 
the formulations of obligations in the Kampala Convention, that uses ‘Member State’ 
of the African Union,  it follows that a Member State of the African Union that 
becomes an occupying power, shall continue to be obliged to abide by the provisions 
of the Convention. Thus, with regard to IDPs it is relevant to note that the Kampala 
Convention determines that the affected state has the obligation under Article 5(6) to 
seek the assistance of third parties in the provision of aid. The Convention does not 
acknowledge an independent obligation to provide assistance for third parties. The 
Convention furthermore states under Article 3(1)(j) that the affected state has a duty 
to facilitate access, which is elaborated in Article 5(7) although the Convention does 
not mention a direct right to access.  
Additionally, the Geneva Conventions applicable in times of occupation contain 
many specific provisions relating to the delivery of aid from external sources, the 
main provision being Article 59 GC IV stipulating that the occupier must agree to 
relief schemes, and facilitate them, thereby providing not only a right to provide 
assistance, but also considering a potential right to access a territory. Although the 
latter is not affirmatively mentioned, it is one of the most far-reaching provisions in 
the Convention concerning access. The limitations on the occupier in the 
determination of ‘control rights’ attest to this, while the occupying force maintains 
the right to ascertain the allowance of passage for each convoy. However, the 
Additional Protocol refers to the application of Article 71 AP I, applicable in times 
of armed conflict, which in fact enhances the control rights of the occupying power. 
The most extensive obligations can be concluded vis-à-vis the protecting power in 
Articles 55 and 61 GC IV, an actor that currently no longer holds much relevance in 
the field. Also, the occupying power has the obligation under Article 63 GC IV to 
allow humanitarian organisations already within a territory to continue their 
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activities. This provision today may indeed be useful in practice, as most states have 
active Red Cross Societies.  
 
7.6.3 The Applicable Lex Specialis in Times of (Natural) Disaster 
 
Lastly, as has been discussed above, no particular legal framework exists pertaining 
to the delivery of aid in times of natural disaster and recourse must therefore be had 
to general international law for resources.  
Security Council resolutions, which can be of a binding nature as discussed above, 
have not concerned situations of natural disaster, instead focusing on circumstances 
that have amounted to a threat to the peace. Although non-binding in character and 
thereby not amounting to hard law, the General Assembly resolutions do follow the 
line taken by the Security Council resolutions and have considered situations of 
natural disaster. Falling short of a determination that an external duty to provide 
assistance exists under international law, the General Assembly does ascertain a need 
for external international assistance, which may be applied to natural disaster 
circumstances. Through its resolutions, the General Assembly mostly surpasses this 
initial need for an offer of assistance, focusing on the need for states to allow access 
to a territory. Yet here too, the Assembly falls short of determining a right to access 
to exist for third parties, as it emphasises the need for consent of the affected state. 
In this manner, the approach taken in circumstances of conflict by the Security 
Council, is echoed.  
With no specific body of law in place to regulate circumstances of natural disaster, 
recourse must be had to another more generally applicable body of law: human rights 
law. From the above discussions pertaining to human rights law, the determination 
can be made that the rights to life, food, health (and water) do not provide a basis for 
a potential external duty to provide assistance or a related right to access. Yet, as in 
circumstances of conflict and occupation, Articles 2 ICESCR and 56 UN Charter 
apply and envisage international cooperation in the fulfilment of human rights. 
Support for this position may also be found regionally through Article 12 of the 
Additional Protocol to the ACHR. Indeed, this perspective aligns with the duty of the 
affected state under existing human rights law to provide humanitarian aid as a 
vehicle in the fulfilment of the rights to life, food and health, which includes 
requesting international assistance to this end.  
Regional and topical developments have taken place specifically concerning 
disaster situations, culminating amongst others in the provisions of the Inter-
American Convention To Facilitate Disaster Assistance, which presupposes an offer 
of assistance in Article I(b) and II(b), as well as determining that a right to access 
cannot be considered as the affected state maintains the right to ‘accept’ an offer 
according to Article II, and thereby retains full consent. Furthermore, the regional 
ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response also 
provides in Articles 11 and 12 that the affected state shall have control with regard 
to the consent to and provision of assistance. However, Article 4(c) determines a duty 






Article 8 states have the duty to coordinate joint emergency response operations 
amongst themselves. The Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear 
Accident or Radiological Emergency distinctly places the control over access to a 
territory for the purpose of the provision of aid at the hands of the request for 
international assistance of the affected state. Pertaining to the right to access, the 
Inter-American Convention determines in Article 5 that the affected state, once 
accepting the offer of assistance, shall fully facilitate the access and freedom of 
movement of the suppliers within its territory, which is equally determined in Articles 
Article 3(1) and 11(2) of the ASEAN Agreement. Also from a regional perspective, 
the Kampala Convention stipulates that the affected state is obligated under Article 
5(6) to seek the assistance of third parties in the provision of aid to IDPs. The 
Convention however does not recognise an independent obligation to provide 
humanitarian aid for external parties, nor does it recognise a right to access. The 
Kampala Convention conversely determines in Article 3(1)(j) that the affected state 
has an obligation to facilitate access, which is elaborated in Article 5(7). Thus, the 
newer, regional developments tailored towards more specific circumstances attempt 
to limit the control rights of the affected state in order to enhance the facilitation of 
assistance.  
This Section has dealt with the lex lata in circumstances of natural disaster, 
inevitably concluding that not much all-encompassing tailored lex lata in this area 
exists, resulting in dependency on somewhat more general frameworks such as 
existing human rights law and regional developments. Although the ILC’s Draft 
Articles on ‘Protection of persons in the event of disasters’ and the IDRL Guidelines 
are indicative of opinio juris as discussed in Section 7.5.6 and thus of the current 
potential developments in customary international law, they are not hard law, and can 
therefore not be considered within this Section. The same holds for the Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement, which, although they find great support within 
the UN system, currently remain soft law.  
 
7.6.4 Determining the Problems and Gaps in the Provision of Humanitarian 
Assistance  
  
The previous Section concerning the various specific circumstances in which the 
provision of humanitarian assistance is needed has shown that, although numerous 
detailed provisions exist in the determination of the rights and duties for third parties 
involved in the provision of assistance, many gaps, uncertainties and problems also 
remain in the current legal framework. The various rights and duties for external 
parties offering assistance vary greatly depending on the circumstances in which 
these parties find themselves, rather than being dependent on the fact that the constant 
variable is the need of persons in crisis to receive food, water, shelter and medical 
aid.  
In times of international armed conflict, many corpora juris are applicable, 
including international humanitarian law and human rights law. Furthermore, 
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the application of specific measures over the years. Thus, a level of protection could 
be obtained in such circumstances, as well as in times of occupation, that may 
outreach the level of protection for those in need of assistance during a non-
international armed conflict; in particular a non-international armed conflict not 
governed by AP II. The protection offered through Security Council involvement – 
which can occur in times of non-international armed conflict – also outreaches that 
of the protection often provided in the aftermath of a natural disaster, as the Council 
only considers circumstances amounting to a threat to the peace.  
The above Sections furthermore display that human rights law does not grant the 
same amount of possibilities to external parties for the protection of persons, as it 
does in the relationship between the affected state and the persons in need of 
assistance. This is explained by the fact that the body of law is tailored to the 
relationship between citizens and the affected state as duty-bearer, but does have 
negative practical consequences. Yet, human rights law as a body of law does in fact 
require the affected state to take far-reaching steps in the fulfilment of the rights to 
life, food and health (through the provision of assistance) which includes seeking 
international assistance. Conversely, international cooperation is required of states 
parties to the ICESCR and the UN member states. This body of law maintains 
applicability in times of a humanitarian crisis, resulting in a base-level of protection 
for all persons in need of emergency aid regardless of the specific circumstance or 
continent they find themselves on.  
Furthermore, the Kampala Convention, although adding to the enhanced 
protection of IDPs regionally in Africa, lays bare the fact that the risk of 
fragmentation of the law is ever-present, as it only grants protection to those IDPs 
that fall within its scope on the continent of Africa. IDPs as a whole throughout the 
world, however, are an increasingly larger group in need of assistance, and should 
not be left behind.  
In addition to such results flowing from the previous Sections, several issues in 
particular remain outstanding. Where the rights-holders and the duty-bearers with 
regard to the provision of assistance were clear in the previous Chapter, such is not 
necessarily the case in the event one turns to the provision of aid by third parties. 
Both third states and international organisations may be involved, and their rights 
and duties vary greatly depending on the particular legal regime that may be 
applicable. For example, international humanitarian law often either places emphasis 
on the role of the ICRC or does not explicate its addressee, while the Security Council 
mostly demands and urges action from its Member States. Thus, such disparities 
make it difficult to ascertain a general right-holder or duty-bearer, in the provision 
of assistance from external sources. Such holds true both regarding a potential duty 
to provide assistance, as regarding a potential right to access for such provision. 
While indeed the common denominator is that the provision of assistance must 
remain neutral, impartial and humane, both organisations and states can in essence 
fulfil these criteria. Arguing that fulfilling these criteria creates an obligation upon 
states to accept assistance, limiting their use of ‘sovereignty’ as a shield against such 






civilians against their sovereign to allow passage has certainly been done.308 
Similarly, the ICJ has argued that such an offer cannot be construed as interference 
in the domestic affairs of the affected state.309 Yet, the incorporation of this duty of 
the affected state to allow access into international practice is lacking.  
At the same time and very much related to this, the political aspects of the 
provision of assistance by external parties cannot be neglected, such as the resistance 
of affected states to accept assistance from countries they may not wish to enter into 
relations with.310 Such resistance may result in the stalling of aid by means of the 
‘control rights’ the affected state has in many instances, or putting up other barriers. 
Such rights are not a (legal) refusal of aid per se, but may be setting up practical 
barriers that constitute an abuse of the sovereigns’ legal rights. Examples spring to 
mind, such as the situations in the Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Ethiopia or Rwanda.  
Another unclear aspect of the rights-holder or duty-bearer –ship when considering 
external duties and rights, is the aspect of ‘vicinity’, as many provisions discussed in 
the above Sections recognise a duty of third states to allow the ‘transit’ of assistance, 
thereby placing an obligation upon neighbouring countries that do not rest upon other 
third states. Such responsibilities have also been asserted within UN context in 
relation to the ‘overflow’ of internal crises to neighbouring countries and the 
responsibilities that may rest upon such states.311 Yet, does such a neighbouring 
location also stretch towards a greater duty to provide assistance, considering the 
close location to the crisis-area? Or conversely, should a greater obligation rest upon 
states or organisations with more economic resources or possibilities to act? 
Alternatively, an argument may be sought to allow access for international 
organisations at an earlier stage than states, as sovereignty issues may play a lesser 
role should an organisation wish to provide assistance rather than another sovereign 
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309 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 
Merits, Judgment 27 June 1986 I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14 § 242-243. 
310 For certain examples of North-Korea regarding its famine in the 1990s, the United States with regard 
to hurricane Katrina in 2005 and Myanmar concerning cyclone Nargis in 2008: Focarelli, ‘Duty to Protect 
in Cases of Natural Disasters’ (n 2) § 17.  See furthermore ILC ‘Sixty-fourth session (second part) 
Provisional summary record of the 3138th meeting Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva’ (2 August 
2012) UN Doc A/CN.4/SR.3138, 13: “During the Commission’s deliberations on the topic at its sixty-
third session, Mr. Dugard had referred to Myanmar as an example of a State that had withheld consent – 
arguing in effect for a duty to accept assistance. His own research in international news websites had 
confirmed that the Myanmar Government had provided reasons for not accepting assistance from United 
States, French and United Kingdom warships and had insisted on the right to distribute aid itself, as 
mentioned by Mr. Murase earlier. Could that be considered as arbitrarily withholding consent? The issue 
was about who provided assistance and under what conditions, and not whether those conditions were 
accepted. To insist on a duty to provide assistance would require the Commission to address the issue, 
and he was doubtful that it was in a position to do so. It was certainly not an issue that could be resolved 
through the commentaries.”  
311 ‘Specific Groups And Individuals: Mass Exoduses And Displaced Persons’ Report of the 
Representative of the Secretary-General UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/95/Add.3 (10 December 2001) § 13: 
“[…]However, responsibility must also be apportioned to countries of the region affected by the overflow 
of internal crises and to the international community, which is needed to play a supporting role as the 
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entity. Such lack of clarity in combination with uncertainties in the law address the 
poignant fact that the legal framework concerning the provision of humanitarian 
assistance from external sources is in need of greater development, regardless of the 
factual circumstance of provision amounting to the humanitarian crisis. 
Indeed, this is also the case regarding the rights and obligations in the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance in the event a sovereign may be lacking, such as in ‘failed’ 
states. The above Sections have addressed a variety of rights and duties to provide 
assistance or possibly obtain access to a territory, but the law invariably presupposes 
the presence of a sovereign in the affected territory (on occasion considering armed 
groups as the responsible party) as the rights-holder or duty-bearer of the granting of 
consent to the external party. Yet, what to assert in circumstances such as a failed 
state? Or circumstances of protracted armed conflict where various parties claim to 
be the rightful sovereign? Or a potential circumstance that no effective authority 
exists in the aftermath of a disaster? The potential need for assistance raises the 
‘critical question’ as to whether or not consent is withheld.312 The current legal 
framework on the provision of humanitarian assistance does not distinctly provide 
for the manner in which to proceed with assistance in such circumstances. Merely 
the Commentary to Article AP II asserts that in the event a lack of clarity exists as to 
the concerned authorities, consent must be presupposed.313 This stance, however, is 
not agreed upon in practice.  
Yet another issue that remains to be addressed is the consequence of the disparity 
between on the one hand the legal and factual practice of ‘consent’ of the affected 
state which is necessary to initiate access, and on the other hand the wording of the 
legal provisions in certain treaties or Security Council resolutions, instructing near 
obligations to provide assistance to third states by the use of ‘shall’ or ‘demand’.314 
Such disparity results in potential problems with the neutrality and impartiality 
principles to which providers of assistance must adhere. In particular the recent action 
of the Security Council concerning the provision of assistance in Syria highlights this 
tension, where the provision of assistance was instructed without the consent of 
Syrian authorities, but was also not under Chapter VII.315  
Although an inability might exist to determine whether or not a hard obligation 
exists to provide assistance and a related right to access therefore through external 
sources, an obligation of the affected state to, upon consent, allow safe and 
unimpeded passage without the abuse of control rights can be discerned. Barber has 
proffered that the affected state may indeed have the obligation to create an 
environment in which it is possible to provide assistance ‘effectively and safely’ to 
                                                        
312 Focarelli, ‘Duty to Protect in Cases of Natural Disasters’ (n 2) §16. 
313 Sandoz, Swinarski & Zimmermann Commentary to the Additional Protocols (n 155) Protocol II 
Article 18, 1479. 
314 ‘Further Promotion And Encouragement Of Human Rights And Fundamental Freedoms, Including 
The Question Of The Programme And Methods Of Work Of The Commission Human Rights, Mass 
Exoduses And Displaced Persons: Internally displaced persons’, Report of the Representative of the 
Secretary-General (2 February 1995) UN Doc E/CN.4/1995/50 § 112.  






those in need.316 Such an environment would – upon state consent – allow third states 
and international organisations to act upon the calls that may be heard in international 
law to provide assistance. This duty would furthermore also align with the affected 
states’ duties to seek international assistance in their fulfilment of the existing human 
rights that are relevant to the provision of humanitarian assistance.  
Finally, as has been discussed in Chapter 6, the problems arising in the event of a 
complex emergency have to date not properly been addressed with regard to the legal 
framework in place for the external provision of assistance. The existing and 
continued fragmentation of the law, addressing either specific circumstances such as 
conflict or occupation on the one hand, or a particular region such as the continent of 
Africa on the other hand, consolidates and amplifies the problems and gaps that exist. 
Harmonisation will in the very least attempt to ensure an equal and level playing field 
for those actors willing to provide assistance regardless of the circumstances the 
persons in need may find themselves in. It is for this precise reason that this research 
takes an all-encompassing approach to the provision of assistance, to ensure the 




This Chapter has addressed and discussed two distinct, but interrelated aspects of the 
provision of humanitarian assistance through third parties: a potential right or duty to 
provide assistance and a potential right to access, to enable such provision. The 
current state of the law however is not unambiguous or crystallised. From the above 
Chapter, it becomes apparent that the legal rights and obligations concerning both the 
provision of assistance and access to a territory are dependent on a variety of 
circumstances and a variety of bodies of law. As the above Section pertaining to the 
current problems and gaps in the legal framework has addressed, it is not possible to 
speak of a ‘general’ right or duty to provide assistance, nor is there a ‘general’ right 
to access. Indeed, in certain circumstances third states may be obliged to provide 
assistance, such as upon a demand from the Security Council under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter, or regionally upon such a demand under the Kampala Convention. 
Other codifications proclaiming that humanitarian assistance ‘shall’ be provided, 
such as the Geneva Conventions, do so without a clear determination of the duty-
bearer. Such duties are furthermore restricted through the control rights of the 
affected authority, existing to various degrees in the most common circumstances 
amounting to a crisis.  
On certain occasions, UN organs might be called upon to comply with a need to 
provide assistance through resolutions of the General Assembly or Security Council 
that are lacking binding force. In such instances, the ‘duty’ to do so is difficult to 
ascertain. Also in relation to this, state consent and related sovereignty issues 
continue to play a relevant role and remain unresolved in the current legal framework. 
Such a need for consent is directly related to the possibility of ascertaining the 
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existence of a right to access; the presence of the latter is in fact impeded by the very 
existence of the affected states’ right to consent. Consent as a threshold for the 
legality of the provision of assistance is not necessarily problematic per se, if such 
consent is clearly and legally delimited. Such demarcation does however not exist 
within the legal framework of the provision of humanitarian assistance, as the notion 
of ‘arbitrary refusal’ of consent is not clearly delimited, nor has it been established 
which actor should determine whether or not a certain refusal of consent has been 
arbitrary.  
Yet despite such gaps or lacunae in protection, the current legal framework does 
offer a variety of provisions pertaining to the provision of aid through external 
sources. General international law, through the notion of state sovereignty, the 
thematic resolutions of the Security Council and the addressing of the matter in 
General Assembly resolutions that declare humanitarian assistance a shared 
responsibility of the international community, all provide an indication that indeed 
the international community is committed to the provision of humanitarian 
assistance. As also asserted by the ICJ, indeed the sole provision of aid in itself cannot 
be a violation of international law. Furthermore, these assessments contribute to the 
establishment of both state practice and opinio juris. However, general international 
law is not (yet) specifically tailored to the provision of humanitarian assistance, 
resulting in grey areas as to the practical implementation of this commitment. It is 
therefore currently not possible to determine a consensus in customary international 
law with regard to the existence of an obligation to provide assistance or a right to 
access, given the dispersed approach of these issues by various actors and bodies of 
law.317 Although perhaps the continued call in various UN resolutions might be 
construed as constituting opinio juris, subsequent state action has been less than 
consistent, making the second component of customary international law more 
difficult to establish.318 The more specific action by the Security Council has, 
however, amounted to the conclusion that in country-specific circumstances, the 
Council has shown a willingness to assert a duty of the affected state or other relevant 
parties to allow access for the provision of humanitarian assistance by third parties, 
including their subsequent safe and unimpeded passage.  
A distinct international obligation to provide assistance for third parties or a hard 
right to access cannot be derived from the various specific bodies of law such as 
international humanitarian law, or from regional law such as the Kampala 
Convention or the ASEAN Agreement. As seen above however, fragmentation of the 
law through the haphazard incorporation of rights and duties within a limited regional 
or topical framework does not necessarily enhance the legal framework concerning 
the provision of assistance as a whole, nor does it aid persons in need of assistance 
in general. In fact, fragmentation of the law runs the risk of increasing the existing 
gaps in protection. 
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Human rights law as a body however does provide recourse both concerning the 
possibilities of third parties to provide assistance and concerning the duties of the 
affected state to allow access. Whilst the protection of international human rights law 
is of international concern, the specific fulfilment of rights may be placed with the 
affected state (or non-state actor) as duty-bearer in particular circumstances. Indeed, 
both Article 56 UN Charter and Article 2 ICESCR establish an obligation of 
international cooperation. Such formulations oblige international efforts in the 
provision of assistance as a vehicle in the fulfilment of the human rights of persons 
facing crises by the affected state. In order to reach such fulfilment, access would be 
necessary to the affected territory. Unlike is the case in humanitarian law, where an 
emphasis is placed on control rights of the affected state, such control rights are 
lacking in the more generally formulated codifications of the rights to life, food and 
health. Naturally, such a lack of specified control rights flows from the origins of the 
creation of the current existing human rights treaties, not specifically tailored to the 
provision of assistance as for example the Kampala Convention is, or the Geneva 
Conventions are, having been created with World War II in mind. However, Chapters 
5 and 6 have asserted that the provision of humanitarian assistance functions as the 
fulfilment of the rights to life, food and health by the affected authority as designated 
duty-bearer. Therefore, in allowing third parties to obtain access to the affected 
territory for the provision of humanitarian assistance, the affected state is complying 
with its own duties to provide assistance (including seeking international help for this 
purpose) to the affected persons in need of aid, as a vehicle in the fulfilment of the 
rights to life, food and health. Indeed, such a duty to allow access in human rights 
law does not exist independently, but is directly related to the affected states’ duties 
to provide assistance themselves. This duty, in particular as codified within Article 2 
ICESCR, does not merely require the affected state to deplete its own national 
resources, but to actively seek international assistance.  
Furthermore upon access to a territory, following these obligations under human 
rights law in circumstances that the affected state cannot sufficiently provided 
assistance itself, third parties should be ensured ‘safe and unimpeded passage’ as 
continuously called upon by the Security Council. Such provisions have equally been 
codified in the Convention on the Security of United Nations and Associated 
Personnel as well as the ICC Statute (see Chapter 8). Upon consent of the affected 
state therefore, an obligation can be determined to exist in current law to allow safe 
and unimpeded passage, without the abuse of control rights (existing depending on 
the circumstances). A distinct duty therefore rests upon the affected state or authority 
to create an environment in which it becomes safe for the (external) providers of 
assistance to deliver the aid. Such an obligation is made more specific through the 
duty, found in many provisions, of the affected state to in fact facilitate such a 
delivery.319 Secondly, although an obligation for third parties to provide assistance 
may not be found in existing international law, despite potential developments in this 
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regard through existing opinio juris, a distinct right to offer assistance can be 
discerned in the various bodies of law discussed above.320  
Despite the lack of a right to access, and even a clear general obligation of third 
parties to provide aid, it has been possible to determine the existing rights and duties 
pertaining to the delivery of assistance by third parties. The current legal 
developments, such as the ILC Draft Articles, unfortunately do not attempt to bridge 
this existing gap in protection, as they equally provide for the affected state’s right 
of consent in the external provision of assistance and do not call for an obligation to 
provide aid. Rather, these developments add to the disparity and fragmentation in 
legal protection. The determined obligations of the affected state in Chapter 6 
therefore do not have immediate corresponding obligations to provide or rights to 
access for third parties under the existing legal framework.  
Many existing soft law documents have attempted to bridge the existing gaps and 
solve the grey areas through their guidelines or resolutions. With regard to the 
external provision of assistance, the 1991 Guidelines for Humanitarian Assistance, 
the 1993 San Remo Principles, the 1995 Mohonk Criteria and the Bruges Resolution 
of 2003 recognise the right of third parties to offer humanitarian assistance to a 
population in need, similar to many existing legal provisions.321 Also, the 1991 
Guidelines for Humanitarian Assistance, the San Remo Principles and the Bruges 
Resolution consider an obligation, as asserted above, of the affected state to facilitate 
the safe passage of assistance and personnel.322 Furthermore, the duty of 
neighbouring states to allow the transit of assistance is addressed by the Mohonk 
Criteria, as well as by the San Remo Principles and the Bruges Resolution, although 
the latter two do so without specifying a particular duty-bearer.323 Similarly, both the 
San Remo Principles and the Bruges Resolution stipulate an obligation of the affected 
state to not arbitrarily refuse an offer of assistance, where the latter specifies that such 
an offer must be ‘bona fide’.324 In support of this, Vukas, the original Rapporteur 
                                                        
320 Ibid and Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America), Merits, Judgment 27 June 1986 I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14.  
321 See in this regard the 1991 Guidelines for Humanitarian Assistance Guideline 10; ‘Guiding Principles 
on the Right to Humanitarian Assistance’ (April 1993) The International Institute of Humanitarian Law 
in San Remo, Principle 5; ‘The Mohonk Criteria for Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies’, 
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September 2003) (ibid)  Principle VII.  
324 ‘Guiding Principles on the Right to Humanitarian Assistance’ (n 321) Principle 7; and Bruges 
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‘bona fide’ offer and reasons for refusal with regard to the Bruges Resolution: Robert Kolb, ‘De 
l’assistance humanitaire: la résolution sur l’assistance humanitaire adoptée par l’Institut de droit 







drafting the Bruges Resolution, has argued that as under current international law the 
protection of human rights of a population no longer exclusively exists within a 
domestic jurisdiction, third states may therefore, in view of an exacerbated 
humanitarian catastrophe, call upon the UN to entice the affected state to comply 
with its obligations.325  
Proceeding beyond the status quo of the law, these soft law documents have 
attempted to stretch the grounds of the current existing legal framework. Indeed, the 
Bruges Resolution recognises in this regard an obligation resting upon the affected 
state to seek assistance from third parties, in a more specified and tailored manner 
than existing human rights law.326 Moreover, the Mohonk Criteria have asserted ‘the 
right and obligation to protect and provide relief’ of third parties in the event the 
affected state is unwilling or unable to do so, arguing that the principles of non-
interference and sovereignty may not be used by the affected state as an obstacle in 
the saving of lives.327  
This brief overview exemplifies that these soft-law documents have attempted to 
provide greater protection for persons in need of assistance. While these documents 
indeed arguably contribute to existing opinio juris on the matter, such a more far-
reaching approach to the external provision of humanitarian assistance is lacking in 
the existing framework.328 It must be concluded that current hard law restricts itself 
to the determination that third parties have a clear right to offer assistance, 
complimented by the duty of the affected state to seek international assistance for the 
provision of assistance in the fulfilment of the rights to life, food and health. From 
this duty flows the obligation to allow safe and unimpeded access (upon consent) to 
facilitate the free passage of goods and personnel for the purpose of the delivery of 
assistance, in light of the duty to create a safe environment for such provision.  
Both in the abovementioned hard law and soft-law documents reference is also 
made to enforcement mechanisms, should the affected state not allow for access to 
the affected territory and population. Such matters shall be addressed in the 
subsequent Chapter, concerning the legal consequences of the denial of humanitarian 
assistance and the ensuing potential violations of international law.   
                                                        
325 Vukas, ‘Humanitarian Assistance in Cases of Emergency’ (n 14) § 24.  
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September 2000) UN Doc 
A/RES/55/2 ‘United 
Nations Millennium 
Declaration’ § 2 and 26. 
 The provision of 
assistance is an 




enshrined in the UN 
Charter 
  UNGA Res 3244 XXIX (29 
November 1974) preamble 
 
 The international 
community (in 
particular the UN 
system) bears the 
task of strengthening 
and improving the 
humanitarian 
response in the 
aftermath of 
emergencies 
  UNGA Res 60/124 (8 March 
2006) UN Doc 
A/RES/60/124 §11; UNGA 
Res 63/139 (5 March 2009) 
UN Doc A/RES/63/139 § 3; 
UNGA Res 64/76 (2 
February 2010) UN Doc 
A/RES/64/76 preamble 
 
 Member States are 
‘urged’ to assist, a 
need for cooperation 
is ‘stressed’ 
  UNGA Res 65/264 (21 June 
2011) UN Doc 
A/RES/65/264 preamble 
and §8, 12 and 13; UNGA 
Res 66/119 (7 March 2012) 
UN Doc A/RES/66/119 
preamble, §4 and 10 
  States in need of 
assistance are invited 





assistance and to 
give their support to 
these organisations  
 UNGA Res 43/131 (8 
December 1988) UN Doc 
A/RES/43/131, § 4 and 5; 
UNGA Res 45/100 (14 
December 1990) UN Doc 
A/RES/45/100 § 4 and 5; 
UNGA Res 46/182 (19 
December 1991) UN Doc 
A/RES/46/182, Annex, § 6-
7; UNGA Res 49/174 (24 






Third Parties and the Provision of Assistance: The Right to Offer Assistance and the 
Related (Potential) Right to Access 
401 
 Right / Duty to 
provide by third 
parties 
Right to access by 
third parties 
Source  
  Calls upon’ or 
‘urges’ states in the 
vicinity to facilitate 
the transit of 
emergency aid 
 UNGA Res 43/131 (8 
December 1988) UN Doc 
A/RES/43/131, § 6; UNGA 
Res 45/100 (14 December 
1990) UN Doc 
A/RES/45/100 § 7; UNGA 
Res 59/141 (25 February 
2005) UN Doc 
A/RES/59/141 preamble; 
UNGA Res 64/251 (30 April 
2010) UN Doc 
A/RES/64/251 § 14; UNGA 
Res 65/264 (21 June 2011) 
UN Doc A/RES/65/264 §14; 
UNGA Res 66/227 (15 
March 2012) UN Doc 
A/RES/66/227 §16; and 
UNGA Res 67/231 (9 April 
2013) UN Doc 
A/RES/67/231 § 16. 
  ‘Calls upon’ parties 
to conflicts or other 
emergency 
situations to take all 
possible necessary 
measures to ensure 
impartial, safe and 
timely humanitarian 
access to persons in 
need of assistance, 
while also calling 
upon states to ensure 




 UNGA Res 49/169 (23 
December 1994) UN Doc 
A/RES/49/169 § 12; 
A/RES/52/167 18 February 
1998, § 3; UNGA Res 53/87 
(27 January 1999) UN Doc 
A/RES/53/87 § 11; UNGA 
Res 54/192 (21 February 
2000) UN Doc 
A/RES/54/192 § 2 and 3; 
UNGA Res 55/175 (7 March 
2001) UN Doc 
A/RES/55/175 § 3 and 4; 
UNGA Res 56/217 (19 
February 2002) UN Doc 
A/RES/56/217 § 3, 4 and 12; 
UNGA Res 58/114 (5 
February 2004) UN Doc 
A/RES/58/114 §8 and 10, 
UNGA Res 59/141 (25 
February 2005) UN Doc 
A/RES/59/141 § 18; UN 
Doc A/RES/60/1, 16 
September 2005 para 169; 
UNGA Res 60/124 (8 March 
2006) UN Doc 
A/RES/60/124 § 2; UNGA 
Res 60/123 (24 March 2006) 






 Right / Duty to 
provide by third 
parties 
Right to access by 
third parties 
Source  
and 4; UNGA Res 61/133 (1 
March 2007) UN Doc 
A/RES/61/133 §3 and 4; 
UNGA Res 61/134 (1 March 
2007) UN Doc 
A/RES/61/134 § 20; UNGA 
Res 62/94 (25 January 2008) 
UN Doc A/RES/62/94 § 24; 
UNGA Res 62/95 (29 
January 2008) UN Doc 
A/RES/62/95 §3 and 4; 
UNGA Res 63/138 (5 March 
2009) UN Doc 
A/RES/63/138 §3 and 4; 
UNGA Res 64/76 (2 
February 2010) UN Doc 
A/RES/64/76 § 26; UNGA 
Res 64/77 (8 February 2010) 
UN Doc A/RES/64/77 § 4; 
UNGA Res 65/132 (1 March 
2011) UN Doc 
A/RES/65/132 §4; UNGA 
Res 65/133 (3 March 2011) 
UN Doc A/RES/65/133 § 
27; UNGA Res 66/117 (1 
March 2012) UN Doc 
A/RES/66/117 §4; UNGA 
Res 66/119 (7 March 2012) 
UN Doc A/RES/66/119 §33; 
UNGA Res 66/120 (7 March 
2012) UN Doc 
A/RES/66/120 § 12; UNGA 
Res 67/85 (21 March 2013) 
UN Doc A/RES/67/85 §4; 
UNGA Res 67/87 (26 March 
2013) UN Doc A/RES/67/87 
§ 37 
  Asserting the 
obligations of parties 
to humanitarian 
emergencies under 
international law in 
ensuring access to 
providers of aid. 
 UNGA Res 67/87 (26 March 
2013) UN Doc A/RES/67/87 
§ 37; UNGA Res 68/101 (18 
February 2014) UN Doc 
A/RES/68/101 § 2-4; 
UNGA Res 68/102 (12 
February 2014) UN Doc 




 Obligation on UN 
Member States to 
ensure universal 
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 Right / Duty to 
provide by third 
parties 
Right to access by 
third parties 
Source  
respect for human 
rights 
 Duty upon those 
states within the 
international 
community that are 
in a position to assist, 
to indeed assist in the 
fulfillment of the 
right to food  
  Article 11 ICESCR (and 
Article 2 ICESCR) 
 Obligations resting 
upon states to take 
measures in 
cooperating to 
ensure food security 
and eradication of 
malnutrition 
  Article 12 of the Additional 
Protocol to the ACHR in the 
Area of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights  
 
 States parties have a 






assistance in times of 
emergency. 
Moreover, given that 
some diseases are 
easily transmissible 
beyond the frontiers 
of a State, the 
international 
community has a 
collective 
responsibility to 
address this problem 
  CESCR interpretation of 
Article 12 ICESCR (and 
Article 2 ICESCR) 
  Parties shall 
facilitate, and refrain 
from placing any 
impediments to, 
humanitarian 
assistance in support 
of the rights to which 
the local population 
are entitled under the 
ICERD 
 Application of the 
International Convention on 
the Elimination of all Forms 
of Racial Discrimination 
(Georgia v. Russian 
Federation), Provisional 
Measures, Order of 15 
October 2008, I.C.J. Reports 
2008, p. 353 § 149 B 







 Right / Duty to 
provide by third 
parties 

















International Armed Conflict 
 
 
 Article 10 GC IV 
 
 Relief actions shall 
be undertaken if the 
civilian population is 
inadequately 
supplied 
  Article 70(1) AP I (read in 
conjuncture with Article 54 
AP I) 
  States shall allow the 
passage of assistance 
subject to the 
condition that there 
are no serious 
reasons to decide 
otherwise 
 Article 23 GC IV (listing the 
reasons) 
  States (including 
third states) shall 
allow and facilitate 
rapid and unimpeded 






 Article 70(2)-(5) AP I 
  States shall provide 
for safety of 
humanitarian 
personnel 




 Right to offer 









 Common Article 3 GC  
 Right to offer relief 
by local organisation 
  Article 18(1) AP II 
 Subject to consent, 
relief ‘shall’ be 
undertaken in the 
event of undue 
hardship  
 Relief actions shall 
be undertaken 
 
 Article 18(2) AP II (read in 
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provide by third 
parties 






 The Occupying 
Power shall agree to 
relief schemes on 
behalf of the 
population, and shall 
facilitate them 
 The Occupier shall 
permit the free 
passage of assistance 
and shall guarantee 
their protection, 
whilst maintaining 
the right to regulate 
passage of convoys 
 Article 59 GC IV 
 The Protecting 
Power has the right 
to check the state of 
provision of 
assistance by the 
occupier 
  Article 55 GC IV 
 The Protecting 
Power shall have the 
duty to supervise the 
distribution of 
assistance (to be 
facilitated by 
Occupier) 




through their own 
territory 
 Article 61 GC IV 
 Duty of the 
occupying power to 
allow the existing 
Red Cross Societies 
and other similar 
humanitarian 
organisations in a 
territory to continue 
with their activities 
  Article 63 GC IV 
 The Occupying 
Power shall have the 
right to approve 
participation of 
personnel 
 States shall provide 
for safety of 
humanitarian 
personnel 










 Duty to cooperate to 
provide prompt 
assistance 
  Article 1(1) Convention on 
Assistance in the Case of a 
Nuclear Accident or 
Radiological Emergency 
  Consent and control 
rights remain with 
affected state 
 Article 3 Convention on 
Assistance in the Case of a 





 Presupposition of an 
offer of assistance by 
third states  
  Inter-American Convention 
To Facilitate Disaster 
Assistance Articles I(b), 






 Right / Duty to 
provide by third 
parties 





  Affected state shall, 
upon consent, 
facilitate fully the 
access and freedom 





 Inter-American Convention 
To Facilitate Disaster 
Assistance Articles V and 
VII  
 Duty for states party 
to ‘promptly 
respond’ to a request 
for assistance by a 
state affected by 
disaster 
  ASEAN Agreement on 
Disaster Management and 
Emergency Response, 
Articles 4(c) + 11 
 States have an 
obligation to 
coordinate the 




  ASEAN Agreement on 




  Duty of affected 
state to ‘exempt’ the 
assisting state from 
all charges of taxes 
and facilitate access 




 ASEAN Agreement on 
Disaster Management and 
Emergency Response, 
Article 14 
  Duty upon third 




 ASEAN Agreement on 








NGOs have the right 
to offer assistance to 
the affected State.  
  Draft Article 12 ILC (+ 
control rights in Draft 
Article 13) 
 
 Duty for states to 
cooperate amongst 
themselves as well as 
with humanitarian 
organisations 





Third Parties and the Provision of Assistance: The Right to Offer Assistance and the 
Related (Potential) Right to Access 
407 
 Right / Duty to 
provide by third 
parties 




  Upon consent, the 
affected State shall 
take the necessary 
measures to facilitate 




 Draft Article 14 ILC 
 
  The affected state 
has a duty to ‘seek 
international and/or 
regional assistance’, 
but on own initiative 
 (IDRL Guideline 3.2 + 10.1) 
 
 Upon consent, 
affected state has 
duty to facilitate 
freedom of access to 
and freedom of 
movement in and 
from the disaster 
affected area 
 
  (IDRL Guideline 16.1.d.) 
 
  Duty of transit states 
to not create 
restrictions that may 
delay or impede 
provision of 
assistance, and extra 
duties of affected 
state to facilitate 
 (IDRL Guideline 16.2 and 
17) 
 
  Call upon the 
affected state to take 
measures in the 
protection of those 
actors that they have 
consented to access 
their territory 















 Duty of affected 





shall seek the 
assistance of 







 Right / Duty to 
provide by third 
parties 















and other relevant 
actors. Such 
organisations may 
offer their services to 
all those in need 
  States Parties shall 
allow rapid and 
unimpeded passage 
of all relief 
consignments, 
equipment and per-
sonnel to IDPs. 
States Parties shall 
also enable and 







and other relevant 
actors, to provide 
protection and 
assistance 
 Article 5(7) Kampala 
Convention 
 
  States Parties shall 
ensure assistance to 
IDPs by allowing 










 Article 3(1)(j) Kampala 
Convention 
 
  Prohibition for 
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actors have the right 
to offer their services 
in support of the 
internally displaced 
  (Guiding Principles 25(2) 
IDPs) 
 
  Authorities 
concerned shall 
grant and facilitate 
the free passage of 
humanitarian 
assistance and grant 
persons engaged in 
the provision of such 
assistance rapid and 
unimpeded access to 
IDPs 
 (Guiding Principles 25(3) 
IDPs) 
  Personnel and 
convoys must be 
respected and 
protected and may 
not be attacked  









LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE DENIAL OF 























Enforcement as a manner in which a situation violating international law can be 
brought to an end must be addressed in this research, in the circumstance 
humanitarian aid cannot be delivered. Part II of this research has dealt with the 
current rights and obligations in the provision of humanitarian assistance. It has set 
out the current existing legal framework pertaining to the rights of persons to receive 
aid in a humanitarian crisis, as well as the duties of the affected state to provide such 
aid. Part III commenced with the legal framework concerning the delivery of 
assistance by external parties, in the event the affected state is unable or unwilling to 
fulfil its duties by itself. In this regard, Chapter 7 set forth the rights of third parties 
wishing to provide aid to persons in need should the affected state not do so, and the 
related obligations the affected state may have in allowing such parties access to the 
affected territories. This access is generally formulated as a duty of the affected state 
to allow entry to third parties and is important, as the normative basis for the potential 
                                                        
1 <http://www.nbcnews.com/id/29492637/ns/world_news-africa/t/sudan-expels-aid-groups-response-
warrant/#.VFETffmsWP4> accessed 29 October 2014. See in this regard also 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/mar/05/sudan-aid-agencies-expelled> accessed 29 October 
2014.  
In March 2009, the Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir reportedly expelled 
several humanitarian aid organisations from the country, upon his indictment 
before the International Criminal Court:   
 
“Sudan ordered 10 leading international humanitarian organizations expelled from Darfur 
on Wednesday after the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for the 
country's president for alleged atrocities in the conflict-ridden region. United Nations 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said the action "represents a serious setback to lifesaving 
operations in Darfur" and urged Sudan to reverse its decision, U.N. deputy spokeswoman 
Marie Okabe said”. 
 
The denial of humanitarian assistance can lead to violations of international law. 
But in what way can humanitarian assistance be enforced? Through which legal 
mechanisms can the provision of aid to persons in need be ensured? This Chapter 
addresses the various methods of enforcement, as part of the larger framework on 







enforcement of such access is found in the protection of the persons in need of 
assistance.  
This Chapter addresses the existing enforcement mechanisms and methods 
through which the affected state may be held accountable for its potential violations 
of international law in a step-by-step manner, commencing with a discussion of the 
law of state responsibility. The substantive enforcement methods operate on a variety 
of levels and will be addressed subsequently and accordingly. At the interstate level, 
the use of force is relevant in the factual enforcement of access for the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance, through authorised international operations. Furthermore, 
human rights law and its mechanisms are addressed, reflecting the enforcement 
method available at a different level, namely that of the individual vis-à-vis the state. 
Lastly, international criminal law is relevant in addressing violations of international 
law by individuals reciprocally in the enforcement of humanitarian assistance. 
Indeed, the more substantive provisions dealing with enforcement that are found in 
these bodies of law may well be considered a consequence or result of establishing 
state responsibility for the denial of humanitarian at various levels. At all levels 
however, it is important to remain cognisant of the role of state sovereignty. As will 
be seen, in this Chapter state sovereignty plays a diminished role compared to 
previous Chapters. Whereas the affected state in certain instances has some discretion 
in the determination of whether or not humanitarian assistance is needed, the 
determination that an unlawful denial of humanitarian aid has taken place leads to a 
breach of international law. Such breaches may then be enforced through human 
rights law, international criminal law or through the use of force, but such 
enforcement comes through means in which the sovereignty of the affected state 
tends to be overridden by other aspects of international law. This overriding occurs 
either based on the character of the UN Security Council and UN member states’ 
obligations under Article 25 of the UN Charter, or for example through the accession 
to certain human rights treaties or the ICC, resulting in the possibility of holding 
states or individuals accountable before these bodies. Indeed, the view that access for 
humanitarian assistance is necessary – a view that has increased in the past years as 
seen in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 – results in the simultaneous changing of the nature of 
state sovereignty, to the point where sovereignty must give way to the delivery of 
food, water, medicine and shelter in times of crisis.  
In addressing the legal consequences of the denial of humanitarian assistance by 
the affected state through the various methods of enforcement existing in 
international law today, it is crucial to first and foremost establish which acts or 
omissions amount to an unlawful denial of humanitarian assistance. Chapters 6 and 
7 have shown that on occasion, denial of humanitarian assistance may occur, such 
as for the purpose of military necessity. This Chapter however addresses the legal 
enforcement mechanisms that can be utilised when considering unlawful denials of 
such aid and to that end firstly addresses the law of state responsibility as related to 
the provision of humanitarian assistance, in order to establish when a sovereign may 
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8.2 The Law of State Responsibility and Enforcement of Humanitarian 
Assistance 
 
Violations of substantive international law pertaining to the denial or obstruction of 
humanitarian assistance may give rise to state responsibility. Indeed, the failure of a 
state to fulfil its sovereign duties results in the rise of state responsibility. The law of 
state responsibility connects the violation of a specific duty to provide aid or allow 
access for third parties to a responsibility under international law. 
The recognition of the law of state responsibility as a ‘legal category’ in which 
responsibility arises in the event of a breach of an international obligation did not 
fully develop until well after Grotius’ time and into the nineteenth century.2 When 
the UN International Law Commission was established in 1947, the law of state 
responsibility was marked as a field in need of attention, which prompted the 
development of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility in the ensuing decades, 
developing gradually into what is known as the law of state responsibility today.3  
 State responsibility is not a field of law containing substantive provisions in 
and of itself, but rather a field of law which becomes applicable upon the violation 
of another, primary, norm of international law. Thus by nature, it allows for an 
overarching, broader, approach to the obligations which may follow from the denial 
of the provision of humanitarian assistance. Such an overarching approach is in fact 
seen in the law on state responsibility, as set out today in the ILC’s Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), which allow 
for the determination of a state’s responsibility not merely towards another state 
bilaterally, but also towards other actors in the international field.4 Although not an 
independent international treaty, the ARSIWA currently hold international standing  
as completed work by the ILC and through their status as annexed document to a 
General Assembly resolution (pending the General Assembly’s further action on the 
topic), as well as having been referred to on countless occasions as (largely) 
reflecting customary international law.5 They will therefore be referenced 
throughout this Section.  
As Crawford and Olleson argue, there is no ‘uniform code of international law’ 
which reflects the obligations of all states operating in the international spectrum.6 
Obligations resting upon states must be determined for each state independently, as 
these obligations are dependent upon the treaties such states have entered into. Only 
a limited number of general norms of international law are recognised internationally 
as universally applicable customary law. Both these norms and the widely accepted 
treaty provisions codified in humanitarian law and human rights laws are addressed 
                                                        
2 James Crawford, State Responsibility: the General Part (Cambridge University Press 2013) 11-20.  
3 Ibid 35-36.  
4 UNGA Res 56/83 (28 January 2002) UN Doc A/RES/56/83 Annex ‘Responsibility of States for 
internationally wrongful acts’ (ARSIWA) (corrected by UN Doc A/56/49 (Vol. I)/Corr.4). The ARSIWA 
specifically exclude matters pertaining to the responsibility of either international organisations or of 
other non-state actors.  
5 Crawford, State Responsibility: the General Part (n 2) 42-43.  






in this Chapter. Indeed, as the law of state responsibility is construed upon legal 
concepts such as a breach, attribution and consequences therefore, it allows for 
application in a general manner to the variety of obligations resting upon individual 
states.7  
Given the fact that the affected state is the primary responsible actor in times of a 
humanitarian crisis in the provision of humanitarian assistance to persons in need,8 
the notion of state responsibility is of great relevance to this research and must be 
examined in more depth with a view to states’ failures in meeting their obligations 
regarding the provision of humanitarian assistance.9 The classical and purely bilateral 
view of state responsibility has been departed from with the development of the 
ARSIWA, by incorporating a responsibility of states towards not only other states, 
either individually or together, but also towards individuals, groups or the 
international community in general.10 Therefore, the law of state responsibility is of 
importance to the legal framework regarding the provision of humanitarian 
assistance, in the event a state does not fulfil its legal obligations under that 
framework, perhaps raising international responsibility towards the persons in need, 
or perhaps the international community in general.  
 
8.2.1 State Responsibility, the ARSIWA and Humanitarian Assistance 
 
In order to invoke the international responsibility of a state, the law of state 
responsibility presupposes in Articles 2 and 3 ARSIWA an act or omission of that 
state, in the event such an act or omission is a breach of international law and 
attributable to the state. With regard to the provision of humanitarian assistance, in 
particular this possibility of an attributable ‘omission’ is of relevance. Specifically 
the aspects of state responsibility that fall outside the classical bilateral view must be 
considered, given the nature of the responsibility of the affected state in the event of 
a humanitarian crisis to provide assistance to persons in need of aid. This 
responsibility includes the duty under the ICESCR to request assistance from abroad 
and the rights of the international community to offer assistance. At the interstate 
level, third states may then choose to bring the state that has breached an obligation 
before the International Court of Justice.  
When applying the law of state responsibility to humanitarian assistance, the non-
provision of such assistance can be considered a breach of an international obligation. 
This obligation could according to the ARSIWA be owed to a group of states, should 
specific treaty provisions be considered, or in general to the international community 
as a whole, based on the concept of state sovereignty or certain norms of customary 
international law. The determination of state responsibility for such breaches of 
obligations held to the international community as a whole may then be sought before 
                                                        
7 Ibid. 
8 Chapter 6.  
9 Ibid.  
10 Articles 42 and 48 ARISWA; and ‘Report of the International Law Commission Fifty-third session (23 
April-1 June and 2 July-10 August 2001)’ UN Doc A/56/10 (2001) 62, 66, 293 and 319-320.  
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the ICJ. This approach by the ILC in the ARSIWA, diverging from the strict bilateral 
perspective, follows the ICJ in its judgment in the Barcelona Traction, Light and 
Power Company Limited (Belgium v. Spain) case (Barcelona Traction case). The ICJ 
held that: 
 
“In particular, an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State 
towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State 
[…]. By their very nature the former are the concern of all States”.11  
 
It becomes apparent that a distinction must be made between the bilateral notion of 
state responsibility, where not all states have a legal interest in the observance of 
certain duties, and legal obligations which can be considered to affect and interest 
the international community as a whole; the notion of erga omnes obligations, 
although the ILC does not refer to them as such.12  
In particular, within the context of the ARSIWA, Articles 42 and 48 both 
specifically provide for state responsibility in the event a breach of an international 
obligation occurs that is indeed owed to the international community as a whole. As 
such, Article 42 stipulates that an injured state may invoke the law of state 
responsibility if an obligation that is owed to the international community as a whole 
is breached, and the injured state is specifically affected, or the character of the 
breach changes the position of all other states:  
 
“A State is entitled as an injured State to invoke the responsibility of another State if the 
obligation breached is owed to: (a) that State individually; or (b) a group of States 
including that State, or the international community as a whole, and the breach of the 
obligation: (i) specially affects that State; or (ii) is of such a character as radically to change 
the position of all the other States to which the obligation is owed with respect to the 
further performance of the obligation”. 
 
As a humanitarian crisis can affect the larger international community rather than 
merely one other state, state responsibility might therefore be invoked in the 
circumstance that a state does not fulfil its sovereign duty to provide assistance to its 
population, or persons in need within its jurisdiction. Article 42 ARSIWA thus 
enables an injured state to hold another state in breach of an obligation owed to the 
international community as a whole if it does not fulfil its responsibilities in the 
provision of humanitarian assistance, based on its duties under various treaty-law 
provisions in international humanitarian law and human rights law (as discussed in 
                                                        
11 ICJ Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited (Belgium v. Spain) case ICJ Reports 1970, 
at p.3, p. 32, § 33. 
12 The notion of potential ‘erga omnes’ obligations shall remain outside the scope of this research, given 
the current debate still held on the particular content of these obligations. The ILC has for this reason 
also decided to leave the concept outside of its ARSIWA. See in this regard ‘Report of the International 
Law Commission’ UN Doc A/56/10 (n 10) 321-322. For a discussion of the notion of erga omnes, see 
Maurizio Ragazzi, The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes (Oxford University Press 







Chapters 6 and 7), or other international law prescriptions. An injured state in this 
circumstance may well be a neighbouring state that is dealing with a large influx of 
refugees fleeing a state’s territory affected by a humanitarian crisis of either man-
made or natural origin. Such a state may also be dealing with the environmental 
consequences of disasters. Articles 28-33 ARSIWA provide for potential legal 
consequences upon invoking state responsibility, which include cessation, non-
repetition and reparation.  
Secondly, with a more progressive view, Article 48 ARSIWA provides that not 
only an injured state, but any state may invoke the international responsibility of a 
state should the breached obligation be owed to either a group of states that includes 
the state invoking the responsibility for the breach, or the international community 
as a whole:  
 
“Any State other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the responsibility of another 
State in accordance with paragraph 2 if: (a) the obligation breached is owed to a group of 
States including that State, and is established for the protection of a collective interest of 
the group; or (b) the obligation breached is owed to the international community as a 
whole. 2. Any State entitled to invoke responsibility under paragraph 1 may claim from 
the responsible State: (a) cessation of the internationally wrongful act, and assurances and 
guarantees of non-repetition in accordance with article 30; and (b) performance of the 
obligation of reparation in accordance with the preceding articles, in the interest of the 
injured State or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached. 3. The requirements for the 
invocation of responsibility by an injured State under articles 43, 44 and 45 apply to an 
invocation of responsibility by a State entitled to do so under paragraph 1”. 
 
In stipulating this, Article 48 ARSIWA allows for a non-injured state to invoke state 
responsibility for the breach of an obligation which is owed to the international 
community as a whole. Humanitarian assistance in essence is owed to those persons 
in need of essential food, water, medicine and shelter. Yet, in the absence of the 
immediate provision of such assistance, humanitarian crises enlarge and spill over 
into greater areas. Indeed, should a state deny the provision of aid to persons in need, 
often the circumstances of such persons will escalate and expand the humanitarian 
crisis at hand. As such, humanitarian assistance is arguably owed to the international 
community as a whole, as large regions and even the entire world can be affected by 
the effects of a humanitarian crisis. Article 48 ARSIWA may allow states in the 
international community to claim that the violations of a state towards its citizens 
could amount to a breach of an obligation which is owed to the international 
community as a whole. In the event of non-provision of humanitarian assistance, 
including the refusal to allow external parties to provide aid and obtain access to a 
territory, such an argument may very well be made. A deteriorating crisis can amount 
to several breaches of obligations in international law that are owed to the 
international community as a whole, such as a threat to the peace, large-scale human 
rights violations, and potentially also one of the four core crimes for which the 
‘Responsibility to Protect’ may be invoked, namely genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity. As Simma argues, every state may then 
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consider itself legally ‘injured’, entitling it to resort to certain (non-forceful) 
countermeasures.13 As Articles 49 and 50 ARSIWA note, these countermeasures are 
indeed non-forceful, thus not allowing for the forceful access to a territory. Such a 
crisis furthermore potentially invokes duties through the provisions of Article 25 UN 
Charter for the Security Council (as seen in Chapter 7), which as supranational organ 
of the UN in a way is a reflection of the international community as a whole. In this 
manner, the ILC has addressed the findings of the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case 
above, and incorporated this viewpoint into the ILC’s ARSIWA.14  
In particular concerning humanitarian assistance, such a provision would allow 
states that are not in the direct vicinity of the affected state to also call upon the 
affected state to abide by its obligations under international law, in providing 
humanitarian assistance to its people in a crisis, and even invoke its responsibility 
therefore under international law. As mentioned above, given the horizontal nature 
of the law of state responsibility, other states shall have the opportunity to bring the 
affected state that is in breach of its obligations (potentially Articles 42 and 48 
ARSIWA) before the ICJ. It must be noted however that Article 48(2) ARSIWA 
includes ‘progressive development’ aspects of international law, which the ILC 
justifies arguing that the collective interests of the international community may be 
at stake in certain instances.15 Such instances may be the case with certain large-scale 
human rights violations occurring in a humanitarian crisis where the affected state is 
not fulfilling its duties under the rights to life, food, health (and water), when no other 
‘injured state’ exists due to the particular circumstances at hand.  
International responsibility in the absence of another ‘injured state’ can indeed 
occur under the law of state responsibility. A state can be held responsible not only 
for obligations towards another state or the international community; a state may also 
be held directly responsible under the international law of state responsibility for 
obligations towards its own citizens. Articles 2 and 3 ARSIWA allow invocation in 
the event of an attributable breach of international law related to a responsibility of 
the state towards its citizens.16 Such possibilities of invoking state responsibility will 
be of particular relevance in the event of human rights or humanitarian law breaches 
when humanitarian assistance is denied by the affected state in times of a 
humanitarian crisis, discussed in Section 8.3. Enforcement will then most likely have 
to occur through the specific judicial bodies of humanitarian and human rights law, 
as the individual bearing the consequences of such a breach of international law 
cannot directly base him/herself on state responsibility: this body of law distinctly 
operates on the horizontal plane between states, and breaches of the law may only be 
claimed by other states within the international community; see in this regard Articles 
42-48 ARSIWA. Whilst the forum for breaches of the law of state responsibility is 
                                                        
13 Bruno Simma, ‘NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects’, (1999) 10 European Journal of 
International Law 2.  
14 Crawford, State Responsibility: the General Part (n 2) 40-41. 
15 ‘Report of the International Law Commission’ UN Doc A/56/10 (n 10) 323 concerning Article 
48(2)(b).  
16 Ibid 62. See also A L Vaurs-Chaumette ‘Peoples and Minorities’ in J Crawford et al (ed) The Law of 






the ICJ, individuals may turn to human rights bodies or the ICC, to be discussed 
below. 
State responsibility may also be invoked through the attribution of certain acts to 
a state, when considering a breach of an obligation not directly incurred by the state 
itself. Articles 4-11 ARSIWA provide the various methods in which acts of 
individuals or groups might be attributed to the affected state.17 In the circumstance 
of the provision of humanitarian assistance, attribution of conduct to the state may 
play a distinct role, as the provision of humanitarian assistance – or refusal thereof – 
is sometimes outsourced to various other actors, amongst which international 
organisations and NGOs, as well as other bodies that may operate within a set 
structure with the affected state. State responsibility may also incur in circumstances 
such as described in Articles 9 and 10 ARSIWA, if non-state actors violate human 
rights law and humanitarian law during a non-international armed conflict, should 
such non-state actors exercise a degree of control and subsequently gain sovereignty. 
Problematic for the determination of responsibility under the law of state 
responsibility as also relevant to the provision of humanitarian assistance remains the 
non-state actor that does not obtain such titles.  
With regard to attribution, the ICJ has determined in the Bosnian Genocide case 
that a breach of international law (in casu genocide) may be attributable to a State:  
  
“if and to the extent that the physical acts constitutive of genocide that have been 
committed by organs or persons other than the State’s own agents were carried out, wholly 
or in part, on the instructions or directions of the State, or under its effective control. This 
is the state of customary international law, as reflected in the ILC Articles on State 
Responsibility”.18 
 
The ICJ therefore determines that ‘effective’ control is necessary for such attribution. 
In doing so, it departs from both its own previous ‘control’ formula in the Nicaragua 
judgment and the ICTY with its Tadić ‘overall control test’, whilst, according to 
Cassese, failing to constructively reformulate them.19 Indeed, ‘effective’ control as 
proposed by the ICJ differs from the approach taken by the ICTY that differentiated 
two degrees of control that vary depending on circumstances and subject; such as 
individuals versus organised groups that as a whole operate under the control of the 
                                                        
17 Article 4 ARSIWA concerns the conduct of organs of a state, Article 5 ARSIWA the conduct of persons 
or entities exercising elements of governmental authority, Article 6 ARSIWA the conduct of organs 
placed at the disposal of a State by another State, Article 7 ARSIWA the excess of authority or 
contravention of instructions, Article 8 ARSIWA relates to the conduct directed or controlled by a state, 
Article 9 ARSIWA the conduct carried out in the absence or default of the official authorities, Article 10 
ARSIWA pertains to the conduct of an insurrectional or other movement and lastly Article 11 ARSIWA 
concerns conduct acknowledged and adopted by a State as its own.  
18 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43 § 401. 
19 Antonio Cassese, ‘The Nicaragua and Tadic Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgment on Genocide 
in Bosnia’, (2007) 18 European Journal of International Law 4, 649-668.  
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state.20 Without delving too deeply into the matter of types of ‘control’ in this aspect 
of attribution as part of the law of state responsibility, it remains therefore that the 
international tribunals dealing with such matters do as of yet not have one singular 
approach. From the ICJ’s application in the Bosnian Genocide case it can be 
concluded that the Court sees ‘effective control’ as determinant in the assessment of 
state responsibility. With regard to the denial of the provision of assistance, such a 
denial can then be attributed to the affected state, should those responsible for the 
denial have been under the effective control of that state.   
 
8.2.2 The ARSIWA, Peremptory Norms and the Denial of Humanitarian Assistance 
 
With regard to the denial of the provision of humanitarian assistance, the ARSIWA's 
notion of ‘circumstances precluding wrongfulness’ as laid down in Articles 20-25 
must be considered. These circumstances could function as potential factors in the 
prevention of the invocation of the law of state responsibility.21 As argued above, 
state responsibility for the denial of the provision of humanitarian assistance could 
arise through violations of substantive provisions and duties found in human rights 
law or humanitarian law. In this regard, the ILC noted (in relation to Article 21 
ARSIWA): 
 
“As to obligations under international humanitarian law and in relation to non-derogable 
human rights provisions, self-defence does not preclude the wrongfulness of conduct”.22 
 
As such, self-defence cannot be invoked by the affected state as a reason to deny 
humanitarian assistance. Rightfully, Chapter 5 has established that the provision of 
such assistance is a means of fulfilling non-derogable rights. Indeed, Articles 20-22 
and 24-25 ARSIWA relate to matters which the affected state in its potential denial 
of provision of humanitarian assistance cannot call upon, as seen in the following.23 
Specifically with regard to humanitarian assistance and access (with and without 
force) by third parties, the ARSIWA provision concerning consent in Article 20 is 
relevant: 
  
“Valid consent by a State to the commission of a given act by another State precludes the 
wrongfulness of that act in relation to the former State to the extent that the act remains 
within the limits of that consent”.  
                                                        
20 Prosecutor v. Tadić a.k.a “Dule” (Appeals Chamber Decision on the Defence motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction) IT-94-1-AR72 (2 October 1995) § 120.  
21 Article 20 ARSIWA pertains to consent of a second state, Article 21 ARSIWA concerns matters of 
self-defence, Article 22 ARSIWA concerns countermeasures in respect of an internationally wrongful 
act, Article 23 ARSIWA concerns force majeure, Article 24 ARSIWA relates to distress and Article 25 
ARSIWA concerns the state of necessity.  
22 ‘Report of the International Law Commission’ UN Doc A/56/10 (n 10) 178. 
23 For a further discussion ‘Report of the International Law Commission’ UN Doc A/56/10 (n 10) 173-






As discussed above in Chapter 7, in certain instances the provision of external 
humanitarian assistance is dependent on the consent of the affected state (in particular 
in times of natural disaster and non-international armed conflict). Despite having 
established that the bona fide offer of assistance; i.e. an offer in accordance with the 
principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality, cannot be construed as an 
interference in the internal affairs of the affected state, it remains relevant to also note 
that the ARSIWA’s provision in Article 20 can also be applied to the circumstance 
of the provision of assistance. As such, the giving of consent for access by third 
parties with a view to the provision of assistance would preclude the establishment 
of an unlawful interference with the affected state’s internal affairs.  
Furthermore relevant to this discussion is Article 25 ARSIWA concerning 
necessity which may – and has been – called in as an argument in favour of providing 
humanitarian assistance as opposed to obliging with another duty under international 
law.24 International humanitarian law in essence merely allows for very distinct 
circumstances ‘precluding wrongfulness’ in consideration of the provision of 
humanitarian assistance, as Chapters 6 and 7 have addressed, mainly pertaining to 
the ‘control rights’ of states and the delaying of assistance for purposes of military 
necessity, but which specifically exclude the potential starvation of civilians.25 
Furthermore, human rights law as specifically related to humanitarian assistance 
(with regard to the rights to life, food and health) precludes the invocation of a state 
of emergency, as seen in Chapter 5. Thus, a state cannot circumvent its responsibility 
for breaches of international obligations under human rights law and humanitarian 
law in relation to the provision of humanitarian assistance by claiming certain 
circumstances precluding wrongfulness; specifically necessity, in its conduct based 
upon those fields of law. The ILC notes however that the question concerning the 
legality of humanitarian interventions (outside the scope of the collective use of force 
under the UN Charter) is not covered by Article 25 ARSIWA. Thus, the ILC merely 
considers the past claims towards this concept, whilst not discussing the potential 
breaches of international law that such claims in itself may amount to, given the fact 
that the use of force outside the context of Chapter VII or Chapter VIII of the UN 
Charter in itself is often a violation of a (peremptory) norm of international law. The 
need to invoke the state of necessity under Article 25 ARSIWA by a third state in the 
external provision of assistance is however somewhat overcome by the ILC’s 
inclusion of Article 41 ARSIWA, which will be discussed in relation to the duty to 
cooperate.26 
Potentially Article 23 ARSIWA allows for an invocation by the affected state with 
regard to a circumstance precluding wrongfulness. Indeed when considering the 
denial of humanitarian assistance ‘force majeure’ could be considered as a potential 
excuse by the affected state. Article 23 ARSIWA states: 
 
                                                        
24  ‘Report of the International Law Commission’ UN Doc A/56/10 (n 10) 202,.  
25 Articles 23, 54 and 55 GC IV, as well as 70 and 71 AP I. Furthermore Section 8.3. 
26 Section 8.2.3 State Responsibility and the Potential Duty to Cooperate in the Event of a Breach. 
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“1. The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation 
of that State is precluded if the act is due to force majeure, that is the occurrence of an 
irresistible force or of an unforeseen event, beyond the control of the State, making it 
materially impossible in the circumstances to perform the obligation. 2. Paragraph 1 does 
not apply if: (a) The situation of force majeure is due, either alone or in combination with 
other factors, to the conduct of the State invoking it; or (b) The State has assumed the risk 
of that situation occurring”. 
 
Wrongfulness is precluded in the event of force majeure when three elements are 
cumulatively met: (1) an unforeseen event or irresistible force, (2) beyond control of 
the affected state, (3) making performance of the obligation materially impossible. 
Considering Article 23 ARSIWA relating to ‘force majeure’, the ILC has held in its 
Commentary that a state cannot claim ‘force majeure’ in the event it has itself ‘caused 
or induced the situation in question’.27 Thus, invoking ‘force majeure’ as a reason for 
the non-provision of humanitarian aid in times of conflict or occupation amounting 
to a humanitarian crisis that the affected state is to any extent partially responsible 
for, shall be quite difficult. The ILC has indeed focused rather on natural disasters, 
clarifying instances in which a state may appeal force majeure for its actions through 
circumstances such as ‘earthquakes, floods or drought’, but also in the event the 
affected state’s territory should be lost due to an insurrection or military operations 
carried out by a third state.28 While Crawford argues that a ‘material impossibility’ 
leading to a claim of force majeure might also arise in the event of a combination of 
factors such as the impossibility of a state to assist foreigners affected by a natural 
disaster because a particular area of a territory is under rebel control, responsibility 
does not necessarily disappear, as it shifts from one actor to another.29 In the latter 
events, the responsibility to provide humanitarian assistance is transferred to either 
the armed groups,30 or at a later stage to the newly occupying force; as the provisions 
pertaining to the delivery of humanitarian assistance may be invoked at a certain 
stage of occupation.31 Also, the ILC Commentary argues that Article 23 ARSIWA 
may not be invoked as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness for situations in 
which the fulfilment of the obligation has merely become ‘more difficult’ rather than 
impossible, such as in the event of a political or economic crisis, nor may it be 
invoked should the situation be the result of neglect of the affected state.32 Crawford 
also argues that force majeure differs from the circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness such as distress and necessity in the sense that it implies an essentially 
                                                        
27 ‘Report of the International Law Commission’ UN Doc A/56/10 (n 10) 188. See in support  of this also 
the Arbitral Tribunal Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company v. Republic of Burundi,  I.L.R., vol. 96 
(1994), p. 279 and 318 § 55. The ILC argues that Article 23 follows by analogy Article 61 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.  
28 ‘Report of the International Law Commission’ UN Doc A/56/10 (n 10) 184.  
29 Crawford, State Responsibility: the General Part (n 2) 298. 
30 Section 6.5.1.2 regarding the obligations of armed groups in the provision of humanitarian assistance 
as argued amongst others by the Security Council and AP II.  
31 Section 6.5.3 on the invocation of provisions pertaining to the delivery of aid at various stages of 
occupation.  






involuntary act.33 Natural disasters such as cyclones, tornadoes, droughts and 
tsunamis are clearly not voluntary acts by the affected state. Claiming force majeure 
as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness specifically for the non-provision of 
humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of a natural disaster shall however remain 
difficult due to a state’s obligations under human rights law and in particular with a 
view to Article 2 ICESCR which provides for international assistance. As such, the 
ILC’s Commentary in this respect does not provide a satisfactory explanation, as it 
alludes to the possibility of invoking Article 23 ARSIWA in circumstances of natural 
disaster, whilst the ICCPR does not allow for derogation of the right to life in times 
of emergency and the ICESCR in its entirety does not contain a derogation clause. If 
and when the affected state is not capable itself of performing this duty to provide 
assistance under human rights law, it continues to have obligations under said law to 
ensure the rights to life, food and health of persons within its jurisdiction, upon which 
according to Article 2 ICESCR it must resort to external parties that are offering their 
assistance. The state of emergency clauses in the various relevant treaties particular 
to the rights with regard to the provision of assistance cannot be invoked, as discussed 
in Chapter 5. Not requesting such assistance or not allowing external assistance by 
third parties into the affected territory shall not be considered force majeure and 
thereby an acceptable circumstance precluding the wrongfulness of the non-provision 
of assistance to persons in need. Whereas the natural disaster itself may be considered 
force majeure, the non-provision of assistance shall not be considered as such. State 
responsibility for the denial of humanitarian assistance may very well ensue. Indeed, 
as the ILC itself has argued, in practice many of the appeals to force majeure have 
failed, as the circumstance was not ‘impossible’ itself, but rather increasingly 
difficult to perform.34 Allowing external help into a territory moreover is not difficult 
per se.  
Furthermore Article 26 ARSIWA must be taken into account regardless of the 
specific circumstance precluding wrongfulness an affected state may attempt to claim 
as potential justification for its denial of humanitarian assistance. Article 26 
ARSIWA stipulates with regard to the chapter in ARSIWA pertaining to 
circumstances precluding wrongfulness: 
  
“Nothing in this chapter precludes the wrongfulness of any act of a State which is not in 
conformity with an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international 
law”. 
 
Thus, conduct in breach of a peremptory norm is excluded from the scope of 
circumstances the ARSIWA recognises as precluding the wrongfulness of an act 
under international law. A ‘circumstance precluding wrongfulness’ as meant in 
Articles 20-25 ARSIWA may not be claimed as a waiver of responsibility for the 
violation of a norm of jus cogens. Although a discussion continues to exist as to those 
                                                        
33 Crawford, State Responsibility: the General Part (n 2) 295. 
34 ‘Report of the International Law Commission’ UN Doc A/56/10 (n 10) 185.  
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norms which are currently accepted in international law as jus cogens,35 the ICJ has 
determined that peremptory norms certainly include the prohibition of aggression, 
genocide, torture, slavery and racial discrimination.36 In the above Chapters it has 
been discussed on numerous occasions that humanitarian assistance cannot be based 
upon racial discrimination, and moreover the non-provision of assistance may not 
lead to genocide. Through various cases before the ICTY, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity have also been recognised by this tribunal as peremptory norms of 
international law.37 As will be discussed in more depth in further Sections, the denial 
of assistance may amount to such crimes. Furthermore, the ICJ has noted in its 1996 
Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons that 
certain principles of international humanitarian law constitute ‘intransgressible 
principles of international customary law’.38 In its 2006 Fragmentation of 
International Law Study, the ILC has reiterated these ‘candidates’ for the status of 
jus cogens.39  
The ICJ places the well-known Martens Clause amongst such principles, and 
declares it to have found a modern codification in Article 1(2) AP I of the Geneva 
Conventions. This Article distinctly refers to the principle of humanity and thus the 
notion of peremptory norms becomes even more relevant to the discussion 
                                                        
35 See for a discussion on the norms which amount to jus cogens amongst others: Rafael Nieto Navia, 
‘International Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) And International Humanitarian Law’ in LC Vohrah, F 
Pocar et al, (eds) Man’s Inhumanity to Man: Essays in Honour of Antonio Cassese (Kluwer Law 
International 2003); Alexander Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law (Oxford 
University Press 2006); and Malcolm Shaw, International Law (Cambridge University Press 2008) 303, 
720-721. 
36 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application : 2002) (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2006, p. 6, § 64 concerning 
the prohibition of genocide; Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. 
Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 422 § 99 concerning the prohibition of torture; somewhat 
more generally concerning erga omnes obligations the ICJ Barcelona Traction, Light and Power 
Company Limited (Belgium v. Spain) case ICJ Reports 1970, § 33-34 regarding the prohibition of 
aggression and genocide, as well as ‘basic human rights’ such as the protection from slavery and racial 
discrimination. 
37 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al. (IT-95-16) ''Lašva Valley''(Judgment Trial Chamber) IT-95-16-T (14 
January 2000 § 520; Prosecutor v. Furundzija (Trial Judgment) IT-95-17/1-T (ICTY 10 December 1998) 
§ 151-157; Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic (aka “Pavo”), Hazim Delic and Esad Landžo 
(aka “Zenga”) (Celebici - Case) (Appeals Chamber) IT-96-21-A (20 February 2001) § 172; Prosecutor 
v. Krstic (Trial Judgment) IT-98-33-T (2 August 2001) § 541. 
38 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226, § 
78-79.  
39 ‘Fragmentation Of International Law: Difficulties Arising From The Diversification And Expansion 
Of International Law’, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission (13 April 2006) 
UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 § 374: “Overall, the most frequently cited candidates for the status of jus cogens 
include: (a) the prohibition of aggressive use of force; (b) the right to self-defence; (c) the prohibition of 
genocide; (d) the prohibition of torture; (e) crimes against humanity; (f) the prohibition of slavery and 
slave trade; (g) the prohibition of piracy; (h) the prohibition of racial discrimination and apartheid, and 







concerning responsibilities in the provision of humanitarian assistance.40 By 
considering the Martens Clause as part of these ‘intransgressible principles of 
international customary law’, the ICJ thus places Article 1(2) AP I and thereby the 
principle of humanity, one of the core foundations and cornerstones upon which the 
legal framework concerning the provision of humanitarian assistance is set, within 
this context also. It stands to reason that if the text of Article 1(2) AP I which states 
that civilians remain ‘under the protection and authority of the principles of 
international law derived from […] the principle of humanity’ is considered by the 
ICJ to be the modern translation of the Martens Clause, which itself is an 
‘intransgressible principle’ of customary international law, then the protection of 
civilians by the principle of humanity itself must also be considered as such. Indeed, 
the principle of humanity has in Chapter 2 been explicated as one of the guiding 
principles along which assistance is provided. Therefore, abiding by the principle of 
humanity – by way of the Martens Clause – is a manner of keeping in line with 
peremptory norms of international law.41  
In relation to the provision of humanitarian assistance given the nature of the 
topic, namely the delivery of emergency aid in times of a humanitarian crisis, 
potential violations of jus cogens will most likely be related to the prohibition of war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and racial discrimination.42 Violating the protection 
of persons in times of crisis by violating the principle of humanity would then 
potentially be considered as such also by the ICJ. The deprivation by the affected 
state of humanitarian assistance to persons in need may very well turn the ‘affected’ 
state into the ‘inflicting’ state, leading to state responsibility for the non-provision of 
humanitarian assistance. Such responsibility is specific to the circumstance and the 
related breach of international law. In times of conflict or occupation, depriving a 
population of food, water, shelter and medicine could lead to war crimes. At all 
times, and therefore also in times of conflict, occupation or a (natural) disaster, racial 
discrimination is prohibited and the (non)-provision of humanitarian assistance may 
not be based upon this.43 It has furthermore been established by the ICJ, in referral 
to the ICERD, that access to humanitarian assistance is a right of persons under the 
ICERD and human rights law.44 Crimes against humanity may also occur in either 
conflict, occupation or (natural) disaster as it has been established in international 
law that the nexus to an armed conflict is no longer required for crimes against 
                                                        
40 Article 1(2) AP I states: “In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, 
civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law 
derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public 
conscience”. 
41 2.2.3 The Principles for the Delivery of Assistance.  
42 8.6.2 Enforcement through International Criminal Law.  
43 See in this regard Georgia’s attempt to claim ‘obstruction of access to humanitarian assistance’ as 
potential racial discrimination in Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation),  Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 
I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 70 § 17.  
44 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(Georgia v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order of 15 October 2008, I.C.J. Reports 2008, 
p. 353 § 149 B.  
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humanity and that such crimes may therefore occur also in circumstances which are 
not related to an armed conflict.45 Meron notes that ‘systematic gross violations of 
human rights directed at civilians’ are also considered as crimes against humanity.46 
This above determination regarding war crimes, crimes against humanity and the 
prohibition of racial discrimination (the latter in particular respect to various human 
rights) provides for a broad range of potential violations of peremptory norms of 
international law that are related to the framework of the provision of humanitarian 
assistance and that may lead to incurring state responsibility. In particular, given 
their broad applicability, crimes against humanity or racial discrimination could be 
the peremptory norms through which state responsibility will most likely be claimed 
with regard to the denial of humanitarian assistance, in particular if the circumstance 
is lacking an armed conflict, but might be related to a (natural) disaster.   
Article 23 ARSIWA concerning force majeure, which is the only Article in the 
ARSIWA’s circumstances precluding wrongfulness that may potentially be invoked 
by the affected state as a reason it has denied humanitarian assistance, may therefore 
not be invoked in the event such a denial leads to a breach of the prohibition of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, or racial discrimination. Thus, 
justifiably invoking Article 23 ARSIWA has another added threshold for the affected 
state: it may not include a breach of a norm of jus cogens, alongside the difficulties 
of arguing force majeure if it has not requested assistance from third parties to 
provide external emergency aid following Article 2 ICESCR and 55 and 56 UN 
Charter. Furthermore, although not immediately recognised as ‘jus cogens’, states 
must also ensure they do not violate the principle of humanity, as determined by the 
ICJ. By way of the Martens Clause, which the ICJ has argued forms part of what it 
coined ‘intransgressible principles of international customary law’, this principle is 
arguably part of the body of jus cogens norms. This is a new concept as such, given 
that this phrasing of ‘intrangressible norms’ was not previously part of international 
legal lingo. It appears, as argued by Vincent Chetail, that the Court has wanted to 
emphasise that such norms, within international humanitarian law as a legal field, 
hold particular importance compared to other norms of customary international legal 
nature.47 
It must be noted that, given the fact that the ARSIWA have only recently been 
codified, they have to date not been used in the enforcement of a state's obligation in 
the provision of humanitarian assistance, nor have those pre-existing elements of 
customary status been invoked in this regard. Therefore, it may be too soon to tell 
whether in fact states will resort to the use of Articles 42 and 48 ARSIWA in their 
attempt to hold a state affected by a humanitarian crisis responsible for the denial of 
                                                        
45 Prosecutor v. Tadić a.k.a “Dule” (Appeals Chamber Decision on the Defence motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction) IT-94-1-AR72 (2 October 1995) § 141; UN CHR Report of the Secretary General 
‘Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Fundamental Standards of Humanity’ (18 December 1998) 
UN Doc E/CN.4/1999/92 § 12; and ICC Statute Article 7. See also 8.6.2. 
46 Theodor Meron, ‘The Humanization of Humanitarian Law’, (2000) 94 American Journal of 
International Law 2, 265.  
47 Vincent Chetail, ‘The contribution of the International Court of Justice to international humanitarian 






humanitarian assistance, or whether such a state will indeed claim a circumstance 
precluding the wrongfulness of its actions, such as that of Article 23 ARSIWA, 
despite difficulties concerning norms of jus cogens and obligations under existing 
human rights law.48  
 
8.2.3 State Responsibility and the Potential Duty to Cooperate in the Event of a 
Breach 
 
The law concerning the international responsibility of states lastly not only places 
responsibilities on the affected state, but also places a responsibility upon third states 
to cooperate to bring violations of international law to an end. Thus, not only the 
affected state could have a duty under the law of state responsibility to provide 
assistance to persons in need, but third states may have also certain responsibilities.49 
These responsibilities must be distinguished from the rights and duties discussed in 
Chapter 7 regarding the provision of assistance by third parties. Such rights of third 
parties are related directly to the provision of assistance under substantive bodies of 
law such as human rights or humanitarian law. Subsequently, the denial of this 
provision of assistance through external sources could indeed result in circumstances 
which might be construed as violations of international law that must be brought to 
an end. This is the subject-matter at hand: the duty to cooperate for third states under 
the law of state responsibility as an enforcement mechanism to bring violations of 
international law to an end. Such a duty is derived and results from the duties of the 
affected state not to violate international law through the unlawful denial of 
humanitarian assistance.  
Article 1(3) of the UN Charter states that it is a purpose of the Organization to 
‘achieve international cooperation in promoting and encouraging respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all’. In relation to the provision of humanitarian 
assistance, this principle is brought into practice through calls upon the international 
community by the General Assembly and especially the Security Council as 
discussed in Chapter 7 with regard to assisting in the provision emergency aid, to 
put an end to certain serious on-going crises.50 The UN therefore recognises a 
responsibility of the international community at large to act in the face of large-scale 
crises and human rights violations. This responsibility was asserted very early on in 
the work of the UN in the well-known General Assembly’s ‘Declaration on 
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations’ of 1970, that 
                                                        
48 The consequences of invoking a circumstance precluding the wrongfulness of an act under international 
law remain beyond the scope of this research. In that regard, see Article 27 ARSIWA and further.  
49 This research will not address the various rights and duties states may have under their national 
legislation, but will rather focus on the international legal aspects.  
50 Sections 7.4.2 Security Council Resolutions and the Right to Access and 7.4.4 General Assembly 
Resolutions and the Right to Access.  
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formulated the ‘duty of States to co-operate with one another in accordance with the 
Charter’.51  
Today, the ILC has codified more extensively the duties and responsibilities of 
the international community with regard to breaches of peremptory and other norms 
of international law. Article 41(1) ARSIWA distinctly calls upon third states to 
cooperate in bringing to an end any breach of peremptory norms that ‘involves a 
gross or systematic failure by the responsible State’.52 The obligation therefore only 
arises should there be a breach of a peremptory norm, and if the affected state was 
involved through a gross or systematic failure. This provision envisages a positive 
obligation, that may be executed either through an institution such as the UN, or in 
a non-institutionalised manner.53 Thus, if the lack of provision of humanitarian 
assistance by the affected state results in the gross or systematic breach of a 
peremptory norm of international law, third states may have a responsibility to bring 
this breach to a halt. Given the current restricted number of norms that are recognised 
in the international community as jus cogens, such a situation may only in reality 
apply to the legal framework of humanitarian assistance in the event the deprivation 
of receipt of humanitarian assistance by a population amounts to crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, genocide or racial discrimination. Benvenisti concurs, 
arguing that indeed circumstances such as crimes against humanity and grave 
breaches of humanitarian law are ‘recognized instances where sovereigns are 
required to invest resources in the effort to protect humanity’s concerns’.54 While 
Article 41(1) calls for ‘lawful’ measures, difficulties might arise when these serious 
breaches remain within the territorial jurisdiction of the affected state, and no 
particular third state may be inclined to initiate the ending of the breach.55 Often 
resort shall be had to the UN Security Council and the collective use of force, 
whereas another international legal discussion might arise as to the lawfulness of the 
use of force in ending the breach according to Article 41(1) ARSIWA.56 
Arguably the vicinity of a state to the crisis can be relevant in the provision of 
assistance and the related legal rights or duties. Naturally, such states may have a 
greater motivation concerning the upholding of political, economic and social 
stability in their particular area of the world. Legally however, if a state may have a 
responsibility in the creation of a crisis, such as can be the case with trans-boundary 
natural or man-made disasters, should such a state also bear active responsibility for 
the delivery of aid to its neighbouring state? According to Vukas, principal drafter 
of the Bruges Resolution of 2003, the state which ‘bears some responsibility for a 
                                                        
51 UNGA Res 2625 (XXV) (24 October 1970) ‘Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations’, Annex. 
52 Article 40 and 41 ARSIWA. 
53 ‘Report of the International Law Commission’ UN Doc A/56/10 (n 10) 286-287. 
54 Eyal Benvenisti ‘Sovereigns as Trustees of humanity: The Concept and its Normative Implications’, 
(2012) SSRN accessed 24 January 2012, 27. 
55 Crawford, State Responsibility: the General Part (n 2) 386-387.  






disaster’ that then affects another state, will also be obliged to provide assistance.57 
Furthermore, Vukas argues that in particular those states in the vicinity of the 
humanitarian crisis should offer aid to the victims to ‘the maximum extent 
possible’.58 A somewhat vague conclusion therefore remains concerning 
neighbouring states. Indeed, as assessed in Chapter 6, bearing responsibility as 
‘affected state’ leads to the duty to provide assistance. The ARSIWA also address 
the issue of vicinity with regard to the duties of the international community 
according to Article 41 ARSIWA. The Article stipulates that the duty to cooperate 
for third states is applicable regardless of whether or not such states were affected 
by the serious breach themselves.59 The ILC Commentary to the ARSIWA argues 
that while Article 41(1) might according to some be a reflection of ‘progressive 
development’, such cooperation, in particularly in an institutionalised manner, is in 
practice already being carried out in response to the gravest violations of 
international law.60 Such arguments are supported by the UN Charter and practice, 
as seen above. As such, the ILC argues that Article 41(1) is an attempt to:  
 
“strengthen the existing mechanisms of cooperation, on the basis that all States are called 
upon to make an appropriate response to the serious breaches referred to in article 40”.61 
 
Indeed, often such responses occur through the UN framework by means of the 
Security Council and the use of force, which is addressed in following Sections. 
Furthermore, Article 41(2) ARSIWA distinctly provides that states are prohibited 
from maintaining a circumstance which is ‘opposable to all States in the sense of 
barring erga omnes the legality of a situation which is maintained in violation of 
international law’.62 Thus, not only do states have a positive duty to cooperate in 
ending a serious breach of a peremptory norm, the law of state responsibility will 
hold third states responsible should they assist in maintaining such breaches after 
the fact.63 In line with this perspective, the General Assembly has held the viewpoint 
pertaining to the provision of humanitarian assistance that it is in fact also a 
‘collective responsibility’ to uphold principles such as human dignity, and to ensure 
that the victims of humanitarian emergencies are given ‘every assistance’ possible.64 
Moreover, this perspective of cooperation has also been asserted by the ICJ in its 
2007 Bosnia v Serbia judgment, where the Court argued that ‘an obligation of 
conduct’ exists for state parties to the Genocide Convention to prevent the 
                                                        
57 Budislav Vukas, ‘Humanitarian Assistance in Cases of Emergency’, (2007) Max Planck Encyclopedia 
of Public International Law § 22.  
58 Ibid.  
59 ‘Report of the International Law Commission’ UN Doc A/56/10 (n 10) 287. 
60 ‘Report of the International Law Commission’ UN Doc A/56/10 (n 10) 287. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1971) 
p. 16, § 126. 
63 ‘Report of the International Law Commission’ UN Doc A/56/10 (n 10) 290. 
64 UNGA Res 55/2 (18 September 2000) UN Doc A/RES/55/2 ‘United Nations Millennium Declaration’ 
§ 2, 26.  
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occurrence of genocide. Although the ICJ expressly asserts that it is merely 
reflecting the Genocide Convention’s scope of the ‘duty to prevent’ and is not 
attempting a general jurisprudence on the matter, it does acknowledge that the 
Genocide Convention is certainly not the only international legal instrument that 
provides for a duty of states parties to take steps in the prevention of acts the 
instrument attempts to prohibit.65 In its assessment of such an obligation under the 
Genocide Convention, the Court determines:  
 
“It is clear that the obligation in question is one of conduct and not one of result, in the 
sense that a State cannot be under an obligation to succeed, whatever the circumstances, 
in preventing the commission of genocide: the obligation of States parties is rather to 
employ all means reasonably available to them, so as to prevent genocide so far as 
possible. A State does not incur responsibility simply because the desired result is not 
achieved; responsibility is however incurred if the State manifestly failed to take all 
measures to prevent genocide which were within its power, and which might have 
contributed to preventing the genocide. In this area the notion of “due diligence”, which 
calls for an assessment in concreto, is of critical importance. Various parameters operate 
when assessing whether a State has duly discharged the obligation concerned. The first, 
which varies greatly from one State to another, is clearly the capacity to influence 
effectively the action of persons likely to commit, or already committing, genocide. This 
capacity itself depends, among other things, on the geographical distance of the State 
concerned from the scene of the events, and on the strength of the political links, as well 
as links of all other kinds, between the authorities of that State and the main actors in the 
events. The State’s capacity to influence must also be assessed by legal criteria, since it is 
clear that every State may only act within the limits permitted by international law; seen 
thus, a State’s capacity to influence may vary depending on its particular legal position 
vis-à-vis the situations and persons facing the danger, or the reality, of genocide. On the 
other hand, it is irrelevant whether the State whose responsibility is in issue claims, or 
even proves, that even if it had employed all means reasonably at its disposal, they would 
not have sufficed to prevent the commission of genocide. As well as being generally 
difficult to prove, this is irrelevant to the breach of the obligation of conduct in question, 
the more so since the possibility remains that the combined efforts of several States, each 
complying with its obligation to prevent, might have achieved the result — averting the 
commission of genocide — which the efforts of only one State were insufficient to 
produce”.66 
 
The Court determines in the above that a ‘manifest failing to take all measures’ in 
the prevention of genocide might lead to the determination of state responsibility for 
third states, whilst it recognises several criteria that may influence whether indeed 
such a duty is fulfilled. The Court notes in this regard a capacity of third states to 
influence those committing genocide, which may depend on geographical distance, 
the strength of political or other ties and other factors. Interestingly, and in line with 
the ARSIWA’s approach on the duty to cooperate, the ICJ notes the obligation of 
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conduct is not waived in the event a state’s efforts ‘would not have sufficed’, given 
the fact that the combined efforts of several states could have achieved the desired 
result. Thus, an obligation continues to lie on each individual state, whilst taking into 
account the criteria recognised by the Court. Drawing a parallel between the crime 
of genocide and the duty of the affected and third state to provide humanitarian 
assistance, in the latter instance an obligation of conduct can be discerned also, in 
particular when considering the provisions in human rights law and international 
humanitarian law. Both fields of law ascertain various duties of the affected state to 
provide humanitarian aid in times of crisis, varying from specific duties to not 
obstruct the assistance being provided to the duty in human rights law to actively 
seek assistance from third parties in the fulfilment of the rights as enshrined in the 
ICESCR.67 The international community is called upon in both corpora juris to assist 
in the provision of aid or the fulfilment of certain rights, from which a duty can be 
deduced to refrain from performing an opposite act, namely reinforcing the crisis.68  
Regarding the matter of vicinity, the joint findings of the ARSIWA Commentary 
and the ICJ conclude that indeed, while it may not be relevant that third states are 
individually affected by the breach in question, the duty of conduct (as formulated 
by the ICJ) and duty to cooperate (as formulated in Article 41 ARSIWA) might be 
found more easily and at a lower threshold for a neighbouring country. In particular 
in relation to a humanitarian crisis, with its risks of spilling over into neighbouring 
countries and thereby enhancing the instability in a particular region, proximity is a 
factor, albeit difficult to definitively ascertain legally. Such difficulties arise from 
the fact that the duty to prevent large-scale violations of human rights as currently 
laid down in international law rests upon the international community as a whole. 
Yet, the notion of proximity and geography cannot be swept aside. In particular, this 
is supported by the large amount of regional organisations taking responsibilities 
upon themselves in the face of crises.69 This duty for third states to prevent the 
exacerbation of the crisis, as seen in the Court’s analysis of the duty in the context 
of the Genocide Convention, must therefore not be seen in a vacuum, but in 
combination of this same duty of other states parties to the treaty at hand. An 
example is the regional Kampala Convention pertaining to the protection and 
assistance of IDPs, where this perspective is translated into a right of the African 
Union to intervene in the event of war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
genocide.70 Together, a combined ‘duty to prevent’ of both neighbouring states and 
                                                        
67 Annex to Chapter 6.  
68 Annex to Chapter 7. 
69 Amongst others ASEAN’s initiative to launch a Humanitarian Assistance Centre for the purpose of 
collective responses to disasters and the African Union’s Stand-by Force as created in Article 4(h) of its 
Constitutive Act in order to intervene in member states should war crimes, genocide or crimes against 
humanity take place. The tasks and mandate of the Stand-by Force are elaborated upon in the Protocol 
Relating To The Establishment Of The Peace And Security Council Of The African Union Adopted by 
the 1st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union Durban (9 July 2002)  Article 3(f) and 
Article 15. 
70 Articles 8(1) and 9 African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced 
Persons in Africa (Kampala 22 October 2009).  
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those further away but with potentially more financial means or resources at their 
disposal, might be positively formulated as a duty to cooperate; as done by Article 
41(1) ARSIWA. However, a duty may not be imposed upon assisting states 
according to the ARSIWA unless non-provision results in the violation of 
peremptory norms, or such norms are violated and the affected state was involved 
through a gross or systematic failure.71 Therefore, from the above it can be 
determined that states may have an obligation of conduct individually in the 
prevention of certain breaches of international law, which may amount to a 
combined duty of the larger international community to cooperate in such prevention 
or bringing to a halt of breaches of peremptory norms as determined by the 
ARSIWA. In particular in relation to humanitarian assistance, such duties would rest 
upon states in relation to crimes against humanity, war crimes and/or racial 
discrimination, and potentially genocide.  
The ARSIWA’s approach with regard to the duty to cooperate is echoed verbatim 
in Article 42 of the ILC Draft Articles on the responsibility of international 
organisations.72 Thus, international organisations such as the UN, or other regional 
institutions would, under these Draft Articles, have a similar duty to that of states in 
the cooperation to end serious breaches of international law by an international 
organisation.73 Interestingly therefore, international organisations according to these 
Draft Articles could be held responsible for failing to cooperate with states in ending 
such serious breaches. Considering the nature of the norms, the ‘jurisdiction’ of the 
UN Security Council would in particular be affected. Under Article 43 of the Draft 
Articles on the responsibility of international organisations, responsibility for 
breaches may be invoked by other international organisations or states, not 
individuals or other actors. For the purpose of this research however, it must be noted 
that the role of international organisations is considered that of provider of 
humanitarian assistance, rather than that of denier, which is also reflected in practice, 
where international organisations assume the role of provider in the event the 
affected state does not provide assistance. Should, however, an international 
organisation violate a peremptory norm of international law, Draft Article 42 might 
provide relief. But currently it remains to be seen whether the General Assembly will 
adopt the Articles as developed by the ILC. 
A well-known manner in which international organisations have taken a duty to 
cooperate in the event of a breach (by a state) upon themselves in cooperation with 
states is the collective use of force to end certain violations of peremptory norms that 
have been addressed: violations of the prohibition of the use of force, genocide, 
crimes against humanity or war crimes. Often, serious breaches of international 
humanitarian law or human rights law also lead to the establishment of a need for 
the collective use of force. This has been distinctly reflected in Article 89 AP I of 
the Geneva Conventions, which declares:  
                                                        
71 Articles 40 and 41 ARSIWA.  
72 Article 42 of the ‘Draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations’ of 2011. 
73 ‘Draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations, with commentaries’ adopted by the 






“In situations of serious violations of the Conventions or of this Protocol, the High 
Contracting Parties undertake to act, jointly or individually, in co-operation with the 
United Nations and in conformity with the United Nations Charter”. 
 
The Additional Protocol thereby clearly recognises a duty to cooperate through the 
call ‘to act’ in conformity with the UN Charter should ‘serious violations’ of 
international humanitarian law take place in times of an international armed conflict. 
AP I itself does not provide for the specific measures which are to be taken in such 
cooperation to bring the violations of the law to an end, but rather leaves these open 
according to the practices of the UN Charter. The Commentary, however, does 
explicate that such serious violations are not confined to the ‘grave breaches’ regime 
of the Conventions, and may therefore cover a wider scope.74 As such, they may 
include amongst others violations pertaining to the duties concerning the provision 
of humanitarian assistance. In this sense, in particular the violation of the protection 
of civilians in accordance with the principle of humanity as codified in Article 1(2) 
AP I is of relevance. The circumstances in international law relating to (the denial 
of) the provision of assistance which may amount to the enforcement through the 
use of force is addressed in the following Sections. The wording of Article 89 AP I 
itself follows that of Article 56 UN Charter, calling upon member states to ‘pledge 
themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization 
for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55’, which in turn reflects the 
duty of states to promote human rights (development). These two Articles are a 
further explication of Article 1(3) UN Charter that was discussed at the beginning of 
this Section. Such a view is also held by Article 1 common to the four Geneva 
Conventions, declaring that all states have a duty to ensure respect for the 
Convention in all circumstances, implying a duty to ensure compliance even when 
that state party is not involved in a particular conflict.75 Thus, when third states must 
uphold the provisions of this Convention, this naturally includes those provisions 
pertaining to the provision of humanitarian assistance.  
It must therefore be noted that throughout various sources of international law; 
including the UN Charter, the ARSIWA, the Geneva Conventions and the 
jurisprudence of the ICJ, a duty to cooperate exists for the international community 
to bring serious breaches of international law that can be related to the denial of 
humanitarian assistance, to an end.  
 
8.2.4 State Responsibility, Humanitarian Assistance and Legal Developments 
 
Another legal development by the ILC – although not (yet) codified like the 
ARSIWA – is the work on the ‘Protection of persons in the event of disasters’. These 
                                                        
74 Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann (eds) Commentary on the Additional 
Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Protocol I and II (International 
Committee of the Red Cross 1987) Protocol I Article 89, 1033-1034. See also Section 8.6 Methods of 
Enforcement through Individual (Criminal) Responsibility. 
75 This has also been reiterated by the ICJ in its Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136, § 158.  
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Draft Articles are currently being developed and thereby do not amount to lex lata, 
compared to large parts of the ARSIWA, yet are relevant to consider as potential 
state responsibility may be invoked should they be developed into law. Thus, 
although they do not form part of the body of hard law, they are more specifically 
tailored towards the provision of assistance. Whereas the purpose of these Draft 
Articles is not to attempt the drafting of a new human rights convention, the Articles 
do incorporate a responsibility of the affected state to provide in humanitarian 
assistance and seek international assistance should the national capacities be 
overwhelmed, in a similar manner to Article 2 ICESCR.76 Interestingly, Draft Article 
12 notes a ‘primary role’ of the affected state in the coordination and direction of aid 
although not strongly formulating a ‘responsibility’, which leads to the inference of 
a ‘secondary role’ for potential third parties, for the provision of humanitarian 
assistance. In the absence of an actual legal ‘responsibility’, it would then also not 
be possible to assert state responsibility for such third parties in the event they fail to 
comply with such coordination or direction. Enforcement of such an Article, should 
it be codified, shall therefore remain difficult.  
Currently, the Draft Articles are formulated generally from the perspective of the 
affected state, as opposed to drafting a potential (joint) responsibility for third parties 
in cooperation or assistance in the aftermath of a disaster. Draft Article 12 decisively 
states that the affected state has the ‘duty to ensure the protection of persons and 
provision of disaster relief and assistance on its territory’. This formulation of a 
responsibility of ‘result’ shall thus allow the invocation of state responsibility in the 
event these Draft Articles are codified and in the event an affected state does not 
comply with said duty. Although the Draft Articles’ outlook is that of the affected 
state, Draft Article 8 has a more encompassing view and clearly formulates that: 
 
“In accordance with the present draft articles, States shall, as appropriate, cooperate 
among themselves, and with the United Nations and other competent intergovernmental 
organizations, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and 
the International Committee of the Red Cross, and with relevant non-governmental 
organizations”. 
 
Thus, through the wording ‘shall’, the ILC envisages a duty of states to ‘cooperate’, 
which has been elaborated upon in Draft Article 9 to include humanitarian 
assistance.77 Such a duty can be read as a duty of conduct, as opposed to a duty of 
result such as enshrined in Article 41 ARSIWA (dealing with breaches of peremptory 
norms). In the absence of a duty of result with regard to international cooperation, 
arguing state responsibility for the violation of such a duty remains difficult, whilst 
potentially the failure to ‘try’ may be argued. The ILC Draft Articles, with a view to 
enforcement, appear to be taking the route therefore of creating international 
                                                        
76 See Draft Articles 8, 12 and 13 as well as Sections 6.5.9, 6.5.10, 7.5.9 and 7.5.10. 
77 Draft Article 9 ILC protection of persons in the event of disasters declares: “For the purposes of the 
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responsibility for the affected state, but such responsibility remains lacking for third 
states or other parties, should they fail to comply with the duty to cooperate in the 
provision of assistance. However, that being said, should such a failure to provide 
aid result in a breach of Articles 40 and 41 ARSIWA, the international community 
may still be held responsible. Naturally, the affected state shall also continue to be 
held responsible under the current regime of Articles 2, 3, 42 and, progressively, 48 
ARSIWA.  
 
8.3 Acts Constituting Denial or Obstruction of Humanitarian Assistance  
 
Denial or obstruction of humanitarian assistance by the affected state can be twofold, 
as the affected state itself may deny the affected population the provision of aid, 
and/or alternatively the state may deny third parties access for the provision of 
assistance to the affected population. Given the potential dual nature of the denial of 
assistance, a state may indeed be in violation of international law on multiple 
accounts. Only upon the establishment of a violation of a norm of international law, 
is enforcement a possibility. Reality on the ground in times of a humanitarian crisis 
indeed often does not mirror the rights and duties reflected in the legal provisions at 
hand. This discrepancy results in both a need and a calling for enforcement methods 
in the event the affected state does not abide by the duties resting upon it according 
to international law, and does not allow persons in need or third parties to exercise 
their rights according to that same law in the provision of international humanitarian 
assistance. In certain instances, the ‘affected’ state may even become the ‘inflicting’ 
state. A well-known recent example in the field of natural disasters includes that of 
cyclone Nargis hitting Myanmar in 2008, upon which the government was not willing 
to allow certain rescue teams into the country.78 In the context of armed conflict, the 
dire situation in Syria also comes to mind, as the Syrian government has repeatedly 
refused international aid to be allowed into the country, as well as refusing 
international providers of such aid.79  
In such instances, the affected state may be violating international law, as it denies 
the provision of humanitarian assistance to its population, leading to a need for 
enforcement. Having asserted that persons in need of food, water, medical supplies 
and shelter should be enabled to receive such assistance, the legal consequences of 
the denial of there become relevant, with a view to potential enforcement methods. 
Legal consequences must specifically be addressed, as they enable persons in need 
of assistance to obtain such assistance through legal methods and mechanisms. Such 
legal, and in particular forceful, consequences as discussed in this Chapter must 
                                                        
78 Reports of the Myanmar government refusing external delivery of aid can be found at 
<http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/04/29/burma-after-cyclone-repression-impedes-civil-society-and-aid-
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79 Reports of the denial by Syria of access by the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator Valerie Amos can 
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however be seen as a last resort. All other options, via diplomatic and humanitarian 
channels, must be sought after first.80 The legal approach of enforcement is not 
necessarily the quickest or most viable solution in all situations, but it is important to 
establish which manners of redress are possible in the event of such flagrant 
violations of international law that amount to the denial of assistance, when other 
attempts (such as diplomatic methods) have failed. 
 
8.3.1 Circumstances of Denial or Obstruction: Determining a Humanitarian Crisis  
 
In the law pertaining to the provision of humanitarian assistance, one of the greatest 
problems is the determination of what specifically constitutes an act of ‘denial of 
humanitarian assistance’, or obstruction thereof. Indeed, as discussed in Chapters 6 
and 7, in certain instances it is up to the discretion of the affected state and its 
sovereignty to determine whether or not it shall allow the external provision of 
humanitarian assistance. This discretion is, however, limited by the boundaries in 
international law that might lead to state responsibility or even individual 
responsibility. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 have indeed asserted that the current legal 
framework on the provision of humanitarian assistance demands far-reaching efforts 
from the affected state. In fact, it is not only the concept of state sovereignty as a 
‘responsibility’ towards citizens that enforces this viewpoint, but also vice versa: the 
currently held perspective that the needs of those in times of a crisis must be met, 
through access for humanitarian assistance, is changing the nature of sovereignty. 
As Spieker has argued, although a right to offer or provide external assistance can 
be established, the problem lies in the enforceability of that title.81 Several distinct 
and tiered questions are indeed crucial in this assertion and determination. 
Firstly, the question whether a territory and population are in fact dealing with a 
humanitarian crisis needs to be addressed. In Section 3.3.3 it has been proposed that 
a humanitarian crisis is ‘a situation deriving from a variety of origins, including 
natural or man-made disaster, armed conflict and occupation; causing grave damages 
of a personal or material nature to persons, where (national/external) assistance is 
needed as the local capacity is either overwhelmed, unable or sometimes unwilling 
to manage the circumstances’. Thus, a situation must exist in which a need or 
necessity for humanitarian assistance exists, either from within the state or from 
external sources.  
Important in answering this initial question is a second related question: Who 
determines whether or not a local capacity is overwhelmed, unable or unwilling to 
provide assistance; leading to the term used in international humanitarian law of an 
‘inadequately supplied’ territory? Based on the cornerstone notion in international 
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law of state sovereignty, a certain margin of appreciation is left to the affected state. 
Examples of this can be found in the law pertaining to non-international armed 
conflicts and which are based on the incorporation of consent of the affected state.82 
But today as established, state sovereignty entails not only an external shield but also 
an internal responsibility, and consent to offers by third parties may not always be 
withheld, which is directly related to this notion of ‘adequacy of supply’.83 Leaving 
the determination of the ‘inadequacy of supply’ solely in the hands of the affected 
state, would result in this state determining itself whether or not it is violating 
international law. As such, the determination in international law regarding the 
question of whether or not humanitarian assistance is needed in certain instances 
should by default be handed over to an authoritative body.84 If the denial of (internal 
or external) humanitarian assistance is a violation of international law; namely when 
the denial cannot be justified according to the provisions discussed in Chapters 6 and 
7, then the determination of what constitutes denial of the provision should not be 
left to the affected state. As will be seen in this Chapter, such a body can be a 
judiciary body like the ICJ, ICC and various human rights courts, or a supranational 
body such as the Security Council. Not one single body is, or can be authoritative, 
as the nature of the crisis may determine which body shall be the recipient of the 
question to answer. Also, whilst such bodies cannot be presumed infallible, in the 
absence of one single judiciary, this is the current system in international law which 
can be utilised and will be explored in this Chapter.  
Based on the above, it is thus possible to establish that the initial assessment for 
enforcement options lies in the determination of whether or not a territory is suffering 
from a humanitarian crisis, and whether the affected territory is adequately supplied 
by the affected state. The determination of this lies initially with the affected state, 
given its sovereign duties, but may – considering potential violation of international 
norms – be extrapolated to the judgment of an international authoritative body.  
 
8.3.2 The Refusal of Consent: Arbitrariness and Enforcement 
 
Enforcement becomes relevant when the affected state is not fulfilling its duties 
under international law. This relevancy has a ‘tiered’ approach. Only upon 
establishing the first tier or criterion, namely that assistance is needed in a specific 
territory and that the affected state is not fulfilling its own duties under international 
law (Chapter 6), does the second tier become relevant, which is related to 
international assistance. In this subsequent tier the question is raised whether or not 
an offer of humanitarian assistance from external parties may be refused; in other 
words: whether or not the consent of the affected state may be withheld (Chapter 7) 
and when such withholding is in line with international law.  
                                                        
82 Amongst others Article 18 AP II.  
83 4.2.3 and 4.3 on the notion of state sovereignty today.  
84 UNGA Res 60/1 (24 October 2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1 ‘World Summit Outcome Document’ § 118, 
138 and 139. 
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Again, a certain degree of autonomy in answering this question may be assumed 
from the notion of state sovereignty.85 However, international law has developed 
certain criteria that can be applied to this question, to create narrower margin of 
appreciation for the affected state: withholding consent is limited to specific reasons 
in international law. Put differently, the discretion of the affected state for refusing 
consent is limited by norms in international law, which are explored below.86  
At an early stage, the ICJ has asserted in its Nicaragua judgment that it is not ‘an 
intervention in the internal affairs’ of the affected state to provide indiscriminate 
assistance for the purpose of prevention and alleviation of human suffering, as well 
as to ‘protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being’.87 This 
assertion has also been held by Vukas, arguing that an international offer of 
assistance cannot be construed as an unlawful interference in the ‘domaine reservé’, 
thereby reserving the protection of human rights exclusively to domestic 
jurisdiction.88  
As such, ‘humanitarian assistance’ as defined in this research as ‘consisting of 
food, medicine, shelter and logistics for its provision; for urgent purposes and which 
is indispensable to the survival of the people at whom it is aimed’, which abides by 
the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality, must be seen as a rightful 
offer in times of crisis.89 Indeed, soft law documents such as the Bruges Resolution 
and the San Remo Principles have also elaborated on this notion of an ‘offer’ and 
reasoned that it should be ‘bona fide’ and not be regarded by the affected state as an 
interference in its internal affairs.90 This notion can be as basic as a choice to deliver 
aid in non-military ships, to avoid doubt as to the intent of the external party. The 
notion of a bona fide offer can also be considered to be fulfilled when in accordance 
with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality.91 The Bruges Resolution 
furthermore elaborates that such an offer may not be ‘arbitrarily and unjustifiably’ 
rejected, and that the offering states should call upon the UN Security Council should 
they fear a ‘humanitarian catastrophe’.92 A similar approach can be seen in the ILC’s 
Draft Articles on Protection of persons in the event of disasters that currently state a 
duty of the affected state to seek international assistance should local capacity be 
exceeded (Draft Article 13), a requirement of consent from the affected state which 
                                                        
85 This has been argued also by Walter Kälin, Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human 
Rights of Internally Displaced Persons in ‘Promotion And Protection Of All Human Rights, Civil, 
Political, Economic, Social And Cultural Rights, Including The Right To Development’ Report Of The 
Representative Of The Secretary-General On The Human Rights Of Internally Displaced Persons UN 
Doc A/HRC/10/13/Add.1 (5 March 2009) § 38; and Chapter 7.  
86 FAO Legislative Study ‘Right to Adequate Food in Emergencies’ (2002) 79; and Chapter 7.  
87 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 
Merits, Judgment 27 June 1986 I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14 § 243.  
88 Vukas, ‘Humanitarian Assistance in Cases of Emergency’ (n 57) 5.  
89 2.2.2 Defining Humanitarian Assistance and further.  
90 ‘Guiding Principles on the Right to Humanitarian Assistance’ (April 1993) The International Institute 
of Humanitarian Law in San Remo, Principle 5. 
91 2.2.3 The Principles for the Delivery of Assistance. 
92 Resolution ‘Humanitarian Assistance’ (2 September 2003) Institute of International Law, Sixteenth 






may not be withheld ‘arbitrarily’ (Draft Article 14) and a duty for the affected state 
to facilitate external assistance (Draft Article 17).93 Arguably, the wording of Draft 
Article 14 which uses ‘shall’ as opposed to ‘should’ in formulating the magnitude of 
the duty of the affected state to consent to external assistance goes beyond common 
practice today. However, the using of ‘shall’ is limited to the arbitrariness of a refusal 
(generally accepted in international law) as well as with regard to the communication 
of a decision concerning offers of aid. The wording is not specifically geared towards 
the content of that communication, and the affected state continues to have the 
opportunity to decide against accepting assistance, provided that it can prove such a 
denial of aid is not arbitrary.  
Thus, in these legal development processes, the nature of the offer is related to 
the extent to which the affected state can refuse consent. Should a humanitarian crisis 
be in place and an offer be ‘bona fide’ and in line with the ICJ’s assertions of non-
discrimination, it shall be difficult for the affected state to argue reasons for 
withholding consent that shall not be construed as ‘arbitrary’. In this way, it 
becomes apparent that the sovereignty of the affected state is curbed by this notion 
of ‘arbitrariness’. Whereas no legal definition of the concept exists in relation to the 
provision of humanitarian assistance, it remains the concept utilised in the law today, 
and is commonly defined as random, lacking a specific reason, or without concern 
for what is fair.94.  
This assessment regarding arbitrariness and the need for consent furthermore 
aligns with existing international law. Firstly, it finds ground in the duties of the 
affected state to seek international assistance in the fulfilments of the rights to food 
and health as codified in Article 2 ICESCR.95 It has been concluded that the 
provision of humanitarian assistance can be a vehicle in the fulfilment of these 
rights.96 Thus, should assistance be denied or obstructed, a state may be in violation 
of its duties under these (and other) international conventions. It is not only at the 
level of complete ‘inaction’ that a violation of human rights law is incurred; indeed 
these rights entail positive duties from the affected state as the CESCR has argued 
that a violation of the right to food can occur through actions including the 
‘prevention of access to humanitarian food aid in internal conflicts or other 
emergency situations’.97 As such Barber has argued that a state party to the ICESCR 
will be considered to be in violation of its obligations under the Convention when it 
fails to provide essential food and healthcare, ‘unless it can demonstrate that it has 
made every effort to use all resources at its disposal – including international 
                                                        
93 ILC ‘Protection of persons in the event of disasters’ Draft Articles UN Doc A/CN.4/L.831 (15 May 
2014).  
94 See in this regard the definitions as provided by Merriam-Webster and Oxford.  
95 7.3 The Provision of Humanitarian Assistance by Third Parties Under Human Rights Law; Article 2 
ICESCR and CESCR General Comment 12 (Article 11 ICESCR) UN Doc E/C.12/1999/5 ‘The right to 
adequate food’ (12 May 1999) § 17 and § 19. See also ‘The right to food’, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur, Note by the Secretary General UN Doc A/63/278 (21 October 2008) § 12.  
96 Section 5.4 Humanitarian Assistance Within the Context of Existing Human Rights. 
97 See Articles 2 and 11 ICESCR amongst others; see also CESCR General Comment 12 (n 95) § 19.  
 
 
Legal Consequences of the Denial of Humanitarian Assistance:  
Methods of Enforcement 
439 
assistance – in an effort to satisfy its obligations’.98 Minimum core obligations 
remain to be fulfilled within the scope of the ICESCR. Similarly, the fulfilment of 
the right to life entails to not ‘arbitrarily deprive’ persons of that right and their life.99 
Such provisions therefore place an active obligation upon the affected state to seek 
assistance in the fulfilment of these rights by indeed allowing access to its territory 
for the provision of emergency aid by third parties.  
At the same time, a duty to seek or request assistance under human rights law 
does not imply an immediate related duty to accept or consent to the help offered: 
Such help must remain in line with the principles of international law related to the 
provision of humanitarian assistance: humanity, neutrality and impartiality. It is 
along these lines that for example the US and Cuba refused each other’s assistance 
following natural disasters in the past decade for political reasons.100 Similarly, 
although not humanitarian assistance per se, in the situation of the Former 
Yugoslavia, concerns were raised regarding the impartiality of certain 
(neighbouring) countries offering assistance to UNPROFOR.101 Only when aid 
offered is categorised as ‘humanitarian assistance’ can it not be arbitrarily refused.  
The notion of arbitrariness is furthermore widely incorporated in international 
humanitarian law. Although acquiescing in particular in circumstances of non-
international conflict that access for third parties is subject to the consent of the 
affected state, international humanitarian law furthermore states that assistance may 
not be ‘arbitrarily denied’ nor that it may be viewed as ‘interference in the armed 
conflict or as unfriendly acts’, as codified in Articles 23 and 59 GC IV and 70 AP I. 
Such more explicit references to the need for consent from the affected state in 
humanitarian law also flow from the assumption often taken that a greater 
willingness will exist for the affected state to accept external assistance in the 
aftermath of a disaster as opposed to conflict. A recent example that however proves 
the contrary, remains the attitude of Myanmar in the aftermath of cyclone Nargis. 
The Security Council has held on various occasions that the ‘intentional denial’, 
‘impeding’ or ‘obstruction’ of humanitarian assistance constitute violations of 
international law and state obligations under said law, for which consequences must 
be had.102 Another norm in times of (non-) international armed conflict is the 
boundary formed by the prohibition of starvation in Articles 54 AP I and 14 AP II.  
                                                        
98 Rebecca Barber, ‘Facilitating humanitarian assistance in international humanitarian and human rights 
law’, (2009) 91 International Review of the Red Cross 874, 393.  
99 Amongst others Articles 6 UDHR, 6 ICCPR and 4 ACHR.  
100 Amongst others the US refusal of Cuban aid in the wake of hurricane Katrina 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/americas/09/05/katrina.cuba/> accessed 6 July 2014 and the 
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Thus, support can be found in international law at various levels and in various 
corpora juris to argue that a state must have legitimate reasons not to accept offers 
of assistance when facing a humanitarian crisis. Such legitimate reasons are, 
however, only elaborated upon in international humanitarian law, which explains 
examples like sieges and blockades as pertaining to ‘military necessity’, where a 
side-effect may be the refusal (or delaying) of external assistance.103 Military 
necessity may be supplemented by certain ‘control rights’ of the affected state to 
check the content of the assistance, or determine the route it takes to the desired 
location as discussed in Chapter 7.104 Such an argument for military necessity may 
not, however, lead to a complete denial of assistance for a prolonged period of time. 
In the absence of legitimate reasons to refuse an offer of assistance, international 
humanitarian law reflects that such a refusal amounts to an ‘arbitrary denial’ of 
assistance, which is a violation of humanitarian law. Furthermore, also relevant to 
circumstances of non-international armed conflict, the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement also argue that consent shall not be ‘arbitrarily withheld’ by the 
affected state.105 It has been suggested that in particular in times of conflict, weighing 
military necessity against humanitarian needs, in order to determine whether or not 
consent is required, is akin to the ‘proportionality test’ frequently applied in 
humanitarian law.106 Such an analogy however should be considered with care, as 
the principle of proportionality in humanitarian law has a specific character of its 
own. The question is thus raised how long a sovereign might take to assess whether 
or not an offer of assistance is accepted. It is not possible to ascertain a specific 
timeframe as such issues will have to be addressed on a case-by-case basis. Yet, 
considering the intensity of the need of persons in a crisis to receive humanitarian 
assistance, such contemplation should not take a prolonged period of time.  
It remains vital therefore to assess factual circumstances on the ground through 
these questions pertaining to the legal framework on the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance. Resulting from this assessment, it can be concluded that certain acts or 
omissions of the affected state or sovereign are obstructions or denials of 
humanitarian assistance. These have been dealt with in Chapters 6 and 7, as potential 
violations of the right to life, food, health (and water), or violations of specific 
provisions of international humanitarian law. These acts or omissions of ‘obstruction 
or denial’ of assistance are the causal link between the violations of certain rights 
and duties as discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, and the consequences of these under 
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international law, through the enforcement mechanisms that are discussed in the 
present Chapter.  
When addressing the tiered approach in the determination of whether or not an 
act or omission amounts to a violation of international law, another ‘tier’ can be 
added to the existing questions pertaining to (1) the existence of a humanitarian crisis 
and (2 and 3) whether or not the affected state is complying with its own (twofold) 
duties under international law to provide aid or allow access for this. The fourth 
question then becomes whether or not the refusal of assistance is ‘arbitrary’.  
Several elements can be discerned concerning the notion of ‘arbitrariness’. 
Refusal of a bona fide offer, in accordance with the principles of humanity, 
impartiality and neutrality could lead to the conclusion that such a decision is 
‘arbitrary’. Furthermore, a refusal resulting in circumstances that would amount to 
violations of the minimum core obligations of human rights law, and in times of 
conflict, also violations of those provisions of humanitarian law such as Articles 23 
and 59 GC IV, 70 AP I and 18 AP II that oblige access (with due regard to control 
rights) could be considered arbitrary.  
 
8.3.3 The Denial or Obstruction of Assistance: a Violation of International Law  
 
The determination of which acts or omissions precisely amount to violations of 
international law pertaining to the denial or obstruction of humanitarian assistance 
can and must only be done on a case-by-case basis. In every situation, an assessment 
must be made firstly whether a humanitarian crisis exists, secondly whether an offer 
of assistance is subject to consent, and whether such consent is arbitrarily denied. 
Related to this, the facilitation of access must be assessed. It is not possible to create 
an exhaustive list of those acts or omissions, although various suggestions have been 
proffered; a few of which will be named and elaborated upon in the following 
Sections. As in many instances pertaining to the legal framework on the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance, international humanitarian law is quite elaborate, 
suggesting amongst others as being potential acts constituting denial or obstruction 
of aid the destroying of foodstuffs or agricultural areas, drinking installations, 
denying access which might result in starvation, and attacking convoys or personnel 
involved in the delivery of aid.107 Along these lines the duty to allow ‘rapid and 
unimpeded’ passage of goods as reflected in international humanitarian law and 
consistently reiterated by the Security Council may consist of avoiding putting up 
barriers such as customs, visa requirements and taxes for the aid shipments and 
providers.108 Other examples proffered include the diversion of aid from civilians to 
the military, excessive searching of convoys, creating roadblocks, holding blockades 
or sieges with the purpose of starvation, expelling aid providers from the country, 
                                                        
107 Articles 71AP I 14 and 18 AP II, and Articles 7 and 8 ICC Statute for corresponding crimes.  
108 Article 70 AP I and Section 7.4.2; and Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, ICRC Customary International 






requesting travel permits, or even claiming that the security of those providing aid 
cannot be guaranteed.109  
From the above Sections, however, general questions that must be addressed in 
each case have been derived, whilst the assessment is case-specific. A primary 
assessment must be made whether or not a humanitarian crisis exists. Secondly, an 
assessment must be made whether or not the affected state is capable of adequately 
supplying the affected territory itself and is in fact doing so. Should the latter 
question not be answered affirmatively, an assessment shall have to take place 
whether an offer to provide humanitarian assistance, abiding by the proper 
principles, was done, and whether or not consent was refused in an arbitrary manner. 
Denial of assistance and denial of access both lead to violations of international law, 
as both constitute norms that the affected state must abide by. This assessment leads 
to distinct questions to determine whether or not a violation of international law has 
occurred for which enforcement options are available: 
 
1. Is a population within a territory facing a humanitarian crisis? 
2. Is the affected state fulfilling its own sovereign duties and providing an 
adequate supply of aid? 
3. If this is not the case, is the affected state withholding consent to third 
parties offering assistance? 
4. Is the refusal of consent legitimate or arbitrary under international law? 
 
In the assessment of these questions, the international legal world lacks one central 
authoritative body. As Ryngaert argues, one of the essential problems lies in the fact 
that ‘no independent mechanism that weighs the evidence and checks whether the 
reasons invoked by states to deny assistance correspond to reality’ and thus, a state 
may for example argue lack of impartiality when withholding access to providers of 
assistance whilst in reality punishing civilians it fears may sympathise with rebels 
within its territory.110 The assessment of which acts or omissions amount to a 
violation of international law takes place by various bodies at various times. During 
or in the immediate aftermath of a humanitarian crisis, such an assessment may occur 
by the Security Council that determines whether or not to take action (enforcement 
through the use of force and targeted sanctions). A longer time after the crisis, the 
assessment may take place by the ICJ in its judgments (enforcement through 
                                                        
109 Amongst others Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, ibid Rule 53 (Starvation as a Method of Warfare); 
Stuart Ford, ‘Is The Failure To Respond Appropriately To A Natural Disaster A Crime Against 
Humanity? The Responsibility To Protect And Individual Criminal Responsibility In The Aftermath Of 
Cyclone Nargis’, (2009) 38 Denver Journal of International Law & Policy 2, 26; Christa Rottensteiner, 
‘The denial of humanitarian assistance as a crime under international law’, (1999) 81 International 
Review of the Red Cross 835, 560; Barber, ‘Facilitating humanitarian assistance in international 
humanitarian and human rights law’ (n 98) 377-378. Specifically concerning the blocking of aid convoys 
Prosecutor v. Krstic (Appeal Judgment) IT-98-33-A (19 April 2004) § 89.  
110 Cedric Ryngaert, ‘Humanitarian Assistance and the Conundrum of Consent: A Legal Perspective’, 
(2013) 5 Amsterdam Law Forum 2, 10. Ryngaert suggests revisiting the International Fact-Finding 
Commission as created pursuant to Article 90 AP I, although noting the lack of viability in this idea, as 
the Commission’s jurisdiction is dependent on the consent of the affected state.  
 
 
Legal Consequences of the Denial of Humanitarian Assistance:  
Methods of Enforcement 
443 
potential state responsibility), by the international human rights courts and 
committees (enforcement through human rights law) and the ICC or potential ad hoc 
tribunals (enforcement through international criminal law). These bodies have been 
given the authority in international law through state parties to treaties and member 
states of their organisations to (judicially) assess whether or not a violation of 
international law has taken place, and must therefore be considered as the 
authoritative institutions available for international legal enforcement, despite the 
lack of a central body.  
As determined above, such a violation of international law can be of two distinct 
norms and duties: firstly, the unlawful denial of assistance by the affected state itself 
(as discussed in Chapter 6), and secondly, the unlawful denial of an offer of external 
aid from third parties and a related right to access, by the affected state (as discussed 
in Chapter 7). Yet, as the ICJ put forward in its Advisory Opinion on the ‘Legal 
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)’, 
qualifying a situation as illegal does not in itself end the situation; it is but the first 
step in an effort to put an end to such a situation.111 Enforcement is indeed a manner 
in which a situation violating international law can be brought to an end. 
Enforcement of humanitarian assistance through international law can take place at 
various levels, and the following Sections in this Chapter address them at an 
interstate level through a discussion of the use of force by the Security Council, 
followed by the more vertical level as discussed through enforcement by various 
human rights bodies. Such bodies, however, also have the opportunity of a horizontal 
approach through the interstate complaint mechanism.112 Lastly, this Chapter 
addresses enforcement through individual responsibility, either through targeted 
sanctions as imposed by the Security Council and through individual criminal 
responsibility; in particular for war crimes and crimes against humanity.  
 
8.4 Enforcement through the Use of Force 
 
The use of force is a consequence or aftereffect of the determination that a state is in 
violation of a breach of international law, and as a result may be held responsible 
under international law. It must be clear that the use of force shall always be an 
ultimate resort, in the event other methods of enforcing the provision of aid, such as 
through diplomatic means and non-military measures, are not successful.113 The 
Mohonk Criteria for example refer to a variety of options besides diplomatic 
initiatives, such as the threat of economic sanctions under Article 41 UN Charter, or 
cross-border assistance operations initiated from the territory of a neighbouring 
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state.114 Such an approach is also addressed by Ryngaert who has argued that whilst 
the crossing of borders by NGOs to gain access may be clandestine, their contested 
status under international law may provide practical solutions.115 
In this particular research, the use of force, authorised by the Security Council 
under Chapter VII, may be a consequence of the denial of humanitarian assistance 
when such denial leads to a breach of international law for which the affected state 
may be held responsible. The use of force in international law can be resorted to by 
way of self-defence and also by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter.116 Given the large number of member states in the UN, the provisions of 
Article 25 UN Charter obliging them to adhere to the Council’s decisions and the 
otherwise strict prohibition of the use of force in Article 2(4) UN Charter outside of 
self-defence, the Security Council is the organ under current international law with 
the most means of enforcing aid through the use of force. It must be reiterated that a 
clear distinction must be upheld between those providing aid and abiding by the 
principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality and those using force to enable 
the provision of such aid.  
Furthermore, the use of force may also be considered as a manner to give effect 
to the determination in Article 41(1) ARSIWA that states have a duty to cooperate 
in bringing a breach of international law to an end.117 In practice, ending such a 
breach may result in the access of a territory. However, the legal framework on the 
international responsibility of states does not explicitly provide for the right to access 
a territory for such purposes. As a result, the ARSIWA also does not indicate the 
manner in which such access could be obtained for the purposes of Article 41(1). 
Article 20 ARSIWA provides that if ‘valid consent’ is given by a state, the 
wrongfulness of an act is precluded. Thus, the consent must be given in accordance 
with proper authorisation and authority, but may occur at any time prior or even 
during the act.118 As the Commentary explicates:  
 
“Consent must be freely given and clearly established. It must be actually expressed by 
the State rather than merely presumed on the basis that the State would have consented if 
it had been asked”.119 
 
The Commentary has also provided for several examples of consent given by states, 
including ‘humanitarian relief and rescue operations’ within the list of possible 
actions that may fall within the scope of Article 20.120 Should consent not have been 
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given, the state(s) gaining access to the territory of the affected state may in turn be 
in breach of the principle of non-intervention. Therefore, in the absence of consent, 
the state(s) obtaining access to the territory on which the humanitarian crisis is taking 
place must ensure that their action is not in violation of international law, as 
envisaged by Articles 2(4) and 2(7) UN Charter. The use of force authorised by the 
Security Council would indeed not amount to such a violation. In relation to this, 
Article 25 ARSIWA regarding ‘necessity’ has been claimed as a reason to breach a 
rule of international law (the principle of non-intervention), in favour of the 
enforcement of providing humanitarian assistance.121 As seen above, the ILC does 
not address the matter concerning the legality of an intervention outside the umbrella 
of the UN Charter’s collective use of force, stating: 
 
“The question whether measures of forcible humanitarian intervention, not sanctioned 
pursuant to Chapters VII or VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, may be lawful under 
modern international law is not covered by article 25 [ARSIWA]”.122 
 
It stands to reason that the ILC does not deal with this legal issue in its Commentary 
on the ARSIWA, as it falls outside the scope of the matter at hand. Yet, should a 
state forego its primary obligation to protect its citizens and provide humanitarian 
assistance, a secondary duty under the law of state responsibility may be placed upon 
international actors to ensure that such assistance is provided.123 Ensuring such 
provision can then be done through the use of force, provided that this use of force 
is in accordance with international law.  
The use of force, authorised by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter as an enforcement mechanism, is legitimised rather by the (potential) 
violation of peremptory norms such as genocide, racial discrimination, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes in the event a state denies humanitarian assistance, 
as opposed to by the independent violation of a right to receive humanitarian 
assistance from the international community. Such a latter right indeed cannot be 
definitively ascertained in positive international law.124 Also, this approach can be 
seen in the perspective of the ARSIWA that addresses the duty of third states to 
cooperate in bringing to an end the violation of a peremptory norm of international 
law.125 The use of force must furthermore be resorted to in lieu of political or 
economic enforcement measures should these not suffice, given the impact of the 
use of force on the international community, as well as primarily on the affected 
state. In the event ‘inducing’ the affected state to discontinue its denial of access or 
provision of assistance through softer mechanisms is ineffective, resort may in 
certain instances be had to the use of force.126 Using force is never the ‘quick’ or 
‘easy’ solution in international law, as evidenced amongst others by the recent 
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international actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Once force is used, an international 
coalition of states or individual states must be willing to commit themselves to the 
potential that their involvement shall go beyond the factual delivery of humanitarian 
assistance, which was the initial occasion or reason for the use of force. The absence 
of a distinct and legally delimited right to assistance furthermore makes 
enforceability difficult: the choice to resort to the use of force must be based not on 
the violation of actions, but rather on an assessment of what has ‘not’ been done, or 
not been done sufficiently: the provision of assistance.  
 
8.4.1 Security Council Action: Enforcement through the UN system and the 
Responsibility to Protect 
 
The role of the Security Council in this setting concerning the use of force is that of 
an enforcer, as opposed to its role in the previous Chapters, where its role has been 
discussed as related to distilling standard-setting and normative developments. Yet, 
this research specifically views the role of the Security Council within the UN 
framework as that of an authoritative body, given the powers bestowed upon it, with 
regard to the establishment of a threat to the international peace pursuant to Article 
39 UN Charter. It is clear from the UN Charter that not just any breach of an 
international legal norm legitimises the use of force: only if and when such a breach 
of international law results in a ‘threat to the international peace’, does the use of 
force become an accepted option under Article 39 UN Charter. Such an approach 
falls in line with the perspective that the use of force is legitimised by a serious 
breach of a peremptory norm of international law. The circumstances that hence will 
be examined pertaining to the use of force shall therefore remain within the scope of 
the UN Charter and thus clearly within the scope of existing international law. This 
Charter will be the basis of their legality in international law. Furthermore, it must 
be noted that the UN Charter declares in Article 103 that precedence must be given 
to the Charter and consequentially the Security Council’s decision to use force over 
conflicting obligations Member States may have. This supports furthermore the 
choice within this research to only consider the use of force within the context of the 
UN Charter and the authority of the Security Council as decision-making organ, 
considering that in the absence of the decision to use force by the Council, Article 
2(4) of the UN Charter prohibiting the use of force must be given precedence over 
conflicting obligations. As Simma has argued, even ‘the purest of humanitarian 
motives’ might not be able to overcome the legal obstacles of straying outside of the 
Charter with the use of force.127 For these reasons, an assessment must be made by 
an authoritative body in international law as to whether or not a humanitarian crisis 
exists, before proceeding to enforcement options through the use of force.  
Chapter 7 of this research has addressed the Security Council’s current 
perspective on the duty of the affected state to allow and ensure access to third parties 
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in the provision of assistance.128 However, the Council has not asserted that a failure 
of the affected state to comply with such duties automatically translates into a right 
to access. As said before, a situation falling within the scope of Article 39 of the 
Charter must furthermore arise. This would correspond with the breach of law 
occurring through the non-provision of humanitarian assistance by the affected state, 
which would then result in a denial of aid that may amount to serious crimes. Such 
crimes include war crimes, crimes against humanity or racial discrimination (and 
potentially genocide), as peremptory norms of international law, or include the four 
core crimes as defined by the notion of the Responsibility to Protect in the World 
Summit Outcome Document of 2005. Such circumstances then warrant Security 
Council action. Furthermore, such a use of force may also, as seen above, be 
implemented in light of the duty to cooperate under Article 41(1) ARSIWA. This 
duty also acknowledges a potential need to use force to end the violation of a 
peremptory norm of international law. The ARSIWA asserts such a duty, but the 
Security Council, by way of Chapter VII, has the potential to execute it. Thus, the 
use of force may be resorted to in the insurance of the delivery of assistance based 
on both Article 39 of the UN Charter in connection to the threat to the peace, as well 
as Article 41(1) ARSIWA. In both instances however, although the ARSIWA itself 
does not mention the Security Council, the monopoly in the determination to in fact 
resort to force remains with one central body, namely the Security Council, given 
the abovementioned provisions of 2(4) UN Charter and the fact that members of 
regional organisations also form part of the UN.129  
In one of its first thematic resolutions on the protection of civilians (Resolution 
1265), the Council has formulated its perspective and role regarding the delivery of 
humanitarian aid, potentially alluding to the use of force, as the Council declared 
that it:  
 
“Expresses its willingness to respond to situations of armed conflict where civilians are 
being targeted or humanitarian assistance to civilians is being deliberately obstructed, 
including through the consideration of appropriate measures at the Council’s disposal in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”.130 
 
Indeed, the Council does not use its common phrasing of ‘all necessary means’ and 
asserted the use of force outright. However, the Council speaks of ‘appropriate 
measures’ at the Council’s disposal. As the primary task of the Security Council is 
the maintenance of peace, the allusion to the use of force is arguably implied. The 
Security Council has addressed that it shall seemingly not condone the ‘deliberate’ 
obstruction of humanitarian assistance in the event of an armed conflict. This 
statement falls in line with the earlier discussed perspective of the Council that 
indeed impeding the provision of humanitarian aid constitutes a violation of 
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international humanitarian law.131 Indeed, this approach also corresponds with the 
Council’s take, as discussed in Chapter 7 of this research, of the role of third parties 
in the provision of aid. Although the Council does not affirmatively assert a right to 
access or an external duty to provide per se, it often presupposes an offer of 
assistance and cooperation of its member states in the provision of emergency 
assistance.132 The manner in which the Council came to this formulation will be 
subsequently addressed.  
From the start, once again a very clear distinction must be made between those 
actors providing aid, and those using force for the purpose of the enforcement of aid 
delivery. The provision of assistance must be done according to the principles of 
humanity, neutrality and impartiality, in order to qualify as provision of humanitarian 
assistance.133 To distinguish between those providing such assistance and those using 
force in order to ensure that the assistance reaches the affected persons, is of 
paramount importance given the circumstances in which such enforcers operate. The 
use of force to enforce aid is only necessary if and when the authorities in the affected 
territory do not look favourably upon the external provision of aid, and deny consent 
arbitrarily. Should the affected state or others exercising authority in the affected 
territory be advocates or proponents of the provision of assistance, the use of force 
would not be necessary as such. Thus, those using force shall likely be met with 
opposition. Such opposition will raise issues concerning the upholding of the 
principle of neutrality or potentially even the principle of impartiality. As Dungel 
argued, these problems arise when the actors enforcing assistance have to take action 
against those opposing the provision of aid; at this point the enforcement mission is 
‘flawed with an inherent lack of neutrality’ as the involved parties have engaged with 
each other.134 Maintaining a clear distinction between those exercising force and 
those actors providing the actual assistance is therefore paramount, as even the 
slightest appearance of bias may influence the acceptance of humanitarian initiatives 
and diminishes its legitimacy. It is along these lines that the ICRC has suggested that 
military forces should themselves not be directly involved in the provision of aid, 
especially during an on-going conflict.135 Equally, the EU has argued that 
circumstances in which the military ‘supports’ humanitarian aid workers – such as in 
complex emergencies – must be seen as a last resort, so as to not result in a blurring 
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of the lines between the two.136 An ensuing risk of such a blurring of the lines would 
be a situation in which the providers of aid will be targeted themselves, as part of the 
conflict. Whereas the safety and security of humanitarian personnel is essential for 
the provision of humanitarian assistance, this aspect of the delivery of assistance shall 
remain largely outside the scope of this research (with the exception of their 
discussion as part of facilitating access), as such issues become relevant upon 
providing aid.137 
The use of force by definition presupposes choosing ‘sides’ – be it the side of the 
affected persons in need of assistance which is denied by the authorities in place, or 
a side to a conflict in itself; a challenge in particular in the case of a non-international 
armed conflict. Therefore, the ‘enforcers’ run the risk of being (or being perceived) 
as either a party to the conflict at hand, or, should this be a situation of a natural or 
man-made disaster, the creator of a ‘conflictual’ situation.138 Ensuring the separation 
of the providers of aid from its enforcers, to maintain the principles of humanity, 
neutrality and impartiality in the provision of assistance is therefore required, as well 
as the realisation that the use of force must also adhere to the standards laid down in 
international law. For this reason, the use of force, as an ultimate and last resort in 
the enforcement of humanitarian aid, is still considered solely within the context of 
the Security Council.  
In the previous Chapters, the dilemma concerning the ‘adequate supply’ of a 
territory has been addressed on several occasions.139 One of the greatest challenges 
of the provision of assistance is the determination of whether assistance is in fact 
needed. Upon this assertion, the particular responsibilities of the affected state in 
relation to the provision of aid are ‘activated’, as well as potential roles of the 
international community. In the previous Chapters, it has been discussed that a 
margin of appreciation in the determination of the adequacy of supply remained with 
the affected state. However, a determination by the Security Council that the use of 
force is warranted to ensure the provision of assistance to persons in the event of a 
crisis, is simultaneously also a determination that indeed a territory is inadequately 
supplied and that the affected state is not properly attending to its citizens: that in 
fact a humanitarian crisis is taking place. In doing so, the Council in essence 
determines that the affected state is not providing for persons in need within its 
jurisdiction. Thus, answering the question of whether a territory is indeed 
‘adequately supplied’ becomes a matter for the Security Council to determine when 
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it is contemplating the use of force, as argued above in Section 8.3.3. This body may 
decide whether or not the situation at hand is becoming so topical and severe – a 
humanitarian crisis – that it must interfere to ‘enforce’ the provision of assistance. 
Within the current legal framework pertaining to the provision of assistance 
therefore, the Security Council is the one actor, besides the affected state, that has 
the opportunity in a circumstance it deems a threat to the peace, to determine whether 
or not a humanitarian crisis is taking place and the (external) provision of 
humanitarian assistance is warranted.  
 
8.4.2 The Beginning of Security Council Action 
 
The analysis of Security Council action over the past decades has played a role in 
the establishment in Chapters 6 and 7 of this research that a legal obligation may 
exist for states to allow access for the provision of assistance if and when the Council 
adopts a resolution under Chapter VII using specific wording in that regard. Equally, 
third states and/or regional organisations are called upon to resort to the use of force 
in specific instances through the wording of the Council. Determined by Article 25 
UN Charter stating that ‘the Members of the United Nations agree to accept and 
carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present 
Charter’, third parties are then obliged to assist in achieving this.  
The Security Council’s mechanism for the use of force, the system of collective 
security on the basis of Articles 39 and 41/42 UN Charter, has only been 
implemented for the enforcement of the provision of humanitarian assistance in 
recent decades, following certain enforcement issues relating to peacekeeping 
missions upon the end of the Cold War. In the early decades of the Security Council’s 
action, in part due to the Cold War, the authorisation of the use of force was an 
exception rather than the rule.140 The Security Council’s and the UN’s general 
inaction in the face of the Biafran crisis in the late 1960’s today still stands as an 
example held by many of a failure to ‘enforce’ humanitarian assistance. The Biafran 
airlift was instigated and operated by humanitarian organisations, without the use of 
force, and is reported to have saved the lives of approximately one million civilians. 
It was argued by some states, such as England, that the role of the Security Council 
was to be concerned with ‘the maintenance of international peace and security, not 
with the relief of suffering’.141 Subsequently in the late 1980’s to early 1990s’, the 
Security Council remained motionless in another well-known situation: the dire 
famine during the protracted civil war in the Sudan.  
However, despite the immovability of the Security Council, the UN as an 
organisation did come into action, creating ‘Operation Lifeline’, an airlift into the 
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Sudan following a General Assembly resolution.142 This airlift was developed and 
carried out by humanitarian agencies in cooperation with the UN, through agencies 
such as the World Food Programme and UNICEF, supported by the UN General 
Assembly, as well as in cooperation with the authorities in Sudan itself.143 As such, 
it was the first humanitarian operation, lasting from 1989-2005, in which civilians 
were assisted within a sovereign country during an on-going conflict. The division 
of tasks within the UN follows the development of the UN Security Council’s stance 
on the concept of ‘humanitarian assistance’ and its own role as an organ of the UN 
therein. As discussed in Section 7.4.1, the UN Security Council did not commence 
addressing a potential role for external parties in the provision of assistance until 
well into the 1980’s. In doing so, the Council adopted resolutions calling for the UN 
and its agencies to provide aid, but does not mention the use of force, nor is Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter involved.144  
Human rights law, in particular Article 2 ICESCR, together with Articles 55 and 
56 of the UN Charter, also envisages a duty to cooperate in the fulfilment of various 
human rights. It has been discussed that both the ARSIWA (in Article 41) and 
international humanitarian law (in the form of Article 89 AP I) recognise a duty to 
cooperate in the event of breaches of peremptory norms or of serious violations of 
humanitarian law respectively. The manner in which such cooperation, when 
amounting to force, takes place has with time been set within the Security Council’s 
framework of action, as this action falls within the UN Charter and international 
law’s general perspective on the non-prohibited use of force.  
Prior to the thematic Resolution 1265 of 1999 which was addressed in the 
previous Section, the Security Council had the opportunity to consider its stance with 
regard to the internal conflict in Somalia and with regard to the conflict in the Former 
Yugoslavia, both in the early 1990’s, followed by the well-known dramatic turn of 
events in Rwanda in the mid-1990’s. Somalia requested such a consideration from 
the Council itself on several occasions, whereas also the then Republic of Yugoslavia 
‘welcomed’ the Security Council’s consideration of the situation.145 Both country-
situations unfolded somewhat simultaneously, and the Council addressed the use of 
force in both situations, through the implementation in first instance of peacekeeping 
missions. These missions were based upon the consent of the affected states and 
parties involved.146 Therefore, they functioned on the basis of certain agreed 
principles, such as impartiality, the non-use of force unless in self-defence and the 
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absence of participation of forces of the permanent members of the Security 
Council.147 However, as Grey rightly notes, once the Security Council operates under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter and the original peacekeeping missions are altered, 
the matter of the necessity of consent of the affected state alters also.148  
The changing nature of conflicts in the 1990’s has increasingly impacted the 
Security Council’s approach to the mandate of peacekeeping missions, as well as the 
particular UN Charter basis upon which it operates and also its perspective on the 
enforcement of humanitarian assistance. Indeed, it is then the role of the Security 
Council as enforcer rather than in a more regulatory or normative capacity as was 
discussed in Chapter 6 and 7 of this research, that comes to the forefront. The 
Security Council noted concerning Somalia that the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance was an ‘important element in the effort of the Council to restore 
international peace and security in the area’ and as such, authorised an ‘urgent airlift 
operation’ to indeed deliver such aid.149 The Security Council then, in calling upon 
the parties to the conflict to cooperate with the UN and its security personnel and 
assist in the stabilisation of the situation, asserted that: 
  
“In the absence of such cooperation, the Security Council does not exclude other measures 
to deliver humanitarian assistance to Somalia”.150 
 
The Council thus appears to indirectly open the door to the potential future use of 
force for the provision of assistance but does not actually formulate it as such. As 
seen above, this formulation by the Council is echoed in its subsequent thematic 
Resolution 1265 ‘Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict’ of 1999, but can be seen 
also as merely referring to non-forceful measures. In this present Resolution, the 
Council more distinctly interlinks the ‘other measures’ to the delivery of emergency 
aid. Although the Council does not reiterate this stance in its subsequent dealing with 
the situation in Somalia, it does reaffirm its approval of the initiatives that have been 
undertaken through the airlift operations.151 It must be noted that the Somalian 
government itself requested the UN’s involvement in the delivery of aid, as 
continuously stressed by the Security Council.152 As months progressed and the 
humanitarian situation deteriorated, not in the least due to the continued impediment 
of the delivery of aid, UN member states offered to assist in the establishment of a 
safe environment in which to provide humanitarian assistance, upon which the 
Security Council determined that, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it: 
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“authorizes the Secretary General and Member States cooperating to implement the offer 
referred to in paragraph 8 above to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible 
a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia”.153 
 
Thus, the Council called upon the use of force by member states, through its well-
known phrase to ‘use all necessary means’, unequivocally for the purpose of the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance. This was in fact the first time the Council 
authorised the use of force for the purpose of the delivery of emergency assistance 
in a humanitarian crisis.154 As such, it has opened the door to a major change in the 
enforcement of the provision of humanitarian assistance: Over the past decades 
Security Council action has consistently been a contributing factor in the 
enforcement of aid provision. In general, the intervention in Somalia is considered a 
success, as the international force UNITAF was able to create safer areas on the 
ground, and enabled the provision of assistance to the Somalians in need.155 This 
mission was succeeded by UNOSOM II, one of the most ambitious peace operations 
of the UN at that time, as the use of force beyond self-defence was mandated, 
amongst other matters for the delivery of humanitarian assistance.156  
Yet, a clear line was not to be distinguished in the work of the Council at this 
stage. As mentioned, the conflict in the Former Yugoslavia unfolded at 
approximately the same time as the conflict in Somalia which led to the determination 
of the use of force by the Security Council. Although both situations are clearly 
distinct, given that the assertion to use force was not done in the case of the Former 
Yugoslavia, the common denominator is that the provision of humanitarian 
assistance played an important role in the Council’s decision-making. The Council 
asserted in a similar fashion to it resolutions concerning Somalia the importance of 
the provision of emergency aid in the restoration of international peace and security 
and acknowledged the rapid deterioration of the situation on the ground, as well as 
the need for delivery of assistance.157 The Security Council commenced by instating 
an arms embargo, prior to asserting the need for a peacekeeping operation, followed 
by a Chapter VII decision for all parties to create conditions for the unimpeded 
passage of humanitarian assistance, including the ‘establishment of a security zone 
encompassing Sarajevo and its airport’.158 In the subsequent resolution, the reopening 
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of the airport was acknowledged as a first step in the establishment of such a security 
zone.159 Whilst the Council addressed the provision of humanitarian assistance 
through the established peacekeeping operation, it appeared to lean towards the use 
of force by member states as an enforcement mechanism similarly to the 
circumstances in Somalia, given that the Council considered ‘other measures’ to 
deliver humanitarian aid as it had done in Somalia in July of 1992.160 The Council 
called upon its member states in August of that year: 
 
“to take nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements all measures necessary to 
facilitate in coordination with the United Nations the delivery by relevant United Nations 
humanitarian organizations and others of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and 
wherever needed in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.161 
 
Explicitly in this Resolution however, the Council takes note of the sovereignty of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.162 Also, the politics of the permanent five members of the 
Council must be taken into consideration, as not all members were in favour of 
intervention. Furthermore, in the case of the Former Yugoslavia as compared to 
Somalia, this potential use of force is specifically related to the provision of aid by 
the UN itself. Grey has argued that this phrasing is an appeal to ‘use force for 
humanitarian purposes’, but falling under Article 53 of the UN Charter for the 
purposes of regional organisations.163 Findlay has argued it to be a ‘threat’ by the 
Council of the use of force by member states or the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO).164 Whether or not this call may indeed, or could have been 
construed as an authorisation to use force by member states is however a question 
the Council took care of. In a subsequent resolution, the Council, while thanking 
member states for offering military personnel, decided to enlarge the mandate of 
UNPROFOR, the peacekeeping mission on the ground.165 Although this Resolution 
776 itself was not taken under Chapter VII, it referred back to Resolution 770, thereby 
allowing the UNPROFOR peacekeeping mission to use force in self-defence as 
meant under Chapter VII for the purpose of delivering humanitarian aid, although 
this was not the mission’s original mandate to which the parties involved had 
consented.166 As such, the facilitation and protection of the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance by UNPROFOR was enforced upon the parties by the Security Council. 
Despite having acted under Chapter VII, the Council determined that consent of the 
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host state remained a necessary component for the peacekeeping mission to operate, 
and replaced UNPROFOR by UNCRO.167  
Thus, in such early instances of peacekeeping missions, even where the potential 
use of force was mandated, the mandate of the Council relating to the peacekeeping 
mission did not necessarily supersede the need to obtain and hold the consent of the 
affected state. Interestingly however, in Resolution 781 pertaining to the situation in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Security Council installed a flight ban on military 
flights over the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for the purpose of securing the 
safety of the delivery of humanitarian assistance.168 Reaffirming this ban in a 
following resolution, the Council did not reiterate its earlier statements pertaining to 
the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and thereby appeared to be 
distinguishing such actions of a more autonomous character from the peacekeeping 
mandate where the use of force was intrinsically linked to self-defence.169 Imposing 
a flight ban for the purpose of the delivery of assistance, whilst acting under Chapter 
VII and with a peacekeeping mission on the ground that is authorised to use (a limited 
amount) of force, certainly gives an outward impression that, whether or not this was 
intentional, the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina was compromised through 
such acting on the part of the Security Council. Yet, in ensuing resolutions, the 
Council does revert back to reiterating the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina.170 
From these examples of Somalia and the Former Yugoslavia, it becomes apparent 
that the Council is open to the use of force for the purpose of the delivery of aid, as 
well as exploring the boundaries of the affected states’ sovereignty.  
With much of the focus on the conflict, it appears almost as if the Council’s initial 
consideration of the use of force by member states to ‘enforce’ the delivery of aid 
goes by unnoticed, as the body continued to grapple with the mandate of the 
peacekeeping mission and with the protracted conflict over the next few years.171 The 
mission appears to remain within the realm of Article 40 UN Charter, also designated 
by the UN itself as a means to ensure the creation of a situation that allows for 
unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance.172  
In relation to the provision of humanitarian assistance, the Security Council 
however asserted a need for ‘safe areas’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina (such as the well-
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known enclave pertaining to Srebrenica) to which humanitarian aid providers would 
have full access.173 Yet, the extent to which UNPROFOR was allowed to use force, 
also in particular concerning the facilitation of the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance, cannot be considered of the same magnitude and depth as the call by the 
Security Council to its member states to use force for the purpose of aid delivery in 
Somalia, which had subsequently been strengthened by Resolutions 814 and 837, 
also allowing the ensuing peacekeeping mission UNOSOM II to use force to ensure 
the delivery of aid to civilians.174 The latter appeal was indeed the authorisation of 
the use of force, for the purpose of the delivery of humanitarian assistance. With the 
benefit of hindsight, knowing the circumstances as occurred in Srebrenica, it is of 
course regrettable that the Council did not apply the Somalian model as a viable 
option in the Former Yugoslavia. As discussed however, other factors aside from the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance played a role in that particular conflict.175 
Nonetheless, despite the differences in both situations, the Council asserted the 
powers of UNPROFOR to use force, albeit on a somewhat flimsy legal basis. As 
such, from the above, it is possible to derive that in the early stages of the enforcement 
of the delivery of humanitarian assistance through the use of force, the Security 
Council was at least willing and able to acknowledge and call upon the need for the 
use of force in the provision of humanitarian assistance upon the request or 
acknowledgment of the affected state, whilst considering this states’ sovereignty. 
Such a possibility of the use of force was recognised strongly in the case of Somalia 
through an appeal to member states. In the case of the Former Yugoslavia, it came 
into being through an enlargement of the mandate of the peacekeepers on the ground.  
The above situations illustrate the difficulties the Council faced in adapting the 
traditional peacekeeping missions to the situations developing in the 1990’s where 
the use of force could have been necessary, and the ensuing blurring of the lines of 
the mandates. Assessing the technicalities in these mandates is relevant to the 
determination of to what extent the Council envisages the potential to use force for 
the provision of humanitarian assistance. While it is not possible to examine all 
peacekeeping operations or subsequent situations in which the Security Council 
authorised the use of force in relation to the provision of humanitarian assistance, 
several instances may be highlighted. Through these brief highlights, a line in the 
practice of the Council can be discerned.  
The struggles the Council faced in the Former Yugoslavia were magnified in 
Rwanda, as the UN’s mission UNAMIR had similar problems with its mandate, 
which did not allow for the use of force, but was a traditional Chapter VI 
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peacekeeping operation and could therefore not ‘enforce’ humanitarian assistance.176 
As Findlay put it, UNAMIR had the ‘misfortune to be established in the wake of the 
Somalia debacle and during the continuing traumas of Bosnia’.177 The mission is 
notoriously known as a failure in the protection of the people in Rwanda, as it lacked 
the proper backing of the UN and the international community. Finally, after 
continuous resolutions not allowing for the use of force,178 an international mission 
was mandated under Chapter VII ‘for humanitarian purposes’.179 The devastating 
tragedy in Rwanda, which followed the already tragic events that occurred in Bosnia, 
lay bare the difficulties the UN faced in the ‘enforcement’ of humanitarian assistance 
or otherwise using force in missions that originally set out as peacekeeping 
operations.  
Following these three missions, which are often considered as the early source of 
more robust operations, the Council asserted on several occasions the possibility of 
the enforcement of the delivery of humanitarian assistance by both peacekeeping 
forces and UN member states in the late 1990’s. Whilst UNPROFOR and UNOSOM 
II in the Former Yugoslavia and Somalia respectively were potentially operating 
beyond a traditional peacekeeping mandate and actually providing peace-
enforcement without a proper corresponding mandate, the Council had the 
opportunity to provide different tools to ensuing operations, in particular relevant to 
the enforcement of humanitarian assistance.180 As such, these later assertions by the 
Security Council were often under the umbrella of Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
and on occasion allowed for a more robust use of force with a view to the delivery of 
assistance. An example includes the multinational force INTERFET that supported 
the UN’s mission UNAMET in East-Timor with a Chapter VII mandate to ‘use all 
necessary force’, with the purpose of facilitating the humanitarian assistance 
operations.181 Also in 1999, the UN mission in Sierra Leone UNAMSIL was 
deployed which, although not given the permission to use all necessary force, was 
mandated under Chapter VII with amongst others the purpose of facilitating 
humanitarian assistance.182 Similarly, the UN mission in the Congo, MONUC, was 
mandated under Chapter VII to use force to ‘protect civilians under imminent threat 
of physical violence’. Whereas the protection of civilians in immediate physical 
danger is not equal to the protection of civilians through the provision of 
humanitarian assistance, it is exemplary of the Council’s inclination to expand 
peacekeeping mandates and use Chapter VII as the authorisation of the use of force 
for broader purposes. Over the years however, as the Council saw more and more 
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reason to authorise the use of force; it called upon military coalitions of the ‘able and 
willing’ to use ‘all necessary measures’, rather than expanding the traditional 
peacekeeping mandates of existing UN missions.183 Indeed, it is in this sense 
important to distinguish between traditional peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and 
such coalitions that use force to establish peace.184 Ascertaining the proper (legal) 
foundations in the Charter, such as Chapter VII, and in the Security Council action, 
is relevant to distilling the approach of the Security Council regarding the use of force 
for the purpose of the delivery of humanitarian aid. The Security Council’s practice 
itself however is somewhat blurred in these early stages, as the above discussion has 
shown. As argued by Blokker, over the years, although the ‘peacekeeping operations’ 
and the ‘authorization operations’ are fundamentally different, they have increasingly 
come to resemble each other.185 
The Security Council commenced adding humanitarian issues as thematic topics 
to its agenda due to the country-situations that came before it, providing more clarity 
to the determination of the use of force for the provision of assistance. As of May 
1997, the Council added the topic ‘Protection for humanitarian assistance to refugees 
and others in conflict situations’ to its agenda, upon which many member states 
addressed the fact that when necessary, peacekeeping missions needed a clear 
mandate under Chapter VII, in order to protect and enable the provision of 
humanitarian assistance.186 The Deputy Secretary General argued that it was indeed 
the responsibility of the Council to be ‘bold committed and determined’ in 
confronting today’s crises and in ending conflicts and securing peace, as such actions 
would support humanitarian actors in their delivery of aid.187 More generally 
furthermore, starting in January 1999, the Council included the item of ‘Promoting 
peace and security: humanitarian activities relevant to the Security Council’ in its 
agenda, upon which the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and 
Emergency Relief Coordinator suggested that the Security Council should consider 
specific action that might aid humanitarian actors, including ‘ensuring access to 
populations in need’.188 The Under-Secretary-General asserted that both 
                                                        
183 Blokker, ‘The Security Council and the Use of Force: On Recent Practice’ (n 140) 14. See in this 
regard for example the situation in Cote d’Ivoire where the Council provided, acting under Chapter VII, 
the French troops with the mandate ‘to use all necessary means’ to support the UNOCI mission that was 
in place: UNSC Res 1528 (27 February 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1528 and reiterated in UN Doc 
S/RES/1975. Also Niels Blokker, ‘Is the Authorization Authorized? Practice of the UN Security Council 
to Authorize the Use of Force by ‘Coalitions of the Able and Willing’, (2000) 11 European Journal of 
International Law 3, 541-568. 
184 A discussion of these notions falls beyond the scope of this research as a focus is maintained on the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance.    
185 Blokker, ‘The Security Council and the Use of Force: On Recent Practice’ (n 140) 28.  
186 Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council (1996-1999), Chapter VIII, ‘Consideration of 
questions under the responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and 
security’, Section 37 Protection for humanitarian assistance to refugees and others in conflict situations, 
Initial proceedings Deliberations of 21 May 1997 (3778th meeting) 1023-1024. 
187 Ibid 1026.  
188 Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council (1996-1999), Chapter VIII, ‘Consideration of 
questions under the responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and 
security’, Section 42 Items relating to promoting peace and security; A. Promoting peace and security: 
 
 
Legal Consequences of the Denial of Humanitarian Assistance:  
Methods of Enforcement 
459 
peacekeeping operations and political actions, as well as well-targeted sanctions may 
assist in averting and reducing humanitarian crises.189 Most  Council members 
concurred the following year, as they highlighted the importance the Council may 
have in ensuring access of humanitarian assistance to civilians in need. However, 
discrepancies existed among the members as to whether or not the determination of 
massive human rights violations or humanitarian difficulties – although a threat to 
the peace – would warrant the use of force.190 
Somewhat simultaneously, the Council addressed the potential capacity to use 
force in its thematic resolutions pertaining to the protection of civilians in times of 
armed conflict. The use of force in the protection of civilians – amongst others 
including for the provision of aid – can therefore be seen as an expanding thread in 
the work of the Council. In a primary statement, the Council ‘expressed its 
willingness to respond’ to such situations in which ‘humanitarian assistance to 
civilians has been deliberately obstructed’.191 The Secretary General then 
recommended that the Council stress the need for civilian populations ‘to have 
unimpeded access to humanitarian assistance’ in its resolutions.192 From the above 
deliberations ensued thematic resolutions such as Resolution 1296, pertaining to the 
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict that has been discussed several times in 
this research. Most relevant to the aspect of enforcement by the Security Council is 
the paragraph cited above in which the Council expressed its willingness to address 
those situations in which ‘humanitarian assistance to civilians is being deliberately 
obstructed, including through the consideration of appropriate measures at the 
disposal of the Council’.193 The Secretary General has continued to emphasise the 
pressing need of the Council to deliberate this issue, given the millions of people that 
continue to be denied assistance.194 The deliberations of the Council led to the 
adoption of a subsequent thematic resolution, also pertaining to the protection of 
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civilians in armed conflict in which the Council addressed that the deliberate denial 
of access for humanitarian personnel to civilians:  
 
“may constitute a threat to international peace and security, and, in this regard, expresses 
its willingness to consider such information and, when necessary, to adopt appropriate 
steps”.195 
 
In this regard the Council also addressed its willingness to:  
  
“consider the appropriateness and feasibility of temporary security zones and safe 
corridors for the protection of civilians and the delivery of assistance in situations 
characterized by the threat of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes against 
the civilian population”.196 
 
As such, the Council addressed the potential consequences it attaches to the denial of 
assistance, and to the protection of those civilians facing serious violations and 
crimes. To that end, the Council would take ‘appropriate steps’ and consider creating 
security zones. Although the Council does not reference the use of force, in reality in 
such circumstances safe zones may only be feasible if indeed protected by those 
mandated to use force (at least in self-defence). Indeed, ascertaining that a situation 
is a threat to the peace allows the Council to invoke action under Articles 41 and 42 
of the Charter. Thus, the Council asserts that a deliberate denial of assistance, which 
as seen above in Section 8.3.2 violates international law if done arbitrarily, opens the 
door to the use of force with a view of enforcing the provision of aid.  
For the purpose of this research, it is relevant to be able to establish from the above 
that the Council is comfortable asserting a need to act under Chapter VII to ensure 
the provision of humanitarian assistance. Yet as the Security Council itself puts it in 
its Repertoire, creating ‘conditions necessary for unimpeded delivery of 
humanitarian assistance’ would rather fall under the scope of Article 40 of the UN 
Charter, pertaining to provisional measures under Chapter VII to prevent the 
aggravation of a situation, as opposed to Article 42.197 The Council also on occasion 
names concrete examples of how this should be done, such as through safe corridors 
or security zones.198 Although the mandates may vary, from the early 1990’s 
onwards, the option to use force has been viable according to the practice of the 
Council. However, the manner of operating of the Council is case-specific and ad 
hoc; one cannot easily discern a line of precedence in its work. Whether the Council 
remains with a mandate under Article 40 of the UN Charter or proceeds to use force 
as directed by Article 42 is not clear from the outset. Furthermore, as O’Connell 
                                                        
195 UNSC Res 1296 (19 April 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1296 § 8.  
196 Ibid § 15.   
197 Article 40 UN Charter. See also Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council (1996-1999), 
Chapter XI ‘Consideration of the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter, Part II Provisional measures 
to prevent the aggravation of a situation under Article 40 of the Charter’ 1127. 
198 For example UNSC Res 1078 (9 November 1996) UN Doc S/RES/1078 pertaining to the situation in 
the Great Lakes Region §10.  
 
 
Legal Consequences of the Denial of Humanitarian Assistance:  
Methods of Enforcement 
461 
rightly notes, in its authorisation of the use of force, the Council itself remains bound 
by international law, specifically the UN Charter and customary international law 
such as the principles of necessity and proportionality.199 As such, international law 
mandates that the Council take other options into consideration prior to the actual 
use of force. With regard to the provision of humanitarian assistance, such options 
would potentially include the delivery of emergency aid with ‘heightened 
security’.200  
Indeed, the practice of the Security Council is growing, and as such would benefit 
from a more streamlined approach. Today, the doctrine of the ‘responsibility to 
protect’ has permeated the peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and other ‘use of force’ 
mandates. The UN General Assembly has adopted this concept as a notion through 
which the use force in the protection of civilians in need may be called for.201 This 
concept, embedded with a clear humanitarian perspective, is able to provide more 
guidance as to the manner in which the use of force is authorised for the purpose of 
the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In the face of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, both potential results from the non-provision of assistance, the doctrine 
can be put into practice.   
 
8.4.3 Security Council Action since the UN embracement of the Responsibility to 
Protect  
 
Should the Security Council decide to use force in a specific circumstance, the 
doctrine of Responsibility to Protect is of relevance. Although RtoP is not a legal 
doctrine, nor does the notion hold specific legal standing in and of itself, it may have 
the potential to add to the manner in which the Security Council approaches the use 
of force. Despite the embracement of the notion of RtoP, seen by many as the more 
viable alternative to the contested concept of a ‘humanitarian intervention’ the 
Security Council did not immediately implement it into its resolutions.202 
Furthermore, despite the UN-wide embracement of the doctrine in 2005, as well as 
subsequent implementation by the Security Council, the following Section will show 
that certainly not every call for the use of force (in relation to the provision of 
humanitarian assistance) can be qualified or classified as an implementation of the 
doctrine.  
In its thematic resolution pertaining to the protection of civilians in armed conflict, 
the Council addressed in further detail the circumstances in which it would consider 
its readiness ‘to adopt appropriate steps’ as:  
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“the deliberate targeting of civilians and other protected persons, and the commission of 
systematic, flagrant and widespread violations of international humanitarian and human 
rights law in situations of armed conflict, may constitute a threat to international peace and 
security”.203 
 
It has already been established that the (arbitrary) denial of humanitarian assistance 
constitutes a violation of both international human rights law and humanitarian law, 
as well as potentially certain norms of jus cogens, should the denial of assistance 
amount to for example war crimes, crimes against humanity, racial discrimination or 
genocide.204 With the formulation in the above Resolution, the Council recognises 
therefore that it will indeed consider taking action in the face of such violations of 
the law. In a subsequent resolution in 2006 the Council reiterated its stance, declaring 
once more the readiness to take action in the face of flagrant violations of 
humanitarian law and human rights law.205 Throughout the following years, the 
Council continued to embrace the theme of humanitarian assistance in its work, as 
well as discussing the need for methods to strengthen humanitarian access to 
civilians.206  
On various occasions the Council continued to envisage enforcement of 
humanitarian assistance through enhancement of the mandates of UN missions in 
countries. The Council did so both referring to the use of force and under Chapter 
VII. As such, it has called upon UN missions such as UNOCI, deployed in Côte 
d'Ivoire upon the conclusion of the 2003 peace agreement, to help ‘establishing the 
necessary security conditions’ for the ‘free flow’ and provision of assistance.207 
Similarly, MINURCAT which was established in 2009 in consultation with the 
government of Chad, was authorised to use all necessary measures ‘to facilitate the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance’.208 These examples illustrate the fact that 
through such wording the Council positively affirms the possibility to use force for 
the sole purpose of ensuring the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Yet, the wording 
itself falls short of actually calling upon either a mission or member states to indeed 
use force, although Resolution 1975 allows UNOCI this possibility in the protection 
of civilians. This indeed relates back to the earlier discussion pertaining to Article 40 
of the UN Charter as opposed to the use of force under Article 42. As can be seen, 
the Council furthermore adopts these resolutions outside the framework of RtoP.  
The Council has also authorised regional missions, such as the hybrid mission 
‘UNAMID’ of the African Union and the UN in Darfur, to ‘ensure the freedom of 
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movement of humanitarian workers’ and ‘ensuring humanitarian access’.209 The 
African Union in particular as a regional organisation has embraced the Security 
Council’s tendency to exercise its collective use of force through its member states 
and has established a ‘Peace and Security Council’ in 2002 that is mandated, inter 
alia, to provide humanitarian assistance.210 Such a development further extends the 
Security Council’s approach to the enforcement of the provision of aid, as it actively 
pursues the security of those actors providing aid.  
In affirmation of the UNAMID mission in Darfur the Council also asserted that it 
would be ready to take action against any party impeding humanitarian assistance in 
Darfur.211 This approach aligns with the above establishment in Section 8.3 that 
impeding humanitarian assistance amounts to a violation of international law, 
warranting enforcement of such assistance. In the protracted situation of Somalia for 
example, the Council has again authorised the African Union to act, although rather 
than the hybrid form of UNAMID, as a singular mission. With regard to the provision 
of aid, the Council declared under Chapter VII that the member states of the African 
Union would be authorised, taking all necessary measures, to contribute ‘to the 
creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian 
assistance’.212 The Council also encouraged such member states participating in the 
AMISOM mission to ‘take appropriate action to protect merchant shipping, in 
particular the transportation of humanitarian aid’ against acts of piracy.213 This 
cannot be but seen as an unambiguous call of the Council to enforce and ensure the 
provision of aid through the use of force.  
Thus, not only in peacekeeping missions does the Council note the possibility to 
use force explicitly for the purpose of the enforcement of humanitarian assistance, 
such options even more so become available for hybrid constructions and regional 
organisations fulfilling the mandate of the Security Council. Whilst acting under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, most of these missions were, however, in cooperation 
with the affected state and government. As such, although the use of force was 
mandated, the sovereignty of the affected state was not seriously impaired, and 
international legal standards not overly stretched.  
Sovereignty continues to remain one of the paramount considerations in the 
provision of humanitarian aid. In particular due to the explicit responsibilities of the 
affected states to provide in humanitarian aid themselves, risks of violations of 
sovereign duties and a larger permeability of the shield of sovereignty ensues should 
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they not do so.214 Yet the Security Council did become more explicit concerning the 
enforcement of the delivery of aid, as it expressed in reiteration of its earlier thematic 
resolution on the protection of civilians in 2009, its willingness to also respond to 
those circumstances of armed conflict in which:  
 
“civilians are being targeted or humanitarian assistance to civilians is being deliberately 
obstructed, including through the consideration of appropriate measures at the Security 
Council’s disposal in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”.215 
 
Hence, not only in country-specific circumstances does the Security Council address 
the potential to use force for the enforcement of the provision of humanitarian 
assistance: through its thematic resolution, the Council opens the door to the use of 
force as a mechanism to ensure the provision of humanitarian assistance in instances 
where its provision is ‘deliberately obstructed’. Such phrasing is in fact in line with 
the discussed arbitrary refusal of a bona fide offer, as noted in Section 8.3.2, and 
forms part of the developments in international law. For example, should a country 
specifically use starvation as a method of warfare, the Security Council can assert the 
need to use force in the enforcement of humanitarian assistance.216 This line of action 
by the Council also aligns with the crimes as codified in the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, which entered into force in 2002, and that are addressed 
in more detail in Section 8.6.2.217 In more recent years, the Council has furthermore 
considered such an approach in practice, whilst embracing the notion of the 
Responsibility to Protect.  
In due course, RtoP in relation to the enforcement of the provision of humanitarian 
assistance has seeped into the wording of the Council in its resolutions. The Council 
has in fact on various occasions called upon member states to use force with a view 
to the protection of civilians and the provision of humanitarian assistance. In the 
situation concerning Libya in 2011, the Council, through the by now familiar phrase, 
first asserted its ‘readiness to consider taking additional appropriate measures’ to 
achieve the provision of humanitarian assistance.218 Subsequently, in its well-known 
Resolution 1973 of 2011, the Council acted upon this ‘readiness’ through the use of 
force, recalling this specific paragraph of resolution 1970. The Council considered 
that a flight ban would constitute an important element in this regard (with the 
exception of flights for humanitarian purposes), as well as authorising member states 
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to take all necessary measures ‘to protect civilians’.219 This well-known Resolution 
has been credited with being the first practical application of the use of force within 
the framework of the Responsibility to Protect. It is therefore striking that such a call 
has been made in connection to the enforcement of the provision of humanitarian 
assistance. Such an outspoken call by the Security Council has, however, 
subsequently not been seen. 
The Council has amongst others successively acted under Chapter VII with regard 
to the on-going situation in Somalia and also concerning South Sudan, but has failed 
to do so with regard to Syria, as well as for example in Mali in 2013. The conflict in 
Somalia has been on-going for decades, as has the Security Council’s involvement 
in this situation. Its particular circumstance, being often classified as a ‘failed state’, 
has added to the difficulties of the Council in finding a solution.220 Concerning the 
South Sudan, the Council authorised its mission UNMISS to contribute to ‘the 
creation of security conditions conducive to safe, timely, and unimpeded 
humanitarian assistance’.221 Such phrasing is recognised from the above 
peacekeeping missions that have been discussed, in which the Council acts under 
Chapter VII but maintains cooperation with the affected governments, and therefore 
does not assert the use of force as such, rather phrasing it in a somewhat ‘softer’ 
manner, most likely remaining within the scope of Article 40.  
Equally, the approach taken through RtoP in the situation in Libya is not echoed 
unambiguously by the Council in its resolutions concerning Syria, but a novel 
approach is taken. The Council did not commence with a forward approach, merely 
calling upon parties to implement the ‘Six-Point Proposal of the Joint Special Envoy 
of the United Nations and the League of Arab States’ that in relation to the provision 
of humanitarian assistance calls for the implementation of a ‘daily two hour 
humanitarian pause to ensure the timely provision of humanitarian aid’.222 In 2014, 
the Council arguably somewhat referenced to the Responsibility to Protect, 
mentioning in Resolutions 2139 and 2165 that Syria holds the primary responsibility 
to protect its population, and ‘demanding’ that all parties allow access for 
assistance.223 Also in Resolution 2165 the Council, although not referring to Chapter 
VII, but instead ‘underscoring that Member States are obligated under Article 25 of 
the Charter of the United Nations to accept and carry out the Council’s decisions’ 
decides: 
                                                        
219 UNSC Res 1973 (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1973 ‘The situation in Libya’ preamble and § 4 
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223 UNSC Res 2139 (22 February 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2139 § 5 and 12; see also UNSC 2165 (14 July 






“[…] that the United Nations humanitarian agencies and their implementing partners are 
authorized to use routes across conflict lines and the border crossings of Bab al-Salam, 
Bab al-Hawa, Al Yarubiyah and Al-Ramtha, in addition to those already in use, in order 
to ensure that humanitarian assistance, including medical and surgical supplies, reaches 
people in need throughout Syria through the most direct routes, with notification to the 
Syrian authorities, and to this end stresses the need for all border crossings to be used 
efficiently for United Nations humanitarian operations, […] that all Syrian parties to the 
conflict shall enable the immediate and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance 
directly to people throughout Syria, by the United Nations humanitarian agencies and their 
implementing partners, on the basis of United Nations assessments of need and devoid of 
any political prejudices and aims, including by immediately removing all impediments to 
the provision of humanitarian assistance; […] notes in this regard the role that ceasefire 
agreements that are consistent with humanitarian principles and international humanitarian 
law could play to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance in order to help save 
civilian lives, and further underscores the need for the parties to agree on humanitarian 
pauses, days of tranquility, localized ceasefires and truces to allow humanitarian agencies 
safe and unhindered access to all affected areas in Syria in accordance with international 
humanitarian law”.224 
 
Whilst the Security Council here certainly does not assert a right to use force by 
member states, it does address the option of entering into a territory without the 
sovereigns’ specific consent, and very distinctly addresses the actions that should be 
taken by parties to the conflict, to enable the provision of humanitarian assistance. It 
has been the first time that the Council refers to such assistance ‘across conflict lines’. 
As such, a novel approach is taken, although it currently remains to be seen how the 
Council will proceed.  
Furthermore in the situation in Mali, the Council acted under Chapter VII, yet 
refrained from the active use of force by member states, merely providing through 
familiar wording the ‘African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA)’ 
with the mandate to:  
 
“support the Malian authorities to create a secure environment for the civilian-led delivery 
of humanitarian assistance and the voluntary return of internally displaced persons and 
refugees, as requested, within its capabilities and in close coordination with humanitarian 
actors”.225 
 
Interestingly, the Council specifically refers to the civilian-led provision of aid. In 
such a manner, the Council appears to attempt to distinguish clearly between those 
providing aid, and those enforcing the provision. Such a distinction is also often seen 
in the General Assembly’s resolutions pertaining to the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance, as that body often ‘emphasizes the fundamentally civilian character of 
humanitarian assistance’, whilst affirming the potential for military support in the 
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implementation of such aid. 226 This has also been asserted by the ICRC in its 
proclamation that neutrality in the provision of aid is paramount, as a result of which 
military forces should according to the ICRC not directly be providing aid in an 
ongoing conflict.227 Yet, the General Assembly has also maintained as recently as 
2013 that the use of the military for the purpose of the provision of assistance should 
be ‘with the consent of the affected State’, thereby taking a different stance than the 
way the practice of the Security Council has developed.228 It is of course possible for 
the General Assembly to take a different path than the Security Council, although in 
situations involving the use of force, the Security Council has the leading role. As 
such, and also given the fact that the resolutions of the latter are of binding legal 
value when taken under Chapter VII, they shall have more impact on the 
developments in the field. 
Some examples from the Council’s practice illustrate the gradual specificity the 
Security Council has reached over the past years, in particular in relation to the use 
of force for the purpose of enforcing the delivery of assistance. Increasingly, the 
Council has asserted the potential to use force in order to specifically carry out the 
task of securing the provision of aid. As such, in its discussion of the transition from 
AFISMA to the peacekeeping mission MINUSMA following the French 
intervention in support of the government in Mali in January of 2013, similar to 
earlier resolutions the Council has asserted under Chapter VII that this missions 
mandate shall include the support for humanitarian assistance and as such shall 
‘contribute to the creation of a secure environment for the safe, civilian-led delivery 
of humanitarian assistance’, thereby echoing its earlier phrasing.229 Subsequently, in 
March of 2013, the African Union’s Member States were authorised by the Council 
to: 
 
“take all necessary measures, in full compliance with its obligations under international 
humanitarian law and human rights law, and in full respect of the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia, to carry out the following tasks: 
                                                        
226 See amongst others for example UNGA Res 60/124 (8 March 2006) UN Doc A/RES/60/124 
‘Strengthening the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations’ § 7; UNGA 
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Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced persons’, UN Doc 
A/HRC/13/21 (5 January 2010) § 64: “Where both humanitarian and military efforts to broaden 
protection of civilians coincide, the Representative has emphasized that the fundamental distinction 
between humanitarian action and military action be upheld at all times so as not to call into question the 
impartiality of humanitarian activities. Fostering a mutual understanding of each other’s role will 
certainly contribute to better coordination. The political and military arms of an integrated mission should 
reach out to non-United Nations humanitarian actors to promote this understanding”. 
227 Statement by Tauxe (n 135).  
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[…] To contribute, as may be requested and within capabilities, to the creation of the 
necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance”.230 
 
Thus, the Council envisioned AMISOM to create the secure environment which 
would enable the provision of aid. Similarly, with regard to the situation in the Cote 
d’Ivoire, the Council has noted in July of 2013 that, in extending the mission of 
UNOCI under Chapter VII the mission shall: 
 
“facilitate, as necessary, unhindered humanitarian access and to help strengthen the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected and vulnerable populations, 
notably by contributing to enhancing security for its delivery”.231 
 
This phrasing by the Security Council focuses on certain specific elements in the 
delivery of assistance. The Council in fact integrates its earlier lingo from previous 
resolutions into one singular phrasing. A similar tendency towards such specificities 
can be seen in the Council’s resolution pertaining to MISCA, the mission to the 
Central African Republic where the Council adopted a lengthy resolution containing 
many new considerations (amongst others also pertaining to the exploitation of 
natural resources in times of conflict). It has been argued that such a breakdown of 
the concepts through emphasis on the various issues relevant to the provision of 
assistance would indeed be beneficial.232 Such an argument certainly is valid, as 
emphasis is placed on a variety of relevant issues within the specific situation under 
the Council’s attention. With regard to the provision of humanitarian assistance the 
Council echoed its approach used concerning UNMISS in the South Sudan, where it 
had called upon the mission to contribute to ‘the creation of security conditions 
conducive to safe, timely, and unimpeded humanitarian assistance’. Yet MISCA is 
authorised to ‘take all necessary measures’, wording of the Council which often 
implies a more forceful approach under Article 42 of the UN Charter.233 In 2014, 
MISCA transitioned into the UN peacekeeping force MINUSCA, with a mandate 
under Chapter VII to ‘facilitate the immediate, full, safe and unhindered delivery of 
humanitarian assistance’.234  
Whilst the use of force by peacekeeping missions is not explicitly mentioned by 
the Council, it has mentioned this with regard to hybrid missions, those undertaken 
by regional operations or coalitions of member states, such as for example the 
missions discussed above in East Timor (INTERFET) and AMISOM.235 In a new 
initiative, the Security Council has in 2013 created an ‘Intervention Brigade’ as part 
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of its MONUSCO mission in the DRC.236 Although it is the first time a UN 
peacekeeping mission is enhanced with the task to in fact ‘carry out targeted 
offensive operations’ to neutralise armed groups in the protection of civilians, as 
well as ensure the protection of civilians and humanitarian personnel, this Resolution 
can be placed in the context of the evolving Security Council action.237  
Indeed, in many circumstances over the past years where a threat to the peace has 
existed and a strong authority was absent, such as the circumstances discussed in 
Somalia, Mali and the Sudan, the Security Council has opted to be increasingly 
specific in ensuring that the mandate of its peacekeeping missions or that the 
assisting member states are functioning under Chapter VII, with the potential to 
stabilise the territory for the purpose of protecting civilians and enforcing the 
provision of humanitarian assistance.238 The door to the use of force for the purpose 
of the enforcement of the provision of humanitarian assistance has therefore indeed 
been opened by the Council. The Council, through using the well-known phrasing 
related to the use of force, as well as increased specificities in its resolutions, thereby 
clearly considering the provision of humanitarian assistance as an object of the use 
of force, is identifying the importance of the enforcement of the provision of 
emergency aid.  
Yet, the willingness to act on the one hand, and the existing legal rights or duties 
on the other hand relating to state sovereignty do not always coincide. The 
sovereignty of the affected state in the provision of assistance, in practice, continues 
to be an obstacle that the Security Council faces, although Chapters 5, 6 and 7 have 
addressed the fact that indeed the viewpoint that access for humanitarian aid is 
needed, has resulted in more permeability of the notion of sovereignty today, next to 
the independent evolution of this concept within the 21st century. Equally, the 
political composition of the Council is a determining factor in its possibility to act. 
This is also apparent from the singularity of the Libyan action by the Security 
Council. Only a few times previously has the Council authorised the use of force 
specifically for the purpose of the provision of humanitarian assistance and the 
protection of civilians, against the wishes of the sovereign. Such was the case in the 
discussed Resolution 794 pertaining to the situation in Somalia in 1992 where the 
humanitarian crisis existed in the absence of a central government. Specific to the 
situation in Libya, however, was that the use of force in Libya was directly against 
the wishes of the government.239 The operation has to a certain extent reopened the 
debate on the notion of the use of force for ‘humanitarian purposes’ under the 
auspices of the Council, following the humanitarian ‘intervention’ in Kosovo by 
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NATO in 1999, outside the scope of the Council.240 Some members of the Security 
Council have expressed negative responses to the use of force for humanitarian 
purposes, also in the context of the notion of the responsibility to protect, with a view 
to the political consequences of the use of force in Libya.241 Such responses may 
explain the reason for the lack of political will in the Council to respond through the 
use of force to ensuing circumstances that may otherwise have warranted a forceful 
action to aid persons in need of emergency assistance, such as in Syria.  
Certainly, if one attempts to use force in the protection of civilians and the 
provision of humanitarian assistance to that end against the will of the sovereign 
state, an outcome most often will be the use of force against that sovereign. Yet, 
distinguishing between the enforcement of humanitarian assistance and a 
‘humanitarian intervention’ which by definition touches upon the sphere of state 
sovereignty, remains necessary. The use of force as authorised by the Security 
Council is furthermore not in violation as such of international law. Hence, this 
research has focused on the use of force within the context of the Council. The use 
of force outside the Security Council, even for the strict purpose of (the enforcement 
of) the provision of humanitarian assistance, risks lacking the legality and legitimacy 
of that use by the Council and would therefore be open to a debate.242 Such a debate 
must remain outside the scope of this research, as the focus lies on the enforcement 
options that are currently legally viable and recognised as such for the provision of 
humanitarian assistance.  
The Security Council has to date only decided to resort to the use of force with 
regard to circumstances that may prove to be a threat to the peace, whereas it does 
not touch upon instances following natural disasters or other crises that may not 
amount to a threat to the peace. Indeed, within international law, no consensus exists 
regarding the establishment of such a ‘right to use force’ in situations that do not 
amount to a threat to the peace.243 The IDRL Guidelines for relief in the aftermath 
of a natural disaster do open the door to potential ‘military assets’ to be deployed, 
but envision such relief to be ‘only at the request or with the express consent of the 
affected State’, and only upon exhaustion of civilian alternatives.244 As such, the 
Guidelines do not attempt to open the door to a potential enforcement of assistance. 
Similarly, the ‘Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets 
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in Disaster Relief’ (Oslo Guidelines) used by OCHA and the IASC do not break new 
ground.245 Vukas (drafter of the Bruges Resolution) argues that despite the lex lata 
not having developed in this direction, the use of force under the auspices of the 
Security Council should be considered also in cases of ‘extreme danger for the 
survival of the victims’ of disasters whilst there should be no risk that the resistance 
of the affected state to the ‘imposed humanitarian assistance’ would cause more 
harm and suffering than its sec denial.246 Vukas has argued that such a perspective 
would not be contrary to the terms of the UN Charter, as the Council would be 
asserting its duty to protect persons from gross human rights violations.247 Equally, 
the Bruges Resolution itself concurs with such action by the Security Council, 
although declaring more conservatively in line with current international law in 
Principle VII(3) that when the refusal of a bona fide offer of assistance leads to a 
‘threat to international peace and security’, the Council indeed should be able to take 
Chapter VII measures.248 The Bruges Resolution thereby remains in line with 
international law when it comes to the consideration of the use of force for the 
purposes of the provision of assistance. At an earlier stage in the 1990’s, when the 
Council itself was even so more than today still struggling to determine the extent of 
the potential use of force in the averting of a humanitarian crisis, the San Remo 
Principles of 1993 stated that should a state already have agreed upon assistance, 
yet regress into refusal, ‘all necessary steps to ensure such access’ would be 
warranted, in conformity with international law.249 The San Remo Principles went 
on to formulate that the UN would be competent to undertake ‘coercion measures’ 
in the event of prolonged and severe suffering of a population, should an offer of 
assistance be refused or encounter serious difficulties.250 
Indeed, finding a formulation that would entice the Council to take more firm 
action does appear necessary, as consistency continues to remain lacking in the 
Council’s approach to dealing with situations that are a threat to the international 
peace and security. This can be seen through its inaction concerning the situation in 
Syria after having taken action through the authorisation of the use of force in Libya, 
as well as for example expanding UNOCI’s mandate in Cote d’Ivoire. In practice 
however, such a ‘standard’ formulation does not appear viable, also considering the 
political composition of the Council. Although consistency in the Council’s work is 
lacking, the determination that the use of force is not viable in all circumstances has 
not become an argument that its use should be prohibited everywhere. The above 
discussion has demonstrated that the Council is in fact ready to assert the need to 
use force for the purpose of the delivery of humanitarian assistance when facing a 
humanitarian crisis. The willingness of the Council has been brought into practice 
both in circumstances in which the affected state has cooperated (somewhat) and in 
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circumstances in which the sovereign has not been willing to cooperate. Such 
forceful action through the Chapter VII framework of Security Council resolutions 
and action furthermore contributes to lessening the international legal debate with 
regard to issues pertaining to state sovereignty when considering a potential forceful 
intervention. Arguments in favour of such developments in the Council’s action have 
been made, on the one hand, towards an already existing erosion of state sovereignty 
due to the changing nature of conflicts today and the contribution of viewpoints 
concerning the provision of humanitarian assistance to this erosion, as well as with 
regard to the use of force as a means to prevent a worsening crisis that may 
destabilise an entire region as opposed to one country.251 Tomuschat has along this 
line argued that sovereignty is a ‘distinction’ conferred upon an entity ‘as a 
recognition of its ability and willingness to take care of law and order and to 
administer justice’ as opposed to an ‘inherent quality’ of that entity, and thus when 
a sovereign commits gross violations of international law such as genocide, it must 
be recognised as an abuse of that state’s sovereign rights and as a forfeit of the 
protection that sovereignty grants under international law, leading to certain 
consequences.252 On the other hand the more conservative argument has been made 
that RtoP has not yet developed fully enough as a concept to be used in foregoing 
consent in the delivery of assistance in and of itself.253 Indeed, the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) , as developer of what 
has been embraced as the notion of RtoP, has argued that whilst sovereignty issues 
‘necessarily arise’ when discussing a forcible intervention, such a potential 
suspension of sovereignty must be de facto rather than de jure, as the objective is not 
to undermine sovereignty but to rather sustain and protect the constitutional 
arrangements in a country that protect the population in need of assistance.254 Even 
so, this argument would still allow for a forceful intervention that would be 
determined on a case-by-case basis. Whilst the Security Council has embraced the 
notion of RtoP, it has obviously chosen not to implement it in certain resolutions 
following the action taken in Libya. Whether or not it shall continue to do so it not 
yet clear at this time, and remains to be seen. What can however be distilled from 
the above, is the fact that where the Security Council has the legal means to use 
force, it has also shown the willingness to assert these means for the enforcement 
purpose of the delivery of aid (against the will of a sovereign). When and how the 
Council will choose to do so next shall, in the absence of a clear line in the work of 
the Council, remain to be determined on an ad hoc basis.  
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8.5 Enforcement through Human Rights Law 
 
The enforcement of human rights law, in the face of gross violations, may not only 
occur through the use of force on a state vis-à-vis state level as discussed above. Such 
enforcement may also occur at the interstate level without the use of force and 
alternatively, human rights enforcement mechanisms exist where human rights 
violations can be claimed directly by individuals. These mechanisms are open to the 
enforcement of the provision of humanitarian assistance, as its provision functions as 
a vehicle in the fulfilment of existing human rights. Two distinct sets of enforcement 
mechanisms exist: through the UN Charter-based system with public ‘naming and 
shaming’ functions as well as through UN treaty body mechanisms such as courts 
and supervisory expert committees. The treaty bodies and courts would be requested 
to determine whether or not the non-provision of humanitarian assistance would be a 
violation of human rights law. In this regard, Section 7.3.2 has addressed the fact that 
the ICJ has determined that an obligation to allow access can exist on the basis of the 
ICERD and other human rights obligations, also in times of conflict. Thus, whilst 
many human rights treaty bodies refrain from referring to international humanitarian 
law, considering whether the affected state has fulfilled its duties in the provision of 
humanitarian assistance would not be a reference to humanitarian law, despite 
potentially judging violations occurring in times of conflict.  
Traditionally, human rights law operates at the level between the affected state 
and an individual.255 Prior discussion in Chapter 5 has ascertained a lack of an 
existing independent human right to humanitarian assistance and determined that its 
provision marks a state’s fulfilment of duties that exist under the established rights 
to life, food, health (and water). Therefore, what remains is the determination in 
which manners individuals or other states may hold the affected state accountable for 
violations of these existing human rights, in order to enforce the provision of the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance, in the fulfilment of the rights to life, food, health 
(and water). This Section addresses enforcement through treaty body mechanisms 
first, as such mechanisms amount to more legal enforcement mechanisms, compared 
to the political regime of the UN system. The UN system, however, has the potential 
of ensuring the enforcement of the delivery of humanitarian assistance whilst a crisis 
may still be on-going. Given the amount of time that passes in the assessment of a 
potential human rights violation, as well as the fact that such claims are brought well 
after an occurrence, the human rights treaty bodies and courts shall be the institutions 
determining ex post facto whether or not such delivery of humanitarian assistance 
should in fact have taken place and whether or not the affected state is or was in 




                                                        






8.5.1 Enforcement through Human Rights Treaty Mechanisms 
 
Chapter 6 has determined that the major treaties dealing with the rights to life, food 
and health as related to the provision of assistance are the ICCPR, the ICESCR and 
the ICERD, as well as regional treaties such as the ECHR, the European Social 
Charter, the ACHR and its Additional Protocol in the Area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, the ACHPR and its Additional Protocol on the Rights of Women in 
Africa, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. Also, more 
specific treaties such as the CRC, the CEDAW and the CRPD, as well as the Kampala 
Convention which is both regional and specific to IDPs deal with the subject matter 
in relation to the rights incorporated in their conventions. Focarelli has asserted that 
states parties to human rights treaties that do not (sufficiently) provide humanitarian 
assistance may indeed incur responsibility for the violation of certain rights.256 This 
has also been concluded in Chapters 5 and 6, based on the various provisions in these 
treaties. Such treaties provide for monitoring bodies that allow for various complaint 
mechanisms, varying from procedures in which those that did not receive 
humanitarian assistance may appeal that the contracting affected state has not 
provided (sufficient) humanitarian assistance in the face of a humanitarian crisis, to 
appeals from other contracting states.257   
Several courts today have a very broad jurisdiction ratione materiae, such as the 
ICJ, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the International Criminal 
Court, the latter of which shall be dealt with further on. Human rights treaty bodies 
are limited to the scope allotted to them by their respective treaties, thereby focusing 
on the rights within their scope that might relate to states parties and the provision of 
assistance. As most of the current relevant human rights treaties do not contain 
references to international humanitarian law, with the exception of for example the 
CRC (in Article 38(1)) and the Protocol to the ACHPR (in Article 11), their 
enforcement bodies have been hesitant to incorporate it in their decision-making 
process. As discussed in Section 3.4.2.1, various treaty bodies and the ICJ have 
asserted the continued applicability of human rights treaties in times where 
international humanitarian law is also applicable.258 Explicit references to or 
application of humanitarian law can indeed be found in certain decisions, although 
they are not distinctly necessary for the enforcement of the provision of humanitarian 
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assistance, which may also be reached through human rights law enforcement. 
Indeed, the judgment of these bodies may be based on the determination of a possible 
violation of the rights to life, food, health (and water), should humanitarian assistance 
not be provided in the event of a humanitarian crisis – be it a natural disaster, or a 
circumstance in which humanitarian law is applicable.  
The ICCPR, with its wide status of ratification, can provide various methods 
through which the right to life might be enforced for the purpose of enforcement of 
humanitarian assistance, although the findings of the Human Rights Committee are 
not binding in themselves. The HRC has however assessed that the non-compliance 
with its interim measures is ‘incompatible with the obligation to respect in good faith 
the procedure of individual communication’, thereby alluding to the duty of states 
parties to the ICCPR to abide by the findings of the Committee on the principle of 
good faith.259 States parties have the opportunity to address potential human rights 
violations of other states parties through the complaint procedure of Article 41 
ICCPR. To date, such allegations have not been made with regard to the provision of 
humanitarian assistance, nor can they be expected anytime soon, given the diplomatic 
and political implications of the state complaint procedure. The HRC however also 
investigates the human rights situations of its state parties on its own merits.260 An 
example includes the recent request of the HRC to Sudan, asking in relation to Article 
6 ICCPR to: 
 
“Please comment on allegations indicating that the State party has restricted or denied the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected areas, especially those controlled 
by rebel groups. Please also provide information on the measures taken to ensure that 
people affected by the conflicts in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, even if 
living in rebel controlled areas, receive humanitarian assistance”.261  
 
Thus, the HRC indeed in practice addresses the potential violation of the right to life 
through the denial or obstruction of the provision of humanitarian assistance. The 
outcome of such reports is however also not binding, and clearly such addresses take 
place after the immediate need for assistance is recognised. Such public addresses 
however do contribute to the pressure upon a state to comply with the human rights 
regime of the treaty it is a state party to. More specific and potentially more intrusive 
for the state furthermore is the individual complaint procedure open to individuals of 
states parties to the Additional Protocol of the ICCPR.262 Equally, such procedures 
are limited in the enforcement of actual provision of assistance as the path an 
individual must travel to reach the HRC is long, and should be considered an 
enforcement of a right by means of reparation, rather than the actual provision of 
food or medicine. A finding by the Committee of a violation of Article 6 can also be 
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considered an international (political) ‘slap on the wrist’, even though the ruling is 
not legally binding.  
Since 2013, the CESCR, pursuant to the ICESCR, also considers individual 
complaints through its Optional Protocol.263 Given the short timespan since this 
development, only few individual complaints have been brought to the CESCR to 
date. The CESCR can however bring forward issues regarding Articles 11, pertaining 
to an adequate standard of living, and 12 concerning the highest attainable standard 
of health, should it consider these rights to be infringed when humanitarian assistance 
is not provided in certain circumstances. Similar to enforcement via the ICCPR, the 
CESCR has noted in a General Comment that reparation may be sought, taking the 
form of ‘restitution, compensation, satisfaction or guarantees of non-repetition’.264 It 
has been addressed previously in Chapter 7 that the CESCR indeed considers the 
possibility of a violation of these Articles when food is not provided or access for 
this is denied in emergencies, or if the affected state does not seek international 
assistance.265 According to the CESCR, non-compliance with the duty to provide 
access to basic shelter, water and sanitation furthermore results in a violation or 
Article 12 ICESCR.266 Such findings however are published in the CESCR’s General 
Comments, which – although of relevance – are not binding in nature, nor do they 
hold a particular state responsible for its actions. It has been argued by Dennis that 
due to the ‘obligation of conduct’-nature of the rights enshrined in the convention, 
the ICESCR is lacking ‘sufficiently clear and precise substantive legal standards’ to 
allow for an adjudicative individual complaints procedure.267 Indeed the nature of 
most (albeit not all) of these rights can be seen as an impediment to enforcement 
procedures, as opposed to the more result-oriented nature of civil and political rights. 
The fact that such rights are often not self-executing furthermore warrants national 
implementation for domestic legal effect, in the event an individual wants to lodge a 
complaint against its sovereign to ensure enforcement. This may in practice make the 
enforcement of humanitarian assistance through human rights law somewhat more 
challenging.  
Although Article 2 ICESCR incorporates ‘progressive development’, certain 
minimum core obligations remain relevant at all times, amongst which those 
concerning the provision of humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, examples exist of 
accountability with regard to progressive development also, as the European 
Committee of Social Rights for example held Greece in violation of Article 11 ESC 
concerning the right to health, considering it had not demonstrated to have 
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implemented enough measures to improve the right to health in a particular area.268 
Indeed, both the treaty bodies of the ICCPR and ICESCR are also capable of ‘naming 
and shaming’ and formulating general concerns for the violation of certain human 
rights within their respective treaties, but they are both not able to enforce the 
provision of humanitarian assistance through their decisions. Despite the non-binding 
nature of the mechanisms, both bodies clearly view the non-provision of 
humanitarian assistance as a potential violation of the rights within their treaties, and 
as such speak out on the need for non-violation of these rights through the provision 
of humanitarian aid. 
Although it is beyond the scope of this research to address all regional and 
specialised bodies, several well-known bodies that do take legally binding decisions 
concerning human rights law violations can be highlighted. Arguably, the European 
Court of Human Rights is the most important of the regional specialised courts due 
to its extensive case law and effective implementation mechanism throughout its 
large membership, as well as its age.269 Article 34 ECHR provides for an individual 
complaint procedure, whilst Article 33 ECHR provides for an interstate complaint 
mechanism as also seen in the ICCPR, although binding in nature on both 
accounts.270 Similarly to the previously discussed treaty bodies, the ECtHR 
procedures are lengthy, and the Court is known to be reactive rather than proactive.271 
The ECtHR however does indeed consider the need for humanitarian assistance, for 
example in Benzer And Others V. Turkey, where it states:  
 
“The Court is further struck by the national authorities’ failure to offer even the minimum 
humanitarian assistance to the applicants in the aftermath of the bombing”.272 
 
However, the Court has of yet not established a clear direct or causal link between 
the denial or non-provision of assistance and the violation of a particular human right 
in its Convention. In its mentioning of humanitarian assistance, to date the Court has 
done so in relation to potential violations of Article 3 ECHR, pertaining to cruel or 
inhuman treatment, rather than the right to life (the ECHR does not contain other 
provisions relating to humanitarian assistance such as the right to food or water).273 
The Court furthermore however cites ‘the obstruction of humanitarian assistance’ as 
a ‘serious abuse’ in its jurisprudence, rather than as a human rights abuse.274 Such a 
distinction by the Court is unfortunate for the enforcement of humanitarian assistance 
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through human rights law as in doing so, the Court foregoes the opportunity to make 
the potential claim immediately viable that obstructing humanitarian assistance might 
result in a Court decision that a human rights violation has taken place. It therefore 
remains to be seen which potential route the ECtHR shall take with regard to the 
enforcement of humanitarian assistance within the context of the ECHR, but such an 
approach via direct assertion of human rights violations currently does not appear 
imminent. 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, like the previously discussed bodies, 
recognises the individual complaint procedure in Article 44 ACHR, which includes 
the possibility of complaints by groups of persons or NGOs and also recognises an 
interstate communication in Article 45 ACHR. Moreover, individuals and NGOs 
may also bring a complaint before the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
under Article 34(6) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights if 
the ratifying state has so declared.275 As with the other regional courts and the 
international complaint mechanisms, the Protocol to the African Charter also 
provides for the possibility of a state complaint to the African Court.276 Although the 
interstate complaint mechanism that exists throughout these enforcement bodies has 
been used concerning the situation in Libya in March 2011, it is not often used in 
practice but as a mechanism reflects a broader principle in international law, 
clarifying that human rights violations within the treaty regime are not solely between 
the state and its population. The interstate mechanism reflects a shared responsibility 
of all states parties for the common goal they have chosen to pursue through the 
creation of the human rights convention.277 Indeed, whilst within the human rights 
regime this role for third states is formulated as a ‘right’, such a perspective falls in 
line with the route taken by the ICJ in its Barcelona Traction case as discussed 
above.278 The approach is somewhat similar, as a possibility is left open for third 
states to assert the responsibility of the affected state for certain violations of 
international law, whilst these third states are not directly affected themselves. Indeed 
this notion, as incorporated by various human rights treaties has been subsequently 
embraced by the ARSIWA in its Article 48. The ILC has argued, referencing such 
human rights mechanisms, that a justification for such progressive development in 
the Articles lies in the protection of the international community as a whole.279 
Similarly, the provision of humanitarian assistance contributes to preventing 
exacerbations of humanitarian crises and their effect on the international community.  
With regard to the potential of enforcement of the provision of humanitarian 
assistance, the treaty bodies and courts will face the difficult task, as does the Security 
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Council when contemplating the use of force, of ascertaining whether indeed enough 
has been done by the affected state to fulfil the basic requirements of the right to life, 
the right to food, the right to health (and the right to water) so as to not violate these 
rights. Questions such as whether or not blankets were provided, safe drinking water 
and food rations sent out, all in an indiscriminate manner, will have to be addressed 
by these institutions when considering whether a right has been potentially violated. 
Whilst the Security Council considers a potential threat to the international peace and 
observes from a more overall approach whether a humanitarian crisis takes place, 
treaty-based monitoring bodies have the opportunity to rather assess individual 
violations. Also of course, a different approach is possible as they are operating in 
the aftermath of the crisis rather than at its peak, although most mechanisms can 
apply ‘interim measures’ should there be some urgency still remaining.280 To date, 
the main treaty enforcement bodies have shied away from such a formal assessment; 
not using human rights standards to measure indeed whether enough food and water 
has been provided in certain specific instances, or whether it has been provided fast 
enough. In theory however, the existing human rights courts and treaty bodies can be 
an enforcement mechanism for the provision and delivery of aid, should they choose 
to determine in cases before them that the non-provision of aid has resulted in a 
violation of the right to life, food, health (or water). To date however, such an 
establishment has not taken place although the possibility continues to be available 
to them. As established in Chapter 5, the provision of humanitarian assistance at a 
time of crisis can function as the fulfilment of the affected state’s obligations under 
the right to life, food, health (and water). With wording such as ‘arbitrary refusal’ 
that has been developed in humanitarian law in relation to the denial of humanitarian 
assistance, as well as notions pertaining to state responsibility, human rights 
mechanisms should be able to assess the human rights in their respective treaties fully 
when it comes to the matter of providing humanitarian assistance. In fact these rights 
to life, food, health (and water) are not so vaguely formulated that the enforcement 
bodies should not be able to assess in a particular circumstance whether or not a 
violation took place because humanitarian assistance was not provided sufficiently, 
or lacking entirely. The willingness of various bodies to indeed address humanitarian 
assistance within their case law or comments is proof that such assistance is well 
placed within the realm of existing human rights law. As a manner of enforcement 
however, given the duration of procedures, these bodies are often not tailored to 
ensure the timely provision of assistance when a crisis is still on-going. As such, these 
bodies provide a different enforcement perspective than of course the Security 
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8.5.2 Human Rights Enforcement through the UN Charter System 
 
Whilst treaty bodies exist for the monitoring, supervision and control of the various 
human rights conventions, states parties to such treaties have been quite reluctant to 
enter into institutionalised forms of human rights enforcement.281 Indeed, within the 
UN Charter system, human rights enforcement initially remained outside of the realm 
of the Security Council, as the task was originally left to the General Assembly, based 
on Articles 13(1)(b) and 68 of the Charter. In the above Sections, the potential use of 
force by the Security Council has been addressed, in times when flagrant human 
rights violations or serious humanitarian crises become a threat to the international 
peace and security. Yet, what recourse can be sought outside the realm of the Security 
Council, within the UN system, for the ‘enforcement’ of humanitarian assistance 
through human rights law should states be in violation of their duties to fulfil the right 
to life, food, health (and water)? After all, Article 1(3) of the UN Charter proclaims 
that one of the purposes of the UN is to promote and encourage ‘respect for human 
rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion’. Furthermore, articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter lay an 
obligation upon all UN member states to ensure the universal respect for human 
rights. As such, states have instated human rights enforcement mechanisms via the 
UN Human Rights Council, operating directly under the UN General Assembly. The 
Charter-based organs and bodies of the UN are not restricted by the provisions in 
various conventions like the treaty-based bodies discussed above are. These bodies 
have a broader, political mandate and derive their mandates from the human rights 
provisions in the UN Charter.282  
The UN Human Rights Council, established in 2006, operates with the older and 
well-known mechanism of Special Rapporteurs, as well as the new concept of 
Universal Periodic Review in order to determine the status quo of various human 
rights situations in member states.283 Much like the Human Rights Committee of the 
ICCPR and the Committee for Economic Social and Cultural Rights, the UN Special 
Rapporteurs, Universal Periodic Review (UPR) documentation and Human Rights 
Council resolutions are not binding by nature.  
Several UN Special Rapporteurs have been quite vocal in their assertion that the 
lack of provision of humanitarian assistance results in human rights violations.284 
Yet, they have also on occasion gone so far as to condemn certain states specifically 
for their (in)actions. Whilst the Special Rapporteur on the right to life mostly calls 
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for the allowance of humanitarian assistance and an ending to human rights violations 
in broader terms,285 the Rapporteur has, for example, also more explicitly announced:  
 
“According to reports forwarded by non-governmental sources, the government forces and 
rival factions of the SPLA had created a humanitarian disaster by waging war on villagers 
and herders. The displacement of millions of people and the killing of thousands of 
civilians have not been by-products of the conflict but a tactic integral to it. The flagrant 
violations of human rights standards and of the principles protecting civilians in times of 
conflict have created famine and dependency on food relief in many areas affected by war. 
Hundreds of thousands of people have lost their lives through illness, food shortage or 
deliberate assault (…) The Special Rapporteur calls on all parties to conflicts, international 
or internal, to respect the norms and standards of international human rights and 
humanitarian law which protect the lives of the civilian population and those combatants 
who are captured or lay down their arms. He also appeals to all those involved in armed 
conflicts to allow convoys of humanitarian aid to reach their destinations as well as to 
allow the evacuation of the wounded, elderly persons and children. All those responsible 
for violations of the right to life in situations of armed conflicts must be held 
accountable”.286 
 
Indeed while the Special Rapporteur himself cannot enforce human rights law, the 
mechanism and reports do function as public awareness and an incentive to alter a 
state’s behaviour. In other instances, the Rapporteur has linked the ‘deprivation of 
food’ to ‘large-scale and widespread violations of human rights’ which have resulted 
in the death of many civilians.287 More explicitly, the Rapporteur has held concerning 
the conflict in the Former Yugoslavia that:  
  
“the policy of deliberately depriving the population of the food, heating, shelter and other 
essentials necessary for survival, practised by Bosnian Serbs against the population of 
besieged cities and areas, should also be viewed as extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary 
execution (…) These deaths are not unavoidable collateral consequences of the conflict 
but are due to the deliberate refusal to allow delivery of sufficient humanitarian relief”.288 
 
In doing so, the Rapporteur clearly attempts to phrase the denial of humanitarian 
assistance in the context of a violation of the right to life. Equally, the Special 
Rapporteur on the right to the highest attainable standard of health has been known 
to make recommendations to the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional 
Authority in Iraq as occupying power, that it establish an inquiry into the health 
situation of Falluja’s civilian population following allegations including:  
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“the use of indiscriminate force resulting in civilian deaths and casualties; blocking 
civilians from entering Falluja’s main hospital; preventing medical staff from either 
working at the hospital or redeploying medical supplies to an improvised health facility; 
occupying the hospital; and firing upon ambulances. According to reports, Falluja was 
experiencing a severe shortage of medicines and other essential supplies”.289 
 
The Special Rapporteur recommended looking into the role of both state and non-
state actors, thereby indicating the possibility of multiple parties violating certain 
provisions of international law.290 Unfortunately, like the Human Rights Council 
itself, Special Rapporteurs themselves have on occasion been criticised for having 
political inclinations and motivations, which of course places their respective 
resolutions and statements within a certain political context and lessens their value.291  
Secondly, the UPR system as a public ‘naming and shaming’ mechanism of the 
UN Human Rights Council has also functioned as a platform in bringing the 
provision of humanitarian assistance to the human rights arena. Although the system 
is not binding, on approximately a dozen occasions states have been recommended 
in various wordings to ‘allow for humanitarian access’ to a certain region or to IDPs 
within their borders,292 or to allow the ICRC or other organisations to provide 
humanitarian assistance,293 as well as to enhance or continue existing mechanisms 
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for the provision294 and to ‘facilitate humanitarian assistance’.295 It must be noted that 
all such recommendations have come from other states or regional organisations 
participating within the UPR. Thus, the system can, and in fact is being used for 
certain inter-state ‘condemnations’, although they are framed and formulated as 
recommendations.  
Unlike the interstate complaint mechanisms of human rights treaty bodies which 
have remained virtually unused, the UPR thus does appear to bring some third states 
to recommend issues pertaining to humanitarian assistance in other countries. Given 
the phrasing as recommendations, such calls in the UPR system have only on a few 
occasions been outright rejected by the affected state.296 Indeed, framing such calls 
as recommendations allows the affected state to be more receptive, as well as 
allowing a more active role of third states. Human rights enforcement in practice has, 
however, shown a rather politicised perspective on the part of states, as research has 
shown states to often act in condemnation of political adversaries, whilst protecting 
allies and befriended states.297 This indeed can be seen to be true also in the relation 
between those states making recommendations in the UPR framework and the 
particular state under review.  
A challenge today, however, continues to be the lack of political will amongst 
states to hold each other responsible and accountable under the existing frameworks 
and mechanisms. In that regard, taking the more judicially institutionalised approach 
to the enforcement of humanitarian assistance through the enforcement of human 
rights law by the judiciary (or treaty bodies) ensures a more balanced and fair legal 
evaluation, albeit non-binding in the case of the HRC and CESCR. Indeed, 
considering the fact that the Security Council has the duty to weigh the facts of a 
specific situation whilst it is taking place, the role of the judiciary continues to remain 
relevant in the aftermath of a crisis, and as such holds a relevant place within the 
existing enforcement mechanisms relating to the provision of humanitarian 
assistance. 
 
8.6 Methods of Enforcement through Individual (Criminal) Responsibility  
 
Individual responsibility in international law has become increasingly relevant in the 
past decades, through the application of international criminal law by international 
courts and tribunals, and through the use of certain ‘targeted sanctions’ by 
international organisations. Both methods could potentially enforce the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance. Prior to these developments, the Geneva Conventions had 
also attempted to regulate the respect for international humanitarian law itself 
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through the creation of the International Fact Finding Commission.298 Although 
created in the 1977 Additional Protocol I, the Commission was not officially 
constituted until 1991. The Commission has expressed its willingness to address 
issues pertaining to non-international conflicts also, upon the approval of the parties 
involved, but to date, no appeal has been made to it, both in times of international 
and in non-international armed conflict.299 
Whereas a large part of this research has dealt with ‘state sovereignty’ as a crucial 
factor in the provision of humanitarian assistance, individuals form part of the 
authority acting as sovereign. Indeed, the provision, denial and obstruction of 
emergency aid all takes place at the hands of human beings. In the circumstance that 
these persons act with the control to indeed deny humanitarian assistance to persons 
in need of such aid, international law has the opportunity to hold them responsible 
for such acts or omissions. Individual (criminal) responsibility for the denial or 
obstruction of humanitarian assistance serves the point, similar to the manner in 
which human rights mechanisms operate, of holding individuals responsible even 
though such enforcement does not take place at the time a humanitarian crisis is on-
going. Targeted sanctions, on the other hand, allow for immediate action in the midst 
of a crisis in order to persuade individuals or leaders of regimes to alter their course.  
 
8.6.1 Enforcement through Targeted Sanctions 
 
Sanctions have been an enforcement mechanism of the Security Council for many 
years since the early 1990’s and the end of the Cold war, as a response to 
internationally wrongful acts.300 These sanctions focus on individuals and their 
assets, as opposed to the state or sovereign authority in general and take place under 
Article 41 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. ‘Targeted’ or ‘smart’ sanctions have 
been introduced, to ensure minimal humanitarian damage or consequences whilst 
maintaining the possibility of individual responsibility.301 The CESCR, out of care 
for economic, social and cultural rights, in the 1990’s even dedicated a General 
Comment to voice its concern that sanctions should remain in careful consideration 
of the rights within the ICESCR.302 In particular, the well-known problems with the 
‘Oil for Food Programme’ in Iraq following Resolution 661 instigated such 
comments and the need for further development of the concept of sanctions.303 
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Targeted or smart sanctions thereby provide a solution to both the more invasive use 
of force and the targeting of large groups, directing themselves at specific individuals 
or entities, whilst attempting to avoid massive impact on a population. At the same 
time, these sanctions do take place whilst a ‘threat to the peace’ is still present, as 
the Security Council takes its action upon such an establishment. These sanctions 
therefore must be differentiated from the potential enforcement mechanisms that are 
open to human rights bodies. They are furthermore different as they target 
individuals, as opposed to the responsible state or sovereign.  
In more recent years, the Security Council has initiated the use of targeted or 
smart sanctions for those responsible for human rights law and humanitarian law 
violations that can be related to the provision of humanitarian assistance. As such, 
the Council has upon expressing more generally its willingness to take ‘appropriate 
measures’ in circumstances where humanitarian assistance is obstructed,304 also 
asserted with regard to for example the Cote d’Ivoire over the course of the past 
decade that it is ‘fully prepared to impose targeted measures’ against those who are 
‘responsible for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian 
law’.305 Furthermore, the Council has requested to be informed of those instances in 
which humanitarian assistance is ‘denied as a consequence of violence directed 
against humanitarian personnel and United Nations and its associated personnel’.306 
More specifically however, the Security Council has determined concerning Somalia 
that targeted sanctions, such as the prevention of entry or transit through UN member 
states, financial asset freezing and the prevention of supply and sale of weapons or 
military equipment or training should be imposed against those individuals and 
entities:  
 
“as obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, or access to, or 
distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Somalia”.307 
 
Thus, the Council clearly determines that targeted sanctions can be imposed against 
individuals or entities that obstruct the delivery, access and distribution of 
humanitarian assistance.  
Following the situations in Cote d’Ivoire and Somalia, the Security Council has 
reiterated its willingness to consider measures in situations where humanitarian 
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assistance ‘is being deliberately obstructed’ or where constraints exist on 
humanitarian access, such as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.308 Very 
specifically, the Council has chosen to impose ‘financial and travel measures’ 
against various categories of persons, amongst which ‘individuals or entities 
obstructing the access to or the distribution of humanitarian assistance in the eastern 
part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’.309 On occasion the Security Council 
has also made a point of excluding equipment for humanitarian use and purposes 
from the targeted sanctions placed upon entities and persons, as done amongst others 
in Libya and the CAR.310 Most recently in January 2015 regarding the situation in 
the CAR, the Council determined an asset freeze and a travel ban for those persons 
‘obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to CAR, or access to, or 
distribution of, humanitarian assistance in CAR’.311 
With time, as has been seen in the previous analysis of the Security Council’s 
resolutions, the Council has thus become increasingly specific in its wording, 
allowing the use of targeted sanctions against those who obstruct the delivery of 
humanitarian aid in the widest possible sense. This manner of enforcement, 
depending of course on the level of implementation by the UN member states, has 
the opportunity to provide a very effective alternative to the invasiveness of the use 
of force.312 Furthermore, without the use of force and if the sanctions target a cross-
range of persons involved in the obstruction of assistance, concerns for a loss of 
neutrality, one of the core principles, in the provision of humanitarian assistance 
would also be minimalised.313  
 
8.6.2 Enforcement through International Criminal Law 
 
As opposed to the targeted or smart sanctions that may be instated by the Security 
Council, the enforcement of the provision of humanitarian assistance through 
international criminal law occurs in the same manner as enforcement through human 
rights law: by judiciary bodies and after the humanitarian crisis has taken place. 
Unlike enforcement through human rights law, and congruent to smart sanctions, 
international criminal law aims to bring individuals to justice, focusing on a 
criminalisation of violations of humanitarian law. Within the Geneva Conventions, 
this was envisaged through the ‘grave breaches’ regime which obliged states parties 
to enact ‘legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions’ for certain severe 
violations of humanitarian law.314 However, this legislation would operate at the 
national, as opposed to the international level. Attempts of the ILC to create a ‘state 
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310 UNSC Res 1970 (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1970, § 9(a)(b); UNSC Res 2127 (5 December 
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criminal responsibility’ have failed in the past, resulting in a renewed focus on the 
individual that may have committed violations of international humanitarian law.315 
Following an unsuccessful proposal by the UN Secretary General in 1969 for an 
independent institution that would supervise adherence to international humanitarian 
law, it took a while for new suggestions to be put forward.316 Although individual 
criminal responsibility existed through customary humanitarian law as well as a duty 
to prosecute violations of that law, the recognition that all states should have the 
jurisdiction to prosecute certain crimes has enhanced the enforcement of international 
humanitarian law, which is relevant to the enforcement of the provision of 
humanitarian assistance.317 As seen in previous situations concerning the interstate 
complaint mechanism in human rights law, whilst a belief might exist amongst states 
that prosecution may be in order, in practice states remained reluctant, as a result of 
which the development of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was 
considered a welcome solution by many.318 It was only a few months prior to the 
establishment of the ICTY that the Security Council had condemned: 
  
“the deliberate impeding of the delivery of food and medical supplies to the civilian 
population of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and reaffirms that those that 
commit or order the commission of such acts will be held individually responsible in 
respect of such acts”.319 
 
The Security Council thereby explicitly underscores the individual responsibility for 
acts such as impeding food and medical aid. Shortly thereafter, the Security Council 
reaffirmed this stance with regard to individual responsibility for such acts in 
Somalia.320 With the establishment of the ICTY, the Security Council has certainly 
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provided the opportunity to indeed bring those responsible before a judiciary.321 
Cassese has also argued that an increase of national prosecutions of violations of 
humanitarian law has taken place following the development of the two ad-hoc 
tribunals.322 For its part, the Security Council has continued to stress the importance 
of national prosecutions of those ‘responsible for war crimes, genocide, crimes 
against humanity and serious violations of international humanitarian law’.323 
Following the successes of these two tribunals, in 1998 the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court was developed to ensure permanent possibilities for 
prosecution and individual criminal responsibility, as set out in Article 25 of the 
Rome Statute.324 With the creation of this Court, problems faced with regard to 
potential immunities of heads of states and state sovereignty were also set aside in a 
novel manner by those states that have ratified the Statute.325 The Security Council 
furthermore maintains the possibility of referring situations to the ICC (given its role 
in the creation of the ICTY and ICTR), and has on occasion already done so.326  
As such, the potential legal enforcement following the denial of humanitarian 
assistance through international criminal law provides for distinct manners in which 
to forego issues relating to state sovereignty that prove to be a recurring problematic 
theme within the legal framework concerning the provision of humanitarian 
assistance. Indeed, whilst states remain largely capable of determining whether or 
not humanitarian assistance should be provided within their sovereign rights (and 
duties), international criminal law provides for a method of enforcement upon 
determination that indeed humanitarian assistance was denied or obstructed contrary 
to international law. Of course, considering and recognising that individual criminal 
responsibility is at hand, it remains relevant to address the potential responsibility of 
the sovereign authorities for the denial of assistance. But, such individual 
responsibility – in particular through Security Council referrals – furthermore counts 
on situations in which the affected state cannot shirk away from its responsibility to 
‘hand over’ those indicted by the ICC. 
With regard to the denial or obstruction of the delivery of humanitarian assistance, 
certain crimes under international law and as incorporated in the ICC Statute are of 
particular relevance. The General Assembly for its part has welcomed the inclusion 
of certain provisions in the Statute that are particularly related to the provision of 
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assistance and the safety of those delivering aid.327 Indeed, the ICC Statute provides 
for the criminalisation of several acts in international humanitarian law that are 
specifically relevant to the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Chapters 6 and 7 have 
shown that a multitude of provisions exist in the Geneva Conventions and their 
Protocols concerning the duties and rights in relation to the provision of humanitarian 
assistance.328 To briefly recapture these it is relevant to note that with regard to an 
international armed conflict, states are obliged to allow the passage of assistance 
subject to the condition that there are no serious reasons to decide otherwise (Article 
23 GC IV), and are prohibited to destroy objects that are ‘indispensable to the 
survival of the civilian population’ (Article 54 AP I). In conjunction with Article 54 
AP I, relief actions ‘shall be undertaken’ if the civilian population is inadequately 
supplied (Article 70 AP I). States must furthermore allow and facilitate the rapid and 
unimpeded passage of all relief consignments, prohibition of delaying humanitarian 
assistance (Article 70 AP I) and provide for the safety of humanitarian personnel 
(Article 71 AP I). Concerning non-international armed conflicts, a prohibition of 
starvation of civilians ‘as a method of combat’ exists (Article 14 AP II) and as a 
corollary, subject to the consent of the state, relief ‘shall’ be undertaken in the event 
of undue hardship (Article 18 AP II). Lastly, regarding a situation of occupation, the 
Geneva Convention provides that the duties of the occupier include to ‘ensure to the 
fullest extent of the means available’ that the population is provided with food and 
medical supplies (Article 55 GC IV). The occupier shall furthermore agree to relief 
schemes on behalf of the population, and shall facilitate them, as well as permitting 
the free passage of assistance and guaranteeing the protection of those providing 
assistance, whilst maintaining the right to regulate passage of convoys (Article 59 
GC IV). Furthermore, the occupying power has a duty to allow existing Red Cross 
societies and other similar humanitarian organisations in a territory to continue with 
their activities (Article 63 GC IV) and must ‘to the fullest extent of the means 
available to it’, also ensure clothing, shelter and other supplies that may be ‘essential 
to the survival of the civilian population’ (Article 69 AP I). Under human rights law, 
the rights to life, food and health remain relevant. The ICC Statute, as discussed 
below, allows for potential individual criminal responsibility for violations of certain 
of these acts, rights and duties. 
This brief revisit will allow a discussion of the provisions in the Rome Statute that 
provide for the criminalisation of certain acts related to the Geneva Conventions and 
their Protocols. The ICC has jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, aggression, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes.329 In particular the latter two, as opposed to 
genocide and aggression, are of relevance in the enforcement of the provision of 
humanitarian assistance as their specific provisions are most tailored to 
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circumstances of denial of humanitarian assistance. For both crimes, a level of ‘intent 
and knowledge’ is required as determined by Article 30 of the ICC Statute.  
Aside from the ICC Statute, certain acts have also been criminalised in regional 
international law, but cannot be focused on specifically in this Section. A primary 
example however includes Article 7(4) and (5)(g-i) of the Kampala Convention, 
asserting criminal responsibility for members of armed groups that obstruct the safe 
passage and access of humanitarian assistance and personnel. Given the role played 
by the ICC in international criminal law today, a focus will be had on this institution, 
supported by the case law of other (regional) tribunals and customary international 
law.  
 
8.6.2.1 War Crimes and Humanitarian Assistance 
 
A connection between a crime and an armed conflict must be established, in order 
for the crime to be considered constituting a ‘war crime’.330 
Specifically, Article 8 ICC Statute regarding war crimes holds several elements 
that can be applied to circumstances pertaining to the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance. As such, with regard to an international armed conflict and relevant to the 
criminalisation of the denial of humanitarian assistance, Article 8(2) ICC Statute 
declares: 
 
“For the purpose of this Statute, ‘war crimes’ means: (a) Grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts against persons or 
property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention: […] (ii) […] 
inhuman treatment […] (iii) Wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or 
health; […] (b) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international 
armed conflict, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the 
following acts: […] (iii) Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, 
material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the 
protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed 
conflict; (iv) Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause 
incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, 
long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive 
in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated; […] (xxi) 
Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment; […] (xxiv) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical 
units and transport, and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva 
Conventions in conformity with international law; (xxv) Intentionally using starvation of 
civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their 
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survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva 
Conventions”.331 
 
Thus, the ICC Statute considers a large range of actions that may be related to the 
denial or obstruction of the provision of assistance as potential war crimes in an 
international armed conflict (see supra Sections 6.5.1.1 and 7.5.2.1). These include 
wilfully causing great suffering or injury to persons health, intentional attacks against 
civilians or personnel involved in humanitarian assistance, launching an attack which 
might severely damage the environment (the principle of proportionality), outrages 
upon personal dignity, directly attacking personnel displaying the emblems of the 
Geneva Convention (the principle of distinction) and using starvation as a method of 
warfare. From the above, it becomes apparent that in particular Article 8(2)(b)(iii) 
and (xxv) concerning the attacks on those providing humanitarian assistance and the 
use of starvation by depriving civilians of means for survival respectively, are most 
specifically tailored towards the enforcement of the provisions in the Geneva 
Conventions and their Protocols concerning the delivery of emergency aid to persons 
in need. The ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study argues that its 
rule ‘Objects used for humanitarian relief operations must be respected and 
protected’ functions as a corollary to the prohibition of starvation.332 Furthermore, 
human rights law continues to be applicable, and as such these crimes may also be 
violations in more general terms of the rights to life and food. Other than the ICRC 
Study, the ICC Statute and the Geneva Conventions maintain distinct provisions for 
the prohibition of starvation and the protection of those providing assistance. Article 
8(2)(b)(iii) ICC Statute indeed quite succinctly reflects the wording of Article 71 AP 
I. It also formulates the international criminalisation of Article 9 of the Convention 
‘On The Safety Of United Nations And Associated Personnel’, which entered into 
force in 1999.333 Furthermore, the ICC ‘Elements of the Crime’ reflect that the attack 
– within the context of an armed conflict – must have been intentionally directed 
towards those persons or materials involved in the provision of aid whilst they were 
entitled to protection, and the perpetrator must have been aware of these 
circumstances.334 A certain degree of wilfulness and knowledge of the circumstances 
are therefore presupposed, for an attack against humanitarian personnel or materials 
to amount to a war crime in an international armed conflict.  
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Closely related to Article 8(2)(b)(iii) is Article 8(2)(b)(xxiv). It has been argued 
that Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) then reflects the obligations as set out in Article 23 GC IV 
and Articles 54 and 70 AP I and thus the deliberate obstruction of relief supplies can 
be distinguished as a war crime.335 Indeed, Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) states that only the 
‘wilful’ impediment of humanitarian assistance shall amount to a crime. In this 
manner Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) continues to ‘leave the door ajar’ to the potential refusal 
by the affected state of consent to allow assistance from outside a territory.336 The 
ICC Elements of the Crime explain that here too a nexus to an international armed 
conflict is required, with an awareness thereof by the perpetrator, who must have 
‘intended to starve civilians as a method of warfare’ by depriving them of objects 
which would be ‘indispensible’ to their survival.337 As such, the current provisions 
in Article 8 of the Statute criminalise the existing legal framework in terms of 
reflecting both the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols as well 
as the human rights to life, food and health.338  
The discussed crimes, however, are not listed as the ‘grave breaches’ of 
international humanitarian law in Article 147 GC IV. Yet, besides the provisions of 
Article 8(2)(b)(iii) and (xxv) that are not considered grave breaches of humanitarian 
law as their origins lie with the Hague Conventions, other instances are listed as 
grave breaches and may also reflect certain actions related to the provision of 
humanitarian assistance. As such, Article 8(2)(a)(iii) concerning the wilful causing 
of ‘great suffering, or serious injury to body or health’ falls within that category, and 
it can be argued that withholding water, food, medical and other supplies necessary 
for the immediate survival of persons can be considered at least the causing of serious 
injury to the health of a person; and thereby a violation of their right to health. 
Relevant in this situation is in particular that the suffering should amount to the 
causing of ‘great physical or mental pain or suffering to, or serious injury to body or 
health of, one or more persons’.339 A level of intentionality is required, which is 
however not required for Article 8(2)(a)(ii) concerning ‘inhuman treatment’ and 
might therefore be argued more easily concerning the withholding of humanitarian 
aid. As opposed to Article 8(2)(a)(iii) for which the Elements of the Crime explain 
that the perpetrator must ‘cause’ the suffering; the Elements of the Crime explain 
concerning Article 8(2)(a)(ii) that the perpetrator must merely ‘inflict’ such pain or 
suffering.340 Considering the denial of humanitarian assistance either wilful killing 
or torture as a war crime however may be one bridge too far, given the elements of 
these crimes.341 
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Other potential provisions exist in the ICC Statute that – although not particularly 
tailored to size – may be related to the denial of humanitarian assistance. Such clauses 
fall outside the ‘grave breaches’ regime, as does the above discussed Article 
8(2)(b)(iii) and (xxv). In particular Article 8(2)(b)(iv) concerning attacks that lead to 
damages to the environment or Article 8(2)(b)(xxi) concerning acts that result in 
outrages upon personal dignity, may be related to the denial or obstruction of 
humanitarian assistance. With regard to Article 8(2)(b)(iv), a presupposition of 
knowledge of the extent of the damages is assumed, as well as the fact that the attack 
must be ‘clearly excessive in relation to’ the military advantages.342 This reflects the 
proportionality principle as enshrined in international humanitarian law. Article 
54(2) AP I declares a prohibition to ‘destroy objects indispensable to the survival of 
the civilian population’, as an explanation of the most common ways in which the 
starvation of a population is obtained. The Commentary to the Protocol asserts that 
this includes agricultural areas in ‘the widest sense’ and acknowledges that this 
excludes circumstances of military necessity.343 As such, whilst it perhaps does not 
specifically tailor to the obstruction of aid, Article 8(2)(b)(iv) ICC Statute concerning 
damages to the environment may indeed reflect the provisions of Article 54(2) AP I 
when it comes to deliberately obstructing a population from sustaining themselves 
and thereby exacerbating a humanitarian crisis and violating the right to food of these 
persons. Article 8(2)(b)(xxi) ICC Statute concerning acts that result in outrages upon 
personal dignity may also be placed within a human rights discourse, as reflecting a 
violation of a person’s right to life or health. The Elements of the Crime explain that 
in order for acts to amount to such a crime, one or more persons must be humiliated, 
degraded or ‘otherwise violated’ in their dignity to the extent that it is ‘generally 
recognized as an outrage upon personal dignity’.344 It follows from this explanation 
that potentially this provision in the ICC Statute might serve as a subsidiary provision 
when prosecuting persons for the denial or obstruction of humanitarian assistance. 
It remains important to be cognisant that whereas certain circumstances may 
appear to be a denial of humanitarian assistance, military necessity may be grounds 
for justification of certain acts.345 Certainly, the element of ‘intentionality’ will in 
such circumstances be difficult to prove, if and when the specific intent to harm a 
group of people was absent from the outset. However, such military necessity at least 
in an international armed conflict may never amount to the situation in which it 
‘leaves the civilian population with such inadequate food or water as to cause its 
starvation’.346 As a result, the actual denial of emergency aid is not to be justified 
with an argument towards military necessity.  
Furthermore, Articles 59 GC IV and 69 AP I pertaining to humanitarian assistance 
in times of occupation are not reflected in the ‘grave breaches’ regime of the Geneva 
                                                        
342 ICC Elements of the Crime concerning Article 8(2)(b)(iv) ICC Statute. 
343 Sandoz, Swinarski & Zimmermann Commentary to the Additional Protocols (n 74) Protocol I Article 
54, 655-656.  
344 ICC Elements of the Crime concerning Article 8(2)(b)(xxi) ICC Statute. 
345 Eyal Benvenisti, ‘International Protection of the Right to Water’, (October 2010) Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law § 20.  






Conventions, nor are they reflected as such in the ICC Statute.347 The ICC distinctly 
only differentiates between international and non-international armed conflicts, as is 
also reflected in the need for a nexus to an armed conflict. Establishing individual 
criminal responsibility specifically for the obstruction of emergency aid as a war 
crime appears therefore to be restricted to circumstances of either international or 
non-international armed conflict.  
Similar to circumstances of international armed conflict, the ICC Statute provides 
for the potential of individual criminal responsibility for war crimes in a non-
international armed conflict for actions related to the denial or obstruction of the 
provision of humanitarian assistance. Article 8(2) ICC Statute notes that serious 
violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions shall be considered war 
crimes, namely:  
 
“(c) […] any of the following acts committed against persons taking no active part in the 
hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those 
placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause: […] (ii) 
Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment; […]  
(e) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of 
an international character, within the established framework of international law, namely, 
any of the following acts: […]  (ii) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, 
material, medical units and transport, and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the 
Geneva Conventions in conformity with international law; (iii) Intentionally directing 
attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a 
humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian 
objects under the international law of armed conflict”. 
 
Thus, the ICC Statute declares that in a non-international armed conflict, similar to 
in an international armed conflict, attacking those persons or objects involved in the 
provision of humanitarian assistance shall amount to war crimes (Article 8(2)(e)(ii) 
and (iii)). These provisions do not find their equivalent specifically in the Geneva 
Conventions or the Additional Protocol pertaining to non-international armed 
conflicts, but are a reflection of those provisions pertaining to international armed 
conflicts with customary law status. Furthermore, the provisions of 8(2)(e) exclude 
circumstances of ‘internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and 
sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature’ that do not meet the 
threshold of a ‘protracted armed conflict’.348 Articles 8(2)(b)(iii) and (2)(e)(iii) of 
ICC Statute therefore define both in international and non-international armed 
conflict the intentionally attacking of humanitarian personnel and materials as a war 
crime. Although this has been established as reflecting pre-existing international law, 
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it does indeed also reflect the international community’s continued dedication to the 
provision of humanitarian assistance in times of a humanitarian crisis.  
The Security Council has repeatedly also condemned such violence against 
humanitarian personnel and called upon states to abide by their obligations under 
international law with regard to such personnel.349 The Special Court for Sierra Leone 
was in 2009 the first international tribunal to indeed convict persons for attacking 
humanitarian personnel under Article 4(b) of its Statute concerning ‘Other Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law’:  
 
“The Chamber holds that the elements of the offence of intentionally directing attacks 
against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian 
assistance or  peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
are as follows: (i) The Accused directed an attack against personnel, installations, material, 
units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; (ii) The Accused intended such 
personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles to be the object of the attack; (iii) Such 
personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles were entitled to that protection given to 
civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict; and (iv) The 
Accused knew or had reason to know that the personnel, installations, material, units or 
vehicles were protected. In the view of the Chamber, the primary object of the attack must 
be the personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian 
assistance or peacekeeping mission. There exists no requirement that there be actual 
damage to the personnel or objects as a result of the attack and this Chamber opines that 
the mere attack is the gravamen of the crime […]”.350 
 
In doing so, the Special Court elaborated on the scope of the crime to include an 
intentional attack, whilst the perpetrator was knowledgeable of the fact that it was 
directed at persons who were entitled to protection. Subsequently in 2010, the ICC 
Prosecutor also argued a potential violation of Article 8(2)(e)(iii) ICC Statute.351 The 
elaboration of the Special Court for Sierra Leone is indeed also reflected in the ICC’s 
Elements of the Crime concerning both Article 8(2)(e)(ii) and (iii), which states a 
need for intentionality and awareness that the objects of the attack were under 
protection of the Geneva Conventions.352  
Conversely, unlike the case concerning international armed conflicts, Article 8 
ICC Statute does not criminalise starvation as a method of warfare in non-
                                                        
349 UNSC Res 1502 (26 August 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1502 ‘Protection of Personnel in Conflict zones’ 
§ 1 &3; in this regard also concerning the DRC: UNSC Res 1794 (21 December 2007) UN Doc 
S/RES/1794 § 17; UNSC Res 1991 (28 June 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1991 preamble; as well as in 
Afghanistan UNSC Res 1868 (23 March 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1868 preamble; and UNSC Res 1894 (11 
November 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1894 § 16. 
350Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (the RUF accused) (Trial 
judgment), Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Special Court for Sierra Leone, 2 March 2009 § 214 and more 
specifically 219-220. 
351 The Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, Case No ICC-02/05-02/09 Decision on Confirmation of Charges (8 
February 2010) § 21(ii). 
352 ICC Elements of the Crime concerning Article 8(2)(e)(ii) ICC Statute and ICC Elements of the Crime 






international armed conflicts, which has been recognised by Article 14 AP II, 
followed by the provision of Article 18 AP II that relief shall be undertaken ‘in the 
event of undue hardship’. Thus, the ICC Statute undeniably differentiates between 
international and non-international armed conflicts and does not follow the line of 
AP II. The explanation can be sought in the fact that at the time of the drafting, 
consensus could not be reached on these potential acts amounting to war crimes in 
international customary law, although they had been criminalised in the national 
legislation of multiple states.353 Given the rise in non-international armed conflicts 
around the globe over the past years, this lacuna in Article 8 results in the situation 
that the denial of humanitarian assistance in a non-international armed conflict per 
se would not be punishable under the current provisions of the Statute. Only an attack 
on those providing assistance or their resources would be considered a war crime in 
a non-international armed conflict under the ICC Statute. The provisions of the 
Statute, however, do not entirely preclude the consideration that ‘starvation as a 
method of warfare’ is considered prohibited in international humanitarian law, 
potentially as customary international law as embraced by the ICC Statute.354 Indeed, 
in certain instances prior to the establishment of the Rome Statute, the Security 
Council already asserted that those whom ‘deliberately impede’ (not ‘attack’) the 
provision of assistance in non-international armed conflicts shall be held individually 
responsible for such acts.355 Therefore, despite the non-inclusion of such acts in the 
Rome Statute, the Security Council and AP II recognise the prohibition of the 
deliberate impediment of aid in non-international armed conflicts, leading to the 
possibility of individual states prosecuting persons within their jurisdiction for such 
acts. Alternatively, state responsibility might be asserted for such deliberate 
impediments, should the impediments occur by way of the sovereign, as opposed to 
armed groups without such a title. Given the Security Council’s assertions, as well 
as the incorporation of such acts in the national penal codes of several countries, a 
case might be made as to the customary international legal status of the prohibition 
of starvation in non-international armed conflicts. Indeed, the ICRC has argued the 
existence of such a rule in customary international humanitarian law.356 Adding 
hereto, such arguments may also be made with regard to violations of the right to life 
and food, in instances of starvation through the denial of humanitarian assistance in 
                                                        
353 Cryer, Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and 
Procedure (n 331) 278; Felix Schwendimann, ‘The legal framework of humanitarian access in armed 
conflict’, (2011) 93 International Review of the Red Cross 884, 1005.  
354 See in this regard Article 10 ICC Statute: “Nothing in this Part shall be interpreted as limiting or 
prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of international law for purposes other than this 
Statute”.  
355 For example the Security Council with regard to the situation in the Former Yugoslavia, UNSC Res 
787 (16 November 1992) UN Doc S/RES/787 § 7 (cited above); UNSC Res 794 (3 December 1992) UN 
Doc S/RES/794 § 5 concerning Somalia: “Stronglv condemns all violations of international humanitarian 
law occurring in Somalia, including in particular the deliberate impeding of the delivery of food and 
medical supplies essential for the survival of the civilian population, and affirms that those who commit 
or order the commission of such acts will be held individually responsible in respect of such acts”. 
356 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study (n 103) Rule 
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times of non-international armed conflict, as human rights law does not cease to be 
applicable. This would indeed allow for criminalisation on a different international 
legal basis. Furthermore, it has been asserted by the ICTY that in the absence of the 
codification of a specific provision of prohibition of an act in the Geneva 
Conventions, criminal responsibility for the act may still be established.357 However, 
consensus could not be reached in the ICC Statute regarding this provision, which 
opposes the argument held in the ICRC's customary law study. Given the surge of 
non-international armed conflicts over the past decades, it is evidenced that the denial 
of humanitarian assistance continues to play a role and that it remains relevant 
therefore to determine to what extent starvation may be considered a war crime in a 
non-international conflict, and under which circumstances. In this regard, should the 
notion continue to develop and be established as a customary international legal 
norm, it can be implemented through Articles 21(1)(b) and (c) and 21(2) of the ICC 
Statute, allowing the applicability of the law of armed conflict, general principles of 
law and previous findings in case law of the Court.358 Through this consideration, the 
provisions of AP II can indeed also be embraced at this time.  
Another provision which is criminalised in both international and non-
international armed conflicts according to Article 8(2)(c)(ii) ICC Statute is the 
concept of ‘outrages upon personal dignity’. Under the ICC Statute such acts are 
punishable as a war crime also in regard to non-international armed conflicts, since 
it draws from Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.359 Whilst not distinctly 
framed with a view to the provision of humanitarian assistance, it may certainly be 
argued that the non-provision of humanitarian aid results in an outrage on a person’s 
dignity, in view of the Elements of the Crime that are similar to those of the crime in 
an international armed conflict.360 Lastly, it must be noted that Article 8(2)(b)(iv)  
concerning damages to the environment is absent from the provisions of Article 8 
ICC Statute with regard to non-international armed conflicts, as is Article 8(2)(a)(iii) 
regarding the ‘grave breach’ of doing wilful damage to a person’s health. Whilst both 
provisions are not specifically tailored to the denial of the provision of humanitarian 
assistance, in fact the obstruction of a person’s ability to sustain themselves through 
damages to the environment may well result in an outrage on a person’s dignity; both 
in an international and in a non-international armed conflict.  
Despite the intentional stripping down of individual criminal responsibility for 
acts during non-international armed conflicts in the ICC Statute compared to acts 
which may be equivalent during international armed conflicts, ample opportunity 
remains to prosecute individuals for war crimes that have denied or obstructed the 
provision of humanitarian assistance. Indeed, the ICC Statute provides for 
                                                        
357 Prosecutor v. Tadić a.k.a “Dule” IT-94-1-AR72 (n 45) § 128 where the ICTY follows the line of 
reasoning of the Nuremburg Tribunal. See also Rottensteiner, ‘The denial of humanitarian assistance as 
a crime under international law’ (n 109) 565.  
358 In these circumstances Article 22 ICC Statute regarding the principle of ‘nullum crimen sine lege’ 
remains relevant of course. 
359 Cryer, Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and 
Procedure (n 331) 291.  






opportunities to prosecute individuals for war crimes related to the obstruction of the 
provision of assistance in both international and non-international armed conflicts. 
The breadth of the opportunity however does differ.  Codification of individual 
criminal responsibility for attacking those involved in the provision of assistance or 
their resources has been criminalised by the ICC Statute with regard to both types of 
conflicts, as well as criminalising outrages upon personal dignity. However, the 
Statute only recognises the possibility of prosecution for starvation as a method of 
warfare and for damages to the environment as well as the ‘grave breach’ of inhuman 
treatment and wilfully causing great suffering to a person’s health, in the situation of 
an international armed conflict and it is regrettable that the criminalisation of such 
acts has not been more equal.   
 
8.6.2.2 Crimes Against Humanity and Humanitarian Assistance 
 
Secondly, relevant to the obstruction of the delivery of assistance, the ICC Statute 
provides for the individual criminal responsibility for crimes against humanity in 
Article 7. With regard to the enforcement of humanitarian assistance, specifically 
relevant are the provisions of Article 7 stating:  
 
“1. For the purpose of this Statute, ‘crime against humanity’ means any of the following 
acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any 
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: […] (b) Extermination; […] (k) Other 
inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury 
to body or to mental or physical health.  
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1: […] (b) ‘Extermination’ includes the intentional 
infliction of conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation of access to food and medicine, 
calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population”. 
 
With regard to the denial of the provision of assistance, several aspects are key in 
Article 7 of the Rome Statute. Firstly, no distinction can be found between an 
international or non-international armed conflict; in fact, the nexus to an armed 
conflict has been completely removed from the notion of a ‘crime against humanity’ 
in the ICC Statute; it is not even mentioned in the provision. Today such a nexus is 
no longer necessary and such crimes may also take place outside the context of a 
conflict altogether.361 This also results in the opportunity to somewhat forego the 
debate regarding the lex specialis relationship between humanitarian law and human 
                                                        
361 Note the development in this regard from Article 5 ICTY Statute that does require a nexus (“The 
International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes 
when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against 
any civilian population  […]”), to Article 3 ICTR where this is no longer needed ( “The International 
Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, 
political, ethnic. racial of religious grounds […]”). See in this regard also Prosecutor v. Tadić a.k.a 
“Dule” IT-94-1-AR72 (n 45) § 141 on the development thereto in customary law. Concurring 
furthermore the UN CHR Report of the Secretary General ‘Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: 
Fundamental Standards of Humanity’ (18 December 1998) UN Doc E/CN.4/1999/92 § 12. 
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rights law in the consideration of which provisions underlie the crime as phrased in 
Article 7 ICC Statute.362 Indeed, a state’s duties pertaining to its obligations in 
upholding the right to life, food, health (and water) remain at the forefront also in 
particular concerning Article 7(2) ICC Statute, which explains the notion of 
‘extermination’. Thus ‘most tailored’ or most specific clause can be considered as 
the lex specialis, regardless of whether it may be a provision of humanitarian law or 
human rights law.363  
Today, ascertaining that a situation (outside of armed conflict) amounts to a crime 
against humanity also gives rise to the responsibilities of states and the UN Security 
Council for the potential use of force under the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, 
given the incorporation of crimes against humanity as one of the ‘core crimes’.364 
Such use of force is traditionally reserved for situations threatening the international 
peace and security through armed conflict, but has been accepted to include ‘crimes 
against humanity’ which do not require such a nexus, although they do in and of 
themselves quite logically through their nature affect the international peace and 
security. These arguments were also raised in the aftermath of cyclone Nargis in 2008 
as manner to convince the taking of international action by the Council (which did 
not occur). As such, the Security Council may be inclined to act upon the 
establishment that a crime against humanity has taken place despite the lack of an 
armed conflict. In practice however, criminal enforcement takes place at a later stage 
than when forceful action of the Security Council might be necessary, resulting in a 
potential action of the Security Council prior to a definitive judicial finding regarding 
the crime.365  
Furthermore, whereas one single act may amount to a war crime, for an act to be 
considered a crime against humanity, it must occur ‘as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack’. As such, with regard to the denial or obstruction of humanitarian 
assistance, for such an act to be considered the ‘deprivation of access to food and 
medicine’ and thereby amount to extermination of civilians (or other inhumane acts) 
as described by Article 7(1)(b) (k) and 7(2) ICC Statute, some form of systematic or 
widespread targeting of a particular group must be involved, or alternatively, a single 
strategic action with the intent of impacting a large group of people.366 This shall to 
a certain extent have an effect on the applicability of the crime in times of a non-
international armed conflict, as the level of organisation needed for such a crime 
might not be present or possible to prove for certain armed groups or non-state actors. 
Yet, intent towards the causation of the attack itself (as opposed to the targeting of a 
                                                        
362 See also Article 21(3) ICC Statute.  
363 Section 3.4.3 
364 UNGA Res 60/1 (24 October 2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1 ‘World Summit Outcome Document’ 
regarding the crimes giving rise to the Responsibility to Protect doctrine within the United Nations.  
365 Ford, ‘Is The Failure To Respond Appropriately To A Natural Disaster A Crime Against Humanity? 
The Responsibility To Protect And Individual Criminal Responsibility In The Aftermath Of Cyclone 
Nargis’, (n 109) 238-240.  
366 Dungel, ‘A Right to Humanitarian Assistance in Internal Armed Conflicts Respecting Sovereignty, 
Neutrality and Legitimacy: Practical Proposals to Practical Problems’ (n 134) 8; and Rottensteiner, ‘The 






group of people) needs not to be proved; suffice that the accused be aware of the fact 
that the attack took place.367 Such consideration has also been given by the ICTY in 
several instances, where the Tribunal has noted the option that one act may amount 
to a crime against humanity should there be a connection to being a widespread or 
systematic attack, or knowledge of the broader context in which the act is 
committed.368  
The ICC Elements of the Crime do not elaborate on the inclusion of ‘deprivation 
of access to food and medicine’ as part of the crime of extermination in Article 
7(1)(b) and 7(2) ICC Statute, but do indeed reiterate the need for intent to ‘bring 
about the destruction of part of a population’ as well as an awareness on the part of 
the perpetrator that the act was part of such a widespread or systematic attack against 
a civilian population.369 Furthermore, concerning Article 7(1)(k) ICC Statute, the 
Elements of the Crime note that ‘serious injury to body or to mental or physical 
health, by means of an inhumane act’ must have been inflicted, again as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack, including an awareness on the part of the 
perpetrator.370 The ICTY has noted similar elements with regard to ‘inhumane acts’ 
(as codified in the ICC Statute in Article 7(1)(k)), whilst including that such acts 
might also amount to a crime against humanity in the case of an ‘omission’ and that 
while lasting effects of the act are not necessary to amount to ‘inhumane acts’, they 
can be evidence of the seriousness of the act.371 It follows reason that indeed also an 
‘omission’ as opposed to an ‘act’ can result in a crime against humanity, should the 
element of intent be present.372 
Interestingly, the fact that the choice was made to elaborate on the notion of 
‘extermination’ in the ICC Statute itself – as opposed to incorporation in the Elements 
of the Crime – specifically including the deprivation of access to food and medicine, 
can be seen as evidence of the willingness to consider the seriousness of the 
obstruction or denial of humanitarian assistance as a crime against humanity. In 
particular concerning the obstruction of humanitarian assistance, the ICTY has found 
that the blocking of access to aid as envisaged by the Serbian Republic in its 
‘Directive 7’ with regard to Muslim enclaves was with ‘catastrophic’ results that 
functioned as a prelude and amongst other factors lead to individual responsibility 
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for both inhumane acts and persecution; therefore as crimes against humanity.373 
With regard to extermination as potential crime against humanity, it goes to reason 
that a certain ‘number’ or ‘amount’ of persons must be affected. The ICTY has 
argued that less than 1700 people or, in referral to the Nuremberg Tribunal, even less 
than 800 people may be sufficient to amount to ‘extermination’; declaring itself 
unwilling to suggest a threshold, although a ‘collective’ element should be present 
rather than singling out individuals.374 
Some have argued that individual responsibility for torture (7(1)(f)), persecution 
(7(1)(h)) and murder (7(1)(a)) as crimes against humanity may also be incurred when 
humanitarian aid is obstructed.375 Yet, Articles 7 and 8 ICC Statute contain specific 
clauses related directly to the provision of aid and the obstruction thereof, as well as 
related to the denial of access or targeting of those providing humanitarian aid, 
allowing for a more tailored prosecution by way of these provisions. Furthermore, 
whilst the proper incurrence of individual criminal responsibility for the denial or 
obstruction of humanitarian assistance is of the utmost importance as the insurance 
of the provision of aid to those in need is fundamental, it remains important to not 
attempt to ‘adjust’ the criteria or elements of certain crimes in international law to fit 
the ‘mould’ of humanitarian assistance. For instance, a too frequent coining of a 
situation as ‘genocide’ may water down this specific crime. In order for the denial of 
humanitarian aid to be considered as genocide, a specific kind of intent to destroy a 
particular group of people must be present; an intent that may be difficult to prove in 
the case of the denial of aid.376 In fact, the allowance of the provision of humanitarian 
assistance has been used to argue the lack of genocidal intent in the case of Darfur.377 
Conversely, despite not (yet) resulting in specific convictions for this fact, the 
Prosecutor of the ICC has argued that the denial of humanitarian assistance has 
formed part of genocidal intent.378 The Prosecutor has specifically stated that ‘denial 
and hindrance of medical and other humanitarian assistance needed to sustain life in 
                                                        
373 Prosecutor v. Krstic (Trial Judgment) IT-98-33-T (2 August 2001) § 28, 615 and 653. See also 
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374 Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdanin (Trial Judgment) Case No IT-99-36-T (1 September 2004) § 465. In 
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notes regarding the concept of ‘extermination’ in footnote 587: “in one case, the court used the expression 
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IDP camps’ formed a method of destruction as part of the Sudanese President Al 
Bashir’s genocidal plan, as well as arguing that the ‘obstruction of humanitarian aid’ 
amounted to the crime of extermination.379 Such allegations from the Prosecutor – as 
well as the Prosecutor’s willingness to assert that the denial of assistance leads to 
other crimes under international law – prove that at least the Office is willing to assert 
that the denial of humanitarian assistance leads to individual criminal responsibility 
in practice, and that such actions must lead to consequences.  
Intentionality with regard to the denial or obstruction of humanitarian assistance 
shall also continue to be a difficult aspect of arguing that a certain act amounts to a 
crime against humanity. Denying humanitarian assistance in and of itself amounts to 
certain specific crimes. Should a circumstance match the framework of another 
crime, it may be tried before the ICC as such, on its own merits. Thus, a more specific 
framework for the denial of assistance within international criminal law already 
exists, and there is no immediate need to have recourse to a series of particular crimes 
that have specificities that will be difficult to fulfil when considering the obstruction 
of the delivery of aid, such as torture, persecution and murder.  The above examined 
crimes of extermination and ‘other inhumane acts’ are at this stage best designed for 
this purpose within the spectrum of crimes against humanity as laid down in Article 
7 ICC. That being said, of course this does not preclude the potential determination 
that for example the denial of humanitarian aid in a particular circumstance amounts 
to persecution (as formulated in Article 7(1)(h) ICC Statute) should the criteria be 
fulfilled. Also, given that the ICC applies – next to the explicit provisions of its own 
Statute – the ‘principles and rules of international law’ as well as ‘general principles 
of law’, it has the opportunity to embrace those developments in humanitarian law or 
human rights law as related to humanitarian assistance that may take place in the 
future.380 Furthermore, individual criminal responsibility for certain crimes under 
international law does not preclude the possibility discussed above of holding a state 
responsible under the law of state responsibility for certain situations in which the 
denial of humanitarian assistance amounts to a violation of international law that may 
be attributable to it. 
 
8.7 The Enforcement of Humanitarian Assistance and the Absence of a 
Sovereign  
 
This Chapter has touched upon the legal enforcement mechanisms of the 
international community in relation to the provision of humanitarian assistance, and 
the present Section lastly addresses the more problematic circumstance of dealing 
with the delivery and enforcement of humanitarian assistance in the absence of a 
sovereign. The absence of a sovereign may occur in a variety of circumstances, such 
as in ‘failed’ or ‘failing’ states, times of non-international armed conflict with a loss 
of control by the affected state and no clear entity to fill the void, or disasters in 
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fragile states, also resulting in a lack of control. In the absence of a true sovereign 
entity in the territory of the ‘affected state’, an alternative method of enforcement of 
the duties to provide assistance must be sought, similar to the circumstance that the 
‘affected’ state becomes the ‘inflicting’ state. Yet, these circumstances cannot be 
compared entirely, as the ‘inflicting’ state shall actively oppose the provision of 
assistance (leading to circumstances in which the Security Council might enforce the 
provision of aid through the use of force), whereas the absence of a sovereign leaves 
a vacuum as to the determination of a responsible actor in the provision of assistance 
and thereby also in its enforcement. In reality of course, such circumstances might 
also lead to a threat to the peace, warranting Security Council action.  
What can be assessed, however, is that if no entity is in place to fulfil the role of 
sovereign, no duties of the ‘affected state’ can be imposed. Given the fact that 
Chapters 6 and 7 have shown that the primary duties and responsibilities for the 
provision of aid and access therefore lie with the ‘affected state’, an absence of such 
an entity brings a problem of enforcement to the forefront. Such circumstances where 
no sovereign exists may be armed conflict, natural disaster or other crises in which a 
collapse of state authority takes place such as just mentioned above. These may be 
natural disasters in failed or fragile states, where it is simply unclear which entity 
assumes responsibility over the territory like for example in Somalia. One can also 
consider disasters in areas where insurrectional movements are active that make the 
sovereign hesitant to allow access to those particular regions of a state where a loss 
of control exists when disaster strikes, such as was the case in Sri Lanka. 
Furthermore, considering non-international armed conflicts, the circumstance in 
which the affected state may not be in the position to provide assistance due to the 
fact that access to the specific territory may be impeded by the presence of armed 
groups is relevant, as the past years in Syria have evidenced. Alternatively however, 
in a circumstance of occupation, the void of the original sovereign of a territory is 
filled with an occupier that shall take on the responsibilities of a sovereign.381  
In the absence of an entity fulfilling the ‘primary’ responsibility of the affected 
state, the void must be filled by other actors in the international community, for the 
simple reason that the affected persons are in a humanitarian crisis and are in need of 
assistance. The absence of a sovereign with certain responsibilities does not change 
the circumstances of those in need of assistance. Whilst no hard ‘human right to 
receive’ aid can be claimed, it is a vehicle in the fulfilment of many human rights, 
which are held by persons against their sovereign, as addressed in Chapter 5. Should 
any of the above circumstances arise in which a territory may be lacking a sovereign, 
enforcement of the provision of humanitarian assistance must be transferred to the 
international community.382 It goes without saying that the provision of humanitarian 
assistance in failed states should be for the purposes of remedying the crisis in which 
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persons find themselves. The international community, when providing such aid, 
should be well aware of the risks of exacerbating a crisis in the event that assistance 
is provided without proper distribution channels due to a lack of authorities in a 
territory.383 In that sense, to avoid prolonging a crisis more action than the sec 
provision of assistance may be necessary. Thus, the law must be examined to 
determine on which basis the international community, in the absence of a primary 
duty-bearer (under human rights law, humanitarian law or other principles of law) in 
the form of a sovereign entity, has the right or duty to enforce the provision of 
assistance. The current conflict in Syria with continued clashes between 
governmental forces and the Islamic State, increasingly obtaining control, is a prime 
example of these difficulties.  
Firstly, a distinction must be made between a ‘de facto’ government or authority 
and a failed state in which no sovereign entity exists altogether. The ARSIWA note 
that the conduct of an insurrectional movement which becomes ‘the new 
government’ of that particular state or which creates a new state in that same territory, 
shall be considered as the conduct of that state for means of state responsibility.384 
Furthermore, the ARSIWA declares in Article 9 that state responsibility can also be 
applied to ‘de facto’ regimes: 
 
“The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under 
international law if the person or group of persons is in fact exercising elements of the 
governmental authority in the absence or default of the official authorities and in 
circumstances such as to call for the exercise of those elements of authority”. 
 
The exercise of governmental authority thereby provides the means for state 
responsibility to be applied to certain groups or movements that exercise a sufficient 
level of control, yet the ARSIWA distinctly do not apply to non-state actors.385 A 
somewhat more broad and pragmatic view was held by the ICJ in its Advisory 
Opinion on Namibia, arguing that the exercise of physical control over a territory 
‘and not sovereignty or legitimacy of title’ serves as the basis for liability.386 Should 
therefore forms of control be exercised by authorities with some form of organisation, 
a claim can be made as to their responsibility in providing aid or consenting to its 
provision subject to international legal regulations. Alternatively, such regimes may 
themselves address the international community in an attempt to receive external 
assistance in the provision of aid when facing a humanitarian crisis. Evidence of this 
can be seen amongst others in Somalia, where Farole, leader of Puntland, called upon 
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the UN to assist in the delivery of humanitarian assistance following a tropical storm 
in 2013, which was indeed delivered.387  
Yet, in the absence of any proper and sufficient governmental authority, direct 
recourse must be had to provisions in human rights law and international 
humanitarian law. In principle, human rights conventions lay obligations upon states 
parties, through which responsibilities exist to provide – and thereby as a derivative 
also to enforce – humanitarian assistance. Yet, Chapter 6 has addressed the status of 
responsibility for non-state actors in the provision of humanitarian assistance under 
human rights law, noting that it has become generally accepted in international law 
today that non-state actors or those exercising de facto control over a territory must 
abide by human rights obligations.388 Therefore, a prohibition rests upon those 
exercising control over a territory to violate the human rights of persons under their 
control. However, enforcement through human rights mechanisms, as seen above, 
shall remain challenging, considering that this route is merely open to those wishing 
to hold a state party to a treaty accountable, or a state in a UN context, as opposed to 
non-state actors.389 Thus, whilst non-state actors must abide by international human 
rights law, enforcement of breaches by the judiciary remains lacking.  
In the event such breaches become threats to the international peace and security, 
the UN Security Council does have the opportunity based on Article 39 UN Charter 
to take enforcement measures, similar to circumstances in which a state would have 
been responsible for such breaches. This can indeed also be deduced from the fact 
that the Security Council has for many years assumed such responsibilities for non-
state actors, calling in its resolutions upon ‘all parties’ (to a conflict) to abide by 
human rights law, humanitarian law and other bodies of law relevant to the provision 
of humanitarian assistance.390 Through the reiteration of such wording, the 
addressing of non-state actors by the Council is reflected. Furthermore, such action 
towards enforcement is also supported by the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect 
that has been embraced by the Security Council, which argues a responsibility for the 
international community in the event the affected state does not take up responsibility 
itself.391 Thus, the Security Council sees opportunities for the international 
community to take action, should non-state actors or armed groups not abide by their 
duties under human rights law (such as the duty to provide aid in the fulfilment of 
the rights to life, food, health (and water)) which amount to a threat to international 
peace and security. The above Section 8.4 must therefore be seen in this light.  
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Given the fact that threats to international peace and security often amount to 
armed conflicts, humanitarian law remains relevant too. The stance of the Security 
Council is indeed also in line with international humanitarian law as discussed in 
Chapter 6, which notes that the responsibility to provide assistance is transferred to 
the entity acting as sovereign when a conflict exists in a certain territory that does 
not fall under the control of the sovereign, which in such a circumstance will be the 
armed group.392 Of particular relevance in the case of the absence of a sovereign, 
however, is the matter of enforcement in times of a non-international conflict, where 
such an absence is most likely to occur in practice. During such conflicts, armed 
groups or other non-state actors may not have acquired the level of organisation 
necessary to consider them as ‘de facto’ regimes, and the result may be a more 
general lack of control and sovereign power. In this regard, the Commentary to 
Article 18 AP II pertaining to the delivery of aid, notes that:  
 
“In exceptional cases when it is not possible to determine which are the authorities 
concerned, consent is to be presumed in view of the fact that assistance for the victims is 
of paramount importance and should not suffer delay”.393 
 
The Additional Protocol therefore operates under the assumption that in the absence 
of a sovereign, or in the event of difficulty establishing which actor is the authority, 
the consent to gain access to a territory may be assumed. Whilst such an assertion 
may seem forward and bold, in reality it matches the manner in which the Geneva 
Conventions and Protocols deal with the matter of consent when a sovereign does 
exist: such a sovereign may not ‘arbitrarily’ refuse access to a bona fide offer of 
assistance.394 In the absence of a sovereign to make such judgment calls, the 
assumption is held that no reasons exist to refuse consent and therefore the 
international community shall have the opportunity to gain access to enforce the 
provision of assistance.  
 From the above, it becomes apparent that the absence of a sovereign also 
leads to the absence of ‘holding a sovereign accountable’ under international law. 
State responsibility and human rights law do not offer solutions for such 
accountability in the absence of a sovereign, and the Security Council’s manner of 
enforcement often entails the use of force. International criminal law however is 
tailored towards the responsibility of individuals in international law, and as such can 
be a mechanism in holding those responsible that have violated amongst others 
Article 7 or 8 of the ICC Statute.395 Yet here too, an assumption is made that ‘a 
responsibility’ exists, either through the existence of persons exercising 
governmental authority or through de facto regimes and armed groups, rather than 
providing solutions for the actual absence of an authority. This remains logical, as in 
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the absence of a factually responsible person or party, holding a person or party 
legally responsible shall be difficult to prove in a court of law. Indeed, in the total 
absence of a responsible actor, the obstruction or impediment of humanitarian 
assistance is often not the largest problem, rather the factual provision of assistance 
to those persons in crisis with no authority to turn to.  
The Security Council, as a body dealing with impending crises as opposed to 
judicial responsibilities after the fact, is therefore in the current international legal 
order the most appropriate enforcer of humanitarian assistance in circumstances 
where a humanitarian crisis takes place in the absence of a sovereign. The Council, 
in particular, will be most suitable for responses to natural disasters in areas where a 
sovereign is absent, as such disasters are often sudden, and require quick and decisive 
action. Equally, such action is suitable to circumstances of non-international armed 
conflicts where often a lack of control or absence of a sovereign over parts of a 
territory exists. In such circumstances where massive humanitarian crises arise 
without a sovereign to take charge and provide assistance, it may be argued that a 
threat to the peace exists, warranting Security Council action. Furthermore, it remains 
relevant that after the fact, armed groups, or other non-state actors might be held 
responsible in national judicial proceedings.  
It must be noted that much of the law pertaining to the absence of a sovereign is 
through inference; deducing the law, based upon other existing obligations. The ILC 
has sought to prevent such analogies by incorporating an option for enforcement in 
its Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters in the absence 
of a sovereign. Draft Article 14(3) notes that pursuant to an external offer of 
humanitarian assistance, the affected state shall ‘whenever possible, make its 
decision regarding the offer known’.396 This ambiguous wording has been explained 
by the ILC’s Drafting Committee as to acknowledge the possibility that a functioning 
sovereign may be absent, upon which consent must be considered implied.397 Such 
wording follows the line of reasoning of AP II concerning matters in a non-
international armed conflict as discussed above. Although the Draft Articles are not 
hard law (yet), Draft Article 14(3) follows the current state of the law, where the 
Security Council – as authoritative body – shall have the opportunity to assess 
whether or not a threat to the peace exists upon which assistance is needed, and 
whether or not consent must be implied. Whilst the current law on enforcement in 
the absence of a sovereign is vague, and provisions are few and far between, in 
practice, the absence of a sovereign in (parts of) a territory upon which a non-
international armed conflict exists or natural disaster takes place is the reality on the 
ground. Often non-governmental actors providing aid will continue to attempt to 
reach such territories, in order to supply persons in need with humanitarian 
assistance. These circumstances in particular point out the need for clarity of the law, 
to enable providers of aid guidance in their work.  
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This Chapter has taken the research into the legal framework on the provision of 
humanitarian assistance to the level of enforcement. In the event of a sovereign not 
fulfilling its duties and providing assistance (duties such as discussed in Chapter 6) 
or allowing assistance by third parties (discussed in Chapter 7), this Chapter has 
addressed the potential methods of enforcement of humanitarian assistance through 
international law. These methods consist of applying the law at an interstate level 
through state responsibility, the use of force by way of the Security Council and 
enforcement through human rights mechanisms, as well as individual responsibility 
through targeted sanctions or individual criminal responsibility.  
State sovereignty continues to play an important role in this aspect of the legal 
framework. In particular, with regard to the assessment of which acts or omissions 
may lead to an obstruction or denial of humanitarian assistance, the affected state has 
the primary responsibility. The enforcement of humanitarian assistance through state 
responsibility remains the primary approach, given the fact that the affected state’s 
sovereignty entails the responsibility to provide assistance in times of a crisis. As the 
ICJ in its Barcelona Traction judgment and the ARSIWA have both left the purely 
bilateral view to state responsibility behind, the international community can now be 
seen to be vested with joint responsibility.398 Whereas state responsibility 
presupposes an act or omission of a state which amounts to a breach of international 
law that is attributable to that state (Articles 2 and 3 ARSIWA), state responsibility 
is also possible for those acts attributable to a state through various other means 
(Articles 4-11 ARSIWA).399 The ARSIWA provide in circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness in its Articles 20-25, whereas most relevant regarding the provision of 
assistance is Article 23 concerning force majeure. In practice it might be potentially 
invoked by an affected state as a reason for denial of humanitarian assistance, 
although such a denial may not lead to breaches of peremptory norms. In particular 
concerning the delivery of humanitarian assistance, such norms include the 
prohibition of genocide, racial discrimination, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.400 Interestingly, with a more communal approach, the ARSIWA envisages 
through Articles 42 and 48 the possibility for third states to hold the affected state 
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accountable for a breach of an obligation owed to the international community in 
general; an aspect of particular relevance in the provision of assistance. This non-
provision may either affect a larger territory and thus amount for example to a threat 
to the international peace, or such non-provision may be a breach of a peremptory 
norm which shall according to the ARSIWA induce the international community to 
act.  
As such, Articles 40 and 41 ARSIWA specifically call upon third states to take 
responsibility through a positive obligation, and cooperate in bringing breaches of 
peremptory norms that are gross failures of the affected, responsible state to an end: 
envisioning an obligation of result.401 The ICJ has also seconded this view, although 
arguing an ‘obligation of conduct’ for state parties to the Genocide Convention, 
which, when such an obligation of conduct for third parties is applied to the provision 
of humanitarian assistance, can found also in both human rights law and humanitarian 
law.402 In these bodies of law the affected states can be held accountable, whilst the 
international community (mostly under the ICESCR and the Geneva Conventions) 
can be seen to be called upon in assistance. The ARSIWA’s ‘duty to cooperate’ for 
the international community under Articles 40 and 41 to bring such violations to an 
end can also be found in Article 42 of the ILC Draft Articles on the responsibility of 
international organisations as well as in Article 89 AP I. Although none of these 
provisions argue that states in the direct vicinity have a higher duty, their possibilities 
are often greater due to their location close to the affected territory. Lastly with regard 
to state responsibility, this Chapter has considered the role of the ILC Draft Articles 
on the protection of persons in the event of disasters, and concluded that these 
Articles too express a potential (although softer) obligation for third states to 
cooperate in the face of disaster under Draft Article 8 (and a role under Draft Article 
12).403 Given the formulations, these Draft Articles must also be read as duties of 
conduct, should they be codified in the future.  
Upon a lack of provision of aid by the affected sovereign, a body such as the 
Security Council or an international court upon which authority has been bestowed 
shall have to determine whether or not enforcement is or was indeed necessary.404 Of 
course, the current existing international bodies are not infallible, nor can each 
decision be presumed just, in particular due to the political realities with which the 
world deals, but in the current state of the law these bodies are those that have been 
given jurisdiction or power by sovereign states to act. The exact determination of 
which acts or omissions amount to violations of international law – through specific 
duties in human rights law and humanitarian law – can only be made on a case-by-
case basis, through the assessment of several key factors.  
The authoritative body in a particular circumstance shall determine (1) whether 
or not a humanitarian crisis exists in which the population is inadequately supplied, 
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thereby warranting assistance, (2) subsequently whether or not the affected state is 
fulfilling its sovereign duties in the provision of aid, (3) in the event it is not capable 
of doing so, whether it has requested help or refused consent to an offer of assistance 
(sovereignty considerations are granted the most leeway in circumstances of natural 
disaster and non-international armed conflict) and (4) lastly, whether or not such 
consent was arbitrarily denied.  
Upon establishment of the above, the facilitation of access by the Security 
Council’s resort to the use of force, or determination of legal responsibility through 
an international legal body, can be done. Both types of bodies have been donned with 
the appropriate authority to consider such assessments. The assessments regarding 
potential violations of international law remain twofold: firstly, the assessment 
whether or not the affected state itself has unlawfully denied humanitarian assistance 
(according to the duties discussed Chapter 6) and secondly, whether the affected state 
unlawfully denied the external offer of assistance and the related right of third parties 
to access the affected territory (as discussed in Chapter 7).  
When the affected state violates its duties, it is seen above that a secondary 
responsibility is put to third states. Third states may ensure the enforcement of the 
provision of assistance following violations of peremptory norms of international 
law, through the use of force by way of the Security Council. The Council is the 
current appropriate body to this end as it has been provided with authority through 
Articles 25, 39 and 103 of the UN Charter. In this manner of enforcement, it remains 
crucial to continue to distinguish between those providing aid and those enforcers 
taking action to enable the providers of assistance. In the current legal framework 
regarding the provision of humanitarian assistance and the use of force, the Security 
Council is the sole body with the opportunity to determine in a situation that amounts 
to a threat to the peace, whether or not a humanitarian crisis is taking place, and 
whether or not external assistance is needed; upon which it may decide to ‘enforce’ 
such assistance.405 Such a determination is simultaneously also the determination that 
the affected territory is inadequately supplied and the affected state is not fulfilling 
its sovereign obligations to take care of those under its jurisdiction. Whilst the 
influence of the veto powers of the ‘permanent five’ indeed cannot be neglected, it 
does not appear likely that the current composition and modus operandi of the 
Council will change in the foreseeable future.    
As discussed in Section 8.4.2, the Council commenced with enforcement actions 
in the early 1990’s, in Somalia, followed by a more troubled approach in the Former 
Yugoslavia, upon which the theme of ‘humanitarian assistance’ was brought to the 
table in a more consistent manner. This was done through adding the topic ‘Protection 
for humanitarian assistance to refugees and others in conflict situations’ in 1997 and 
in 1999 the item of ‘Promoting peace and security: humanitarian activities relevant 
to the Security Council’ to the Council’s agenda, as well as the thematic resolutions 
on the protection of civilians in armed conflict (most notably Resolution 1265). 
Whilst the Security Council faced certain difficulties in this initial period, pertaining 
amongst other problems to the adaptation of traditional peacekeeping missions to 
                                                        
405 8.4.1 Security Council Action: Enforcement through the UN system and the Responsibility to Protect. 
 
 
Legal Consequences of the Denial of Humanitarian Assistance:  
Methods of Enforcement 
511 
circumstances warranting more explicit use of force, ascertaining whether or not the 
Council authorises the use of force under Chapter VII continues to be of importance 
to distilling the approach taken by the body in the enforcement of the provision of 
aid. It becomes apparent in the above that in fact the Council today is quite 
comfortable asserting the use of Chapter VII, to ensure the provision of humanitarian 
assistance, whilst in its initial period in the 1990’s the Council was reserved in the 
use of force pursuant to Article 42 UN Charter and did not set out a clear line of 
action though the option of the use of force was on the table.406  
Following the UN embracement of the Responsibility to Protect in 2005, the 
Security Council did not classify each act under Chapter VII as such, but does 
continue to express its readiness to take action in the face of flagrant and widespread 
violations of human rights or humanitarian law and continues to address the need for 
methods to strengthen humanitarian access.407 Whilst most peacekeeping missions 
and hybrid missions were in cooperation with the affected state, whose sovereignty 
therefore was not too tainted or affected, the Council does increasingly note the 
possibility to use force explicitly for the purpose of the enforcement of humanitarian 
assistance as well as opening the door to the use of force where humanitarian 
assistance is ‘deliberately obstructed’ as noted in its thematic resolutions. The 
circumstances in Libya in 2011 have shown the Security Council’s willingness to use 
both force and to apply the RtoP doctrine, strikingly in direct connection to the 
enforcement of humanitarian assistance.408 Despite subsequent Chapter VII action in 
Somalia and the South Sudan, the Council fails in consistency as it did not embrace 
RtoP in these circumstances, nor did it refer to Chapter VII in the case of Mali and 
Syria to date, although it alluded to Syria’s responsibility to protect its citizens. 
Indeed, in a novel approach the Council has called upon the provision of 
humanitarian assistance in Syria ‘across conflict lines’.  
Increasingly the Council has also become more specific with the language in its 
resolutions, focusing with greater detail on the use of force for the purpose of 
enforcement of aid delivery, such as in Somalia and Mali, yet continues to grapple 
with the difficulties of state sovereignty. Thus, as concluded above, it may be useful 
to find a formulation for the Council to take more consistent and firm action, although 
this may not be realistic and viable in practice, given the ad hoc basis upon which the 
Council operates.409 Despite lacking consistency in action, this must not be read as a 
determination that the use of force is prohibited, as the Council has clearly 
demonstrated its willingness and readiness to use force either through strengthening 
existing missions, or through calling upon its member states, both in circumstances 
where the sovereign has cooperated and in circumstances against the direct wishes of 
such a sovereign. The Council’s actions hereby follow the line of the on-going debate 
pertaining to issues with the permeability of state sovereignty in the event a sovereign 
does not protect those under its jurisdiction. With the on-going developments 
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surrounding RtoP, a case-by-case analysis will continue to be the manner in which to 
follow the Council’s actions in order to distil more clarity.  
Besides the ad-hoc action by the Security Council, enforcement options are also 
available through human rights law, either by way of (semi-) judicial treaty-bodies 
or through the UN Charter system, in which both individuals and states may hold the 
affected state accountable for violations of the rights to life, food, health (and water) 
that may incur should humanitarian assistance not be provided.410 This Chapter has 
addressed the position of four main treaty body mechanisms concerning the 
enforcement of humanitarian assistance, which are all limited in their scope of 
application to the content of their respective treaties. Both the ICCPR and ICESCR 
have treaty bodies: their findings are not binding and cannot hold states legally 
accountable for potential violations of human rights.411 Their interstate complaint 
mechanism has furthermore not been used, nor is it expected to be used, given the 
political implications. Independently, the HRC has recognised on occasion that the 
non-provision of humanitarian assistance may amount to a violation of the right to 
life under the ICCPR, thereby opening the door to subsequent findings. Problematic 
to the CESCR is that the rights in the ICESCR are obligations of conduct rather than 
hard result (with the exception of the minimum core obligations) and as such may be 
more difficult to argue as having been violated. For the purpose of the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance however, the minimum core obligations are of particular 
relevance, as addressed in Chapter 5. Furthermore, the CESCR individual complaint 
procedure has not existed long enough to have allowed for any findings related to the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance, leaving only the General Comments procedure 
through which the Committee has indeed argued potential violations of Articles 11 
and 12 should humanitarian assistance not be provided.  
It is particularly regrettable that the ECtHR, although having had ample 
opportunity, has neglected to connect the non-provision of humanitarian assistance 
consistently to the violation of human rights under its Convention. The Court has 
done so only in relation to potential violation of Article 3 (cruel or inhuman 
treatment), and noting the obstruction of aid as a serious ‘abuse’ rather than as a 
human rights abuse, thereby foregoing the opportunity to classify the denial of aid as 
a violation of a human right, more specifically as a violation of the right to life.412 
The IACtHR lastly also recognises both the individual and state complaint procedure, 
but no jurisprudence to date is specifically relevant to this research into the 
enforcement of humanitarian assistance. 
The latter notion of ‘state complaints’ reflects a shared responsibility of all states 
parties to the respective Conventions, such as also can be seen in the ARSIWA and 
the ICJ’s perspective in the Barcelona Traction case. Difficult for the treaty bodies 
however remains, in particular concerning obligations of conduct, the ascertaining of 
whether or not enough has been done by the affected state to fulfil the basic 
requirements of the right to food, health (and water), as well as ensuring the right to 
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life; through the indiscriminate provision of emergency assistance. Given the 
attempts, slowly, to also apply humanitarian law where necessary, these bodies may 
well use the wording of that law such as ‘arbitrary refusal’ or ‘adequate supply’ to 
add more specificity to their findings. However, even outside of armed conflict, the 
formulations of the rights to life, food and health are not so vague as to not allow the 
enforcement bodies to assess whether or not the non-provision of assistance entailed 
a violation of a right.413  
Operating next to the treaty bodies are the Charter-based organs and bodies of the 
UN, with a more broad and political mandate, such as the Human Rights Council 
with its UPR system and the Special Rapporteurs.414 Both in the UPR system as well 
as through the Special Rapporteurs, the UN member states have been called on to 
allow for humanitarian access and assistance, and such bodies have placed the denial 
of assistance clearly within a human rights context, condemning states for inaction. 
Such recommendations (some coming from third states) contribute to the general 
consensus that the enforcement of humanitarian assistance can be viewed from a 
human rights perspective, although they remain non-binding. In particular, the 
politics of the Human Rights Council mechanisms must be recognised and taken into 
consideration, when addressing their value.  
Lastly, individual responsibility is addressed in this Chapter through targeted 
sanctions and criminal responsibility. Individual responsibility can be asserted by 
the Security Council, in its appliance of sanctions as an enforcement mechanism 
‘targeted’ towards individuals, a mechanism it has used since the 1990’s and which 
has become more and more specific over recent years, also with regard to those 
responsible for human rights- and humanitarian law violations related to the non-
provision of humanitarian assistance.415 In instances such as in Cote d’Ivoire, 
Somalia, the DRC and the CAR, the Security Council has expressed its willingness 
to take action against those that have denied or obstructed humanitarian assistance 
or directed violence towards humanitarian personnel, through asset freezing, travel 
bans and similar sanctions. This enforcement mechanism of the Council has proven 
an increasingly useful tool, as it avoids the impact on the civilian population in 
general that may be had by the use of force. As it is subject to the implementation of 
member states, its impact may however not be great enough to pressure authorities 
into allowing aid into a territory.  
Unlike targeted sanctions, individual criminal responsibility is allocated often 
after the crisis has taken place, similar to the work of human rights enforcement 
mechanisms. With the creation of the ICC a permanent court has jurisdiction over 
the crimes of aggression, genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, the 
latter two of which are of particular relevance to the enforcement of the provision of 
humanitarian assistance.416 The ICC has also the crucial novel capacity to forego 
many obstacles pertaining to the immunities of sovereigns and other authorities. 
                                                        
413 8.5.1 Enforcement through Human Rights Treaty Mechanisms.  
414 8.5.2 Human Rights Enforcement through the UN Charter System. 
415 8.6.1 Enforcement through Targeted Sanctions. 






Article 8 ICC Statute pertaining to war crimes recognises a wide variety of actions 
that may be related to the denial or obstruction of humanitarian aid, separately in an 
international armed conflict and in a non-international armed conflict.417 In an 
international armed conflict, such actions include wilfully causing great suffering or 
injury to a person’s health, intentional attacks on civilians or personnel involved in 
humanitarian assistance, launching attacks which might severely damage the 
environment (a violation of the principle of proportionality), outrages upon personal 
dignity, directly attacking personnel displaying the emblems of the Geneva 
Convention (a violation of the principle of distinction) and using starvation as a 
method of warfare. The provisions of the ICC reflect the criminalisation of 
provisions in the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols, such as Articles 23 GC 
IV, and 54 and 71 AP I as well as the human rights to life and food. The ICC does 
leave room for the consent of the affected state, as it criminalises the ‘wilful 
impediment’ of aid in Article 8(2)(b)(xxv). However, such intentionality is not 
necessary with regard to the crime of inhuman treatment: Article 8(2)(a)(ii) clarifies 
that merely ‘inflicting’ pain or suffering suffices for criminalisation.  
In particular it must be noted that military necessity may be argued as a 
justification for certain acts of non-provision of humanitarian assistance as long as 
these do not amount to starvation.418 In non-international armed conflicts, the ICC 
Statute has criminalised serious violations of common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions, detailing these as intentionally attacking those persons or objects 
involved in the provision of humanitarian assistance (Article 8(2)(e)(ii) and (iii)). 
However, starvation as a method of warfare is not criminalised, despite the 
recognition of its unlawfulness both by AP II and the Security Council. Alternative 
methods of prosecution would be possible through the argument that this norm is 
part of customary international law. Another distinction between international and 
non-international armed conflicts – although ‘outrages upon personal dignity’ are 
criminalised for both, is that the ICC Statute furthermore only criminalises damages 
to the environment as well as the ‘grave breach’ of inhuman treatment and wilfully 
causing great suffering to a person’s health in the situation of an international armed 
conflict.  
Secondly, individual criminal responsibility for the obstruction or denial of 
humanitarian assistance is possible through Article 7 ICC Statute pertaining to 
crimes against humanity. Unlike war crimes, crimes against humanity no longer 
warrant a nexus to an armed conflict, thereby also putting the debate concerning the 
concept of the ‘lex specialis’ relationship between human rights law and 
humanitarian law somewhat more aside.419 In particular in relation to the non-
provision of assistance, Article 7(2) ICC Statute criminalises ‘extermination’, which 
includes the ‘deprivation of access to food and medicine’. A crime against humanity 
however must be a widespread or systematic attack, or, in the event of a single 
strategic act, it must have occurred with the intent of impacting a larger group, 
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bringing about the destruction of part of a population.420 Intentionality remains a 
difficult aspect of this crime in relation to humanitarian assistance, but the 
willingness of states to put the delivery of humanitarian assistance at the forefront of 
criminalisation can be seen in their inclusion of such obstruction as an act of 
‘extermination’ within the text of Article 7 of the ICC Statute. ‘Other inhumane acts’ 
as mentioned in Article 7 ICC Statute shall then provide for alternative means of 
prosecution in the denial or obstruction of assistance by certain individuals.   
Finally, this Chapter has also ascertained in what manner enforcement options 
are available in those circumstances in which a sovereign is absent partly or entirely. 
Given that the sovereign is the primary responsible party for the provision of 
assistance, state responsibility shall not be able to be asserted, save for in the 
circumstance of a de facto regime as meant in Article 9 ARSIWA.421 The ICJ has 
declared more broadly that the ‘exercise of physical control over a territory ‘and not 
sovereignty or legitimacy of title’ serves as the basis for liability.422 Indeed, the 
absence of a sovereign does not change the fact that a crisis may take place, and that 
persons may be in dire need of humanitarian assistance. The provision of assistance 
continues to be a fulfilment of the human rights of such persons as well as a 
fulfilment of certain provisions in humanitarian law (should an armed conflict take 
place). The international community shall therefore have the opportunity to enforce 
the provision of humanitarian assistance directly on the basis of these bodies of law, 
as both bodies recognise the responsibility of non-state actors to abide by 
international law.423 In particular Article 18 AP II presupposes the consent to access 
a territory in the event of difficulty establishing which actor is the authority.  
Naturally international criminal law is also tailored to individual responsibility, 
and as such can also hold those non-state actors responsible that have committed 
violations of Articles 7 or 8 of the ICC Statute, although difficulties will continue to 
exist in an absolute void of authority. Such a void shall however potentially enhance 
the opportunity of the Security Council to take immediate action to provide aid, 
without struggling with the difficulties of crossing sovereignty barriers. In particular 
for circumstances of natural disaster, the ILC Draft Articles attempt to fill the gap 
through Draft Article 14(3) allowing for an implied consent in the absence of a 
sovereign.424 Problematic to the complete absence of a sovereign, however, is the 
need to infer many of the enforcement options throughout the bodies of law. As seen 
throughout this Chapter, many of the circumstances bound to occur in practice do 
not have explicit legal equivalent solutions. As such, in international law 
enforcement currently continues to be a case-by-case assessment.
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 CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
  
 
The tragedies of World War II, in particular the persecutions and horrendous death 
camps, were the epitome of a humanitarian crisis and caused the international 
community to cry out ‘never again!’. Yet within a single century, the world has been 
witness to numerous disasters, emergencies and conflicts, resulting in millions of 
people in dire need of aid, but not receiving it. The provision of aid to persons in 
need, a concept founded on basic human dignity and the principle of humanity, 
turned out not to be as self-evident as perceived. The provision of humanitarian 
assistance continues to raise legal questions and faces legal barriers to this day. These 
struggles have triggered the present research into the legal framework on the 
provision of humanitarian assistance.  
 
9.1 Conclusions Pertaining to the Existing Legal Framework  
  
This research has proposed addressing the provision of humanitarian assistance from 
an all-encompassing and integral ‘umbrella’ perspective, to ensure a common 
denominator for all persons who may find themselves in need of humanitarian 
assistance. Although recognising the historical context through which the delivery 
of humanitarian assistance – as a concept – has developed in times of war, separately 
from in times of peace, it must be concluded that the persons in need of assistance 
remain a constant factor, as do their needs: regardless of facing a conflict or 
hurricane, basic human needs remain constant. Indeed, the purpose of humanitarian 
assistance: protecting victims of crises, should allow their equal protection. In 
international law, a clear-cut definition of the concept of humanitarian assistance 
remains lacking. Therefore, based upon the various definitions suggested in soft law, 
it has been proffered in Chapter 2 that for the purpose of this research,  
 
humanitarian assistance shall be considered assistance consisting of food, 
medicine, shelter and logistics for its provision, for urgent purposes and 
which is indispensable to the survival of the people at whom it is aimed.1 
 
This succinct definition restricts humanitarian assistance to emergency aid for the 
immediate survival of persons in need. Similar to the fact that a plethora of potential 
definitions of assistance exist, so do various actors involved with its provision hold 
different viewpoints on the manner in which it should be provided, amongst which 
the ICRC/IFRC and the UN. Again, in searching for a common denominator, this 
research has confirmed three principles that find common ground amongst the main 
providers of aid. These principles are the principles of humanity, impartiality and 
                                                        






neutrality. Human dignity plays a central role, as well as non-discrimination and 
refraining from involvement in the crisis on the territory in which assistance takes 
place. From the principles through which assistance is provided, the recipients and 
providers of said assistance can be distilled.2 Chapter 2 addresses that these 
recipients shall be civilians, regardless of the specific circumstances in which aid is 
provided, and may include refugees or IDPs. With the principles of assistance in 
mind, this ‘civilian’ requirement is indeed necessary for aid to be considered 
humanitarian assistance, and similarly requirements exist for those providing aid. 
First and foremost, the affected state has a primary role, as it is the authority in the 
territory in which the crisis takes place. Secondly, when abiding by the principles of 
humanity, neutrality and impartiality, international organisations and third states 
may also provide assistance.  
Establishing the boundaries of this research thus immediately brings several 
initial gaps in the legal framework pertaining to the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance to the forefront. Whilst ‘humanitarian assistance’ is a common term 
involving legal rights and duties, the concept itself has not been defined definitively 
or conclusively, thereby warranting a definition in this research. Furthermore, 
several of the providers of assistance hold differentiating views on the manner in 
which assistance should be provided, leading to the need to distil common 
denominators that are accepted by all those who provide aid.   
The need for humanitarian assistance, as argued in this research, arises in times 
of a humanitarian crisis. A crisis in reality can be any factual circumstance, provided 
that it meets a certain threshold of severity and as such aligns with the overarching 
approach to the provision of assistance taken in this research. To this end, the 
definition for such a crisis is stipulated in Chapter 3: 
 
A humanitarian crisis is a situation deriving from a variety of origins, 
including natural or man-made disaster, armed conflict and occupation; 
causing grave damages of a personal or material nature to persons, where 
(external) assistance is needed as the local capacity is either overwhelmed, 
unable or sometimes unwilling to manage the circumstances.3 
 
This definition of a humanitarian crisis allows for a multitude of factual 
circumstances to ‘amount’ to a crisis, as long as a basic threshold is met, regardless 
of the legal qualification of such circumstances. As is well-known, the law follows 
the facts, not the other way around. When considering these circumstances, it 
becomes apparent that the law pertaining to the provision of aid differentiates 
between assistance in times of natural disasters, (non-) international armed conflicts 
and occupation. A variety of rights and duties exists regarding the provision of 
assistance that are dependent on the specific legal qualification, which is not 
conducive to the comprehensive assertion that a person in need of aid should receive 
such aid, as human dignity proscribes. In practice therefore, ‘classifying’ a crisis 
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results in a disparity in the level of protection of persons in need of aid, warranting 
this research. The law is most explicit concerning relief provided in circumstances 
of occupation, a logic that originates from the law being created in the aftermath of 
Nazi occupation throughout Europe. Yet today, a trend developing since the early 
1990s, non-international armed conflicts and natural disasters claim most casualties, 
as victims of these circumstances often desperately need emergency aid but remain 
without receiving it.  
For these purposes, this research has assessed in Chapter 3 the definitions of these 
legal denominations, as well as their thresholds. Circumstances of natural disaster 
are not clearly delimited, as the notion of a natural disaster itself is not properly 
defined in international law. Therefore, this research has suggested upon distilling 
from various offered soft law definitions that:  
 
A natural disaster is a sudden or slow-onset natural occurrence or course of 
events that may include a variety of environmental origins (including 
biological, climatological, geophysical, hydrological, etc.), resulting in an 
overwhelming of the local or national capacity and an immediate need for 
assistance to a civilian population.4 
 
Such a wide scope allows for a broad range of circumstances that may create a need 
for persons to receive aid. Perhaps consequential to a lacking definition to apply to 
legal rights and duties, so is a specific legal framework lacking for the provision of 
assistance in times of disaster. For the applicable rights and duties in times of natural 
disaster, resort must therefore be had to general international law and human rights 
law. For armed conflicts, the determination that such a circumstance is occurring, 
remains factual and is done case-by-case, most often through the judiciary’s 
application of the well-known Tadić-definition. Upon determination of this and 
thereby application of international humanitarian law, the duties pertaining to the 
delivery of aid specific to this field of law immediately apply, simultaneous to 
general international law and human rights law.5 Establishing a circumstance such 
as occupation is also a factual assessment and requires the ascertainment that a form 
of authority is established in a territory, which is also exercised and covers parts of 
or the whole territory. However, the legal rights and obligations pertaining to the 
provision of assistance, unlike in times of armed conflict, do not immediately apply 
to the occupier due to this abovementioned ‘exercise of control’ criterion. It must be 
reiterated that the threshold of a humanitarian crisis must be applied to each of these 
circumstances: not every conflict, disaster and particularly not every circumstance 
of occupation warrants the delivery of aid. Such aid should be provided if and when 
the situation amounts to a humanitarian crisis. In the 21st century, the first decade 
has shown that such circumstances amounting to a crisis more often than not are 
natural disasters and non-international armed conflicts.  
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Chapter 3 has also addressed the particular relationship between human rights 
law and humanitarian law, given their simultaneous applicability to certain instances 
that may amount to humanitarian crises. Acknowledging the various perspectives on 
the lex specialis-doctrine in international law, as well as the debate on the extra-
territorial applicability of human rights law, it can be firmly established that both 
human rights law and humanitarian law share the common goals of serving the 
protection of persons and humanity. As a result, this research submits that the lex 
specialis-principle must be read as a manner in which to apply the most specific 
provision in a specific circumstance; resulting in the application of a human rights 
provision in some instances, and a provision deriving from humanitarian law in 
others. Given the topic of the research, this will result in the application of the most 
protective clause in all circumstances. This converging approach of the lex specialis-
doctrine again aligns with the overarching approach taken by this research that 
persons in need of assistance should be able to receive such assistance, equally 
protected by the law, regardless of which factual circumstance has amounted to the 
humanitarian crisis in which they find themselves.6  
Determining the circumstances in which aid is needed, as well as the applicable 
law, has raised more issues pertaining to the existing legal framework. The above 
portrays the difficulties arising in the assessment of what in fact amounts to a 
circumstance in which assistance is necessary, which has prompted this research to 
provide not only a definition of a natural disaster, but more importantly, a definition 
of a ‘humanitarian crisis’. Likewise, offering a perspective on the lex specialis-
doctrine is done for the purpose of establishing which provisions must be adhered 
to, in the event of a lack of clarity in the law that has the purpose of protecting 
individuals. It is for this reason that it is suggested that the most specific and 
protective clause must be adhered to in various circumstances, as opposed to an 
entire body of law, which has more and less specific provisions. More support and 
clarification of this position in international law would benefit the persons the law is 
attempting to protect.  
Critical to the provision of humanitarian assistance is furthermore the concept of 
‘state sovereignty’, addressed in Chapter 4. The Westphalian notion of state 
sovereignty today is somewhat outdated, as well as the Lotus-perspective of the 
PCIJ. The erosion of the notion of sovereignty as a ‘shield’ over the course of the 
21st century followed various developments, such as greater international 
interdependence, the embracement of the UDHR and various human rights treaties 
allowing for a larger role of individuals on the international plane and the subsequent 
creation of multiple international tribunals and courts. With the embracement of the 
‘Responsibility to Protect’-doctrine in the UN, another effort has been taken to pierce 
the sovereign veil. Indeed, in the 21st century, sovereignty must be seen as a 
reciprocal relationship between rights and duties of the sovereign authority. Whilst 
the principles relevant to the provision of humanitarian assistance, such as those of 
non-intervention, respect for the domestic jurisdiction of a state and consent continue 
to be upheld, not only do such rights exist for the sovereign, duties exist also. In 
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other words, these principles are not void of boundaries: a responsibility rests upon 
the sovereign to take care of those under its jurisdiction. Consequently, when the 
sovereign fails to fulfil its obligations in this regard, the obligation to protect civilians 
falls to the international community. In particular, this obligation arises under RtoP 
for crimes such as genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic 
cleansing. RtoP may not be fully developed yet nor put into much practice, but it 
does represent a tendency in the international community to view sovereignty 
increasingly as a notion that includes a responsibility towards those under the 
sovereign’s authority, as well as a secondary responsibility for the international 
community itself.7 Furthermore, as international law recognises individuals as legal 
subjects, it allows such individuals to reach out to the international community 
through a request to fulfil their human rights through the provision of humanitarian 
assistance. The provision of humanitarian assistance in this sense is a key example 
of the manner in which sovereignty is exercised. It is a method for sovereign 
authorities to fulfil their responsibilities, but upon failing to do so, it becomes a 
vehicle through which the international community can fill the sovereign’s void. 
Sovereign responsibilities then become translated from internal, belonging to the 
sovereign, to external; for the international community to provide. Such duties are 
discussed in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, in consideration of responsible state sovereignty.  
From the perspective of the individuals receiving humanitarian assistance, 
Chapter 5 addresses the matter of a potential human right to receive aid. At this time, 
no such individual, independent human right exists. However in treaty law, the CRC, 
CRPD and African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child recognise a right 
to receive aid in connection to the fulfilment of other rights within the respective 
treaties. Equally, in customary international law no such right can be distilled, 
despite various soft law initiatives that refer to the potential existing of opinio juris 
on the matter. A problematic aspect of the determination of an independent human 
right is the assessment of the content and scope of the right, with a view to assessing 
rights-holders and duty-bearers in the particular provision of humanitarian 
assistance.8 Chapter 5 has addressed that a right to humanitarian assistance would 
potentially fall in the category of ‘third generation’, or ‘solidarity’ rights, which often 
have very broad scopes. Whilst this would not be the case for humanitarian 
assistance given the quite narrow definition of the concept provided above in relation 
to its provision in times of emergencies only, it remains that the entire collective of 
individuals needing assistance would be considered rights-holders. Furthermore, 
whilst the state would be the first and foremost duty-bearer, a responsibility to 
provide aid may rest upon the international community as a whole. As such, the 
development of a human right to receive humanitarian assistance would place such 
a right in the problematic category of ‘collective rights’. From this perspective, as 
well as taking into consideration the lack of development in treaty incorporation, it 
is more pragmatic to consider the provision of humanitarian assistance within the 
context of existing human rights.  
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Indeed, when assessing the existing body of human rights from the perspective 
of the provision of humanitarian assistance, it becomes clear that the need for the 
development of an individual right is not necessarily acute in international law today. 
Humanitarian assistance can – and does – function as a vehicle in the fulfilment of 
existing human rights. A strong basis is found in Articles 55 and 56 of the UN 
Charter and in particular, given the content of emergency aid, in the rights to life, 
food, health (and water). Chapter 5 has discussed these existing rights as 
incorporated in the UDHR, ICESCR, ICCPR, ECHR, ACPHR, ACHR, ICERD, 
CRC, CRPD, CEDAW and various other human rights treaties.9 The formulations 
of these rights, the lack of restrictions by states in their reservations to the various 
treaties and moreover the interpretations of the treaty bodies accumulatively allow 
for the assessment that the delivery of humanitarian assistance is a manner in which 
to fulfil the rights to life, food, health (and water). This assessment is supported by 
the fact that those treaties which include a ‘state of emergency’-clause, exclude the 
right to life from such derogation, as well as the fact that, whilst the ICESCR does 
not contain such a clause and is considered generally to entail mostly obligations of 
conduct, the treaty does recognise certain ‘minimum core obligations’. Adding to 
this, the ICJ has declared in its Nicaragua-case that humanitarian assistance serves 
for the protection of ‘life and health’, providing additional arguments for the framing 
of humanitarian assistance in such a human rights context. 
Therefore it can be concluded that the absence of a specific individual human 
right to humanitarian assistance is not necessarily an absence of a right to receive 
humanitarian assistance in itself. The right to receive assistance forms part of the 
entire body of human rights, most specifically the rights to life, food, health (and 
water) as enshrined in existing international law. Whereas the development of an 
individual human right might facilitate claiming such receipt, it may also attribute to 
the proliferation of human rights. Strengthening the current body of rights and 
simultaneously strengthening the function of humanitarian assistance as a vehicle in 
the fulfilment of such rights is more pragmatic and realistic, when considering the 
lack of developments of such a potential individual right. Furthermore, such a 
development should also not be considered necessary for individuals in their receipt 
of assistance, as they are currently able to receive assistance through claiming such 
a need based on the existing rights to life, food, health (and water).10  
A core part of this research (in Chapters 6, 7 and 8) has focused on the specific 
legal rights and duties of the potential providers and recipients of humanitarian 
assistance according to the various legal sources that are of relevance to its provision. 
Legal sources such as human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee 
law have been examined as well as Security Council resolutions. The primary 
responsibility for the provision of humanitarian assistance lies first and foremost 
with the authority of the territory on which the crisis takes place. In essence, this is 
a reflection of the newer interpretation of state sovereignty, and is recognised also 
by the Security Council in resolutions dating from 2006, as well as General 
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Assembly resolutions concerning natural disaster situations, the first dating back to 
1991 and which later also embraced duties under international humanitarian law. 
Both corpora juris do not recognise an explicit ‘right’ of persons to receive aid, but 
do assert that the duties to provide assistance are not limited to the state, and can 
include other ‘parties’ such as non-state actors. In particular concerning the provision 
of aid in non-international armed conflicts, this is of relevance. That such actors – 
exercising a certain level of control – hold responsibilities under international law 
has also been asserted by the ICJ in its Namibia-opinion.11 
In human rights law as seen in Chapter 5, rights and duties concerning the 
provision of humanitarian assistance can also be found, at a greater level of 
specificity than through the UN bodies’ resolutions. With a strong foundation in 
Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter, UN member states are obliged to promote 
observance of human rights; which can today also be applied to non-state actors 
acting as (local) sovereigns. More specifically concerning the right to life, states have 
a positive obligation to not arbitrarily deprive persons of the right to life under 
Article 3 UDHR, Article 6 ICCPR, Article 2 ECHR, Article 4 ACHR and Article 4 
ACHPR. This includes an individual’s right to protection in this regard from the 
state, and as interpreted by the HRC an obligation of the sovereign to reduce 
‘malnutrition’, which is of relevance in the provision of assistance. Specifically 
Articles 6 and 22 CRC recognise the duty to provide assistance in the fulfilment of 
the non-deprivation of life for children. The right to adequate food has been codified 
mostly as a state duty in Article 11 ICESCR, where the sovereign needs to 
demonstrate, in order to fulfil its minimum core obligations under the convention, 
having utilised all possible resources; including seeking international cooperation 
under Article 2 ICESCR. The CESCR has interpreted the non-provision of 
humanitarian assistance as a violation of this duty. The obligation to provide food – 
rather formulated as such than as a right to receive – can also be found in Article 
24(2)(c) CRC, Article 12(2) CEDAW, Article 28 CRPD, Article 12 Additional 
Protocol to the ACHR in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well 
as Article 15 of the Additional Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights of Women in 
Africa. The right to health finds a main provision in Article 12(2)(c) ICESCR, 
specifically calling upon the ‘prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, 
endemic, occupational and other diseases’, where international cooperation 
continues to be a fulfilment of the minimum core obligations. The right to health is 
furthermore codified in Articles 25 UDHR, 5(e)(iv) ICERD, 24 CRC, 11 European 
Social Charter, 10 Additional Protocol to the ACHR in the area of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, 16 ACHPR, 14 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of 
the Child and 14 of the Additional Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights of Women 
in Africa. There are some differentiations amongst the provisions, and as a result, 
difficulties ensue in formulating this as a clear-cut ‘right’ to receive for individuals. 
Concerning humanitarian assistance specifically, a consensus can be found in the 
obligation of the sovereign to prevent diseases and in the provision of aid, to 
prioritise a vulnerable population. Although water is of essential value to human 
                                                        






beings, no distinct international right to water has been codified. With a more 
haphazard incorporation, provisions can be found in Articles 24(1)(c) CRC, 14(2)(h) 
CEDAW, 28 CRPD, 15(a) Additional Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights of 
Women in Africa and 14(2) African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. 
These treaties recognise a duty of the sovereign to provide access to safe drinking 
water, and the CESCR has also ‘read’ this right in Articles 11 and 12 ICESCR. From 
a more general perspective, the CRPD quite uniquely has also asserted in Article 11 
that states parties have the obligation to take ‘all necessary measures’ to ensure the 
protection of those with disabilities in humanitarian emergencies. Turning to soft 
law instruments, equally the well-known Vienna Declaration has asserted the 
importance of the provision of humanitarian assistance in the context of human 
rights. The provision of humanitarian assistance therefore functions as a method 
through which states can fulfil their duties under human rights law.12 
International humanitarian law contains a variety of provisions specifically 
tailored to the delivery of assistance, formulated as duties of the sovereign rather 
than as rights of individuals to receive assistance. The law however differentiates the 
duties of the authorities (or non-state actors, depending on the circumstances) 
according to the situation in which the need for assistance arises. Should a 
humanitarian crisis arise in times of international armed conflict, non-international 
armed conflict or occupation, the duties are diverse. Whilst the latter is rarely topical 
in international law today, the opposite can be said for non-international armed 
conflicts. Upon examining the law, it becomes apparent that in an international 
armed conflict, Article 54 AP I contains the obligation to refrain from causing 
starvation amongst civilians, but the Geneva Conventions and Protocols do not 
contain a strong positive obligation to provide aid. From Article 70 AP I, referring 
to the fact that relief schemes ‘shall be undertaken’ when a civilian population is in 
need, a right to receive aid might be inferred at best, but is not explicitly mentioned.13 
Furthermore, ‘military necessity’ may be a reason for a state to temporarily delay or 
not be capable of providing aid, although it may not be utilised as an argument to 
withhold assistance entirely. In times of occupation, no explicit rights are mentioned, 
but duties rest upon the occupying force under Article 55 GC IV to ensure food and 
medical supplies in the territory if it should be inadequately supplied, under Article 
56 to maintain hospitals, public health and prevention of epidemics (but all in 
cooperation with the local authorities) and under Article 69 AP I also to ensure 
clothing, shelter and other essential items for the civilian population.14 Conversely, 
in times of non-international armed conflict, no specific rights to receive and no 
positive obligations to provide aid are codified. The provision of humanitarian 
assistance in times of a non-international armed conflict is based upon the duty to 
provide humane treatment as codified in common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions, and the prohibition of starvation as incorporated in Article 14 AP II. 
Whereas ‘military necessity’ is not a grounds for exception in non-international 
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armed conflicts, the Geneva Conventions and Protocols unfortunately are based 
upon the somewhat rosy perspective – reflecting the timeframe of their codification 
– that in a non-international armed conflict, the sovereign is inclined to provide for 
those in need upon its territory. Today, where civilian suffering is a constant integral 
part of warfare in non-international armed conflict, it is apparent that this view is no 
longer tenable.15  
Chapter 6 has also addressed the rights and duties as available to those in times 
of natural disasters amounting to humanitarian crises. Human rights law remains 
applicable, and the General Assembly has – as noted above – asserted as early as 
1991 a primary duty of the affected state in the provision of aid. A body of law 
tailored to the protection of persons in such times is currently under development 
with the ILC, and its Draft Articles call for a respect for human rights (Draft Article 
6) and also such a primary duty for the state to ensure protection of persons through 
the provision of assistance on its territory (Draft Article 12). The likelihood of this 
codification initiative materialising into treaty law however remains to be seen. In 
current law, this duty has been codified regionally through Article IV(a) of the Inter-
American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance and Article 3 of ASEAN 
Disaster Management Agreement. Again, the absence of law indicates a presumption 
by the international community that the affected sovereign shall be keen to provide 
aid to its civilians, a presumption not always reflected in reality.16 
Should emergencies cause the creation of groups of IDPs or refugees, several 
distinct duties pertaining to the provision of assistance can be found and the Security 
Council has asserted that such persons are entitled to protection.17 Article 23 of the 
Refugee Convention notes that a state has the duty to treat refugees as its own 
nationals in the provision of public relief. Furthermore, Articles 22 CRC and 23 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child note a right to receive 
assistance as within the context of the enjoyment of the human rights in both 
conventions. The latter Charter also reflects the protection of IDPs. IDPs on the 
African continent are furthermore protected in the new Kampala Convention, which 
codifies a duty to ensure assistance to IDPs, in combination with the participation of 
IDPs in this process under Article 9. The same views are reflected in the non-binding, 
but well-known, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. A limited protection 
can finally also be found in Article 17 AP II, prohibiting the forced movement of 
populations.  
From the above reflection of the law as discussed in Chapter 6, it can be 
concluded that the current law is by no means all-encompassing. The applicable law 
is dependent on the specific circumstance amounting to a humanitarian crisis. Whilst 
a primary duty for the affected state or authority can be discerned, a need exists for 
harmonisation and a common minimum standard. Currently, a rather ‘sectoral’ 
protection exists, risking fragmentation in the law and in the level of protection for 
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those in need. Although the international community is hesitant to recognise a right 
to receive aid, a duty to provide such assistance can be derived from the above. 
International humanitarian law contains several detailed provisions, but lacks 
general duties, in particular concerning non-international armed conflicts, often 
resulting in acute problems such as the issues seen in the protracted conflict in Syria. 
Conversely, human rights contain more general provisions, yet it can be argued that 
the law is specific enough to be considered the lex specialis on various occasions 
when international humanitarian law is lacking such duties. In particular, the human 
rights provisions regionally on the African continent and topically for children and 
IDPs are very suitable for the adequate fulfilment of such a role. In an attempt to fill 
certain gaps, soft law documents such as the San Remo Principles, the Bruges 
Resolution and the Mohonk Criteria all recognise a duty of the sovereign to provide 
aid, as well as a right to request the receipt of such assistance from the sovereign. 
Again, such recognition goes to the argument of existence of opinio juris on the 
matter, but does not fill the gaps in the lex lata.  
Following an ascertainment of the legal rights and duties of the civilian 
population and the affected state, Chapter 7 expands upon this with the assessment 
of the legal framework concerning assistance from outside the affected territory; the 
examination of a potential right to offer and provide assistance, and a related right 
to access therefore. State sovereignty continues to function as a constant and 
consistent thread throughout international law and therefore also in this aspect of the 
research. In relation to external humanitarian assistance, sovereignty plays a 
continuing crucial role, as the state is the primary responsible actor for the provision 
of assistance.  
In human rights law, a distinction can be made between the civil right to life, and 
the economic and social rights to food, health and water when considering the 
manner in which duties manifest themselves. As the right to life can be considered a 
right to be ‘free from arbitrary deprivation’ thereof, human rights law does not 
proscribe a specific duty of the affected state or right of third parties in human rights 
conventions to positively ensure such a right. Conversely, the rights to food and 
health in the ICESCR acknowledge an obligation of conduct of the affected state as 
well as in particular in Article 2 ICESCR, which includes a responsibility of the 
international community in cooperation and assistance to help the affected state. 
Article 2 ICESCR furthermore proscribes a duty of the affected state to in fact seek 
that international assistance in fulfilling the rights of the ICESCR. Whilst Article 11 
ICESCR does not allow for a ‘right to access’ in relation to the right to food as it 
evolves around state consent, of course resort may be had to enforcement 
mechanisms should certain core rights be violated. Similarly, Article 12 Additional 
Protocol to the ACHR in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and 15 
Additional Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights of Women in Africa recognise an 
obligation upon states parties to take measures in cooperating to ensure food security 
and ending malnutrition. Article 12 ICESCR pertaining to the right to health does 
not call for the consent of the affected state, but also does not formulate a right to 
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regarding such a right in international treaty or customary law and hence no right to 
access in this regard can be discerned.18  
Support for a duty to cooperate in the fulfilment of human rights can also be found 
in the UN Charter and through the perspectives of various UN bodies, adding to the 
argument that some opinio juris exists on an emerging responsibility or duty to 
cooperate in the fulfilment of such human rights through the provision of 
humanitarian assistance, as reflected also in Article 2 ICESCR. Relevantly, the ICJ 
has as recently as 2007 declared in the Georgia v. Russia case a need to refrain from 
impediments to humanitarian assistance, in support of a population’s human rights 
under the ICERD; such as concerning Articles 5 (b) regarding security of persons 
and (e) regarding economic, social and cultural rights. Such a formulation, although 
focusing on the duty-bearer to allow access, also appears to presuppose a right to 
offer assistance by third parties. In human rights law therefore, obligations of 
conduct and non-impediment of assistance can be found, as well as a potential 
responsibility of the international community to provide assistance in the fulfilment 
of human rights of the affected population.  
Furthermore within the UN framework, the Security Council has as a primary 
actor in circumstances requiring the cooperation of the international community for 
many decades addressed the humanitarian responsibilities of the UN as well as 
making appeals to the international community of states to provide assistance in 
circumstances where it was needed. Increasingly, towards the end of the 20th century, 
the Council acted under Chapter VII and called upon the global responsibilities of 
the international community in various country-resolutions. In its resolutions, the 
Council does not differentiate between circumstances of international armed conflict 
or of non-international armed conflict, but bases itself solely on the establishment of 
a potential threat to the peace, providing a more egalitarian approach. Whilst such 
resolutions are not ‘thematic’, they are an indication of the perspective of the 
Council, as it commenced (in Resolution 688) formulating calls to the affected 
sovereign to ‘allow access’ as well as ‘safe and unhindered’ access and passage for 
the provision of assistance from 1991 onwards. Rather than formulating a right of 
third parties, the Council does so by calling upon the affected state to comply with 
its duties under international law. In fact, by arguing that the affected state should 
allow access for the provision of assistance in line with its duties under international 
law, the Council actually somewhat foregoes a ‘right to offer’ as this is presupposed 
in such an assertion, to the point where the ‘right to access’ becomes the flip side of 
the coin of a duty of ‘allowing access’. However, although the Council calls or urges 
the affected state to comply with the law, it does not actually assert a right to access 
of third parties. The furthest the Council has gone to date, acting under Chapter VII, 
is ‘demanding’ of the affected state to ‘ensure’ access and safe passage in compliance 
with its duties under international law, as done for example with regard to Iraq in 
2003. In case-specific circumstances therefore, the Council has shown its willingness 
to act under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and assert a duty of the affected state to 
allow access for humanitarian aid, culminating in its novel approach towards Syria 
                                                        






in 2014 where humanitarian assistance was called upon without force, but 
circumventing the state sovereign.19  
Similar to the Security Council, the General Assembly has assumed a need for 
the international community to assist. In its well-known Resolution 46/182, the 
General Assembly has furthermore argued the need to strengthen the collective 
efforts of the international community in the provision of humanitarian aid and 
subsequently in the Millennium Declaration, the General Assembly has expressed 
the view that such provision is a shared, collective responsibility. Unlike the Security 
Council, the General Assembly has not expressed an international legal ‘duty to 
provide’ or a right to access a territory. Although such expressions would not have 
been legally binding, they would have expressed broad viewpoints from member 
states and as such contributed to the potential formation of customary norms. With 
time, the General Assembly has however broadened its scope when discussing 
humanitarian assistance, to include more complex emergencies and circumstances 
of conflict. At first asserting this need primarily in times of natural disaster, the 
General Assembly has broadened this to include times of ‘war’, and has argued that 
such assistance is an expression of the principle of international solidarity. In the late 
1990s the General Assembly commenced reiterating the stance taken by the Security 
Council, using similar wording in resolutions, and thereby leading to the conclusion 
that indeed the overall impression from these UN bodies may be that a duty exists of 
affected states to allow access in compliance with norms in international law, which 
in itself is a presupposition of a right to offer assistance by third parties.20  
Chapter 7 has furthermore addressed the rights and duties in the external 
provision of assistance in specific circumstances in international law, such as armed 
conflict and natural disaster. In case of international armed conflicts, Article 10 GC 
IV proscribes a right to offer assistance of international organisations, subject to the 
consent of the affected state, which must merely be seen as an invitation and not 
entailing legal duties. Article 23 GC IV cites an obligation of the affected state that 
passage ‘shall’ be allowed for relief, save for ‘serious reasons’. Article 70(1) AP I 
then asserts that relief ‘shall’ be undertaken when a territory is inadequately 
supplied. This provision too is subject to agreement with the affected state, but the 
state does not have unlimited freedom in this regard as Article 70 AP I must be read 
in conjuncture with 54 AP I concerning the duty to refrain from starvation. The 
‘shall’ in Article 70 AP I implies an obligation, and even if read in the least stringent 
manner, still entails a right to offer assistance. Article 70(2-5) AP I subsequently 
broadens the content of Article 23 GC IV, but balances this with further control rights 
of the affected state. Lastly, Article 71(2) AP I addresses the safety of humanitarian 
personnel, a prerequisite in the delivery of assistance. Thus, in an international armed 
conflict, again the right to offer assistance is somewhat presupposed, as deduced 
from the formulations in the provisions which call for a duty of the affected state to 
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allow passage of humanitarian assistance, subject to various specific control rights 
and in specific circumstances the right of the affected state to refuse assistance.21  
In non-international armed conflicts, Chapter 7 has seen a similar development 
from the Conventions to the Additional Protocols. Common Article 3 merely states 
that humanitarian organisations may offer ‘services’, whilst Article 18 AP II (to be 
read in line with Article 14 regarding the prohibition of starvation), states that ‘relief 
actions shall be undertaken’ when a population is suffering ‘undue hardship’, but 
again such relief is subject to consent of the ‘concerned party’.22 AP II assumes this 
party to be the state, but given the non-international character of the conflict, it has 
been argued that this may include a non-state actor acting as an authority, or 
alternatively when the authority is not to be determined, consent must be 
presupposed. In drafting Article 18 AP II, consensus was difficult to find concerning 
the concept of humanitarian access, and it is regrettable that stricter wording was not 
agreed upon, given the amount of problems faced today in non-international armed 
conflicts.  
Conversely, as seen in Chapter 6 also, the law concerning humanitarian assistance 
in times of occupation is rather explicit: Article 59 GC IV states that an occupying 
power ‘shall’ accept relief if a territory is inadequately supplied, subject to control 
rights, and facilitate its rapid distribution according to Article 61 GC IV. The latter 
Article also declares that all states have a duty to allow the transit of such assistance. 
As seen before, the law of occupation stems from the circumstances in World War 
II and in subsequent times has not been developed much: Article 69 AP I succinctly 
declares that civilians in times of occupation are subject to the provisions of GC IV 
and AP I. Hence, it can be concluded that similar to circumstances of armed conflict, 
an offer to provide external assistance is presupposed, the occupying force has an 
obligation to accept assistance when a territory is inadequately supplied, and it 
continues to exercise control rights over the provision of assistance. 
Chapter 7 has shown that – as is the case in the legal framework pertaining to the 
duties of the affected state – no specific field of law is applicable in times of external 
provision of assistance in the aftermath of (natural) disasters. Whilst human rights 
law and general principles of international law are applicable at all times, very few 
conventions are tailored to address the external provision of assistance. An example 
includes the Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Relief, which 
presupposes an offer of assistance, but leaves the power to accept such an offer in 
the hands of the affected state, thereby not addressing a right to access. Should 
however the sovereign concede to access, then Article V asserts that such access 
shall be fully facilitated. Also, the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and 
Emergency Response recognises a duty of states to promptly respond to the affected 
states’ requests for aid in Article 4(c), thereby envisioning an international duty to 
cooperate. This duty is furthermore reflected in Article 8, asserting an obligation of 
states to coordinate the provision of aid amongst themselves, whilst Articles 3 and 
11(2) continue to assert the right of the affected state to consent to assistance. Thus, 
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these smaller regional conventions – although in areas of the world prone to disasters 
– envision a right of the affected state to consent, as opposed to a right to access for 
third parties. However, the ASEAN Agreement does reflect, as seen earlier in human 
rights law and the UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, a duty to 
cooperate for third states. A similar approach regarding cooperation and consent is 
held by the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or 
Radiological Emergency in Articles 1 and 3. With a view to potential future 
regulation in times of disaster, the ILC Draft Articles explicitly formulate a right to 
offer assistance in Draft Article 16, and calls upon states to cooperate in Articles 8 
and 9. As reflected in lex lata, Draft Article 14 asserts that consent continues to be 
required, although it may not be withheld arbitrarily, and according to Article 15 the 
affected state may place conditions on the provision of external assistance: a 
reflection of the ‘control rights’ as seen in international humanitarian law.23  
With regard to the external delivery of assistance, not only circumstances but also 
specific subjects may be of relevance, such as refugees. The nature of refugee law 
does not exactly allow for provisions relating to the access of a territory. The Refugee 
Convention merely states in Article 23 that refugees in this sense must be treated as 
a state’s national, given the fact that the third state is the recipient state. The regional 
African Kampala Convention on IDPs interestingly restricts offers from, and the 
seeking of assistance by, the affected state to ‘international organizations’, merely 
referring to ‘other relevant actors’ in Article 5(6) which could be interpreted as third 
states. Articles 3(1)(j) and 5(7) declare that the affected state must allow and 
facilitate the rapid and unimpeded access of humanitarian assistance, a duty which 
is also upheld for armed groups in Article 7(5)(b) and (g). Again, as other provisions 
have done, the Convention formulates such allowance of assistance as a duty of the 
affected state, rather than as a right of external parties. Furthermore, it remains 
problematic to the protection of IDPs – a group associated both with natural disasters 
and non-international armed conflicts – that only a regional binding document such 
as the Kampala Convention serves for their specific protection.24 Outside of the 
African continent, no binding provisions exist, although both the UN General 
Assembly and other UN bodies have expressed their concern in this regard.  
The discussion of the legal framework on the external provision of humanitarian 
assistance in Chapter 7 has brought several clear gaps in the rights and duties to the 
forefront. A (legal) right of third parties to offer humanitarian assistance is often 
presupposed, and taken for granted. The law tends to commence its regulation at a 
‘next’ step or level: access. The notion of access however is not formulated from the 
perspective of the external providers, but rather from the perspective of an obligation 
of the affected state to allow such access for the provision of aid. Throughout the 
various bodies of law, a consensus can be found to exist with regard to the initial 
power of the affected state to ‘consent’ to the delivery of aid, but no consensus exists 
on the threshold of such consent. Such consent can be subject to various degrees of 
sovereignty or freedom, depending on the ‘arbitrariness’ of the refusal, but consent 
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as a concept nevertheless continues to play a crucial role. Such a role for the 
sovereign is also seen in the formulation in international humanitarian law that a 
territory must be determined ‘inadequately supplied’. Yet, no definition of this, or of 
‘arbitrary denial’ is provided, nor is the abuse of ‘control rights’ precluded. What 
however also surfaces, in a positive development, is the recognition throughout the 
various bodies of law, that an (emerging) duty of the international community exists 
to cooperate in the provision of humanitarian assistance. As such the UN Security 
Council and General Assembly resolutions contribute to the formation of opinio juris 
and state practice, in conjuncture with the various conventions. Furthermore, from 
the developments in the various corpora juris, it can also be concluded that at times, 
a duty to allow access exists: consent must be provided when its refusal would 
amount to a violation of international law such as for example the right to food.  
It must, however, be noted that the proliferation of ‘sectoral’ regulations and 
codifications result in this present wide range of provisions and diversity regarding 
the aspect of the provision of aid by third parties in the legal framework on the 
provision of assistance. Each individual circumstance in which assistance may be 
necessary has been subject to a variety of different regulations and conventions, such 
as the Kampala Convention or the ASEAN Agreement. As such, the rights and duties 
vary greatly according to the specific circumstances, and whilst the Kampala 
Convention for example may serve to aid IDPs in Africa, it may hinder a more 
comprehensive protection internationally. A minimum level of protection is difficult 
to discern, as the control rights and consent thresholds vary throughout the bodies of 
law, the regions and the circumstances. A lack of clarity ensues concerning the 
responsibilities of various rights-holders and duty-bearers. To this end, the various 
soft law doctrines on the topic all recognise a third party’s right to offer assistance, 
and a duty of the affected state not to arbitrarily refuse such an offer. Furthermore, 
the San Remo Principles and the Bruges Resolution also note an obligation to allow 
for safe passage, and the latter asserts an obligation of the affected state to seek 
assistance from third parties. In order to coerce the international community to 
pursue the international provision of humanitarian assistance, clarity is needed in the 
determination of the extent to which assistance can be ‘enforced’, which is what 
Chapter 8 has sought to deliver.  
The enforcement of the provision of humanitarian assistance touches the very 
core of the relationship between humanitarian assistance and state sovereignty. Legal 
enforcement of assistance is possible if and when a sovereign is in violation of 
international law by denying those in need of the aid they are entitled to. A violation 
of international law exists when (1) a humanitarian crisis warranting the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance exists, (2) the affected state is not providing (sufficient) 
assistance and (3) a lawful offer of external assistance is refused for reasons outside 
of those allowed for in international human rights and humanitarian law. If these 
circumstances take place, (4) a violation of international law occurs as the affected 
state is obstructing or denying the provision of humanitarian assistance, resulting in 






by either the Security Council, or judicial entities such as the ICJ, ICC or human 
rights bodies.25  
Chapter 8 has addressed the various methods through which the enforcement of 
assistance might take place, upon the establishment of state responsibility for the 
violation of international law. State responsibility arises under Articles 2 and 3 
ARSIWA and is today no longer considered purely bilateral, as considered by the 
ICJ in the Barcelona Traction-case (amongst other cases). This assessment is 
particularly relevant to the establishment of responsibility by other states for the non-
provision of assistance by the affected state. Articles 42 ARSIWA (invocation by an 
injured state) and somewhat more progressively Article 48 ARSIWA (invocation by 
the international community) assert a responsibility that is owed towards a larger 
community, such as states parties to a treaty, or responsibility for a violation of a 
norm of customary international law. Attribution of acts to the state is possible under 
Articles 4-11 ARSIWA, and although Articles 20-25 ARSIWA note circumstances 
precluding wrongfulness, with regard to the provision of humanitarian assistance 
only Article 23 may potentially be argued and it will most likely not be accepted 
given the nature of such provision. Relevant to the provision of humanitarian 
assistance, by means of enforcement through state responsibility potentially in 
combination with the use of force, Articles 40 and 41 ARSIWA assert a duty for 
states to cooperate in the ending of breaches of peremptory norms. With regard to 
humanitarian assistance, such violations of norms of jus cogens are the commission 
of racial discrimination, war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. The 
principle of humanity is furthermore also placed within the context of 
intransgressible norms of international law. Thus, the law of state responsibility 
distinctly places a duty not only upon the affected state not to commit such acts, but 
also upon the international community to cooperate in ending their commission.26 
The ICJ has supported this stance in its 2007 Bosnian Genocide-case, arguing an 
obligation of conduct to end the commission of genocide. This perspective is also 
voiced in Article 89 AP II, where third states are called upon to cooperate with a 
view to ending ‘serious violations’ of the Geneva Conventions taking place in a non-
international armed conflict. Equally, with a view to the future, the ILC Draft 
Articles on the protection of persons in the event of disasters deduce a ‘secondary 
role’ for third states in the provision of assistance in Draft Article 12 and also 
reflected in Draft Article 8; although the Articles are too hesitant to assert such a role 
as ‘responsibility’.  
State responsibility can be enforced through judiciary means, largely utilised after 
a crisis has taken place. An alternative method of enforcement at this state vis-à-vis 
state level, is the use of force under the auspices of the UN Security Council. The 
use of force must naturally always be seen as an ultimate resort, upon establishment 
by the Security Council that a threat to the peace according to Article 39 exists (to 
date it is not used in cases of natural disasters), and as a potential mechanism to give 
effect to prior measures such as those under Articles 40 and 41 of the UN Charter. 
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The Security Council has the role of enforcer in this regard, with a view to Articles 
2(4), 25 and 103 UN Charter. A determination by this body that the use of force may 
be warranted to ensure the provision of humanitarian aid simultaneously functions 
as the determination that in fact (1) a territory is inadequately supplied at a times of 
crisis and (2) the affected state is not providing for those in need within its 
jurisdiction or not allowing aid into the territory. It remains essential when 
discussing the use of force as an enforcement mechanism to distinguish between 
those providing the emergency aid, and those enforcing it; in order to allow those 
providing aid to adhere to the core principles of neutrality, impartiality and 
humanity. The Council has alluded to the use of force by asserting a need for 
‘appropriate measures’ in its Resolution 1265 on the protection of civilians, and 
equally has cautiously eased into the use of force in the early 1990s in Somalia and 
the Former Yugoslavia, for the purpose of the delivery of aid, although state 
sovereignty remained a constant factor. Over time, peacekeeping operations have 
been entrusted with the enforcement of humanitarian assistance and from the turn of 
the century, increasingly coalitions of states have been entrusted to do so too. The 
Security Council is comfortable asserting a need to provide assistance under Chapter 
VII, but this also includes measures under Article 40 as opposed to solely the use of 
force in Article 42. With the recognition of the doctrine of the Responsibility to 
Protect, and continuing with thematic resolutions pertaining to the protection of 
civilians, the use of force also with regard to the provision of aid, has become more 
embedded, such as in Somalia through troops of the African Union in 2007. The 
Security Council in particular has increasingly referred to violations of international 
law as a reason leading to these forceful actions.27 A well-known and discussed 
example is Resolution 1973 (2011) where under RtoP, the use of force was asserted 
in particular relation to the provision of humanitarian assistance in Libya. Since then 
however, the Council has been hesitant, which leaves a clear line lacking in the 
Council’s work.  
It is apparent from previous country-specific resolutions that the Council is 
willing to use force for the purpose of the delivery of aid, yet in which circumstances 
and with what threshold, is currently not to be distilled. Such reasoning of course 
also lies within the political mandate of the Council. Yet, useful on the other hand is 
the increasing level of specificity in the Council’s resolutions, which is helpful in 
providing more clarity in distilling the direction of the body. Chapter 8 has concluded 
that the Council does in fact see itself fit to resort to the use of force for the purpose 
of the provision of aid, with and on occasion without, the cooperation of the 
sovereign. Whilst in practice a more ‘standard’ formulation or threshold might not 
be viable, it would be necessary or at least helpful to ascertain some more 
consistency in the work of the Council, as its inactivity in Syria (despite the more 
recent authorisation of humanitarian assistance without the consent of Syrian 
authorities) is a painful failure to act, following the assertive resolutions concerning 
Libya. Furthermore, should the scope of the concept ‘threat to the peace’ as 
formulated in Article 39 UN Charter be given a wide interpretation so as to not be 
                                                        






exclusively reserved for armed conflicts, they might include for example widespread 
crimes against humanity. Such crimes are relevant with regard to the provision of 
humanitarian assistance, and although they no longer need a nexus to an armed 
conflict, they do by nature result in a threat to the peace. In such instances, Security 
Council action might in the future also be possible in circumstances of natural 
disaster. Again, as in the case of Syria, the Council’s inaction in the face of disasters 
such as the one in Myanmar following cyclone Nargis make the political character 
of the body painfully apparent. Indeed the notion of sovereignty, changing over the 
decades, would also allow for a more active role of the Council in circumstances 
where the consent of the affected state is lacking, and the potential duty to cooperate 
under the law of state responsibility discussed above furthermore supports such an 
attitude.  
From the enforcement of assistance through to the use of force, at an inter-state 
level, Chapter 8 has progressed to the level of enforcement of assistance through 
human rights law. Human rights treaty bodies such as the HRC, CESCR and regional 
courts like the ECtHR recognise both inter-state and individual complaint 
mechanisms. The inter-state mechanism, although a reflection of the concept of 
shared responsibility as codified in Article 48 ARSIWA, has proven too political to 
be used in practice. Both the HRC and CESCR have also not had the opportunity to 
express themselves regarding the provision of humanitarian assistance through the 
individual complaint mechanism, the latter due to the fact that it has only recently 
opened up to such a mechanism. A problem may also well lie in the ‘obligation of 
conduct’-nature of the rights enshrined in the ICESCR, as the minimum core 
obligations the states parties must fulfil at all times might not be sufficiently explicit 
to allow for such an individual complaint mechanism. The HRC, however, has 
addressed its concerns regarding humanitarian assistance and Article 6 ICCPR in its 
own investigations. Both bodies, although legal in nature, do not have the power to 
create binding legal findings, but have both asserted that the non-provision of 
humanitarian aid may amount to a violation of the rights in their respective 
Conventions.28 The ECtHR has in its case law touched upon the non-provision of 
humanitarian assistance, although not in direct correlation to a violation of a human 
right, but calling it a ‘serious abuse’. Furthermore, rather than placing such an abuse 
in the context of the right to life, the ECtHR addressed it in relation to torture. Thus, 
the main human rights bodies have not (yet) taken it upon themselves to determine 
in specific cases brought before them whether or not an affected state in casu violated 
international human rights law by falling short of the obligation to ensure the 
provision of assistance in the fulfilment of the rights to life, food and health. 
Conversely, the ICJ has in the Georgia v. Russia-case asserted that the non-provision 
of assistance may amount to a violation of the rights enshrined in the ICERD.  
A second human rights approach used for enforcement, rather than the legal treaty 
bodies, is through the more political UN mechanisms under the Human Rights 
Council, such as the UPR system and the Special Rapporteurs. As a political 
mechanism, these Rapporteurs are often very vocal and they have on many occasions 
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asserted states’ violations of human rights when denying the provision of assistance. 
The inter-state UPR rather focuses on recommendations, inciting states to allow or 
facilitate humanitarian assistance. Rather than ‘naming and shaming’, such a positive 
formulation may help in the creation of more willingness to allow for external 
assistance, although the political nature of these mechanisms continues to 
overshadow their potential value.  
From a different viewpoint of enforcement, Chapter 8 has discussed two methods 
of individual responsibility for the non-provision of humanitarian assistance in 
international law. Firstly, the possibility to bring about ‘targeted sanctions’ towards 
individuals and their assets has increasingly been utilised by the Security Council in 
recent years following violations of international law in particular relation also to the 
obstruction and denial of humanitarian assistance. Specifically, the Council has 
opted for enforcement mechanisms such as travel bans and financial asset freezing 
targeted towards those individuals and entities the Council assessed as having 
obstructed humanitarian aid. Such sanctions provide a specific coercion mechanism 
to entice those involved in conflict to allow access for the providers of assistance, 
without resorting to force which may have an impact on society as a whole on a 
larger scale.29  
Moreover, aside from targeted sanctions, individual responsibility for specific 
crimes in international criminal law – reflecting violations of human rights law and 
international humanitarian law, has been addressed. Two specific crimes in the ICC 
Statute are most relevant for the incurrence of individual responsibility for such 
violations that pertain to the denial of the provision of aid, namely war crimes and 
crimes against humanity.  
The ICC Statute criminalises violations of international humanitarian law as war 
crimes in Article 8 of its Statute, and differentiates between provisions tailored 
towards an international and a non-international armed conflict. Concerning the 
former, several provisions within Article 8 ICC Statute are most relevant in relation 
to the obstruction of aid. Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) criminalises the use of starvation by 
depriving civilians of means for survival, Article 8(2)(b)(iii) concerns the 
unlawfulness of attacks on those providing humanitarian assistance, to which Article 
8(2)(b)(xxiv) is closely related, concerning attacks on personnel. Furthermore, 
Article 8(2)(a)(iii) concerning the wilful causing of ‘great suffering, or serious injury 
to body or health’ is considered a grave breach of international humanitarian law and 
arguably the non-provision of humanitarian assistance, when amounting to such 
serious injury, would also be considered such a breach. For the above crimes, a level 
of intentionality and knowledge is required, which is however not required for 
Article 8(2)(a)(ii) concerning ‘inhuman treatment’ and might therefore be argued 
more easily concerning the withholding of humanitarian aid, although being less 
tailored as a provision in and of itself. Furthermore, the ICC provisions concerning 
attacks that result in damages to the environment (Article 8(2)(b)(iv)) or acts that 
lead to ‘outrages upon personal dignity’ (Article 8(2)(b)(xxi)), can be violated, when 
they lead to obstructing humanitarian assistance. Concerning the former, an 
                                                        






assumption is made regarding the presupposition of knowledge of the extent of the 
damages caused, and it must be excessive in relation to military advantages, 
formulating a reflection of the principle of proportionality. ‘Outrages upon personal 
dignity’ can be placed within a human rights context, allowing the argument that 
violations of the right to life, food, or health may have occurred resulting in such 
outrages when humanitarian assistance is not provided, but must at least amount to 
humiliation, degradation or other violations of dignity. Throughout the 
criminalisation of war crimes in an international armed conflict, military necessity 
remains an argument to which those being held responsible may resort in their 
defence.  
Such an argument cannot be made in times of non-international armed conflict. 
Many of the provisions of the ICC Statute are similar, but not all acts are criminalised 
in the same manner. In a non-international armed conflict, Article 8 ICC Statute does 
not criminalise starvation as a method of warfare, which has been recognised by 
Article 14 AP II and conviction is thus only possible should the ICC accept it as a 
norm of customary international law and would then be incorporated through Article 
21 ICC Statute, an argument that has been made by the ICRC.30 Also absent is Article 
8(2)(b)(iv) concerning damages to the environment from the provisions of Article 8 
ICC Statute with regard to non-international armed conflicts, as is Article 8(2)(a)(iii) 
regarding the ‘grave breach’ of doing wilful damage to a person’s health. Yet, 
attacking those persons or objects involved in the provision of humanitarian 
assistance shall amount to war crimes (Article 8(2)(e)(ii) and (iii)) needing a level of 
intentionality and awareness that the objects of the attack were under protection of 
the Geneva Conventions, as is the case for international armed conflicts. Also the 
concept of ‘outrages upon personal dignity’ which is criminalised according to 
Article 8(2)(c)(ii) ICC Statute is recognised as unlawful in times of non-international 
armed conflicts.31  
Conversely to the situation of war crimes, no nexus to an armed conflict is 
necessary for the categorisation of a crime as a crime against humanity, which allows 
for prosecution of such crimes under all circumstances relevant to the provision of 
assistance. As such, whilst both war crimes and crimes against humanity may give 
rise to responsibilities (amongst which the resort to the use of force) under the RtoP 
doctrine, this is especially relevant given that such responsibilities might now also 
arise outside the framework of an armed conflict. A resort may be had to the use of 
force should a threat to the peace in the widest sense be asserted by the Security 
Council, as discussed above. In practice however, this has yet to be ascertained. Key 
to the assessment of an act as a crime against humanity, is the fact that it must have 
occurred ‘as part of a widespread or systematic attack’, which in the context of the 
unlawful deprivation of humanitarian assistance means that a form of systematic or 
widespread targeting of a particular group must have taken place, or in the 
alternative, a single strategic action with the intent of impacting a large group of 
                                                        
30 In these circumstances, Article 22 ICC Statute regarding the principle of ‘nullum crimen sine lege’ 
must be taken into consideration.  
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people. Article 7(1)(b) (k) and 7(2) ICC Statute criminalise the ‘deprivation of access 
to food and medicine’ as part of  the ‘extermination’ of civilians as well as ‘other 
inhumane acts’, the latter of which are explained as an infliction of ‘serious injury 
to body or to mental or physical health, by means of an inhumane act’. Whilst the 
provisions relevant to the criminalisation of the denial or obstruction of humanitarian 
assistance are clearly not as elaborate as the provisions concerning war crimes, it is 
interesting to note that the deliberate choice was made to include the ‘deprivation of 
access to food and medicine’ within the Statute of the ICC, rather than as an 
explanation in the Elements of the Crimes. Such an inclusion can only be considered 
as an acknowledgment of the seriousness of the violation of international law that 
the obstruction or denial of humanitarian assistance constitutes. Whilst intentionality 
is difficult to argue, and shall have to occur on a case-by-case basis, case law has 
given indications with regard to the notion of how ‘widespread’ extermination must 
be to amount to a crime against humanity as opposed to singular persons. As such 
the ICTY has argued that less than 1700 people, and in referral to the Nuremberg 
Tribunal, less than 800 people, may be a sufficiently large group of persons to 
amount to the collective and widespread element of such a crime.32 Indeed, the 
notion of a humanitarian crisis will by its very nature affect a larger amount of 
persons, making it possible to ‘fit the profile’ of a crime against humanity.  
Lastly, Chapter 8 has addressed the manner in which enforcement of 
humanitarian assistance might take place should a state sovereign be absent in a 
territory. A distinction has been made in circumstances where a level of authority 
exists, such as certain organised non-state actors in non-international armed 
conflicts, which carry responsibilities in international law that have been addressed 
throughout this research, and situations where in fact authorities are absent such as 
in failed states or even complex emergencies. Problems arise as no primary 
responsible actor is present, leading to a vacuum in the primary responsibility. 
Article 9 ARSIWA argues for a responsibility of de facto regimes, whereas the ICJ 
in its Namibia-Opinion is somewhat more pragmatic, arguing that actual physical 
control of a territory as opposed to ‘sovereignty or legitimacy of title’ serves as the 
basis for liability in international law. It is indeed generally accepted in international 
law today that – as established in this research – those in de facto control or non-
state actors carry obligations under human rights law and humanitarian law. Yet, 
enforcement mechanisms in human rights law do not allow non-state actors to be 
held accountable in their courts or before their council or committee, nor can they be 
held responsible by the ICJ. Equally, whilst addressing individuals, Articles 7 and 8 
ICC Statute assume some form of responsibility, either through a sense of authority 
in de facto regimes and armed groups or the existence of persons exercising 
governmental authority. These enforcement mechanisms are therefore merely 
relevant in the circumstance that ‘some’ form of authority exists. In the assumption 
that no request has been made to the international community welcoming the 
provision of aid, or that no sovereign authority is identifiable, resort may be had to 
the Security Council, in line with the doctrine of RtoP, as the international 
                                                        






community takes on a responsibility in the absence of a sovereign to provide aid. 
The Commentary to Article 18 AP II envisions such action too, as it argues a level 
of consent is presumed in circumstances of uncertainty of a sovereign. As judicial 
bodies are unable to deal with circumstances of denial of aid in the absence of a 
responsible actor, the Security Council – as the designated authoritative body dealing 
with impending crises – shall therefore be considered the most appropriate enforcer 
of humanitarian assistance in such circumstances and when the crisis is still on-
going.33 With a potential future perspective, the ILC Draft Articles appear to follow 
the line of reasoning of the Commentary to AP II, as Draft Article 14(3) cites that 
the affected state shall ‘whenever possible, make its decision regarding the offer 
known’ pursuant to an external offer of assistance, which has been explained by the 
Drafting Committee as an acknowledgement of the possibility that consent must be 
implied in the circumstance a functioning sovereign is absent. This stands to reason, 
as in the absence of a sovereign wilfully denying aid or access for its delivery, the 
affected persons remain in need of assistance.  
The final Chapter of this research has assessed the manner in which international 
law allows for the enforcement of the provision of aid, which in fact, considering the 
amount of gaps in the earlier stages of the research, are relatively satisfying. 
Although some of the provisions in the ARSIWA are considered progressive 
development, a responsibility (if not duty) to cooperate in the enforcement of 
assistance in order to end violations of humanitarian law or human rights law – 
general human suffering – can be discerned. Indeed, whilst none of the bodies with 
authority in the matter of enforcement: the ICJ, Security Council, ICC and human 
rights bodies are all-encompassing or infallible, their combined strength allows for 
enforcement mechanisms in a variety of ways. A large gap however remains in the 
international judicial enforcement of the denial of humanitarian assistance by non-
state actors. However, such entities might be held accountable before the ICC or in 
national proceedings. The Security Council as a political and ‘forceful’ body must 
in fact be differentiated from legal and judiciary bodies. The various types of 
enforcement bodies fulfil different roles, from specific case-assessments after the 
fact as done by the ICJ, ICC and human rights bodies, to immediate decisions in the 
midst of a crisis as done by the Security Council. As such, each functions in its own 
merit, but the fact remains that not one ‘single’ high authority exists in international 
law, to determine enforcement in all circumstances of humanitarian crisis. As seen 
above, the Security Council restrains its actions to circumstances reflecting a threat 
to the international peace, which to date has meant refraining from action in times of 
natural disaster. Yet, as has been seen in the discussed interaction between the RtoP 
doctrine and the notion of a crime against humanity, such crimes no longer warrant 
a nexus to armed conflict and as such may now, as a core crime of RtoP as established 
in the World Summit Outcome Document, potentially trigger Security Council 
action. Lastly, it has become apparent that enforcement in the absence of a sovereign 
is obtained largely via inference, clearly not the strongest or most reliable method. 
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These gaps point out the need to strengthen the law, also in this final aspect of the 
legal framework on the provision of humanitarian assistance.  
 
9.2 Recommendations for Improvement of the Legal Framework Concerning 
Humanitarian Assistance  
 
The above conclusions have distilled the current lex lata pertaining to the provision 
of humanitarian assistance and laid bare the gaps in the law. Prior to addressing these 
gaps in more depth and discussing potential solutions, it is relevant to establish which 
legal framework can be discerned for the provision of humanitarian assistance in 
times of a humanitarian crisis, that is to say: which rights and duties exist at all times, 
regardless of the factual circumstances on the ground, provided that the circumstance 
meets the threshold of the notion of a ‘humanitarian crisis’ as defined in this research. 
Humanitarian assistance need only be provided if it can be ascertained that such a 
crisis is taking place; acknowledged by all parties involved and/or a relevant 
authoritative body in international law. Such an assessment will prevent legal 
disputes concerning the status of the situation and thereby also the legality of the 
provision of assistance. The basic threshold for the provision of assistance therefore 
commences with the assessment that a humanitarian crisis is taking or has taken 
place.  
Following on from this, it is important to assess which aspects of the legal 
framework result in legally binding obligations for states or other actors. This 
assessment firmly brings the framework regarding the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance from the notion of an ‘imperfect obligation’, not entailing binding legal 
duties, into the realm of ‘perfect obligations’ that do not allow as much leeway and 
oblige actors to abide by their legal duties and rights.  
 
9.2.1 The Basic Existing Legal Framework and Problems with Fragmentation 
 
It has become very apparent that the law varies according to circumstances, leading 
to much more explicit provisions for the delivery of humanitarian aid in times of 
applicability of humanitarian law, as well as, recently, for those falling within the 
scope of the Kampala Convention. How can we explain that no aid is provided 
because those who needed it were ‘merely’ victims of a natural disaster and the 
international community did not enforce it? Or, as argued by the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees, because the persons in need of assistance lived in 
certain ‘parts of the world’?34 That simply will not do. It is precisely for this purpose 
that this research has taken a more overarching, comprehensive and integral view of 
the delivery of humanitarian assistance and its legal framework. In 2007, the ICRC 
noted how dispersed, underutilised and lacking harmonisation the law can be in 
                                                        
34 Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council (1996-1999), Chapter VIII, ‘Consideration of 
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disaster relief.35 Fragmentation of the law is a serious problem in the provision of 
humanitarian assistance, as it leads to a lack of clarity concerning the applicable law 
in certain given circumstances. Regional and ‘sectoral’ law are the effects of such 
fragmentation, creating a patchwork, as opposed to a single framework. 
Fragmentation is furthermore exacerbated by the legal difficulties surrounding the 
simultaneous applicability of various bodies of law, as well as potential domestic 
legal regulations. Such problems continue to highlight the undesirable circumstance 
that certain types of emergencies or locations might result in more or less provision 
of aid, whilst the persons in need continue to share one single common denominator: 
a need for humanitarian assistance. It is precisely this need which should define them 
and determine the law, as opposed to being defined by their location in the world. 
Throughout this research, an attempt has therefore been made to discern those rights 
and duties that are continuous, regardless of the specific circumstance where 
humanitarian assistance may be needed.  
 
Firstly, this research has shown that the notion of state sovereignty entails a 
responsibility of the sovereign towards all persons under its jurisdiction, which 
coincides with the primary responsibility in the provision of humanitarian assistance 
lying with the affected state itself. This duty is also recognised by the UN Security 
Council and General Assembly and is also embraced in the notion of the 
Responsibility to Protect. Indeed the legal developments concerning the provision of 
humanitarian assistance and those regarding the notion of state sovereignty as 
responsibility reinforce and mutually support each other.  
Secondly, whereas no independent human right to receive humanitarian 
assistance exists, its provision is a vehicle in the fulfilment of the rights to life, food 
and health as enshrined in the ICCPR and ICESCR that both have widespread 
accession. The rights to life (which is excluded from derogation in times of 
emergency), food and health (for which the state must continue to fulfil the minimum 
core obligations) continue to be applicable at all times, resulting in an obligation of 
the affected state to provide humanitarian assistance in times of crisis in order to 
fulfil its obligations under international human rights law. This includes refraining 
from the impediment of assistance. As such, human rights law forms a legal basis 
for the provision of humanitarian assistance in all circumstances amounting to a 
humanitarian crisis.  
Thirdly, the current law can be seen to presuppose the right of the international 
community – including both international organisations and third states – to offer the 
provision of humanitarian assistance, provided that such delivery abides by the 
principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality. The offer and provision of such 
neutral, humane and impartial assistance cannot be considered an infringement on 
the affected state’s sovereignty. 
Lastly, whilst no general right to access a territory exists, upon the initial consent 
to access by the affected state, a duty rests on said state to facilitate the passage of 
aid and provide a safe environment for its provision. Furthermore, consent may not 
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be arbitrarily withheld, and the Security Council has, in line with obligations under 
human rights law, asserted in some specific instances that a duty to allow access 
exists. State sovereignty is therefore curtailed by the international legal duties under 
human rights law (such as Article 2 ICESCR), as well as following Security Council 
assertions, to allow access for the provision of humanitarian assistance.  
 
Whilst these basic duties exist at all times in the law today, international law is of 
course ever changing, and new norms are continually emerging. Indeed, one such 
emerging norm is the responsibility of the international community to cooperate, 
based on provisions in the ARSIWA, Additional Protocol II, ICJ jurisprudence, 
human rights law and Security Council resolutions, in ending circumstances of 
denial of humanitarian assistance, as such denial is a violation of international law. 
In other words: an emerging responsibility exists for the international community to 
contribute to the provision of humanitarian assistance.  
 
Creating more law is however not necessarily the solution and does not necessarily 
help persons facing an emergency. Proper application of the law which exists, and 
which can be applied to all circumstances amounting to a humanitarian crisis, will 
provide more clarity and will – relevantly – also align with the principle of human 
dignity. Equity and the principle of humanity can be considered as a source of law 
to fill lacunae. In a similar manner, the General Assembly and ILC Draft Articles on 
the protection of persons consider the principle of solidarity as a basis upon which a 
duty to cooperate might exist for the international community (although it is not 
explicitly incorporated in the Draft Articles).36 For this purpose, it is relevant to distil 
the remaining needs for the existing comprehensive and overarching legal 
framework. Many tools are present, and bringing them together will allow for equal 
protection of all those in need of humanitarian assistance. Without attempting to 
‘universalise’ certain legal provisions into applications for which they were not 
designed, it is possible to assert which sources of law are available to potentially fill 
the gaps in the current patchwork of law pertaining to the provision of assistance. 
The cornerstone notion of human dignity clearly supports such an overarching 
approach to the provision of assistance. Furthermore, the principles of humanity and 
solidarity stress the importance of the need to treat all humans equally, as codified 
also in the UN Charter and supported by the ICJ’s assertion that the principle of 
humanity is related to the intransgressible norms of international law. Such 
principles may serve as a basis upon which this framework is founded. Protection of 
individuals’ rights, by way of the provision of humanitarian assistance, must 




                                                        






9.2.2 Fixing the Problems and Gaps in the Law 
 
The above research has pointed out areas in which the law is missing necessary 
provisions, or areas in which fragmentation has led to other issues in protection. It 
must be noted that the solutions offered attempt to find a realistic and pragmatic 
conjoining and synchronisation between the practical realities faced in times of 
crisis, and the legal rights and legitimate needs of those in need of assistance. It is 
precisely this that Henry Dunant attempted to do nearly two centuries ago.  
 
Firstly, this research has pointed out that a single definition of both the notion of 
humanitarian assistance and the concept of a natural disaster are lacking. Whilst this 
may not amount to legal problems per se, those involved in the provision of 
assistance both from a practical and legal perspective, may benefit from the 
development of one generally used and applicable definition of ‘humanitarian 
assistance’ as well as that of a ‘natural disaster’, such as the definitions proposed in 
this research.37 Furthermore, as multiple actors in the provision of aid held diverse 
views as to the principles according to which such aid is provided, a common 
denominator in the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality had to be 
distilled. Also, the division of legal protection according to circumstances such as 
conflict or disaster do not enhance equal protection, resulting in the suggestion of 
the notion of a ‘humanitarian crisis’ in this research, to form a single basis upon 
which the legal framework can operate.  
Prior to addressing the existing problems and gaps in the legal framework, such 
problems and gaps are therefore immediately apparent at the outset, due to a lack of 
synchronisation of what in fact the framework is and where its boundaries lie. A 
delimitation has therefore been made regarding the notion of ‘humanitarian 
assistance’, the principles for its provision and the concept of a ‘humanitarian crisis’.  
 
Secondly, regarding the existing legal framework, it is first and foremost clear that 
an individual human right to receive humanitarian assistance is lacking. Such an 
absence in the human rights framework, however, is not problematic, nor should 
such a right necessarily be created: the absence can well be compensated by 
acknowledging that provision of assistance is a vehicle in the fulfilment of the 
existing rights to life, food and health, as can be done in international law today.38 
Whilst these individual human rights do not contain many specificities pertaining to 
the delivery of aid, the ICJ has determined that at the very least, states must ensure 
to abide by non-discrimination measures in such provision. Ascertaining that the 
delivery of emergency aid functions as the fulfilment of the rights to life, food and 
health in times of a humanitarian crisis will allow for the elaboration of this by 
various human rights courts, without the need to develop new regulations. Indeed, 
this provision is the fulfilment of the ‘minimum core obligations’ that must be 
respected at all times, as enshrined in the ICESCR.  
                                                        
37 9.1 Conclusions Pertaining to the Existing Legal Framework. 
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Thirdly, whilst humanitarian law contains various detailed provisions pertaining to 
aid, it lacks a general codification of the duty of the affected state to provide 
assistance in times of a crisis. In particular in the increasingly frequent circumstances 
of non-international armed conflicts over the past decades, such an absence is 
painfully visible in the realities on the ground. The result is a fragmentation of 
regulations that does not enhance the protection of persons in need. A solution may 
be sought in the approach to the lex specialis-doctrine in this research. It has been 
suggested that the most specific clause – in this field concerning the provision of 
assistance thereby also the most protective clause – must be adhered to as opposed 
to considering an entire body of law the most specialised law. In times of a 
humanitarian crisis, such an interpretation would allow for the assertion of duties of 
the affected state to provide assistance to be found in human rights law or general 
international law principles such as concerning state sovereignty or the principle of 
humanity. Indeed, the developments regarding human rights law over the past 
century have influenced the concept of state sovereignty, which has evolved with 
time to incorporate a responsibility to protect its citizens. Such a general duty to 
provide assistance can therefore be sought in the more overarching concept of state 
sovereignty and the more broadly applicable human rights law. Through this 
approach to the lex specialis-doctrine, human rights provisions concerning the right 
to life, food and health would function as the most protective clauses.  
 
Fourthly, the existing legal framework does not specifically recognise a right of 
international organisations or third states to offer assistance. In fact as also seen in 
the Nicaragua-case, such a bona fide offer does not violate international law, and is 
generally even presupposed. Given the attitude of various bodies such as the Security 
Council to indeed presuppose such a right, it is not necessary to establish, but again, 
might assist in clarification of the law, should an authoritative body decide to do so. 
Unequivocally establishing that such a right exists, adds to the responsibilities to 
cooperate in bringing humanitarian crises to an end. Problems with regard to the 
provision of assistance by third parties, following the circumstances in which a 
sovereign does not fulfil its own obligations under international law, do in fact form 
a large component of the issues that the legal framework on the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance faces. Indeed, such problems clearly flow from the initial 
problem of a sovereign not fulfilling its own duties. Whilst this non-provision may 
arise through both incapacity and unwillingness of the sovereign to fulfil its duties, 
it is more often than not the latter which results in problems for external or 
international access.   
 
Fifthly therefore, it is key to note that no right to access a territory exists for third 
parties, for the purpose of the provision of humanitarian assistance. Indeed, 
determining whether or not such a right should exist is a normative question that is 
bound by the legal parameters of the current law. Currently, the provisions relating 
to provision of aid by third parties are formulated from the perspective of the 






formulated in international humanitarian law from the perspective of a duty to allow 
access in relation to certain ‘control rights’. The obligations are absent in 
circumstances of natural disaster due to the lack of a specific body of law. In such 
circumstances as also possible in times of armed conflict, recourse must currently be 
had to the obligations of the affected state to seek international cooperation as found 
under Article 2 ICESCR. This latter obligation is arguably not as strongly formulated 
as that in international humanitarian law which dictates that relief ‘shall’ be 
provided. However, fulfilment of the rights to food and health under the ICESCR 
does require seeking international assistance. Indeed, the basic provisions of 
humanitarian assistance are considered ‘minimum core obligations’.  
Whilst it may not be problematic to be lacking a ‘right’ to access, such access 
should then however be formulated from the perspective of the sovereign as an 
obligation in international law, taking into account and recognising in particular the 
content of the concept of state sovereignty. When state sovereignty includes a duty 
to provide emergency assistance to those within its jurisdiction, such a duty must be 
seen to include the prohibition of arbitrarily refusing external aid that might be able 
to do just that.  
Yet, this duty proves to be lacking uniformity in international law. A general basis 
is currently found in human rights law, but not formulated as an obligation of result, 
although the minimum core obligations must be fulfilled at all times. A further 
obligation to allow access is furthermore only established on an ad hoc basis by the 
Security Council, given the explicit control rights that otherwise exist under 
international humanitarian law.  
 
Indeed, sixthly, in the only field of law addressing an obligation to allow access 
(humanitarian law), such access is subject to the consent of the affected state, which 
then in turn may not be ‘arbitrarily refused’. This consent-issue is one of the greatest 
concerns pertaining to those attempting to provide aid, as no clear threshold can be 
established regarding what precisely constitutes ‘arbitrary’ refusal of consent in 
relation to the provision of humanitarian assistance. Such attempts at a legal 
definition have also not been made in soft law documents, and it stands to reason 
that this must be determined on a case-by-case basis.39  
Creating an exhaustive list of potential ‘arbitrary refusals’ by a sovereign is 
simply not realistic, as practice will always surpass the attempted regulation. 
However, determining which acts as a minimum would amount to such a threshold 
or ‘arbitrariness’ would be an aid in practice. Indeed, circumstances where the 
affected sovereign authority acquiesces, concedes or grants access without outright 
                                                        
39 However, in an attempt at more clarity, the Resolution ‘Humanitarian Assistance’ (2 September 2003) 
Institute of International Law, Sixteenth Commission, Bruges Session Principle VIII(1) does note that: 
“Affected States are under the obligation not arbitrarily and unjustifiably to reject a bona fide offer 
exclusively intended to provide humanitarian assistance or to refuse access to the victims. In particular, 
they may not reject an offer nor refuse access if such refusal is likely to endanger the fundamental human 
rights of the victims or would amount to a violation of the ban on starvation of civilians as a method of 
warfare”. Such clarification however is not comprehensive, as it does not address issues falling short of 
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‘consent’ are not the contested problem in international law today. Currently, the 
‘baseline’ in humanitarian law can be found in the provisions prohibiting the 
starvation of civilians. Arguably, such a baseline in human rights law would be the 
threshold of the fulfilment of the minimum core obligations of the rights to food and 
health, as well as the non-arbitrary deprivation of the right to life. The risk of 
proliferation of definitions and of minimum standards of protection is ever-present, 
and thus such an assessment of what in fact amounts to an ‘arbitrary refusal’ of 
humanitarian assistance should be done by an authoritative judiciary body in 
international law.  
 
Seventhly and closely related to the matter of the prohibition of the arbitrary denial 
of access, is the fact that the obligation in humanitarian law to allow access, resting 
upon the sovereign, is dependent on the assessment that a territory is ‘inadequately 
supplied’. This law is inherently flawed, as it grants leeway to the sovereign itself to 
determine and interpret this ‘inadequateness’ of supply. Similarly outside of armed 
conflict, gaps exist in international legal regulation, as it is often mistakenly assumed 
that a sovereign will show willingness to call for assistance from abroad when it is 
overwhelmed. Yet here too, a margin of appreciation is left to the sovereign to 
ascertain whether or not those within its jurisdiction are adequately supplied.  
One of the great difficulties in the current framework is determining whether or 
not the affected territory is ‘inadequately supplied’, when no legal direction is 
provided in this regard. Again, a case-by case analysis is currently the only viable 
manner in which a pragmatic solution to these difficulties may be found; the concept 
is too vast to exhaustively delimitate. In proffering a solution to these two related 
problems concerning access, calls have been made for the creation of a new treaty.40 
Yet, states are understandably and necessarily attached to their sovereign rights, 
including the notion of non-intervention and that of non-interference with domestic 
affairs. It does not seem viable therefore that states shall be willing to forego these 
in an international convention and effectively address the concerns regarding the 
adequacy of supply of a territory and the right to refuse consent, through the 
codification of methods of enforcement to tackle such crucial issues. The potential 
new legal document addressing the provision of assistance would then be created 
without addressing issues of enforcement, and therefore be futile from its birth. 
Human rights law as a basis continues to be a constant factor that may provide 
guidance, as an ‘inadequate’ supply of humanitarian assistance amounts to violations 
of the rights to life, food and health, which can be ascertained through legal standards 
of enforcement. The focus then lies with the establishment of a violation of the rights 
to life, food or health, rather than establishment of the ‘inadequate supply’ of a 
territory.  
                                                        
40 Amongst others Yoram Dinstein, ‘The Right to Humanitarian Assistance’ (2000) LIII Naval War 
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Right of access to victims of natural disaster’, (1998) 38 International Review of the Red Cross 325, 596-
597; Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng (5 December 1995) 






This brings forward the eighth and final issue faced by the current legal framework 
that must be addressed. Upon deciding that the need for access must be determined 
on a case-by-case basis, the question is raised: who shall determine whether or not a 
territory is inadequately supplied, and whether or not consent is arbitrarily withheld 
when an offer of assistance is made? If such circumstances are affirmatively 
assessed, enforcement becomes possible as violations of international law arise 
through the unlawful obstruction and denial of assistance.  
Enforcement issues in international law are not new, nor are they unique to the 
legal framework on the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Leaving the 
determination of such matters regarding the use of force solely in the hands of the 
Security Council, as (political) authoritative body in international law concerning 
the use of force, risks widening the gap between the protection in times of armed 
conflict and that in times of natural disasters, as the Security Council operates within 
the realm of peace and security and its related functions and powers under Chapters 
VI and VII, most notably of course the concept of a ‘threat to the peace’ as 
established in Article 39 UN Charter. Yet, handing such matters solely to 
international courts and tribunals shall also not provide timely, satisfactory 
enforcement, as such judiciaries shall not have the opportunity to act in the midst of 
a humanitarian crisis. With the current judiciary bodies, enforcement will occur well 
after the crisis has taken place.  
An ensuing issue pertaining to having sole recourse to enforcement by means of 
the judiciary, is the fact that existing human rights bodies cannot enforce a situation 
of denial by non-state actors. Non-state actors are, given the proliferation of non-
international armed conflict, in reality often those denying humanitarian assistance. 
Equally, in the absence of a responsible authority, such as in the circumstance of a 
failed state, the ICJ and ICC face problems with adjudication as they are not 
equipped to adjudicate such actors. The absence of a sovereign, as seen from the 
above assessment that the existing duties all rest upon a sovereign, results in the need 
for legal recourse to immediate action for those persons finding themselves in a crisis 
in a ‘failed state’ with no sovereign. 
It cannot be denied that all these authoritative bodies therefore have their 
limitations, as well as shortcomings and flaws. Yet, as addressing and overcoming 
these crucial enforcement issues in a potential new treaty regarding the framework 
on the provision of assistance does not appear viable, solutions from within the 
current international legal system must be sought. Granted, the International Fact 
Finding Committee as envisaged by Article 90 AP I exists, but aside from the fact 
that it is indeed in practice not being sought out in conflict resolution, it merely has 
authority over international armed conflicts. As such, it is currently also not a 
realistic enforcer, with the most pressing crises arising in non-international armed 
conflicts, natural disasters and complex emergencies.  
 
In the current international legal arena, the ICJ, ICC, human rights courts and 
Security Council are the bodies available to address enforcement issues. A combined 
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the Security Council, in ad hoc circumstances amounting to a humanitarian crisis. 
Such an informal (ad hoc) judiciary body or committee would provide more judicial 
backing for the otherwise political decisions of the Council.  
 
As the above shows, the law regarding the rights and duties concerning the provision 
of assistance is largely in place. Human rights law and general principles in 
international law allow for a broad basis to build on. Problematic is especially the 
situation in which an affected state does not allow access, and international law must 
dictate how to enforce access.  
This is indeed a normative issue: how the denial of humanitarian assistance is 
enforced – either ex post facto by the judiciary, or immediately by the Security 
Council – is directly related to the manner in, and speed with which, the rights of the 
affected persons are fulfilled. It has been argued above that a responsibility of third 
states to cooperate to provide humanitarian assistance in the ending of violations of 
international law (the denial of humanitarian assistance) can be seen to be emerging 
in international law, through the combination of norms in existing human rights law, 
the ARSIWA, appeals of the Security Council and the General Assembly, as well as 
the Draft ILC Articles. These assertions must be considered the most protective 
clauses concerning the external provision of assistance at this time, and furthermore 
relate to the violation of norms of jus cogens as such cooperation becomes a potential 
duty when the affected state may violate norms of jus cogens in the denial of 
emergency aid. This emerging duty also falls in line with Security Council action as 
seen over the past years ranging from measures under Articles 40 and 41, to the use 
of force under Article 42 UN Charter regarding for example Somalia, as well as the 
emerging doctrine on the Responsibility to Protect, which has been embraced by the 
Security Council and put into practice by that body with regard to the situation in 
Libya.  
Whilst this doctrine is by no means well-established in international law, it does 
acknowledge Security Council authorisation for the use of force in circumstances 
amounting to ‘crimes against humanity’, a circumstance that does not require a nexus 
to an armed conflict. The denial of humanitarian assistance may in fact, as discussed 
above, amount to such a crime.41 When a state sovereign does not provide assistance 
and denies access to third parties wishing to do so, the result might be a humanitarian 
crisis that can be qualified as a crime against humanity. The scope and magnitude of 
such a crime can in reality often result in a threat to the peace. Indeed, whilst the 
Council remains bound by the text of the UN Charter, requiring the existence of a 
‘threat to the peace’ to warrant the enforcement by means of the actual use of force, 
it is viable to argue that a threat to the peace may arise should crimes against 
humanity be committed also outside of the context of an armed conflict.  
Therefore, should for instance a natural disaster occur where humanitarian 
assistance is not being provided, resulting in vast amounts of IDPs and/or refugees 
and risking for example a spill-over effect or instability in a larger area, the Security 
Council might find such circumstances to be a threat to international peace, and have 
                                                        






the tools to resort to the use of force in order to enforce the provision of humanitarian 
assistance. Similarly, circumstances not meeting the threshold of a non-international 
armed conflict as considered by Additional Protocol II may nevertheless concern the 
Council with regard to a threat to the peace in that area, and equal recourse may be 
had. In such circumstances, where an armed conflict can however be ascertained, 
recourse may also be had to the use of force when ‘war crimes’ are committed 
through the denial of humanitarian assistance. Security Council action is thereby 
possible through a variety of means. Through such a view of the meaning of Article 
39 UN Charter, the Security Council would remain within its mandate, yet also 
ensure enforcement options at all times that the provision of humanitarian assistance 
may be necessary due to the existence of a humanitarian crisis amounting to a threat 
to the peace, even when this does not involve a ‘classic’ armed conflict. The Council 
shall evidently remain bound by the determination that indeed a crisis exists 
warranting the provision of assistance. Should the provision of assistance not be 
initially required, then its denial also does not result in a violation of international 
law.  
 
Currently, legal developments regarding the concept of ‘crimes against humanity’ 
are underway, as the ILC announced in July 2014 that it would move the topic of 
crimes against humanity from its long-term agenda and now include it in its 
‘programme of work’. This might provide more insights into the possibility to view 
crimes against humanity as a threat to the peace in the absence of an armed conflict 
and for the purpose of the provision of humanitarian assistance. Potentially, this new 
study might develop into greater protection for persons in times of a humanitarian 
crisis.  
 
The use of force is never the first, nor the perfect solution, but sometimes it is the 
only option when all others fail and the international community is witness to 
massive human suffering. As such, the use of force must always be proportional to 
the goal it is serving: the relief of a civilian population in need. Naturally, all other 
(coercive) measures to entice a sovereign to allow access to a territory should have 
prior preference. These include methods of access as discussed, such as for example 
through diplomatic channels, to establish means of access to provide aid on a more 
consensual basis. Such methods may be followed by measures within Chapter VII 
but still exempting the use of force. Furthermore, regardless of Security Council 
action, judicial enforcement mechanisms shall remain open to those wishing to 
enforce the delivery of humanitarian assistance through other means. As argued by 
Schwendimann, although the norms of international law can at most represent the 
minimum standards in obtaining access, the legal framework remains a useful 
mechanism in the insurance that aid is delivered to those who need it most.42  
Indeed, establishing the minimum legal framework does not withhold 
international actors to take further steps to protect persons in times of a humanitarian 
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crisis. International law has developed over time to protect the interests of persons 
through human rights law and humanitarian law: both branches have developed 
parallel to each other and thus so should the protection of persons be parallel and 
equal.43 It is therefore essential to the protection of persons in need of aid that the 
legal framework be addressed in this integral, over-arching and comprehensive 
manner, as uncertainty regarding the applicability of the law results in a lack of 
application and thereby a lack of protection on the ground. The existing legal 
framework pertaining to the provision of humanitarian assistance and its 
enforcement mechanisms must therefore be communicated, disseminated and 
endorsed in all possible manners towards all actors involved in the provision of 
assistance. With an increase in knowledge of the legal regulations to ensure the 
provision of humanitarian assistance, comes an increase in power to implement 
them, resulting in an increase of protection of those in need. In the end, that is the 
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SAMENVATTING: HUMANITAIRE  
ASSISTENTIE EN STAATSSOEVEREINITEIT IN 
HET INTERNATIONALE RECHT: 
RICHTING EEN INTEGRAAL RAAMWERK 
 
1 INLEIDING  
 
In een wereld met toenemende globalisering, bestaat er ook een toenemende mate 
van mondiale betrokkenheid bij humanitaire rampen. Men ontkomt niet aan de 
shockerende beelden van mensen in nood, die getoond worden in internationale 
media bij conflictsituaties of na (natuur-)rampen. De lokale overheden zijn meestal 
overweldigd door de intensiteit en omvang van de ramp, en kunnen de situatie vaak 
niet zelfstandig oplossen. De wens om humanitaire assistentie te verlenen is dan ook 
groot, en deze assistentie vindt voornamelijk plaats op initiatief van derde landen of 
internationale organisaties. Hoewel het verlenen van humanitaire assistentie geen 
rampen kan voorkomen, kan het wel nadrukkelijk bijdragen aan de verlichting van 
bestaande rampen, en bijdragen aan de overleving van mensen in nood.  
Zowel het verlenen van humanitaire hulp, als het ontvangen hiervan, is gebonden 
aan internationaal juridische regels. Veel van deze regels zijn ontwikkeld na afloop 
dan de Tweede Wereldoorlog, met het oog op het voorkomen van een herhaling van 
het lot dat miljoenen mensen in deze periode trof. Door ontwikkelingen in de tweede 
helft van de twintigste eeuw, en aan de start van de eenentwintigste eeuw kan echter 
geconcludeerd worden dat de bestaande regelgeving helaas noch eenduidig, noch 
altijd helder is. De noodzaak tot verheldering ligt in de veranderende aard van 
humanitaire rampen en een toenemend aantal actoren op het internationale speelveld.  
Bestaande regelgeving is veelal toegespitst op internationaal gewapende 
conflicten en bezettingssituaties. Daarentegen zijn de hedendaagse humanitaire 
rampen (voortvloeiend uit een periode van dekolonisatie en het einde van de Koude 
Oorlog) over het algemeen het gevolg van interne gewapende conflicten en 
(natuur-)rampen. Men kan hierbij denken aan de huidige conflicten in Syrië, Libië en 
Irak, evenals rampen zoals de aardbevingen in Haïti en Nepal, respectievelijk in 2010 
en 2015, of de tsunami in Japan in maart 2011. Bovendien zijn in de afgelopen jaren 
behalve staten, ook in toenemende mate niet-statelijke actoren, zoals gewapende 
groeperingen en internationale organisaties, actief welke aan regelgeving gebonden 
dienen te zijn. Deze ontwikkelingen gaan hand in hand met een nieuwe kijk op het 
eeuwenoude concept van staatssoevereiniteit. Met het oog op deze veranderende 
omstandigheden is er een verheldering nodig van het bestaande internationale recht, 
om vast te stellen of het huidige juridische raamwerk afdoende is, of dat er behoefte 
bestaat aan ontwikkeling van nieuwe regelgeving. Vragen dienen zich aan, zoals: 
welke rechten hebben mensen in nood om hulp te ontvangen? Welke plichten bestaan 
er voor de getroffen staat of derde partijen om hulp te leveren? Hoe kan hulpverlening 






Kortom, de noodzaak tot het in kaart brengen van het huidige internationaal 
juridische raamwerk is bijzonder groot in de hedendaagse maatschappij. De actuele 
internationaal juridische vraagstukken met betrekking tot het leveren van humanitaire 
assistentie zijn in essentie viervoudig: allereerst bestaat er een grote verscheidenheid 
aan omstandigheden waarin humanitaire hulp verleend dient te worden, zoals 
bezetting, internationale en interne conflicten, en (natuur-)rampen, en daaraan 
gelieerde verscheidenheid in toepasbare juridische regelgeving. Deze 
verscheidenheid leidt tot een risico van fragmentatie in de beschermingsgraad van 
individuen. Dit risico bestaat doordat de bescherming van het individu in het huidige 
internationale recht bepaald wordt door het juridische regime dat van toepassing is in 
de specifieke omstandigheid. Een tweede probleem is de grote verscheidenheid aan 
actoren op het internationale speelveld, wat leidt tot een veelvoud aan 
rechthebbenden en dragers van plichten. Onduidelijkheid bestaat ten aanzien van 
(met name) de plichten van de getroffen staat, internationale organisaties, (coalities 
van) derde staten, niet-statelijke actoren, non-gouvernementele organisaties en 
individuen, al naar gelang de aard van de humanitaire crisis. Deze actoren zijn niet 
alleen dragers van rechten en plichten, maar ook actoren in het al dan niet verlenen 
van humanitaire assistentie. Gelieerd aan deze eerste twee vraagstukken is het 
concept van staatssoevereiniteit, als derde component met betrekking tot het 
juridische raamwerk ten aanzien van het verlenen van humanitaire assistentie. De 
nadrukkelijke rol van de soevereine overheid en politieke wil om humanitaire 
assistentie te verlenen of toe te staan van buitenaf speelt een doorslaggevende rol in 
de overleving van getroffenen ten tijde van een humanitaire crisis. Tenslotte is de 
proliferatie van regelgeving een laatste probleem dat zich heeft voorgedaan in het 
bestaande juridisch kader ten aanzien van humanitaire assistentie, als gevolg van de 
drie bovenstaande vraagstukken. Deze proliferatie heeft gelijktijdig gezorgd voor 
onduidelijkheid in het bestaande recht, in plaats van verheldering hiervan.  
 
2 DOEL ONDERZOEK & PROBLEEMSTELLING 
 
Deze vier problematische vraagstukken leiden tot zowel overlappingen als hiaten in 
de regelgeving ten aanzien van het verlenen van humanitaire assistentie, en hebben 
geleid tot het opzetten van het onderhavige onderzoek. Bij gebrek aan een 
gemeenschappelijk, alomvattend en integraal raamwerk van rechten en plichten, is 
onderzoek naar de mogelijkheden hiertoe van belang, evenals het in kaart brengen 
van de specifieke hiaten in de rechtsbescherming van mensen in nood. Het brengen 
van duidelijkheid in het internationale recht met betrekking tot humanitaire 
assistentie zal bijdragen aan de handhaving van bestaande rechtsregels en de 
mogelijke ontwikkeling van eventuele nieuwe regelgeving.  
Het doel van dit onderzoek is: het vaststellen wat de status en reikwijdte is van 
het huidige juridische raamwerk met betrekking tot humanitaire assistentie, en om 
vast te stellen of verduidelijking en verbetering hiervan nodig en wenselijkzijn. 
Onderzoek naar deze vraagstukken, en de beantwoording hiervan, zal bijdragen aan 






Het onderzoek hanteert hierin een integrale benadering, en bestudeert de stand van 
het recht in alle mogelijke omstandigheden (bezetting, conflict en (natuur-)ramp)) 
waarin humanitaire assistentie van belang kan zijn. Op deze wijze zal het mogelijk 
zijn om vast te stellen wat het juridisch kader is met betrekking tot de rechten en 
plichten welke te allen tijde van toepassing kunnen zijn met betrekking tot het leveren 
van humanitaire assistentie, ongeacht of dit zou moeten plaatsvinden ten tijde van 
oorlog of vrede.  
De algemene onderzoeksvraag van dit onderzoek luidt: wat zijn de bestaande 
rechten en plichten met betrekking tot het ontvangen, leveren en handhaven van 
humanitaire assistentie, en is ontwikkeling of verbetering van het huidige 
internationale recht nodig voor het creeëren van een integraal juridisch raamwerk? 
In het onderhavige onderzoek wordt deze algemene vraag beantwoord door de 
bespreking van drie subkwesties, namelijk: 1) wat zijn de huidige rechten en plichten 
met betrekking tot de ontvangst, levering en weigering van humanitaire assistentie?; 
2) identificatie van ontwikkelingsmogelijkheden en/of verbetermogelijkheden van 
het internationale recht ter voorkoming van wederrechtelijke weigering van 
humanitaire assistentie; en 3) het vaststellen van een allesomvattende en 
samenhangende kern van het juridisch raamwerk dat kan functioneren als basis voor 
het verlenen van humanitaire assistentie ongeacht de specifieke omstandigheid van 
de humanitaire crisis.  
 
3 JURIDISCH KADER 
 
Gezien het veelomvattende karakter van het onderzoek, neemt het ook een veelvoud 
aan juridische bronnen mee. Met betrekking tot het juridische kader, worden regels 
van algemeen internationaal recht, zoals ten aanzien van staatssoevereiniteit en de 
internationale verantwoordelijkheid van staten besproken, evenals specifieke 
deelgebieden binnen het internationale recht. Onder andere de mensenrechten, het 
humanitaire oorlogsrecht, vluchtelingenrecht en regelgeving met betrekking tot 
natuurrampen komen aan bod. Binnen deze bespreking zijn zowel primaire als 
secundaire rechtsbronnen relevant, evenals lex lata en lege ferenda. In de bespreking 
van secundaire rechtsbronnen is de jurisprudentie van het Internationaal Gerechtshof 
van belang. Hoewel de nadruk ligt op de lex lata, wegens het in kaart brengen van 
het huidige juridische kader, wordt ook aandacht besteed aan de lege ferenda met het 
oog op mogelijke ontwikkelingen van en verbeteringen aan het bestaande juridisch 
kader. 
 
DEEL I: HET RAAMWERK 
 
Alvorens de bestaande rechten en plichten te bespreken heeft dit onderzoek een 
raamwerk vastgesteld waarbinnen het verlenen van humanitaire assistentie 
plaatsvindt. Zo is een definitie van het concept humanitaire assistentie voorgesteld 
bij gebrek aan een bestaande algemeen geaccepteerde definitie: ‘humanitaire 






logistiek ten behoeve van de verlening van deze assistentie voor dringende 
doeleinden en die onmisbaar is voor het overleven dan diegenen voor wie het bedoeld 
is’. Drie beginselen zijn vastgesteld welke een grootst gemene deler vormen bij het 
verlenen van humanitaire assistentie door de grotere actoren zoals de Verenigde 
Naties en het Rode Kruis, te weten ‘humaniteit’, ‘onpartijdigheid’ en ‘neutraliteit’. 
Hiernaast spelen ook andere beginselen zoals ‘menselijke waardigheid’ en non-
discriminatie een belangrijke rol bij het verlenen van noodhulp. Statelijke actoren 
zijn eveneens gebonden aan deze beginselen. Als onderdeel van het raamwerk is 
bovendien vastgesteld dat de ontvangers van humanitaire assistentie burgers zijn, een 
begrip dat tevens vluchtelingen en ontheemden kan omvatten.  
Zoals reeds aangegeven gaat dit onderzoek uit van een alomvattende benadering 
van het verlenen van humanitaire hulp, in tegenstelling tot een benadering vanuit het 
perspectief van een conflict, bezetting of (natuur)ramp. Om deze reden is ook een 
drempel vastgesteld als graadmeter voor het concept van een humanitaire crisis: ‘een 
humanitaire crisis is een situatie welke kan ontstaan uit meerdere oorsprongen, 
waaronder een natuurramp of een ramp met menselijke oorsprong, gewapend conflict 
en bezetting, welke ernstige schade teweegbrengt van een persoonlijke of materiële 
aard, waar (externe) assistentie nodig is omdat de lokale capaciteit ofwel overweldigd 
is, ofwel niet in staat is, danwel soms niet welwillend is om de omstandigheden te 
beheersen en te regelen’. Hoewel het concept van een ‘humanitaire crisis’ dus als 
gemene deler wordt aangehouden in dit onderzoek, is ook gebleken dat een definitie 
van het concept ‘natuurramp’ ontbrak binnen het juridische raamwerk. Deze is dan 
ook voorgesteld: ‘een natuurramp is een plotselinge of langzaam groeiende 
natuurlijke omstandigheid of reeks gebeurtenissen welke uit verscheidene natuurlijke 
oorsprongen kan voortvloeien (waaronder biologische, klimatologische, geofysische, 
hydrologische, etc.), en welke resulteert in een overweldiging van de lokale of 
nationale capaciteit en resulteert in een onmiddelijke noodzaak tot het verlenen van 
assistentie aan de burger-bevolking’.  
Terwijl de specifieke omstandigheden (conflict, bezetting en (natuur-)rampen) 
moeten uitgroeien tot een ‘humanitaire crisis’ voor de verlening van humanitaire 
assistentie, zijn in de specifieke omstandigheden verschillende rechtsregels van 
toepassing. Zo is ten tijde van een natuurramp uiteraard geen oorlogsrecht van 
toepassing, in tegenstelling tot de onmiddellijke toepassing van dit recht ten tijde van 
een gewapend conflict. De rechtsregels voor het verlenen van assistentie ten tijde van 
bezetting gelden pas wanneer inderdaad ook is vast komen te staan dat er een zekere 
mate van ‘controle’ is over het bezette grondgebied. De toepasselijke rechtsregels 
staan tot elkaar in verhouding volgens de doctrine van de ‘lex specialis’. Dit 
onderzoek stelt voor dat de lex specialis-doctrine inhoudt dat de meest specifieke 
clausule toegepast dient te worden in een bepaalde omstandigheid, in tegenstelling 
tot een corpus juris in zijn geheel. Als gevolg hiervan zal soms een bepaling uit de 
mensenrechten van toepassing zijn, en soms een bepaling uit het oorlogsrecht, maar 
de grootst gemene deler zal zijn dat de meest specifieke bepaling, en daarmee ook de 






Tenslotte komt in de vaststelling van het juridisch raamwerk ook het concept 
‘staatssoevereiniteit’ aan bod. Als gevolg van de ontwikkelingen in de 21e eeuw ten 
aanzien van de mensenrechten, internationale interdependentie, de grotere rol van het 
individu en de internationale tribunalen die ontwikkeld zijn, is het Westfaalse beeld 
van staatssoevereiniteit veranderd. Wanneer de nieuwe doctrine van de 
‘Responsibility to Protect’ hier bovendien aan toegevoegd wordt, is er nog een 
bestanddeel in het internationale speelveld dat het concept ‘staatssoevereiniteit’ aan 
verandering onderhevig maakt. In de 21e eeuw moet het concept van 
staatssoevereiniteit dan ook gezien worden als een wederkerige relatie tussen de 
rechten en plichten van de soeverein. Hoewel traditionele beginselen als non-
interventie, respect voor territoriale jurisdictie en toestemming door de soeverein 
blijven bestaan, heeft diezelfde soeverein ook plichten jegens burgers binnen 
zijnjurisdictie. Wanneer de soeverein faalt in het vervullen van deze verplichtingen, 
verschuift in sommige gevallen de plicht naar de internationale gemeenschap; in het 
bijzonder in het geval van internationale misdrijven jegens de burgerbevolking. Het 
leveren van humanitaire assistentie is in die zin een manier voor de soeverein om zijn 
plichten als staatssoeverein te vervullen.  
 
DEEL II: PRIMAIRE RECHTEN EN PLICHTEN TIJDENS EEN HUMANITAIRE CRISIS 
 
Deel II van dit onderzoek bespreekt de rechten van ontvangers van humanitaire 
assistentie, evenals de primaire plichten voor levering, welke rusten op de getroffen 
staat, als verantwoordelijke soeverein. Ten aanzien van de discussie omtrent het 
bestaan van een eventueel onafhankelijk ‘mensenrecht op het ontvangen van 
hulpverlening’ is vast komen te staan dat een dergelijk mensenrecht niet bestaat in 
het huidige internationale recht. Zowel gewoonterechtelijke componenten ontbreken 
hiertoe, als bepalingen in bestaande mensenrechtenverdragen. Daarbij is voor een 
dergelijk mensenrecht geen directe noodzaak, wanneer een pragmatische benadering 
wordt gehanteerd ten aanzien van de reeds bestaande mensenrechten op leven, 
voedsel en gezondheid.  
Het verlenen van humanitaire assistentie functioneert als middel in de vervulling 
van bestaande mensenrechten. Een basis kan gevonden worden in de artikelen 55 en 
56 VN Handvest, evenals bestaande rechten in het UVRM, IVESCR, IVBPR, 
EVRM, Afrikaanse en Amerikaanse mensenrechtenverdragen, en toegespitste 
verdragen zoals o.a. het Vrouwenrechtenverdrag, het Kinderrechtenverdrag en het 
IVERD. Het gebrek aan voorbehouden bij deze verdragen ten aanzien van de 
‘noodtoestand’ welke uitgeroepen kan worden, draagt hier aan bij, evenals het 
concept van ‘minimum core obligations’ welke voortvloeien uit het IVESCR. Het 
gebrek aan een zelfstandig mensenrecht is dan ook niet per definitie een gebrek aan 
een recht op het ontvangen van hulpverlening an sich. Dit recht vloeit immers voort 
uit de plichten welke de soevereine staat heeft in de vervulling van het recht op leven, 
voedsel en gezondheid zoals vastgelegd in bovengenoemde verdragen.  
Met betrekking tot het recht op leven hebben staten een positieve verplichting om 






neergelegd in o.a. artikelen 3 UVRM, 6 IVBPR, 2 EVRM, en artikel 4 in zowel het 
Inter-Amerikaanse als Afrikaanse Verdrag voor de rechten van de mens (en 
volkeren). Het recht op voedsel omvat een meer actieve rol van de soeverein tot het 
vervullen van de ‘minimum core obligations’  in artikelen 2 en 11 IVESCR, 
waaronder ook de verplichting valt tot internationale samenwerking. Een recht op 
voedsel kan ook gevonden worden in o.a. artikel 24(2) van het Kinderrechtenverdrag 
en Artikel 12(2) Vrouwenrechtenverdrag. Het recht op gezondheid is o.a. 
gecodificeerd in artikel 12(2)(c) IVESCR, 25 UVRM, 5(e)(iv) IVERD, 24 
Kinderrechtenverdrag en artikel 16 van het Inter-Amerikaanse verdrag. Dit recht 
heeft iets meer codificatieverschillen, waardoor het moeizamer eenduidig te 
distilleren is. Een consensus kan gevonden worden in het verlenen van humanitaire 
assistentie aan een behoeftige bevolking, en het voorkomen van ziektes. Een 
internationaal mensenrecht op het ontvangen van water is tevens afwezig, hoewel er 
codificaties zijn in bij voorbeeld aArtikel 21(1)(c) Kinderrechtenverdrag en 14(2)(h) 
Vrouwenrechtenverdrag.  
In het internationaal oorlogsrecht bestaan verschillende bepalingen al naar gelang 
de aard van het gewapende conflict. Deze bepalingen functioneren tevens vanuit de 
plichten van de getroffen staat om humanitaire assistentie te leveren. Artikel 54 AP I 
formuleert een verbod op het veroorzaken van uithongering ten tijde van een 
internationaal gewapend conflict. artikel 70 AP I stelt dat hulpverlening ‘zal 
plaatsvinden’, maar daaruit kan geen direct recht op het ontvangen van humanitaire 
assistentie worden afgeleid. Bovendien bestaat de uitzonderingsgrond van ‘militaire 
noodzaak’  voor de getroffen staten ten aanzien van het niet (onmiddellijk) leveren 
van hulpverlening. Ten tijde van bezetting bestaan er verplichtingen volgend uit 
artikel 55 GC IV voor de bezetter om voedsel en medische voorzieningen te leveren 
wanneer het bezette gebied ‘ontoereikend’ voorzien zou zijn. Met betrekking tot een 
intern gewapend conflict bestaan echter vooralsnog geen specifieke bepalingen ten 
aanzien van het ontvangen of leveren van humanitaire hulp, en wordt dit gedistilleerd 
uit Gemeenschappelijk artikel 3 en het verbod op uithongering zoals neergelegd in 
artikel 14 AP II.  
Specifiek ten tijde van natuurrampen gelden de toepasselijke mensenrechten en 
worden ook nog bepaalde ‘Draft Articles’  door de International Law Commission 
van de VN ontwikkeld, waarin artikel 12 een primaire taak voorziet voor de getroffen 
staat om hulpverlening te bieden. Voor specifieke groepen zoals ontheemden en 
vluchtelingen geldenook enkele specifieke bepalingen, en met name zogenaamde 
‘soft law’ documenten hebben veelvuldig de taak van de getroffen staat 
beargumenteerd in het verlenen van humanitaire assistentie.  
 
DEEL III: HULPVERLENING DOOR DERDEN  
 
Volgend op de primaire rechten van burgers en plichten van staten ten tijde van een 
humanitaire crisis worden de rechten en plichten van derde partijen, zoals andere 






recht op toegang tot een grondgebied als de getroffen staat zelf geen humanitaire 
assistentie biedt.  
Ten aanzien van de bestaande mensenrechten bevatt met name artikel 2 IVESCR 
de basis voor een algemene verplichting en verantwoordelijkheid voor de 
internationale gemeenschap om samen te werken en assistentie te bieden aan de 
getroffen staat in tijden van nood, welke de getroffen staat zelf ook moet vragen. 
Deze interpretatie wordt tevens onderschreven door meerdere VN organen. Het 
Internationale Gerechtshof heeft in 2007 gesteld dat de getroffen staat zich moet 
weerhouden van het belemmeren van humanitaire assistentie, op basis van het 
IVERD.  
De VN Veiligheidsraad roept de internationale gemeenschap al vele jaren op tot 
het leveren van humanitaire assistentie, en vooronderstelt in deze zin een ‘recht op 
aanbod’ van de internationale gemeenschap hiertoe. In specifieke landenresoluties 
richt de Veiligheidsraad zich op de mogelijkheid van zogenaamde ongehinderde 
toegang voor humanitaire assistentie van buitenaf, en de verplichting van de getroffen 
staat in deze context. Hoewel de Veiligheidsraad geen onderscheid maakt tussen 
interne of internationale gewapende conflicten, is hij gebonden aan die 
omstandigheden die te kwalificeren zijn als een bedreiging voor de internationale 
vrede en veiligheid (volgend uit Artikel 39 VN Handvest). De Veiligheidsraad stelt 
echter geen recht op toegang van derde partijen, maar formuleert eerder vanuit het 
perspectief van de getroffen staat een verplichting tot het verzekeren van 
ongehinderde toegang. In een alternatieve poging heeft de Raad met betrekking tot 
Syrië in 2014 de internationale gemeenschap opgeroepen tot het verlenen van 
humanitaire hulp buiten de toezeggingen van de getroffen soevereine staat om. Dit 
wellicht in verband met de omstreden status en het zwakke gezag van het Assad-
regime. De Algemene Vergadering van de VN heeft eveneens al sinds de jaren ’90 
van de vorige eeuw gesteld dat er een noodzaak is tot internationale assistentie bij 
humanitaire rampen, zoals o.a. in haar bekende Resolutie 46/182. Evenwel zonder 
het stellen van harde plichten. 
Met betrekking tot internationaal humanitair recht en hulpverlening bij conflicten 
stelt artikel 10 GC IV een recht op het aanbieden van hulpverlening door 
internationale organisaties, hetgeen onderworpen is aan de toestemming van de 
getroffen staat. Een dergelijke bepaling behelst echter geen verplichtingen, en moet 
gezien worden als een uitnodiging aan het adres van internationale organisaties. Deze 
bepaling wordt aangevuld door artikel 23 GC IV, evenals door artikelen 70 en 71 AP 
I, waarin gesteld wordt dat hulpgoederen toegestaan ‘zullen’ worden wanneer een 
grondgebied ontoereikend voorzien is. Een vergelijkbare tendens is zichtbaar bij 
interne gewapende conflicten, waar Gemeenschappelijk Artikel 3 wordt aangevuld 
door Artikelen 14 en 18 AP II, die zowel een verbod op uithongering behelsen als de 
stelling dat de levering van hulpgoederen ‘zal’ plaatsvinden wanneer een bevolking 
lijdt. Met betrekking tot bezettingssituaties stelt Artikel 59 GC IV op vergelijkbare 
wijze dat de bezettende macht hulpgoederen ‘zal’ accepteren, en de verdeling 






van internationale conflicten wordt een aanbod tot leveren van hulpgoederen dus 
reeds voorondersteld.  
Een specifiek juridisch kader voor het leveren van humanitaire assistentie door 
derde partijen ontbreekt ten tijde van (natuur-)rampen. Derhalve wordt teruggevallen 
op meer algemene bepalingen, evenals bestaande mensenrechten. Enkele regionale 
overeenkomsten bestaan, zoals de ASEAN Agreement, waaruit volgt dat staten een 
verplichting hebben om samen te werken in de coördinatie van hulpverlening. 
Inderdaad is een dergelijk perspectief ook te zien in de ILC Draft Artikelen (artt. 8 
en 9). Zo zijn er evenzeer enkele specifieke bepalingen voor groeperingen zoals 
vluchtelingen en ontheemden. Deze laatsten krijgen met name bescherming op het 
Afrikaanse continent middels de bepalingen van het Kampala Verdrag (artt. 3(1)(j), 
5(7) en 7(5)(b) en (g)) waarbij vooral relevant is op te merken dat dit verdrag zich 
tevens richt op de verplichtingen van niet-statelijke actoren ten aanzien van het 
toelaten van hulp van buitenaf.  
Uit bovenstaand overzicht blijkt, zoals besproken in dit onderzoek, dat er met 
name problemen liggen bij de mogelijkheid van de getroffen staat tot het bepalen van 
toestemming voor het leveren van hulp, terwijl tegelijkertijd gesteld wordt dat 
dergelijke assistentie geleverd ‘zal’ worden. De getroffen staat heeft dan ook 
bepaalde controlerechten ten aanzien van deze levering. De 
handhavingsproblematiek ten aanzien van de levering van humanitaire assistentie 
raakt derhalve de kern van de relatie tussen staatssoevereiniteit en humanitaire 
assistentie. Handhaving is mogelijk bij een schending van het internationale recht. 
Een dergelijke schending bestaat wanneer: (1) er sprake is van een humanitaire crisis 
waarbij de levering van humanitaire assistentie nodig is; (2) de getroffen staat zelf 
niet (afdoende) voorziet in deze levering; (3) een rechtmatig aanbod door derde 
partijen wordt afgeslagen om redenen welke buiten de toegestane uitsluitingsgronden 
liggen. Als aan deze voorwaarden wordt voldaan is er (4) sprake van een schending 
van internationaal recht wanneer de getroffen staat de levering van humanitaire hulp 
weigert of belemmert. De vaststelling van deze mogelijke schendingen vindt onder 
huidig internationaal recht plaats door de VN Veiligheidsraad, het Internationaal 
Gerechtshof, het Internationaal Strafhof of mensenrechtenorganen.   
Juridische handhaving bij een rechterlijke instantie is in eerste instantie mogelijk 
wanneer de verantwoordelijkheid van de getroffen staat wordt vastgesteld onder 
internationaal recht. Met name relevant hierin zijn artikelen 2 en 3 ARSIWA, evenals 
artikelen 42 en 48 ARSIWA ten aanzien van eventuele verantwoordelijkheden jegens 
de internationale gemeenschap, evenals artikelen 40 en 41 ten aanzien van plichten 
van de internationale gemeenschap zelf met betrekking tot het eindigen van ernstige 
schendingen van internationaal recht. Bij situaties waar onduidelijkheid bestaat ten 
aanzien van de betreffende soevereine actor bieden artikelen 4-11 ARSIWA 
uitkomst(en).  
Een alternatieve methode van handhaving vindt meer ad hoc plaats middels 
handelingen van de Veiligheidsraad bij de vaststelling dat er sprake is van een 
bedreiging van de internationale vrede en veiligheid. Tot op heden is deze 






conflictsituaties is de Raad langzamerhand vooruitstrevender geworden in zijn kijk 
op het gebruik van geweld door de internationale gemeenschap met als doel het 
leveren van hulpgoederen ter beëindiging van een humanitaire crisis. Thematische 
resoluties ten aanzien van de bescherming van burgers en de omarming van de 
‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine dragen hier aan bij en zijn zichtbaar in o.a. de 
bekende Resolutie 1973 (2011) met betrekking tot Libië.  
Handhaving vindt ook plaats door middel van het stellen van schendingen van 
mensenrechten, in het kader van regionale gerechtshoven zoals het Europees Hof 
voor de Rechten van de Mens, of mensenrechtencommissies horend bij het IVBPR 
of IVESCR. Hoewel de mogelijkheden hiertoe bestaan, wordt er weinig tot geen 
gebruik gemaakt van het interstatelijke klachtenrecht. Het individuele klachtrecht 
met betrekking tot de niet-levering van humanitaire assistentie en daaropvolgende 
eventuele schendingen van mensenrechten bestaat in het IVESCR nog maar kort 
(sinds 2013) en heeft tot op heden tevens nog niet geleid totprocedures op dit terrein. 
Het Internationaal Gerechtshof daarentegen heeft in de Georgia v. Russia-zaak 
gesteld dat het niet leveren van assistentie kan leiden tot een schending van de 
mensenrechten als neergelegd in het IVERD. Oproepen tot handhaving van het 
leveren van assistentie op mensenrechtelijk gebied vinden bovendien plaats in een 
politiekere context middels de VN-mechanismen als de Mensenrechtenraad en de 
Speciale Rapporteurs.  
Tenslotte bespreekt dit onderzoek handhavingsmogelijkheden op individueel 
niveau, zoals door gerichte sancties en individuele strafrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid. 
Gerichte sancties zoals het bevriezen van banktegoeden, worden de afgelopen jaren 
in toenemende mate toegepast door de Veiligheidsraad, in specifiek verband met de 
weigering van humanitaire assistentie. Individuele strafrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid 
is met name besproken in het kader van de specifieke categorien ‘oorlogsmisdrijven’ 
en ‘misdrijven tegen de menselijkheid’ zoals tegenwoordig gecodificeerd 
(respectievelijk Artikel 8 en 7) in het Statuut van Rome. Voor mogelijke vervolging 
voor oorlogsmisdrijven moet daadwerkelijk sprake zijn van een gewapend conflict, 
en het Strafhof maakt onderscheid tussen een intern en een internationaal gewapend 
conflict: meer mogelijkheden bestaan voor vervolging bij de weigering of 
belemmering van hulpverlening ten tijde van een internationaal gewapend conflict. 
In het geval van vervolging voor misdrijven tegen de menselijkheid is tegenwoordig 
geen verband meer nodig met een gewapend conflict: dit zou dus eventueel ook 
mogelijk zijn voor situaties waarin hulp geweigerd wordt na een (natuur-)ramp. 
Cruciaal is echter wel dat er een wijdverbreide of systematische aanval moet zijn 
geweest op de getroffen bevolking, om iets aan te merken als misdrijf tegen de 
menselijkheid. Het onthouden van hulp na een natuurramp zou dan dus zeer gericht 
moeten zijn. Het Statuut van het Internationaal Strafhof erkent ook het ontzien van 
voedsel en medicijnen als een mogelijkheid hiertoe, en biedt dus in ieder geval de 
mogelijkheid tot vervolging in de context van het weigeren van humanitaire 
assistentie.  
Het internationale recht is, zoals blijkt, redelijk toereikend als het gaat om 






te zien met betrekking tot handhaving in verhouding tot niet-statelijke actoren, en 





Uit bovenstaande verhandeling blijkt duidelijk dat het recht niet alomvattend is in 
situaties waar humanitaire assistentie nodig is. Dit onderzoek distilleert dan ook 
welke rechten en plichten te allen tijde van toepassing zijn (ongeacht of er sprake is 
van bij voorbeeld een conflictsituatie of een natuurramp) wanneer een crisis gaande 
is. Onderscheid maken in de hoeveelheid hulp die iemand zou moeten kunnen 
ontvangen vanwege de omstandigheid van de crisis druist immers in tegen iedere 
notie van humaniteit.   
Dit onderzoek heeft ten eerste aangetoond dat staatssoevereiniteit een 
verantwoordelijkheid omvat van de soeverein jegens diegenen binnen de jurisdictie 
van de staat, welke overeenkomt met een primaire verantwoordelijkheid tot het 
leveren van humanitaire assistentie. Ten tweede is in dit onderzoek aan bod gekomen 
dat, hoewel er geen onafhankelijk mensenrecht op het ontvangen van hulpgoederen 
bestaat, het leveren van humanitaire assistentie ten tijde van een crisis in zichzelf het 
vervullen is van het recht op leven, voedsel en gezondheid. Als zodanig vormen de 
mensenrechten als corpus juris een juridische basis voor het leveren van humanitaire 
assistentie. Ten derde kan geconcludeerd worden dat een vooronderstelling bestaat 
in het huidige internationale recht ten aanzien van een recht van de internationale 
gemeenschap om hulp aan te bieden bij de levering van humanitaire assistentie, 
wanneer deze assistentie zich houdt aan de beginselen van humaniteit, neutraliteit en 
onpartijdigheid. Tenslotte is duidelijk geworden dat hoewel er geen recht op toegang 
bestaat, wanneer de getroffen soeverein daadwerkelijk toestemming geeft tot 
toegang, deze soeverein dan ook al datgene dient te doen dat bevordelijk is voor de 
doorstroom van hulpgoederen en een veilige omgeving dient te waarborgen voor de 
distributie hiervan. Hierbij komt bovendien dat er momenteel sprake is van een zich 
ontwikkelende norm ten aanzien van de noodzaak tot samenwerking in de levering 
van assistentie door de internationale gemeenschap ten tijde van een crisis.  
Hoewel hiaten in het recht bestaan, en het recht aan verandering onderhevig is, is 
het niet per se nodig om nieuwe rechtsregels te ontwikkelen. Voortbouwen op 
bestaande rechtsregels, en deze verder uitdiepen of naar de voorgrond brengen, kan 
een alternatieve oplossing brengen. De geboden oplossingen in dit onderzoek 
trachten een realistische en pragmatische kijk te geven op de juridische rechten en 
plichten ten tijde van crisis.  
Ten eerste stelt dit onderzoek voor dat het raamwerk verhelderd wordt, door het 
bieden van definities voor de concepten ‘humanitaire assistentie’, ‘humanitaire 
crisis’ en ‘natuurramp’. Tevens dienen de actoren zich te houden aan die beginselen 
waarvoor een grootst gemene deler bestaat, te weten de beginselen van humaniteit, 






Ten tweede is vast komen te staan dat het gebrek aan een onafhankelijk 
mensenrecht op het ontvangen van humanitaire assistentie niet problematisch hoeft 
te zijn voor de bescherming van burgers in nood, wanneer erkend wordt dat het 
leveren van assistentie een vervulling is van de bestaande rechten op leven, voedsel 
en gezondheid ten tijde van een crisis. Het Internationaal Gerechtshof vult hierbij aan 
dat levering dient plaats te vinden middels het beginsel van non-discriminatie. 
Ten derde, hoewel internationaal humanitair recht vele specifieke bepalingen 
kent, ontbreekt een algemene codificatie van een plicht tot het leveren van 
humanitaire hulp. Fragmentatie in het recht is een gevolg van het ontbreken van een 
dergelijke plicht, en een oplossing kan gevonden worden in de wijze waarop naar de 
lex specialis doctrine gekeken wordt. Wanneer de meest beschermende clausule te 
allen tijde gebezigd wordt, hebben de getroffen burgers de grootste kans op de juiste 
mate van bescherming. Deze benadering strookt ook met het huidige concept van 
staatssoevereiniteit, welke plichten met zich meedraagt jegens de burgerbevolking.  
Ten vierde is vast komen te staan dat het huidige juridische raamwerk geen 
specifiek recht erkent van de internationale gemeenschap (organisaties en staten) om 
assistentie aan te bieden. Een dergelijk recht wordt vaak verondersteld reeds te 
bestaan, zoals gezien in de resoluties van de VN Veiligheidsraad en ook bepaald door 
het Internationaal Gerechtshof in de Nicaragua-zaak. Het uitblijven van een dergelijk 
specifiek recht is gekoppeld aan de problematiek welke samenhangt met toegang 
verkrijgen tot een grondgebied.  
Ten vijfde is dan ook vastgesteld dat er in het huidige internationale recht geen 
recht op toegang tot een grondgebied bestaat voor derden, ten behoeve van het 
leveren van humanitaire assistentie bij ontbreken van toestemming door de soeverein. 
In het huidige recht zijn de verplichtingen geformuleerd vanuit het perspectief van 
de plichten van de getroffen staat en niet vanuit de rechten van derden. Dergelijke 
plichten omvatten vanuit de mensenrechten een plicht tot zoeken van internationale 
assistentie (art. 2 IVESCR), en vanuit het oorlogsrecht de verplichting dat assistentie 
verleend ‘zal’ worden, onderhavig aan de controle-rechten van de betrokken staat. 
De normatieve bepaling of een dergelijk recht op toegang zou moeten bestaan staat 
derhalve los van de huidige internationale rechtsregels. Tevens zijn de plichten van 
de betrokken staat niet geheel eenduidig in de verschillende rechtsgebieden, en is er 
derhalve geen uniformiteit in het huidige recht, afgezien van de verplichting welke 
opgenomen is in artikel 2 IVESCR.  
Ten zesde komt inderdaad hierdoor duidelijk naar voren dat het concept 
‘toestemming’ van de getroffen staat één van de grootste obstakels vormt in het 
huidige raamwerk, aangezien niet één eenduidige drempel kan worden vastgesteld 
ten aanzien van hetgeen een zogenaamde ‘willekeurige’ weigering is van aangeboden 
assistentie. Hoewel een uitputtende lijst niet realistisch is, zou een minimum drempel 
eventueel vast te stellen kunnen zijn, en zou deze in de praktijk van dienst kunnen 
zijn. In het oorlogsrecht kan een dergelijk minimum eventueel gelezen worden in het 
verbod op uithongering, en in de mensenrechten in het vervullen van de zogenaamde 
‘minimum core obligations’. Een vaststelling hiervan dient evenwel te geschieden 






Als zevende, en gerelateerd aan het bovenstaande punt, is het feit dat het 
humanitaire recht stelt dat de verplichting om toestemming tot toegang tot een 
grondgebied te verlenen gekoppeld is aan de vaststelling dat dit grondgebied 
‘ontoereikend voorzien’ is. In het recht zit een inherent problem: namelijk dat het aan 
de soeverein zelf is om te bepalen of er sprake is van een ontoereikende voorziening 
van humanitaire hulp. Een oplossing hiervoor kan gezocht worden in het toepassen 
van de criteria die een schending van het recht op leven, voedsel en gezondheid 
kunnen vormen. Immers is vast komen te staan dat het niet leveren van humanitaire 
hulp kan leiden tot een schending van deze rechten. Op deze wijze zou handhaving 
geschieden middels de toepassing van mensenrechtenstandaarden, in tegenstelling 
tot het toetsen van het criterium ‘ontoereikende voorziening’ in weerwil van de 
soeverein.  
Hiermee is ook het achtste en laatste punt aan de orde gekomen waar het huidige 
juridische kader ten aanzien van het leveren van humanitaire assistentie mee worstelt: 
handhaving. Wie dient te bepalen of een grondgebied ontoereikend voorzien is? Wie 
bepaalt of toestemming wederrechtelijk ontbreekt bij een bona fide aanbod van hulp? 
Wanneer dergelijke vraagstukken instemmend beantwoord worden, kan 
geconcludeerd worden dat er sprake is van het onhouden of belemmeren van 
hulpverlening en dat derhalve een schending van het internationale recht plaatsvindt, 
wat leidt tot handhavingsmogelijkheden.  
Handhaving binnen het internationale recht kent zo haar eigen problematiek: de 
politieke componenten van de Veiligheidsraad en de traagheid van de juridische 
organen zoals het Internationaal Gerechtshof zijn bekend. Tevens spelen niet-
statelijke actoren een grote rol in interne conflicten, terwijl handhaving met 
betrekking tot hun handelen niet goed mogelijk is bij bestaande gerechtshoven. Alle 
organen hebben derhalve hun tekortkomingen en beperkingen. Echter, het creeëren 
van nieuwe rechtsregels, middels een verdrag, lijkt niet levensvatbaar, en oplossingen 
dienen dan ook vooral gezocht te worden binnen het huidige recht.  
De huidige organen met autoriteit zijn de VN Veiligheidsraad, het Internationaal 
Gerechtshof en het Internationaal Strafhof, en mensenrechtenhoven. Een 
gecombineerde aanpak biedt dan ook wellicht de oplossing: een juridisch orgaan dat 
advies brengt aan de Veiligheidsraad in ad hoc omstandigheden. Een dergelijk orgaan 
zou zorgen voor meer juridische onderbouwing van de politieke besluitvorming van 
de Raad.  
In het huidige internationale recht vormt de Veiligheidsraad het orgaan dat het 
snelste in staat is vast te stellen of er handhavingsmogelijkheden zijn welke vallen 
binnen het internationale recht. Met het onderschrijven van de ‘Responsibility to 
Protect’-doctrine is deze weg voortgezet. Tevens, wanneer de Raad zich zou richten 
op eventuele natuurrampen en overige scenario’s waar grote groepen ontheemden uit 
voortvloeien met een ‘spill-over’ effect naar naburige landen, bestaat de 
mogelijkheid ook hier te concluderen dat sprake kan zijn van een ‘gevaar voor de 
internationale vrede en veiligheid’ als gesteld in Artikel 39 VN Handvest. Met de 
toepassing hiervan, staat het de Veiligheidsraad vrij om te handelen. Dit geldt 






menselijkheid’ waarbij geen koppeling nodig is aan een gewapend conflict, en welke 
dus ook vastgesteld kan worden inclusief daaropvolgend handelen van de 
Veiligheidsraad, indien een soeverein geen hulpverlening biedt na een natuurramp.  
Dit gezegd hebbende, moet evenwel benadrukt worden dat het gebruik van 
geweld nooit de eerste, noch de perfecte oplossing is voor het handhaven van het 
leveren van humanitaire assistentie. Het is echter in sommige gevallen de enige optie 
voor de internationale gemeenschap, wanneer zij getuige is van wederom een enorme 
humanitaire crisis. Bovendien geldt dat, ongeacht of de VN Veiligheidsraad overgaat 
tot handelen, de route naar juridisch handhaven altijd blijft bestaan.  
Inderdaad, het vaststellen van het huidige bestaande ‘minimum’ raamwerk, kan 
en mag niet afdoen aan de mogelijkheid van internationale actoren om verder te gaan 
in de bescherming van burgers ten tijde van een humanitaire crisis. Het internationale 
recht heeft zich in de afgelopen decennia steeds verder ontwikkeld in de bescherming 
van personen door middel van de geleidelijke samenkomst van het oorlogsrecht en 
de mensenrechten. Deze ontwikkeling dient ook tot uiting te komen in de gelijke 
bescherming van personen ongeacht het soort crisis waarin zij zich bevinden. Het is 
daarom van essentieel belang dat het raamwerk ten aanzien van het leveren van 
humanitaire hulp deze rechten en plichten op een integrale wijze benadert. 
Onduidelijkheid in het recht leidt al te vaak tot het niet (juist) toepassen ervan, en dat 
resulteert in het onderhavige geval in een gebrek aan hulpgoederen voor diegenen die 
het nodig hebben. Het huidige juridische raamwerk ten aanzien van het leveren van 
humanitaire hulp, en de handhaving ervan, dient dan ook verspreid en onderschreven 
te worden op alle mogelijke wijzen, door de verscheidene actoren in dit veld. Met 
grotere kennis ontstaat ook een grotere kans op bescherming van diegenen die het 
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